Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, W.D. Louisiana
Filed
Jul 16, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 42.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

MONIQUE HARMON CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-0489

VERSUS JUDGE ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

HANSEN ADKINS AUTO TRANSPORT, MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST

INC., ET AL.

MEMORANDUM RULING

This case began with a car accident. And with trial approaching, Hansen

Adkins Auto Transport, Inc. and Quadris Jones (collectively, “defendants”) have filed

an omnibus motion in limine asking to exclude eleven categories of evidence. Record

Document 29. The plaintiff, Monique Harmon (“Harmon”), has conceded all but five.

See Record Document 31 at 1. The Court grants the undisputed motions and

addresses each disputed category below. To start, though, the Court admonishes

counsel for Harmon who did not provide a single pinpoint citation to support his

arguments. Instead, he made bare conclusions without giving any legal authority or

evidence. Going forward, counsel must provide pinpoint citations to both evidence

and law, or otherwise, the Court will disregard his arguments.

1. Future medical treatment and expenses

The defendants ask to exclude all testimony and evidence, including a “life care

plan,” about Harmon’s future medical treatment and expenses. Record Document 29.

According to the defendants, the evidence should be excluded because Harmon did

not provide a sufficient disclosure of her non-retained expert’s anticipated testimony.

Id. at 5.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) requires parties to disclose expert

testimony during discovery and distinguishes between expert witnesses who must

provide a written report and expert witnesses who are not required to provide a

written report. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). Treating physicians are typically subject to

the “less stringent disclosure regime than their retained counterparts.” Causey v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 16-9660, 2018 WL 2234749, at *1 (E.D. La. May

16, 2018). For non-retained experts, like treating physicians, Rule 26(a)(2)(C)

requires that the party disclose “the subject matter on which the witness is expected

to present evidence[,]” and “a summary of the facts and opinion to which the witness

is expected to testify.”

In this case, Harmon provided Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures and identified Dr.

James Rabalais (“Dr. Rabalais”) as a non-retained expert who would testify based on

“personal knowledge acquired during the course of [his] treatment of [Harmon.]”

Record Document 29-3 at 2. The defendants have argued that Dr. Rabalais’s

disclosure did not provide enough detail about his testimony on future medical

treatment. See Record Document 29-1 at 3. According to the defendants, Dr.

Rabalais’s disclosure said nothing more than “[f]uture medical treatment expenses

are anticipated.” Id. at 2.

After reviewing Harmon’s disclosure for Dr. Rabalais, though, the Court finds

that she has satisfied her obligations. Although the disclosure included a conclusory

statement that Dr. Rabalais anticipated future medical treatment, that statement

had been preceded by a lengthy narrative of Dr. Rabalais’s treatment of Harmon and

her responsiveness to those treatments. See, e.g., Record Document 29-3 at 3-5.

Among other things, Dr. Rabalais described how he treated Harmon through

multiple “cervical medial branch blocks” and her pain relief only “lasted three days”

after each procedure. Id. at 4. The disclosure also stated that Dr. Rabalais treated

Harmon less than a month before the disclosure, and she continued to experience

“right-sided cervical pain that refers to her right shoulder.” Id. This fulsome narrative

both disclosed the subject matter of Dr. Rabalais’s testimony and provided a summary

of the facts and opinions Dr. Rabalais would offer. 1 Therefore, Harmon satisfied the

requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(C), and the motion is denied.

2. Future physical therapy and radiofrequency ablation

In the alternative, the defendants ask to exclude evidence and testimony

related to Harmon’s need for physical therapy and radiofrequency ablation

treatment. Record Document 29-1 at 5. In his life care plan, Dr. Rabalais detailed

that Harmon would need future physical therapy and radiofrequency ablation.

Record Document 29-6 at 2-3.

The defendants argue that testimony about future physical therapy should be

excluded because Harmon said in her deposition that she stopped such treatments

1 To the extent that the defendants have argued that the life care plan amounted to an untimely

supplement, the argument is unavailing. The scheduling order required the parties to furnish

expert reports no later than April 20, 2026, Record Document 17, which the parties extended

on their own until April 27, 2026. Record Document 29-1 at 3. The defendants received Dr.

Rabalais’s life care plan on April 27, 2026 as an attachment to the report of a different expert

witness. Id. Accordingly, even if construed as a supplemental disclosure, the life care plan was

not untimely.

and did not need them. Record Document 29-1 at 6. Similarly, the defendants argue

that testimony about future radiofrequency ablation should be excluded because Dr.

Rabalais said in his deposition that Harmon could “potentially” need such

treatments, and it was “impossible [him] to speculate in the future how many.” Id.

“As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an expert’s

opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its admissibility and

should be left for the jury’s consideration.” United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80

F.3d 1074, 1077 (5th Cir. 1996).

Here, the deposition testimony that the defendants identify goes to the factual

basis for Dr. Rabalais’s opinions. Harmon’s admission that she does not need physical

therapy, for instance, would undermine his conclusion that she will require such

treatment. But it does not render his opinion so unreliable that exclusion is

warranted. The defendants’ remedy is cross-examination. Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of

contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional

and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”). The motion is

denied.

3. Testimony exceeding summary disclosure

The defendants ask to prohibit Harmon’s expert witnesses from giving

testimony “outside the scope of [their] respective disclosure[s].” Record Document 29-

1 at 7. “The purpose of the expert disclosure requirements is to allow both sides to

prepare their cases adequately and efficiently, to prepare for effective cross-

examination, to arrange for testimony from other experts if necessary, and to prevent

the tactic of surprise from affecting the outcome of the case.” Bradley v. Mountain

Lake Risk, No. 19-56, 2022 WL 3011146, at *3 (W.D. La. July 29, 2022) (collecting

cases).

Here, the defendants seek to categorically exclude testimony and have not

identified any specific testimony that Harmon’s expert witnesses will offer that goes

beyond the scope of their summary disclosures. See generally Record Document 29-1

at 7. The Court does not exclude broad categories of evidence through a motion in

limine. See, e.g., Luv n’ care v. Laurain, No. 16-777, 2021 WL 3440623, at *6 (W.D.

La. Aug. 5, 2021) (stating “[t]he purpose of motions in limine is to identify specific

issues which are likely to arise at trial” and holding “motions in limine should rarely

seek to exclude broad categories of evidence, as the court is almost always better

situated to rule on evidentiary issues in their factual context during trial.”). And even

if it did, Rule 26 “does not limit an expert’s testimony simply to reading his report.

The rule contemplates that the expert will supplement, elaborate upon, and explain

his report in his oral testimony.” Harris v. United States, No. 17-1443, 2022 WL

16824894, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 8, 2022). The motion is denied.

4. Golden Rule and Conscience of the Community

The defendants moved to exclude the “golden rule” and “conscience of the

community” arguments. Record Document 29-1 at 10-11. A golden rule argument tells

the jury to “place themselves in the plaintiff’s position and do unto him as they would

have him do unto them.” Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 631 F.3d 724, 732 (5th

Cir. 2011). Meanwhile, a conscience of the community argument “references to a

community standard or expectation which would be disappointed unless the jury

returned a large verdict in [the plaintiff’s] favor.” Westbrook v. Gen. Tire & Rubber

Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985).

First, a golden rule argument is permissible on the question of liability, Stokes

v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983), but is not permissible on the issue

of damages, Brown v. Parker Drilling Offshore Corp., 410 F.3d 166, 180 (5th Cir.

2005). Here, the defendants have stipulated to liability and fault for the vehicle

accident that prompted this lawsuit. Record Document 27. Damages is the sole

question for trial, and a golden rule argument is barred for precisely that issue.

Therefore, the motion is granted.

Second, as for conscience of the community, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit has held that such arguments “serve no purpose and carry the

potential of substantial injustice when invoked against outsiders.” Westbrook, 754

F.2d at 1238. Accordingly, the motion is granted, and Harmon may not raise a

“conscience of the community” argument.

5. Trial references to the motion in limine

The defendants also seek a sweeping prohibition against “all questions

statements, references, and arguments to this Motion in Limine and/or Strike and

any and all matters raised in this Motion in Limine and/or Strike.” Record Document

29-1 at 14. That request fails for two reasons. It would exclude broad categories of

evidence in a single stroke, which is an improper use of a motion in limine. Luv n’

care, 2021 WL 3440623, at *6. Also, the Court has already resolved the substance of

the defendants’ requests, making such a declaration unnecessary and duplicative.

The motion is denied.

DONE AND SIGNED at Shreveport, Louisiana, this 16th day of July, 2026.

ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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