Abramson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

NICHOLAS L. ABRAMSON ) CASE NO. 5:25-CV-02030

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

)

vs. )

)

EDERICA ANDRADE ) ORDER AND DECISION

) (Resolving Doc. 15)

Defendant. )

)

)

Pending before this Court is Defendant Ederica Andrade’s unopposed motion for judgment

on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.Civ.R. 12(c). Doc. 15. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

GRANTS Defendant’s motion and DISMISSES the complaint in its entirety.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff Nicholas Abramson contends that he submitted an anonymous complaint against

Defendant, a police officer in Alliance, Ohio. Doc. 1, ¶8. Plaintiff asserts that on that same day,

Defendant filed a criminal complaint with the Massillon Police Department accusing him of

menacing by stalking. Doc. 1, ¶10. Plaintiff contends that Defendant made the complaint while on

duty and in uniform. Doc. 1, ¶21. “Plaintiff was arrested and prosecuted[.]” Doc. 1, ¶14. On August

18, 2025, the Stark County Grand Jury declined to charge him with the offense. Doc. 1, ¶15.

Plaintiff contends that “Defendant’s actions were retaliatory, malicious, and intended to chill [his]

protected speech.” Doc. 1, ¶16.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for reviewing a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is the same as

th e standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The Sixth Circuit stated the

standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss in Assn. of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. Cleveland, 502

F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2007) as follows:

The Supreme Court has recently clarified the law with respect to what a plaintiff

must plead in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007). The Court stated that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and

a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 1964-

65 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the Court emphasized that

even though a complaint need not contain “detailed” factual allegations, its

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Id.

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In so holding, the Court

disavowed the oft-quoted Rule 12(b)(6) standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46 (1957) (recognizing “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be

dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”),

characterizing that rule as one “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on

an accepted pleading standard.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.

Id. at 548. Instead, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).

If an allegation is capable of more than one inference, this Court must construe it in the

plaintiff’s favor. Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing

Allard v. Weitzman, 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993)). This Court may not grant a Rule

12(b)(6) motion merely because it may not believe the plaintiff’s factual allegations. Id. Although

this is a liberal standard of review, the plaintiff still must do more than merely assert bare legal

conclusions. Id. Specifically, the complaint must contain “either direct or inferential allegations

respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Scheid

v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (quotations and emphasis

omitted).

“In addition, it is well settled that this Court may ‘grant dispositive motions because they

are unopposed.’ When a party fails to respond to a dispositive motion, it may be treated ‘as a

confession to’ the motion’s merits.” Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jacobs, No. 5:20-cv-02189,

2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99012, at *8 (N.D. Ohio May 31, 2022).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff asserts three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: First Amendment Retaliation, Fourth

Amendment Malicious Prosecution, and Abuse of Process-Conspiracy. Plaintiff asserts one state

law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To establish a federal claim under §1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that a person acting

under color of state law deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003).

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for the violation of federal rights by a person

acting ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State.’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In rare circumstances, private actors may also be liable

under §1983, but only when the plaintiff can show that the private party’s actions

‘so approximate state action that they may be fairly attributed to the state.’ Inner

City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Township of Northville, 87 F.4th 743, 757 (6th

Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Generally, we look to three tests to determine whether

private action has become state action: (1) the public-function test, (2) the state-

compulsion test, and (3) the nexus test. See Weser v. Goodson, 965 F.3d 507, 516

(6th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff may also show state action by establishing ‘that a private

party has engaged in a conspiracy or concerted action with other state actors.’ Id.;

see also Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed.

2d 142 (1970).

Leta v. TriHealth, Inc., No. 23-3406, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1548, at *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2024);

Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff asserts that “[a]cting under color of law, Defendant influenced another Police

Officer from the Massillon Police Department to accept and file her allegations without conducting

an y meaningful investigation.” Doc. 1, ¶14. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant acted under

color of law when she filed “her complaint while on duty, in uniform, and leveraging her position

as a police officer.” Doc. 1, ¶21.

To the extent that Plaintiff contends Defendant was acting under the color of law merely

because she was wearing her uniform and was on duty when she filed the complaint, this argument

is without merit. “When determining whether a person acted under color of state law, [t]he fact

that a police officer is on or off duty, or in or out of uniform is not controlling. It is the nature of

the act performed, not the clothing of the actor or even the status of being on duty, or off duty,

which determines whether the officer has acted under color of law.” (internal quotations omitted)

Morris v. City of Detroit, 789 F. App’x 516, 518 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Stengel v. Belcher, 522

F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933, 937 (E.D. Pa. 1968)).

Here, Defendant, an Alliance Police Officer, filed a criminal complaint at the Massillon Police

Department accusing Plaintiff of menacing by stalking. Doc. 1, ¶¶7, 10, 13. This is clearly the act

of a private citizen. “Acts of police officers in the ambit of their personal, private pursuits fall

outside of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Morris, supra. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant

was acting under color of law on this basis.

Plaintiff’s further asserts that Defendant “influenced” another police officer to file her

allegations. The Court construes this as an argument on the theory that Defendant “engaged in a

conspiracy or concerted action with other state actors.” Leta, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1548, at *7.

A conspiracy claim must be pled with specificity.

To hold a private party liable under §1983, the plaintiff must show that the private

actor ‘willfully participate[d] in joint action with state agents.’ Weser, 965 F.3d at

516 (citation omitted). The plaintiff must ‘alleg[e] that (1) a single plan existed, (2)

the conspirators shared a conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiffs of their

constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act was committed.’ Revis v. Meldrum, 489

F.3d 273, 290 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Rudd v. City of Norton Shores, 977 F.3d

503, 517 (6th Cir. 2020). ‘A complaint must identify the alleged conspiracy with

more than vague and conclusory allegations.’ Rudd, 977 F.3d at 517 (citation

omitted); see also Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003) (‘It is

well-settled that conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity. .

. .’ (citation omitted)).

Id. Plaintiff fails to set forth the necessary specificity to establish that such a conspiracy existed

between Defendant or the Massillon police officer who took her complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff

fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

B. State Claims

Plaintiff’s remaining claim sound in state law. Supplemental jurisdiction exists whenever

state law and federal law claims derive from the same nucleus of operative facts and when

considerations of judicial economy dictate having a single trial. United Mine Workers of America

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). The Court, however, may exercise discretion in hearing state

law matters. Id. at 726. In cases where the federal law claims are dismissed before trial, the state

law claims should also be dismissed. Id. Having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal law claims, this Court

declines jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s state law claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. This matter is hereby

DISMISSED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: July 20, 2026 /s/ John R. Adams

U.S. District Judge