The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KEITH KRIKSTAN, *
Plaintiff, *
v. * Civil Action No. GLR-24-2001
STATE OF MARYLAND, et al., *
Defendants. *
*
***
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant State of Maryland’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 42), Defendant Neil Daubach’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 46), and
Defendant Debora Darden’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 56). The Motions are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary.
See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2025). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant
the State’s Motion to Dismiss, deny Daubach’s Motion to Dismiss, and grant Darden’s
Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1
This action arises out of alleged violations of Plaintiff Keith Krikstan’s
constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF
No. 27). At all times relevant to this case, Krikstan was an inmate at Eastern Correctional
Institute (“ECI”), a Maryland correctional facility. (Id. ¶ 4). Defendant Debora Darden
(“Warden” or “Darden”) was the Warden of ECI and an employee of the Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“MDPSCS”). (Id. ¶ 6). Defendants
Samuel Warren, David Quillen, Ananias Wilson, and Neil Daubach worked for MDPSCS
as Correctional Officers, and Defendant Jermaine Robert Sturgis worked for MDPSCS as
a Sergeant. (Id. ¶¶ 7–10). Defendant State of Maryland employed the correctional officers
named herein, including the warden and high-ranking officials at ECI, exercising control
and exerting influence over their policies and customs. (Id. ¶ 5)
On July 12, 2021, Correctional Officers Warren, Quillen, Wilson, and Daubach
were assigned to work at ECI Housing Unit 4. (Id. ¶ 13). That same day, Krikstan reported
to his shift on Unit 4 as an Inmate Observation Aide—a position he received due to his
excellent disciplinary record. (Id. ¶ 14). Upon entering the housing unit, Krikstan was
frisked. (Id. ¶ 15). During the initial frisk, Warren grew frustrated with Krikstan for not
properly wearing his face mask as required. (Id. ¶ 15). Krikstan made remarks about this
1 Unless otherwise noted, the Court takes the following facts from the Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 27) and accepts them as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007).
interaction, which further irritated Warren. (Id. ¶ 16). As a result, Warren instructed
Krikstan to enter the property room to undergo a second and more intrusive strip search.
(Id. ¶ 17). Daubach and Wilson joined them. (Id. ¶ 18).
Once inside the room, Krikstan made a coarse comment toward the officers. (Id.
¶ 19). Warren then instructed Krikstan to turn around and repeat his earlier remark. (Id.).
After doing so, Warren informed Krikstan that he would no longer be permitted to serve
as an Inmate Observation Aide and stated that they would begin the monitored strip search.
(Id. ¶¶ 19, 20). This procedure required Krikstan to be handcuffed and escorted to a cell
where officers would remove his clothing. (Id.). With Krikstan’s hands cuffed behind his
back, shoes off, and pants lowered, Warren walked Krikstan to the property room door.
(Id. ¶ 21). As they approached the doorway, Krikstan pulled away from Warren, breaking
his grip on Krikstan’s arm. (Id.).
In response, Warren threw Krikstan to the floor. (Id. ¶ 23). While handcuffed and
lying on his side, Warren punched Krikstan five or six times in the face and head, resulting
in visible signs of injury and bleeding. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 25). Wilson and Daubach observed the
assault but did not intervene. (Id. ¶ 24). After hearing about this incident, Quillen arrived
on the scene and proceeded to record Krikstan’s subsequent medical evaluation and the
monitored strip search. (Id. ¶ 26). During his medical evaluation, Krikstan explained that
Warren assaulted him. (Id.).
After filming, Quillen showed the video to various officers, including Correctional
Officers Warren, Wilson, Daubach, and Sergeant Sturgis. (Id. ¶ 27). While viewing the
footage, Sturgis commented that the video should be deleted because of what it depicted.
(Id.). Warren agreed. (Id.).
Over the next few hours, the officers determined that the use of force was not
justified and coordinated a plan to cover up the incident by deleting the video and
submitting false written and verbal statements. (Id. ¶¶ 28–29). Ultimately, Correctional
Officers Warren, Quillen, Wilson and Daubach pled guilty to criminal charges arising from
the above-described conduct. (Id. ¶ 30).
B. Procedural History
On July 10, 2024, Krikstan initiated this action against Defendants State of
Maryland, Kathleen Green (Warden), Samuel Warren (Correctional Officer), David
Quillen (Correctional Officer), Ananias Wilson (Correctional Officer), Neil Daubach
(Correctional Officer), and J.S. (Sergeant). (Compl. at 1–2, ECF No. 1).2 On March 3,
2025, Daubach filed a Motion to stay proceedings pending the resolution of the criminal
case arising out of this matter (Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Stay at 1, ECF No. 24-1), which the
Court granted on April 10, 2025 (ECF No. 37). On October 16, 2025, Daubach was
sentenced in United States v. Neil Daubach, et al., No. MJM-24-0363 (Jt. Status Rep. ¶ 1,
ECF No. 40), and the stay was lifted on October 20, 2025 (ECF No. 41).
Krikstan amended his Complaint on March 19, 2025, replacing Kathleen Green with
Debora Darden as Warden, and adding the full name of Sergeant Jermaine Robert Sturgis.
(Am. Compl. at 1–2). He asserts five counts against Defendants for use of excessive force
2 Citations to the record refer to the pagination assigned by the Court’s Case
Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system.
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count
One), supervisory liability in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Two), negligent supervision and retention (Count Three), battery
(Count Four), and cruel and unusual punishment under the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
Articles 16 and 25 (Count Five). (Id. at 8–14). Krikstan seeks compensatory and punitive
damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
associated with this litigation. (Id. at 15).
On November 19, 2025, the State of Maryland filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No.
42). Daubach filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 3, 2024. (ECF No. 46). On December
17, 2025, Krikstan filed his Opposition to both Motions. (ECF Nos. 48, 49). Daubach filed
a Reply on December 31, 2025. (ECF No. 50). To date, the State of Maryland has not filed
a Reply.
On February 5 and 19, 2026, the Amended Complaint was served on Defendants
Darden and Sturgis, respectively. (ECF Nos. 52, 53). Darden filed a Motion to Dismiss or,
in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment on April 13, 2026. (ECF No. 56). On
May 11, 2026, Krikstan filed an Opposition. (ECF No. 61). Darden filed a Reply on May
26, 2026. (ECF No. 66).3
3 To date, the Court has no record that Defendants Samuel Warren, David Quillen,
Ananias Wilson, or Jermaine Robert Sturgis have answered Plaintiff Keith Krikstan’s
Amended Complaint. Therefore, the Court will direct Krikstan to file a Motion for Clerk’s
Entry of Default as to these Defendants.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standards of Review
1. Conversion
Defendant Warden Darden styles her Motion as a Motion to Dismiss under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for Summary
Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (ECF No. 56). A motion styled in this
manner implicates the court’s discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., 788
F.Supp.2d 431, 436–37 (D.Md. 2011), aff’d sub nom, 684 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2012). This
Rule provides that when “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded
by the court, the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion must be treated as one for summary judgment
under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The Court has “‘complete discretion to determine
whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered
in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion,
or to reject it or simply not consider it.’” Wells-Bey v. Kopp, No. ELH-12-2319, 2013 WL
1700927, at *5 (D.Md. Apr. 16, 2013) (quoting 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2012 Supp.)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has articulated two
requirements for proper conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion: (1)
notice; and (2) a reasonable opportunity for discovery. Greater Balt. Ctr. For Pregnancy
Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013).
When the movant expressly captions its motion “in the alternative” as one for
summary judgment and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court’s consideration,
the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur. See
Moret v. Harvey, 381 F.Supp.2d 458, 464 (D.Md. 2005) (citing Laughlin v. Metro. Wash.
Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260–61 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Ordinarily, summary judgment is inappropriate when “the parties have not had an
opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.,
Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448–49 (4th Cir. 2011). Yet, “the party opposing summary judgment
‘cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party
had made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for
discovery.’” Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir.
2002) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir.
1996)). To sufficiently raise the issue that more discovery is needed, the non-movant must
typically file an affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d), explaining the “specified
reasons” why “it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(d).
“The Fourth Circuit places ‘great weight’ on the affidavit requirement.” Nautilus
Ins. Co. v. REMAC Am., Inc., 956 F.Supp.2d 674, 683 (D.Md. 2013) (quoting Evans, 80
F.3d at 961). However, non-compliance may be excused “if the nonmoving party has
adequately informed the district court that the motion is pre-mature and that more discovery
is necessary.” Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244. Courts place greater weight on the need for
discovery “when the relevant facts are exclusively in the control of the opposing party,”
such as “complex factual questions about intent and motive.” Id. at 247 (quoting 10B
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 2741, at 419 (3d ed. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, the Court finds that the second requirement for conversion, a reasonable
opportunity for discovery, is not satisfied. While Darden placed Krikstan on notice that the
Court might resolve her Motion under Rule 56 by styling the Motion in the alternative for
summary judgment (see generally, Mot. Dismiss or, in the alt., Mot. Summ. J. [“Darden
Mot.”], ECF No. 56-1) and submitting materials outside the pleadings for the Court’s
consideration (see ECF Nos. 56-3 through 56-5), Krikstan argues that he would need
discovery from the State to support his opposition (Opp’n Darden Mot. at 6–7, ECF No.
61). As such, the Court finds the second conversion requirement unmet and will decline to
convert Darden’s Motion into one for summary judgment. See Carey v. Throwe, No. GLR-
18-162, 2019 WL 414873, at *3 (D.Md. Jan. 31, 2019), aff’d, 957 F.3d 468 (4th Cir. 2020)
(declining to convert defendants’ motion to one for summary judgment when plaintiff filed
Rule 56(d) affidavit requesting discovery). Accordingly, the Court will construe the Motion
(ECF No. 56) as a motion to dismiss and will not consider materials outside of the
pleadings.
2. Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires a plaintiff to establish the Court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction by showing the existence of either a federal question under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A plaintiff may establish
federal question jurisdiction by asserting a claim that arises from a federal statute or from
the U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 To show that the claim arises on one of
these bases, the federal question must appear “on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded
complaint.” AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Smith, 470 F.Supp.2d 586, 592 (D.Md.
2007) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). However, when a
party challenges subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court may consider “evidence outside the
pleadings” to resolve the challenge. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v.
United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).
A defendant challenging a complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) may advance a “facial
challenge, asserting that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to establish subject
matter jurisdiction, or a factual challenge, asserting ‘that the jurisdictional allegations of
the complaint [are] not true.’” Hasley v. Ward Mfg., LLC, No. RDB-13-1607, 2014 WL
3368050, at *1 (D.Md. July 8, 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Kerns v. United
States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)). When a defendant raises a facial challenge, the
Court affords the plaintiff “the same procedural protection as he would receive under a
Rule 12(b)(6) consideration.” Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192 (quoting Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d
1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)). As such, the Court takes the facts alleged in the complaint as
true and denies the motion if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject-matter
jurisdiction.
3. Rule 12(b)(6)
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to “test[] the sufficiency of a complaint,”
not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City
of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). A complaint fails to state a claim if it
does not contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Though the plaintiff is
not required to forecast evidence to prove the elements of the claim, the complaint must
allege sufficient facts to establish each element. Goss v. Bank of Am., N.A., 917 F.Supp.2d
445, 449 (D.Md. 2013) (quoting Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012)),
aff’d sub nom, Goss v. Bank of Am., Na., 546 F.App’x 165 (4th Cir. 2013).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must examine the complaint as a
whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268
(1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005)
(citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). But the court need not accept
unsupported or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, see
United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding
dismissal of complaint proper because plaintiffs’ “conclusory allegations” of
discrimination were unsupported by “reference to particular acts, practices, or policies”),
or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
B. Analysis
1. State of Maryland’s Motion to Dismiss
The State of Maryland moves to dismiss Krikstan’s Amended Complaint under Rule
12(b)(1) on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment bars all claims against the State and
against Defendants in their official capacities. (State Mot. Dismiss at 5–9, ECF No. 42-2).4
Krikstan concedes the same in his Opposition, noting that while the State’s argument is
consistent with the existing state of the law, he reserves the right to challenge the status
quo on appeal. (See Opp’n State Mot. Dismiss at 1–2, ECF No. 48). Accordingly, the Court
will grant the State’s Motion to the extent that it seeks dismissal of all claims against the
State and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities.
2. Correctional Officer Daubach’s Motion to Dismiss
Krikstan asserts a single count against Daubach for violating his right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment under Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights (Count Five). (Am. Compl. at 14). Daubach argues that this Court should dismiss
Count Five because Krikstan fails to state a claim against him in his individual capacity.
(Def.’s Mot. Dismiss [“Daubach Mot.”] at 4–9, ECF No. 46-1). For the reasons discussed
below, the Court will deny Daubach’s Motion.
4 The State of Maryland also argues that Krikstan’s State law claims against the
Defendants are barred under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. (State Mot. Dismiss at 7–9,
ECF No. 42-2). The Court will address this argument in the sections that follow.
Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights are construed in pari
materia with the Eighth Amendment. Wallace v. Moyer, No. CCB-17-3718, 2020 WL
1506343, at *9 (D.Md. Mar. 30, 2020). The Eighth Amendment protects inmates from
cruel and unusual punishment by prohibiting the use of excessive force and deliberate
indifference to an inmate’s medical or safety needs. See Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d
756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). To state a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference, Krikstan
must allege that: (1) he sustained a significant physical or emotional injury as a result of
the challenged conditions; and (2) a prison official knew of and disregarded an excessive
risk to his health or safety. Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003)).
As to the first element, there is no real dispute that Krikstan suffered serious physical
injuries as a result of Warren’s attack. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25 (noting that Krikstan
displayed visible signs of injury and bleeding); Daubach Mot. at 5–6). Thus, the Court
finds Krikstan’s injury sufficient to meet the first element.
With respect to the second element, “the test is whether the guards know the plaintiff
inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily yet they
fail to do so.” Brown, 612 F.3d at 723 (quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th
Cir. 2002)). Here, the Court can infer that Daubach knew Krikstan faced serious danger
because the Amended Complaint alleges that Daubach observed as Warren repeatedly
punched Krikstan in his face and head while Krikstan remained defenseless on the floor,
with his hands cuffed behind his back. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21–24). Moreover, given
Daubach’s proximity to Krikstan during the attack, the Court can also infer that Daubach
could have interfered to avert the danger but chose not to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 24 (explaining
that Daubach was inside the property room during the attack and observed the assault but
did not intervene)). At this stage of the litigation, the Court finds these allegations sufficient
to support a claim of deliberate indifference under Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. See Brown, 612 F.3d at 723 (finding that plaintiff’s allegation that
corrections officer observed altercation and failed to respond adequate to support claim of
deliberate indifference).
To avoid this result, Daubach next argues that he is immune from liability under the
Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA” or “Act”) because Krikstan fails to allege that he
acted with malice or gross negligence. (Daubach Mot. at 7–9); Howe v. Md. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety & Corr. Servs., No. GLR-24-1896, 2024 WL 4825782, at *5 (D.Md. Nov. 19, 2024);
Andrews v. Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., No. JMC-23 -172, 2024 WL 520038,
at *9 (D.Md. Feb. 9, 2024). The Court disagrees.
The MTCA confers immunity against state common law tort claims and violations
of state constitutional rights, such as those at issue here. See Francis v. Maryland, No. ELH-
21-1365, 2023 WL 2456553, at *23 (D.Md. Mar. 10, 2023). Specifically, the Act provides
in relevant part that “State personnel . . . are immune from suit in courts of the State and
from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public
duties of the State personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence.” Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b). A plaintiff can overcome a defendant’s MTCA
immunity, however, by showing that the defendant acted with malice or gross negligence.
See Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 124 (4th Cir. 2018).
Maryland courts have consistently defined “malice” as “conduct characterized by
evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, knowing and deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or
fraud.” Barbre v. Pope, 935 A.2d 699, 714 (Md. 2007) (citation modified). Gross
negligence is “an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the
consequences as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless
disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them.” Id. at 717.
Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that Daubach acted with gross negligence
towards Krikstan’s safety and wellbeing. As a Corrections Officer, Daubach had a duty
under the Eighth Amendment to protect Krikstan from violence at the hands of other
prisoners or corrections staff. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). As such,
his decision not to interfere as he watched Warren beat Krikstan, who was lying on his side
on the floor in handcuffs, “implies a thoughtless disregard of the consequences” sufficient
to raise a plausible inference of gross negligence. Barbre, 935 A.2d at 717; (see Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 22–24). On these facts, the Court finds that the MTCA does not bar Krikstan’s
claim against Daubach. Accordingly, the Court will deny his Motion to Dismiss and Count
Five shall proceed against Daubach in his personal capacity.
3. Warden Darden’s Motion to Dismiss
Krikstan asserts three claims against Warden Darden for supervisory liability under
Section 1983 (Count Two), negligent supervision and retention (Count Three), and cruel
and unusual punishment under Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
(Count Five). (Am. Compl. at 10–12, 14). The Warden argues that these claims should be
dismissed because: (1) Krikstan failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) Krikstan
fails to state a claim for supervisory liability under Section 1983; and (3) Darden is entitled
to immunity under the MTCA. (Darden Mot. at 9–19). At bottom, the Court will grant
Darden’s Motion to Dismiss Counts Two, Three, and Five.
a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Darden first asserts that Krikstan is barred from bringing his Section 1983 claims
because he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Id. at 9–11). The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner . . . until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Administrative remedies are deemed unavailable, however, when “prison administrators
thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644 (2016).
Here, Krikstan alleges that Defendants thwarted his ability to pursue his
administrative remedies by destroying evidence and conspiring to cover up their
misconduct. (Am. Compl. ¶ 29; Opp’n Darden Mot. at 6–7). To that end, he requests that
the Court defer the issue of administrative exhaustion until the completion of discovery as
evidence concerning the Defendants’ prohibitive conduct is within the State’s possession.
(Id. at 7). Because there appears to be a genuine dispute as to whether Defendants’
misrepresentations rendered the administrative remedy process unavailable to Krikstan,
“the Court finds that it would be premature and improper to assess the merits of [Darden’s]
administrative exhaustion defense without first providing a reasonable opportunity for
discovery.” Gilliam v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., No. MJM-23-1047, 2024 WL
5186706, at *7 (D.Md. Dec. 20, 2024).
b. Supervisory Liability under Section 1983
Even if Krikstan properly exhausted his federal claims, Darden argues that his
Section 1983 claim for supervisory liability would still fail because Krikstan does not
allege sufficient facts to state a claim. (Darden Mot. at 11–12). The Court agrees, for the
reasons discussed below, and will dismiss Count Two.
Liability of supervisory officials “is not based on ordinary principles of respondeat
superior, but rather is premised on ‘a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit
authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional
injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.’” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228,
235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)). To state
a claim for supervisory liability under Section 1983 based on a subordinate’s conduct, the
plaintiff must allege that (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that the
subordinate’s conduct “posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to
citizens like the plaintiff;” (2) the supervisor responded in a manner that was so inadequate
that it showed “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization” of the subordinate’s
conduct; and (3) there was “an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction”
and the plaintiff’s constitutional injury. Timpson by & through Timpson v. Anderson Cnty.
Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31 F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Shaw v.
Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)).
Here, the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege any of these three elements.
Rather, in a conclusory manner, Krikstan restates each element without identifying any
prior incidents involving Warren, any prior grievances related to the excessive use of force
involving Warren, or any disciplinary findings that would have put the Warden on notice
of any pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm to Krikstan, or any other inmate. (See Am.
Compl. at 10–11; Darden Mot. at 12). Under federal pleading standards, such “naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[s]” are insufficient to state a claim.
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Cf. McCarter v. Univ. of N.C.at Chapel Hill, No. 1:20-CV-1050, 2021 WL
4482983, at *14 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2021) (finding plaintiff adequately alleged
supervisory liability because plaintiff alleged supervisor was informed by a third party of
subordinates’ ongoing racial harassment toward plaintiff, yet responded by taking no action
whatsoever against subordinates). Therefore, the Court finds that Krikstan fails to plausibly
allege his Section 1983 claim of supervisory liability and Count Two will be dismissed
with prejudice.5
c. Statutory Immunity
As to the remaining State law counts against Darden (Counts Three and Five), the
Warden argues that she is immune under the MTCA. (Darden Mot. at 17–19). At bottom,
the Court agrees with Darden and will dismiss Counts Three and Five.
5 Because Krikstan fails to state any violation of a federal statutory or constitutional
right against Darden, the Court need not address Darden’s qualified immunity argument.
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (where no constitutional violation is shown,
there is no requirement for further inquiry regarding qualified immunity).
As discussed earlier, under the MTCA, State personnel are afforded statutory
immunity for “intentional torts and constitutional torts as long as they were committed
within the scope of state employment and without malice or gross negligence.” Lee v.
Cline, 863 A.2d 297, 304 (Md. 2004).
Turning first to Krikstan’s negligent supervision claim (Count Three), the Court
finds that this claim is barred because the MTCA confers state personnel “with qualified
immunity from negligence actions” such as this. McDaniel v. Maryland, No. RDB-10-189,
2010 WL 3260007, at *10 (D.Md. Aug. 18, 2010) (summarily dismissing negligence claim
against correctional officers under MTCA because a plaintiff may only maintain claims
against state personnel that are based upon allegations of malice or gross negligence).
With respect to Krikstan’s State constitutional claim for violation of Articles 16 and
25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count Five), a plaintiff can overcome a
defendant’s MTCA immunity by showing that the defendant acted with malice or gross
negligence. See Thomas v. Maryland, No. GJH-17-1739, 2017 WL 6547733, at *9 (D.Md.
Dec. 20, 2017) (dismissing claims against state officials under MTCA because complaint
contained no allegations of malice or gross negligence). But to do so, a plaintiff must allege
with some particularity those facts that make defendant’s conduct malicious or grossly
negligent. See Cooper v. Doyle, No. DKC-22-52, 2022 WL 16923857, at *3 (D.Md. Nov.
14, 2022) (citing Elliott v. Kupferman, 473 A.2d 960, 969 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1984)).
Here, as Darden aptly points out, Krikstan’s Amended Complaint fails to identify
any specific conduct that shows the Warden acted with the requisite carelessness or intent.
(Reply Supp. Darden Mot. at 9–10, ECF No. 66; see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60–62). In anticipation
of this argument, Krikstan states that “development of the record through discovery and
trial will show whether [he] ultimately can prove that Darden’s conduct was grossly
negligent.” (Opp’n Darden Mot. at 11). While this may be true, Krikstan has not alleged
any facts at this stage that plausibly permit an inference of gross negligence or malice on
the part of the Warden that would justify discovery. Put simply, Krikstan’s vague assertions
are insufficient, and the Court will deny Krikstan’s request for discovery. See, e.g., Hamel
v. Phelan, No. BAH-24-2134, 2026 WL 84391, at *6 (D.Md. Jan. 12, 2026) (denying
request for discovery because plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts that, if taken as true,
would show immunity did not apply). Accordingly, the Court finds that Darden is entitled
to immunity under the MTCA and will dismiss Counts Three and Five without prejudice.
See Howe v. Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., No. GLR-24-1896, 2024 WL
4825782, at *6 (D.Md. Nov. 19, 2024) (finding that defendant prison officials were entitled
to MTCA immunity against plaintiff’s claim under the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
Articles 16 and 25 because plaintiff failed to allege prison officials acted with reckless
disregard or malice).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the State’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 42), deny Daubach’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 46), and grant Darden’s Motion to
Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 56), which the
Court construes as a Motion to Dismiss. A separate Order follows.
Entered this 15th day of July, 2026.
/s/ .
George L. Russell, III
Chief United States District Judge