The opinion
Case: 25-60383 Document: 119-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/06/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 25-60383 August 6, 2026
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Chelsea Jade Knighton,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Benton County, Mississippi; Kathy Graves, officially and
individually; Robert Goolsby, officially and individually; Steve
Belew, officially and individually,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:22-CV-56
______________________________
Before Southwick, Graves, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
James E. Graves, Jr.:
Chelsea Knighton was married to Robert (“Rob”) Graves. They both
were at least occasional drug users. Rob’s mother is Kathy Graves, the
Circuit Clerk of Benton County, Mississippi.
One night, after hearing that her son had passed out at a gas station,
Kathy found him and took him to see Steve Belew, a parole officer. Then,
Belew, Kathy, and Rob all went back to Knighton and Rob’s home. Here, the
parties’ versions of events sharply clash. According to Belew and Kathy,
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Knighton voluntarily took a drug test administered by Belew and tested
positive. According to Knighton, Belew physically forced her to take a drug
test before declaring that it was positive without showing it to her. In any
event, Sheriff Robert Goolsby later arrested Knighton and, though the
charges were later dropped, she lost custody of their children to Kathy for
over a year.
Knighton sued Kathy, Belew, Goolsby, and Benton County, alleging
various federal and state-law violations. The district court denied
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. They now appeal.
I. Background
Chelsea Knighton was married to Rob Graves. Kathy Graves, Rob’s
mother and Knighton’s then-mother-in-law, is the Circuit Clerk of Benton
County. Knighton and Kathy have had a long and difficult relationship. This
incident took place after several years of drug-related issues.
According to Kathy, she received a phone call that Rob was passed out
in his car at a gas station. She went looking for him and, after not finding him
there, went to Rob and Knighton’s home. She initially received no answer,
so Kathy began loudly banging on the door until Rob and Knighton emerged.
Kathy told Rob to get in the car, and she left with him. Knighton, in her
deposition, could not recall this initial interaction and did not remember Rob
coming home at all the night before.
Kathy drove towards the town square of Ashland, Mississippi and
decided to stop at the office of Mississippi Department of Corrections Officer
Steve Belew. As the Circuit Clerk, she knew Belew and that he had worked
with drug offenders in his role as a probation officer. Belew met with Rob in
his office while Kathy remained outside. In this meeting, Belew said that Rob
confessed to using drugs and stated that Knighton was passed out at the
house where their kids were. Rob, Kathy, and Belew all returned to the house.
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As the district court noted, “[h]ere the facts diverge.” According to
Knighton, she was making coffee when the three arrived. Either Belew or
Kathy demanded she take a drug test, but Knighton told them to leave. Belew
“aggressively forced her into a bathroom and stood over her while she tried
to provide a urine sample” but she could not, so Belew took her to the living
room and “pinned her down with his knee, grabbed her face, pried open her
mouth and forced an oral swab into her mouth.” Belew announced that the
test was positive for opiates but refused to show Knighton the test results. 1
Belew and Kathy then left with the children and “told her that she would be
arrested.”
Defendants recall the events very differently. According to them, Rob
was loudly knocking on the door to get Knighton’s attention and after
receiving no response, they looked in the window and saw Knighton
unconscious on the couch. She finally woke up and “crawled” to the door.
When they entered the house, she and Rob began arguing and Kathy went to
care for the children. Kathy was concerned specifically for the infant, who
was breastfeeding and so could have been exposed to drugs from Knighton.
Belew told Knighton that she did not need to take the drug test, but Rob
forced her into the bathroom. She then agreed to take the oral drug test
produced by Belew. According to him, Rob and Knighton both admitted to
using fentanyl.
The parties agree, however, that Kathy requested Sheriff Robert
Goolsby go to Knighton’s home. Belew told Goolsby that she had tested
positive for drugs and admitted to using fentanyl. Goolsby arrested Knighton
and swore in an affidavit that she and Rob had used drugs in the presence of
their kids. Knighton was tested for drugs multiple times after her arrest but
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1
Knighton also stated in her deposition that she later learned the test was expired.
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never tested positive. As a result of these allegations, Knighton lost custody
of her children for over a year and was briefly jailed before the charges against
her were dropped.
II. Standard of Review
Courts “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review grants and
denials of summary judgment de novo. In re La. Crawfish Producers, 852 F.3d
456, 462 (5th Cir. 2017). However, we must view the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Hillman v. Loga, 697 F.3d 299, 302 (5th
Cir. 2012). While “metaphysical doubt” or “conclusory allegations” cannot
create a genuine dispute of material fact, Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), testimony by a plaintiff often can. See
Byrd v. City of Bossier, 624 F. App’x 899, 905 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
III. Federal Claims
Knighton asserts federal claims for unlawful seizure, false
imprisonment, excessive force, abuse of process, fabrication of evidence, and
violation of her right to familial association. 2 Individuals acting under color
of law are subject to civil suits for deprivation of federal constitutional rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, government officials may invoke qualified
immunity for these suits. E.g., Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 169 (5th Cir.
2015). The district court denied qualified immunity for all claims against
Kathy, Belew, and Goolsby, and denied summary judgment against Benton
County. Each appeals.
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2
Knighton also initially raised a First Amendment claim, but she abandoned it
below.
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A. Jurisdiction
We start with jurisdiction. Linares-Rivas v. Bondi, 139 F.4th 454, 457
(5th Cir. 2025).
We ordinarily lack jurisdiction over a denial of a motion for summary
judgment. Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016). However, we
still conduct interlocutory review of a denial of qualified immunity at
summary judgment. Juarez v. Aguilar, 666 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2011). But
this review is limited, so we only review the materiality of any fact disputes,
“not their genuineness.” Id. (citation modified).
Though we have jurisdiction over the individual defendants’
invocation of qualified immunity, the same is not true for Benton County.
The County is not protected by qualified immunity, so we lack interlocutory
jurisdiction over its appeal. Gentry v. Lowndes Cnty., 337 F.3d 481, 484 (5th
Cir. 2003); see also Ibarra v. Harris Cnty., 243 F. App’x 830, 833 n.2 (5th Cir.
2007) (per curiam) (“[M]unicipal governments do not enjoy the same right
to interlocutory appeal as their officials.”). So we dismiss Benton County’s
appeal.
We also note that Knighton sued each of the individual defendants in
their official capacities. But official capacity claims “are not subject to a
qualified immunity defense,” and so “are not properly before us on
interlocutory review.” Magnolia Island Plantation, L.L.C. v. Whittington, 29
F.4th 246, 251 n.1 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).
B. The District Court’s Analysis
The remaining Defendants first urge us to summarily vacate the
district court’s order for failing to perform a qualified immunity analysis.
Each of the defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity, but the district court, in a relatively brief opinion that did not
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mention qualified immunity, denied summary judgment because the case
presents “a classic ‘he said, she said’ scenario” given the parties’ differing
deposition testimony.
“[Q]ualified immunity questions should be resolved ‘at the earliest
possible stage in litigation.’” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Thus, district courts
must conduct a qualified immunity analysis in every case. See, e.g., Randle v.
Lockwood, 666 F. App’x 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Even though
the district court did not conduct a qualified immunity analysis, we may still
decide this appeal. Howell v. Town of Ball, 827 F.3d 515, 526 n.4 (5th Cir.
2016). Since discovery is complete and a remand for further analysis would
only needlessly prolong this litigation, we decline Defendants’ invitation to
kick the can further down the road.
Turning to the merits, we first consider whether Kathy was acting
under color of law and then whether to grant qualified immunity on the
remaining claims.
C. Color of Law
Kathy argues that all of the federal claims against her fail because she
was not acting under color of law. She asserts that she played no part in drug
testing or law enforcement as Circuit Clerk and that her role in these events
was merely that of a concerned mother and grandmother. 3 We agree.
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3
Kathy also seems to argue that whether she was acting under color of law is a
purely legal question that cannot be submitted to the jury. But that is wrong. Whether an
official is acting under color of law may turn on factual disputes that must be decided by a
jury. Cf. Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 862 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (concluding
there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether defendant was acting under
color of state law).
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A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may only be brought against a
defendant acting “under color of law.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,
835 (1982). “Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.” Townsend, 291 F.3d at 861
(citation modified). Government officials “performing their official duties
are included whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it, but
acts of [officials] in the ambit of their personal pursuits are generally
excluded.” Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2010)
(citation modified). So, we must consider (1) if Kathy “misused or abused”
her power as Circuit Clerk and (2) if “there is a nexus between the victim,
the improper conduct and [Kathy’s] performance of official duties.” United
States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 1999). Whether an official is on
duty is not determinative. Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 776 (5th Cir. 2021)
(per curiam).
Though Officer Belew certainly would not have been involved in this
investigation had it not been for Kathy, there is no evidence that Kathy used
her power as Circuit Clerk to force him to act. Without any manifestation of
official power, no jury could conclude she was acting under color of law. See
Bustos, 599 F.3d at 465 (concluding defendant was not acting under color of
law when he never “assert[ed] his authority as a police officer”); cf. Tyson v.
Sabine, 42 F.4th 508, 522–23 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding that officer was
acting under color of state law when he “interwove sexual advances with his
authority as a law enforcement officer”). Since there is no evidence that she
invoked her authority as Circuit Clerk, she did not misuse or abuse her official
power.
To be sure, Kathy likely got more law enforcement action than the
average person would in these circumstances. After all, it is certainly possible
that Officer Belew and Sheriff Goolsby would want to respond positively to a
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request from a local politician. But this does not mean she acted under color
of law when she herself made no manifestation of her authority or office.
Without more, we cannot say there is a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding whether she was acting under color of law, so she should be granted
summary judgment on the federal § 1983 claims against her.
D. Qualified Immunity
When considering a qualified immunity defense, we must determine
whether the defendant violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights and, if so,
whether defendant violated clearly established law. Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th
198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021). But we do not define clearly established law “at a
high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). So,
plaintiffs seeking to overcome qualified immunity must present a case with
reasonably similar factual circumstances. Cope, 3 F.4th at 205. However, in
some circumstances, the constitutional violations may be “so obviously
unlawful no precedent is required.” Terrell v. Harris Cnty., No. 23-20281,
2024 WL 4446408, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2024) (first citing Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) and then citing Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 9
(2020)).
E. Unlawful Seizure
Knighton argues that Defendants committed an unlawful seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment when she was forced to take the drug
test. She does not, however, assert a claim for an unlawful search.
A “seizure of a person must be based on probable cause particularized
with respect to that person unless a constitutionally adequate substitute for
probable cause exists.” Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 208 (5th
Cir. 2009). Collecting saliva for a drug test is a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Cf. Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1109 n.4 (5th Cir. 2006)
(“It is undisputed that the collection of a saliva sample for DNA analysis is
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a search implicating the Fourth Amendment.”). It then follows that if the
search was unreasonable, the physical seizure of Knighton to effectuate the
search is also an unlawful seizure. See Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 325
(2021) (“[T]he application of physical force to the body of a person with
intent to restrain is a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not
subdued.”).
Officer Belew asserts that the seizure was justified under the exigent
circumstances and community caretaker doctrines. Because Knighton’s baby
was breastfeeding and nonresponsive, Belew argues, he was justified in
forcibly testing Knighton to ensure that her baby did not need medical
attention. We disagree.
Officials “investigat[ing] possible child abuse must satisfy the typical
Fourth Amendment standards of a court order, consent, or exigent
circumstances.” McMurry v. Weaver, 142 F.4th 292, 300 (5th Cir. 2025). It
is clear that, according to Knighton’s version of the facts, neither a court
order nor consent applies here. “The well-recognized exception for exigent
circumstances applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of
law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 299 (citation modified).
“Exigent circumstances exist when a child faces immediate danger.” Id.
Belew’s decision to force Knighton to take a drug test is not excused
by exigent circumstances because, if he believed the children to be in danger,
the correct course of action would be to remove them from the home—which
he did. But he also chose to essentially begin gathering evidence against
Knighton rather than simply removing them from the situation. So even if
Belew had a reasonable basis to believe the children were in danger because
of Knighton’s drug use, a drug test does not assist him in resolving that
danger. After all, “there is, of course, no longer any exigency if the
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emergency has dissipated.” Ramirez v. Killian, 113 F.4th 415, 422 (5th Cir.
2024). By removing the children from the home, he was removing them from
immediate harm, so he had no cause to force Knighton to take the drug test.
See, e.g., McMurry, 142 F.4th at 300 (concluding no exigent circumstances
for search when child faced no immediate danger); Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of
Protective & Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (removing
children from house was not justified when abuser was not at home and so
children were not facing immediate danger).
Furthermore, the law was clearly established by Gates and McMurry
that officials investigating alleged child abuse or neglect had to comply with
applicable Fourth Amendment principles. See McMurry, 142 F.4th at 300–
01. This is sufficient to put Belew on notice that it would be a constitutional
violation to force Knighton to take a drug test when doing so was unrelated
to any danger the children might face. Cf. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141,
165 (2013) (“[T]he natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not
constitute an exigency.”). And McMurry and Gates “foreclosed the
possibility of a lower standard justified by community caretaking,” so that
doctrine is inapplicable as well. McMurry, 142 F.4th at 301. Thus, there is a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Belew’s actions violated
the Fourth Amendment.
Sheriff Goolsby, however, is entitled to qualified immunity on this
claim. He was not present during the drug test and Knighton points to no
evidence that he played any role in it.
F. False Arrest
Knighton next brings a federal claim for false arrest under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. A constitutional claim for false arrest requires
a showing that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Haggerty v.
Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 2004). “Probable cause exists when
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the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge
at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that
the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Id. at 655–56.
Sheriff Goolsby argues that he had probable cause to arrest Knighton
for child neglect based on Kathy and Belew’s statements to him that she had
tested positive for opioids and admitted to using fentanyl, as well as the
Chancery Court testimony of a Family Protection Specialist named Kayla
Reno.
While Reno’s testimony does support the inference that Knighton had
used drugs in the past, she did not testify until November of 2021, nine
months after Knighton was arrested. So, this testimony is irrelevant to the
probable cause analysis. Robles v. Ciarletta, 797 F. App’x 821, 830–31 (5th
Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Indeed, probable cause is an objective inquiry
based on the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest.” (emphasis
added)).
A police officer may rely on the statements of other officers and is
entitled to qualified immunity if it was “reasonable for him to believe, on the
basis of the statements, that probable cause for the arrest existed.” Deville v.
Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 166 (5th Cir. 2009). Knighton has not argued as to
why it would not have been reasonable because, even if Belew made up the
results as she contends, there is no evidence that Goolsby would have known
this, at least at that point. So, it was reasonable for Goolsby to rely on Belew’s
statements.
The question then is whether Kathy and Belew’s statements to
Goolsby are enough to establish probable cause. 4 Child neglect under
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4
Defendants argue the independent intermediary doctrine applies. But the
gravamen of Knighton’s argument is that they made up evidence. And that doctrine only
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Mississippi law is defined as “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
commit[ing] any act or omit[ting] the performance of any duty, which act or
omission contributes to or tends to contribute to the neglect or delinquency
of any child.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(1)(a). Putting aside whether
Knighton’s alleged conduct would meet this standard, 5 her claim fails on the
clearly established prong. She points to no case that “obviously resolve[s]
whether the circumstances” in this case “constituted probable cause.”
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018). And since it is at least
plausible that drug use in the home would meet the statutory definition of
child neglect, she has not shown that the law was clearly established that
Goolsby did not have probable cause to arrest her. So, he is entitled to
qualified immunity.
Officer Belew did not participate in the arrest itself or assist in the
preparation of the arrest affidavit, so he should also be granted summary
judgment on this claim.
G. Excessive Force
Knighton next brings an excessive force claim. However, Knighton
admitted that Sheriff Goolsby did not use any force against her, so he should
be granted summary judgment on this claim.
Turning to Officer Belew, a plaintiff bringing an excessive force claim
“must show (1) an injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from the use
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applies when officials do not “withhold any relevant information from the independent
intermediary.” Cuadra v. Hou. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation
modified). Knighton’s argument is essentially that the Defendants accused her of trumped-
up charges. So the doctrine is not sufficient to shield them from liability in this case.
5
Using drugs in the presence of children is a separate crime, child endangerment.
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(4)(a). So, it is somewhat unclear whether this conduct would
also be considered child neglect under Mississippi law.
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of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was
clearly unreasonable.” Garza v. Briones, 943 F.3d 740, 744 (5th Cir. 2019).
Since we are bound to accept Knighton’s version of events, we agree that the
force used was excessive and clearly unreasonable. Officer Belew does not
dispute this and instead challenges only the injury prong.
To satisfy that element, an injury must be more than de minimis, but
psychological injuries can nevertheless “satisfy the injury requirement.”
Lincoln v. Turner, 874 F.3d 833, 846 (5th Cir. 2017). Knighton stated in her
deposition that she sought treatment for psychological and emotional distress
relating to the incident. 6 Cf. Brooks v. City of W. Point, 639 F. App’x 986, 990
(5th Cir. 2016) (considering whether evidence supported psychological
distress).
Officer Belew argues that this is likely related to losing custody of her
kids rather than the alleged excessive force, but this is irrelevant. While
multiple aspects of this incident may have caused her psychological trauma,
that is a genuine dispute of material fact, and so it is for the jury to decide
whether a particular injury was caused by excessive force.
There is also a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Officer
Belew’s actions that is material to whether he violated clearly established law.
Byrd v. Cornelius, 52 F.4th 265, 273 (5th Cir. 2022). Absent a specific case,
an officer’s actions can still violate clearly established law if it is “an
‘obvious’ instance of excessive force in light of the factors set forth in”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 749
(5th Cir. 2017). The Court in Graham considered factors such as “severity of
the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
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6
She also testified that she experienced “some spotting while [she] was in jail”
after the incident.
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safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 490 U.S. at 396.
A reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Belew’s actions violated
clearly established law. Under Knighton’s version of events, he barged into
her home, refused to leave, and forced her to take a drug test. Indeed, under
these circumstances, any use of force would have been excessive. Police
cannot simply enter someone’s home, command them to submit to a drug
test, and “pry” their mouth open to effectuate their demand. If the jury
believes Knighton’s version of events, this would be an “obvious” case under
Graham.
H. Fabrication of Evidence
Knighton next asserts that the Defendants fabricated evidence against
her. There is a “freestanding due process right not to have officials
deliberately fabricate evidence and use it to frame and bring false charges
against a person.” Dean v. Phatak, 162 F.4th 555, 565 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation
modified). This claim requires that the defendant knowingly fabricate
evidence. Id. at 567. And it is clearly established. Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393,
398–99 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting “that there is a clearly established
constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the
basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government”
(citation modified) (quoting Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir.
2001) (en banc))).
Sheriff Goolsby argues that Knighton has put forward no evidence
that he specifically fabricated any evidence. 7 Knighton argues that he wrongly
asserted in an affidavit that she had used drugs in front of her children.
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7
Goolsby also argues that Reno’s later testimony confirms the Defendants’ version
of events. However, while Reno testified that Knighton admitted to her that she had used
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There is a genuine dispute regarding whether Sheriff Goolsby
fabricated evidence against Knighton because he admitted that statements
made in the post-arrest affidavit were incorrect. He initially stated under oath
that Knighton neglected her children by “using drugs in the presence of the
child and passing out.” But later in his deposition, Goolsby stated that
Knighton had admitted to using drugs during the last 48 hours, but that he
“never said that [she was] using them while the kids were in the house.”
These statements are at least possibly contradictory, so it could lead a
reasonable jury to infer that he lied in the affidavit. Thus, there is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether he fabricated the evidence in his
affidavit.
Next, if a jury believes Knighton’s version of events, it could conclude
that Officer Belew fabricated evidence against her. Sherriff Goolsby relied on
Officer Belew’s statements that Knighton admitted to drug use and that she
tested positive for drugs when he arrested her. Knighton contends that these
were all lies. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriately denied as to
Goolsby and Belew.
I. Abuse of Process
Knighton next brings a claim for abuse of process in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment against Goolsby. However, “[t]here is no
constitutional right to be free from abuse of process.” Morgan v. Chapman,
969 F.3d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 2020), overruling on other grounds recognized by,
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drugs in the past, she did not give her any specific timeframe. Thus, her testimony cannot
negate Knighton’s contention that she was not using drugs during this specific incident.
And even if it could, Reno’s testimony says nothing about using drugs in front of the
children or what Knighton admitted to anyone at the time.
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Espinal v. City of Houston, 96 F.4th 741, 748 (5th Cir. 2024). Thus, the district
court wrongly denied summary judgment on this claim.
J. Right to Familial Association
The last federal claim Knighton brings is for a violation of her right to
familial association against Sheriff Goolsby and Officer Belew.
The right to family integrity is “a form of liberty guaranteed by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the rights to
conceive and to raise one’s children and to maintain the integrity of the
family unit.” Marks v. Hudson, 933 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation
modified). These claims are “analyzed by placing them, on a case by case
basis, along a continuum between the state’s clear interest in protecting
children and a family’s clear interest in privacy.” Morris v. Dearborne, 181
F.3d 657, 671 (5th Cir. 1999). “[W]here the two interests overlap and create
a tension, the right to family integrity may properly be characterized as
nebulous, and thus a defendant may claim the protection of qualified
immunity.” Id. But this defense fails “when the facts of a case place it
squarely on the end of the continuum where the state’s interest is negligible
and where the family privacy right is well developed.” Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Knighton, as
discussed above, Sheriff Goolsby and Officer Belew could have fabricated
evidence which resulted in the removal of Knighton’s children from her
custody. While the State certainly has an interest in removing children from
the care of a mother who is on drugs, Knighton denies she was on drugs. By
her telling, this incident was motivated by Kathy’s animus towards her,
which means that this case falls well on the family privacy side of the
continuum. Thus, again, if the jury believes Knighton, it could find a
constitutional violation.
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While “[a] balancing test is difficult terrain for a party having to prove
a clear violation of the law,” these facts, viewed in Knighton’s favor, meet
this burden. Romero v. Brown, 937 F.3d 514, 520 (5th Cir. 2019). Other panels
of our court have found it clearly established that officials may not
“temporarily remove children from their parents[] without affording the
parents due process of law,” Stewart v. Perry, 369 F. App’x 593, 594 (5th Cir.
2010) (per curiam), nor may they knowingly “make[] a false statement or
omission that results in the issuance of a warrant without probable cause.”
Wernecke v. Garcia, 452 F. App’x 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). And
“an actionable Fourteenth Amendment claim exists for a false affidavit
submitted to a court for the purpose of obtaining a child seizure order.”
Marks, 933 F.3d at 486. So, it is clearly established that fabricating evidence
in order to remove children from their parent is unconstitutional and Goolsby
and Belew are not entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. State Claims
Knighton also asserts claims under Mississippi law for intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and malicious interference with
familial relationship against Kathy, malicious prosecution against Kathy and
Sheriff Goolsby, and conspiracy against all Defendants. 8 However, Knighton
has not shown any Mississippi law adopting a malicious interference with
familial relationship tort, so summary judgment should be granted on that
claim.
_____________________
8
Knighton abandoned her assault and battery claims below.
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A. Jurisdiction
“[W]e have limited jurisdiction to conduct an interlocutory review of
a district court’s order denying a motion for summary judgment based upon
qualified immunity.” Hogan v. Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 730 (5th Cir.
2013) (citation modified). However, “[f]ederal qualified immunity does not
apply to state-law claims.” Tuttle v. Sepolio, 68 F.4th 969, 976 (5th Cir. 2023).
Still, we “may review denials of immunity under Mississippi law because the
immunity is a protection from suit.” Walton v. City of Verona, 82 F.4th 314,
320 (5th Cir. 2023).
Defendants raise immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act
(“MTCA”). The MTCA waives sovereign immunity for municipalities for
torts committed by “their employees while acting within the course and
scope of their employment.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5(1). This is an
exclusive remedy, so any suit against a government employee must be
brought under this statute. Id. § 11-46-7(1); Ricks v. City of Winona, 858 F.
Supp. 2d 682, 690 (N.D. Miss. 2012). However, this does not apply unless
an employee is acting within the course and scope of their employment or if
their conduct involved malice. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5(2).
Since Kathy was not acting under color of law, we conclude she was
not acting within the course and scope of her employment either, so the
MTCA does not grant her immunity. See, e.g., Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th
769, 781 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (noting that the burden to show an
officer was acting within the course and scope of their employment is “even
greater” than showing they were acting under color of law).
Some of Knighton’s state law claims against Belew and Goolsby also
fall outside of the MTCA because they must involve malice. Univ. of Miss.
Med. Ctr. v. Oliver, 235 So. 3d 75, 83 (Miss. 2017). For example, malicious
prosecution falls outside the MTCA because malice is an essential element
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of it. See, e.g., Springfield v. Members 1st Cmty. Fed. Credit Union, 106 So. 3d
826, 829 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). However, the MTCA applies to the IIED
claim, but only “to the extent [that it] . . . is [not] predicated on malicious
conduct.” Springer v. Ausbern Constr. Co., 231 So. 3d 980, 987 (Miss. 2017).
And conspiracy similarly likely falls under the MTCA. 9 So, defendants have
no state law immunity for the malicious prosecution claims. But they may
have immunity for the IIED and conspiracy claims.
Still, there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the
Defendant’s actions were in the course and scope of their employment or
involved malice. See Sanders v. Attala Cnty., 332 So. 3d 292, 303 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2021). According to Knighton’s version of events, Kathy always
disliked her and so worked with Officer Belew and Sheriff Goolsby to
manufacture evidence in order to take her children away from her. So, a
reasonable jury could also conclude that they were not acting in the course
and scope of their employment (particularly Officer Belew since he had no
formal role in law enforcement investigations). See Miss. Code Ann.
§ 11-46-5 (noting that an employee is not acting within the course and scope
of his employment if his “conduct constituted fraud, malice, libel, slander,
defamation or any criminal offense other than traffic violations”). So, there
is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the MTCA immunity
applies to these claims as well. 10
_____________________
9
It is unclear exactly whether conspiracy falls under the MTCA because the
Mississippi Supreme Court has never explicitly decided the question. See Patterson v. Miss.
Dep’t of Mental Health, No. 1:22-CV-196, 2023 WL 4242755, at *4 (N.D. Miss. June 28,
2023). However, the Mississippi Supreme Court has still applied the MTCA to a
conspiracy claim. See Moton v. City of Clarksdale, 367 So. 3d 979, 982–83 (Miss. 2023).
10
Defendants also argue that Knighton’s state law claims should be dismissed
based on the failure to comply with the MTCA’s notice provision. See Miss. Code Ann. §
11-46-11. However, the notice requirement similarly does not apply for torts done outside
the course and scope of employment. See Springer, 231 So. 3d at 988; Beacham v. City of
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So, the MTCA categorically does not apply to Knighton’s malicious
prosecution claims and there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether it applies to her conspiracy and IIED claims. However, we may still
exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the state law claims because they
are sufficiently intertwined with the federal claims. See Batiste v. Theriot, 458
F. App’x 351, 359–60 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). And since the facts are
identical and the elements are similar, it is proper for us to consider these
claims at this stage.
B. Malicious Prosecution
A malicious prosecution claim in Mississippi has six elements: “(1)
the institution of a proceeding; (2) by, or at the insistence of the defendant;
(3) the termination of such proceeding in the plaintiff’s favor; (4) malice in
instituting the proceedings; (5) want of probable cause for the proceeding;
and (6) the suffering of the injury or damage as a result of the prosecution.”
Miles v. Paul Moak of Ridgeland, Inc., 113 So. 3d 580, 585 (Miss. Ct. App.
2012).
Both Kathy and Sheriff Goolsby argue that there is no evidence of
malice. They are correct that malice speaks to a subjective intent, but
“[m]alice may be and usually is shown by circumstantial evidence.”
Funderburk v. Johnson, 935 So. 2d 1084, 1097 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). The
“absence of probable cause for the prosecution is circumstantial evidence of
malice.” Magyar v. Shiers, 426 So. 3d 312, 322 (Miss. Ct. App. 2025).
A jury could conclude Kathy acted with malice. Knighton testified at
length about the conflict between the two of them. So, a trier of fact could
conclude that Kathy concocted this incident (and falsified evidence, as
_____________________
Brookhaven, No. 5:22-CV-65, 2023 WL 4918346, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 1, 2023); Burroughs
v. City of Laurel, No. 2:19-CV-48, 2019 WL 4228438, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 5, 2019).
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Knighton argues) in order to remove her children from Knighton’s care.
After all, this is more than just Knighton’s “subjective feeling or belief”
about why Kathy acted, it is evidence of long running enmity in conflict over
family matters. See Dowdy v. Grayson, 416 So. 3d 132, 140 (Miss. Ct. App.
2025). This creates a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Kathy’s
subjective motivations.
However, there is no evidence in the record that Sheriff Goolsby acted
with malice. “[M]alice occurs when the primary purpose of prosecuting is
one other than bringing an offender to justice.” Miles, 113 So. 3d at 586. As
discussed above, there is some evidence that Sheriff Goolsby may have made
false statements to justify arresting Knighton, but he also had probable cause
to arrest her. There is no evidence, only conjecture, that he had any other
motivation for his actions. So, Goolsby is entitled to summary judgment on
the malicious prosecution claim.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Knighton next brings a claim for menace which is properly analyzed
as IIED. An IIED claim requires a showing that
1. The defendant acted willfully or wantonly towards the
plaintiff by committing certain described actions; 2. The
defendant’s acts are ones which evoke outrage or revulsion in
civilized society; 3. The acts were directed at or intended to
cause harm to the plaintiff; 4. The plaintiff suffered severe
emotional distress as a direct result of the acts of the defendant;
and 5. Such resulting emotional distress was foreseeable from
the intentional acts of the defendant.
Rainer v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 119 So. 3d 398, 403–04 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)
(citation modified). Again, Kathy challenges the malice prong.
As discussed above, there is a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding whether Kathy acted with malice. Viewing the facts in the light
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most favorable to Knighton, Kathy always disliked her and so leveraged her
connections in local government to get her grandchildren away from
Knighton. Like Officer Belew, she reported incriminating information to
Sheriff Goolsby that Knighton argues was false. This kind of behavior, if
believed by the jury, would certainly be sufficiently outrageous.
D. Conspiracy
Finally, Knighton’s conspiracy claim against all Defendants should
proceed. “To establish a civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must prove (1) an
agreement between two or more persons, (2) to accomplish an unlawful
purpose or a lawful purpose unlawfully, (3) an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, (4) and damages to the plaintiff as a proximate result.” Bradley v.
Kelley Bros. Contractors, 117 So. 3d 331, 339 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
Defendants challenge the agreement element.
The elements of a civil conspiracy are largely analogous to the
elements of a criminal conspiracy. Id. at 339. Under Mississippi criminal law,
“the jury may infer a conspiracy from the circumstances, acts, and conduct
of the alleged conspirators.” Stokes v. State, 141 So. 3d 421, 428 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2013); see also Harris v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 873 So. 2d 970, 980
(Miss. 2004) (noting that a conspiracy in a § 1983 context may be proven by
circumstantial evidence). There is no direct evidence of an agreement. But
since there is a genuine dispute of material fact that Kathy and Officer Belew
both fabricated evidence by reporting allegedly false information to Goolsby,
a jury could reasonably infer that they agreed to do so.
The evidence of conspiracy is more attenuated for Sheriff Goolsby.
But he arguably fabricated evidence by making a false affidavit and a jury
could infer from this action that he had joined the agreement to fabricate
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evidence against Knighton. 11 If the jury believes Knighton, the Defendants’
conduct is similar enough that a jury could believe it was the result of an
agreement to frame her.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE in part the district court’s
denial of summary judgment and DISMISS the appeal in part.
As to Benton County, we DISMISS the appeal.
As to Kathy Graves, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of
summary judgment of the federal claims and the malicious interference with
a familial relationship claim. We DISMISS the appeal as to the malicious
prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy
claims.
As to Steve Belew, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of
summary judgment as to the false arrest and abuse of process claims. We
DISMISS the appeal as to the unlawful seizure, excessive force, fabrication
of evidence, right to familial association, and conspiracy claims.
As to Robert Goolsby, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of
summary judgment as to the unlawful seizure, false arrest, excessive force,
abuse of process, and malicious prosecution claims. We DISMISS the
appeal as to the fabrication of evidence, right to familial association, and
conspiracy claims.
_____________________
11
There is no evidence that Sheriff Goolsby was involved in any way with any
misconduct at the time he made the arrest. It wasn’t until after he arrested Knighton that
he submitted an arguably false affidavit about her drug use in front of her children. So, a
jury could infer a conspiracy from Goolsby’s conduct at that point. But there is no evidence
that Goolsby played any role in an alleged conspiracy until he made a false affidavit.
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We DISMISS the appeal as to all official capacity claims.
We REMAND the claims for which the appeal was dismissed for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
24