Perry

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DOMENEQUE PERRY, }

}

Plaintiff, }

}

v. } Case No.: 2:25-02053-MHH

}

AARON SIMS, et al., }

}

Defendants. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Domeneque Perry has sued three City of Irondale officials—

City Councilman Aaron Sims, City Attorney April B. Danielson, and Mayor James

D. Stewart, Jr.,—for alleged failures to respond appropriately to her communications

and requests. Ms. Perry has filed second and third amended complaints (Docs. 8,

18), and twenty-four motions or notices, (Docs. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22,

23, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41). This order addresses Ms.

Perry’s pending filings. The Court begins this opinion with the legal standard that

governs a district court’s review of a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Then,

consistent with that standard, the Court summarizes Ms. Perry’s factual allegations

in the light most favorable to her. The Court then considers whether Ms. Perry has

stated a valid claim for relief in her complaints. Finally, the Court addresses Ms.

Perry’s motions.

***

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), a federal court must dismiss a pro se

action that “is frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted.” When reviewing a pro se complaint pursuant to § 1915, a district court

must hold complaints written by pro se litigants to a less stringent standard than

pleadings drafted by attorneys. Jacob v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, 40 F.4th 1329,

1334 (11th Cir. 2022). Though a district court must be lenient in its review of a pro

se pleading, a district court “cannot act as de facto counsel or rewrite an otherwise

deficient pleading to sustain an action.” Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911

(11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Generally, a district court accepts the factual

allegations in a pro se complaint as true and construes the allegations in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, but a court must not accept unsupported legal

conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The facts a plaintiff

alleges “must allow [the Court] to ‘draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Jastram v. NextEra Energy, Inc., 161 F.4th

693, 706 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

***

In her complaints, Ms. Perry alleges that she has requested official

proclamations and funding from City of Irondale officials, and the officials denied

or ignored her requests. For example, on December 1, 2024, Ms. Perry asked the

City of Irondale to issue a military and birthday proclamation for her daughter, an

active-duty member of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Ramstein, Germany. (Doc.

18, p. 3, 9, ¶¶ 1, 67). Ms. Perry’s daughter’s birthday was in late December. (Doc.

18, p. 3, ¶ 6). Ms. Perry sent additional messages to Irondale officials but did not

receive a substantive response until January 12, 2025, when City Councilman Aaron

Sims responded via email. (Doc. 18, pp. 3–4, ¶¶ 2–9). According to Ms. Perry, Mr.

Sims explained that he had not seen Ms. Perry’s email earlier because he was

travelling and not replying to email messages, and he indicated that Ms. Perry’s

request was not “feasible or warranted.” (Doc. 18, p. 4, ¶ 12). Councilman Sims

“express[ed] his [own] struggles with being heard about . . . military recognition”

and asked Ms. Perry “for her support on future military recognitions.” (Doc. 18, p.

4, ¶ 12).1

On May 18, 2025, Ms. Perry requested a $5,000 donation from Irondale to

sponsor her children’s picture book, The Brave Little Panther, and a related

nonprofit Ms. Perry had formed. (Doc. 18, pp. 4–5, ¶¶ 15–19). Ms. Perry included

an invitation to her book signing in Birmingham. (Doc. 18, pp. 5–6, ¶¶ 18, 32).2

Councilman Sims denied the request for a donation, saying that it would not be an

1 The quotes above and below are from Ms. Perry’s summaries of the emails.

2 It is not entirely clear whether Ms. Perry requested the donation to finance the book signing, but

her account of the defendants’ responses seems to indicate that the defendants interpreted Ms.

Perry’s request that way.

appropriate “use of Irondale public funds.” (Doc. 18, p. 5, ¶ 20). Ms. Perry then

reached out to Sherry Berry, the director of the Irondale Chamber, asking what “the

protocol [was] to receive the $5,000 to The Brave Little Panther nonprofit.” (Doc.

18, p. 6, ¶ 29). Ms. Berry “sent a formal denial stating that the request had been

denied due to it not meeting their criteria, . . . building community and education.”

(Doc. 18, p. 6, ¶ 30). In June 2025, Ms. Perry requested reconsideration, and

Councilman Sims explained that Irondale could not fund her book signing because

it was not in Irondale, and Irondale funds could only “service contract[s] that

benefit[] the citizens of Irondale.” (Doc. 18, p. 6, ¶¶ 31–32).3

On July 3, 2025, Ms. Perry submitted a “service agreement proposal” that

asked Irondale to pay her $49,980 for providing “500 books for each elementary and

middle school . . . at $24.99 per book.” (Doc. 18, p. 3, ¶ 33). On July 14, 2025,

Councilman Sims informed Ms. Perry that this request would need to be presented

at a public meeting of Irondale’s city council. (Doc. 18, p. 6, ¶ 35). Ms. Perry asked

to have her request placed on the agenda for the next meeting on July 15. (Doc. 18,

3 Between Ms. Perry’s initial and renewed donation requests, Ms. Perry sent two emails to

Irondale’s city council about Irondale’s finances. (Doc. 18, pp. 5–6, ¶¶ 22–28). The first email

referenced allegations in the news that Irondale was spending too much too quickly on unprofitable

investments. (Doc. 18, pp. 5–6, ¶¶ 22–25). In her second email, Ms. Perry referenced an FBI

report, but it is unclear whether Ms. Perry submitted a report to the FBI or if Ms. Perry learned

about an FBI report through the news. (Doc. 18, p. 5, ¶¶ 26–27). Ms. Perry requested documents

about the city’s finances or the FBI report, and Councilman Sims denied the request, stating “that

the city can’t provide documents that do not exist.” (Doc. 18, p. 5, ¶ 27).

p. 6, ¶¶ 3–36).

April Danielson, an attorney for Irondale, replied to this request. (Doc. 18, p.

7, ¶¶ 37–38). Ms. Danielson explained that the deadline to add agenda items for the

July 15 meeting had passed and that the earliest the city council could consider Ms.

Perry’s request would be at the August 5 city council meeting. (Doc. 18, p. 7, ¶¶

37–41). Ms. Perry asked for her request to be placed on the agenda for the August

5 city council meeting, and Ms. Danielson confirmed that she added the request to

the August agenda as a “public comments” item. (Doc. 18, p. 7, ¶¶ 42–44). Ms.

Perry informed Ms. Danielson that she would not attend the meeting but would

watch the meeting on YouTube. (Doc. 18, p. 7, ¶ 45). Ms. Danielson and Ms. Perry

discussed whether Irondale’s municipal code required physical attendance to present

requests. (Doc. 18, p. 7, ¶¶ 46–47). Unable to resolve the issue, “[Ms.] Danielson

offered another date for the meeting and [Ms. Perry] declined.” (Doc. 18, p. 7, ¶

48).

Ms. Perry watched the August 5 meeting on YouTube. (Doc. 18, p. 7, 15 48–

49, 53). At the meeting, Irondale denied Ms. Perry’s written proposal, partly due to

how it was written. (Doc. 18, p. 8, ¶ 49). At the meeting, the City issued a

proclamation to another business for its sale of hamburgers. (Doc. 18, p. 8, ¶ 50).

Ms. Perry asserts that the city wanted her to attend the August 5 meeting in person

to humiliate her by denying her service agreement request and then making her

watch the sort of celebratory proclamation that the city had denied her daughter.

(Doc. 18, p. 8, ¶ 51).

On August 16, 2025, Ms. Perry renewed her request for a “service agreement,”

this time asking for $63,000.79 “due to plaintiff having more of an accurate account

of students that had enrolled” in Irondale schools. (Doc. 18, p. 8, ¶¶ 54–55). The

defendants did not respond to this request or Ms. Perry’s follow-up messages. (Doc.

18, p. 8, ¶¶ 57–59).

“By September 2025, [Ms. Perry] had achieved significant local and national

success with her book, The Brave Little Panther, receiving multiple accolades,

including public awards, billboard recognition, placement in Jefferson County

libraries, Birmingham Parent Magazine full cover, and placement []and book signing

at the Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport.” (Doc. 18, pp. 8–9, ¶ 61).

Ms. Perry requested a proclamation for her book at the Irondale public library’s

opening. (Doc. 18, p. 9, ¶ 62). Irondale did not respond. (Doc. 18, p. 9, ¶ 62).

On October 15, 2025, Ms. Perry submitted a bar complaint against Ms.

Danielson. (Doc. 18, p. 10, ¶¶ 76–77). The Alabama State Bar denied this complaint

and Ms. Perry’s subsequent request for reconsideration. (Doc. 18, pp. 10–11, ¶¶ 77–

89).

In November 2025, “as [Ms. Perry’s] daughter’s 21st birthday was

approaching,” Ms. Perry again requested a military and birthday proclamation for

her daughter as well as an apology letter. (Doc. 18, p. 9, ¶ 63). Ms. Danielson denied

Ms. Perry’s request without addressing its substance, instead referencing “unrelated

prior correspondence” and “previous denial[s]” related to Ms. Perry’s book and non-

profit. (Doc. 18, p. 9, ¶¶ 64–65). Ms. Perry told Ms. Danielson “that this [request]

was not book or non-profit related,” but Ms. Danielson still did not respond. (Doc.

18, p. 9, ¶ 65). In the same email chain, Councilman Sims “responded dismissively

and requested [Ms. Perry’s] daughter’s direct contact information,” which Ms. Perry

refused to give because she “and her daughter maintain an agreement that all external

communications be directed to Plaintiff due to military scheduling constraints.”

(Doc. 18, p. 9, ¶¶ 66–67). Councilman Sims found Ms. Perry’s daughter’s contact

info and contacted Ms. Perry’s daughter. (Doc. 18, p. 9, ¶ 68). Ms. Perry sent a

cease-and-desist letter. (Doc. 18, p. 9, ¶ 69).

Ms. Perry alleges that she copied James D. Stewart, Jr., the mayor of Irondale,

on her communications with Mr. Sims and Ms. Danielson, yet Mayor Stewart did

not respond or supervise Mr. Sims or Ms. Danielson. (Doc. 18, pp. 2–3, 6, 8–9, 12–

13, ¶¶ 31, 59, 62, 74).

On December 1, 2025, Ms. Perry filed this action. (Doc. 1). The Clerk of

Court randomly assigned the case to Chief Magistrate Judge John H. England, III.

On December 19, 2025, Judge England dismissed Ms. Perry’s original complaint

and instructed her to replead. (Doc. 5). Judge England described deficiencies in Ms.

Perry’s complaint and provided guidance for repleading. (Doc. 5).

On December 29, 2025, Ms. Perry amended her complaint. (Doc. 6). On

January 6, 2026, Judge England dismissed Ms. Perry’s amended complaint. (Doc.

7). Judge England explained that the amended complaint did not comply with the

instructions in his order and did not state a valid claim for relief. Judge England

again instructed Ms. Perry to amend her complaint and advised Ms. Perry that

“[f]ailure to follow the instructions in the order to amend may result in the

dismissal of some or all of Ms. Perry’s claims without further notice.” (Doc. 7,

p. 3) (bold and underline in original).

On January 12, 2026, Ms. Perry filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. 8).

Ms. Perry later filed a motion for a status conference. (Doc. 9).

On February 18, 2026, Judge England entered a reassignment order. (Doc.

10). In the reassignment order, Judge England explained that Ms. Perry’s second

amended complaint did not comply with prior court orders and did not cure many of

the deficiencies in her prior complaints. Because Judge England lacked dispositive

jurisdiction to close the case, he directed the Clerk of Court to reassign the case to a

district judge. (Doc. 5, p. 5). After reassignment, Ms. Perry filed twenty-four

motions or notices, (Docs. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31,

32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41), a third amended complaint, (Doc. 18), and a

petition for a writ of mandamus, (Doc. 19).4

In her second and third amended complaints, Ms. Perry has raised claims of

First Amendment retaliation, violations of procedural due process, negligence,

wantonness, tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

breach of ministerial duties against Mr. Sims, Ms. Danielson, and Mayor Stewart.

(Doc. 8, pp. 7–9; Doc. 18, pp. 11–16).

***

Ms. Perry alleges that the defendants retaliated against her in violation of her

First Amendment rights. (Doc. 18, pp. 11–12). She alleges her protected speech

includes: (1) requests for proclamations, (2) requests for sponsorship and service

agreements, and (3) criticism of Irondale. (Doc. 18, p. 11). Ms. Perry alleges five

different kinds of retaliatory activity: “denial of [her] proclamation requests without

[a] neutral explanation,” denial of sponsorship and service agreements, shifting or

selectively enforced procedural requirements, unresponsiveness, and contact with

her daughter. (Doc. 18, p. 12).

To state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that “(1) the plaintiff engaged in constitutionally protected speech, such

4 The Court did not give Ms. Perry permission to file a third amended complaint. Under Rule 15,

“[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course” within certain time limits. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15. A plaintiff must obtain permission from a district court for additional amendments.

Thus, Rule 15 provides an independent basis for rejecting Ms. Perry’s third amended complaint.

as his right to petition the government for redress; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory

conduct adversely affected that protected speech and right to petition; and (3) a

causal connection exists between the defendant’s retaliatory conduct and the adverse

effect on the plaintiff’s speech and right to petition.” Huggins v. Sch. Dist. of

Manatee Cnty., 151 F.4th 1268, 1281 (11th Cir. 2025) (internal brackets omitted)

(quoting DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019)).

Retaliatory conduct adversely affects protected speech if the conduct “would

likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment

rights.” Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 481 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bennett v.

Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1254 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated in part on other grounds

by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–43 (2009)). For example, courts have

found that arrest, criminal prosecution, use of force, or adverse employment actions

(such as firing, transferring, or failing to promote a public employee) may qualify as

retaliatory conduct. See, e.g., Hall v. Merola, 67 F.4th 1282, 1294 (11th Cir. 2023)

(collecting cases). A plaintiff must show more than “de minimis inconvenience to

her exercise of First Amendment rights.” Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1252 (citation

omitted).

Although not necessarily an absolute rule, a plaintiff generally cannot state a

claim for retaliation based on a defendant official’s speech. Compare DeMartini v.

Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1289 n.8 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted)

(“[S]pecial concerns arise when an official’s ‘own First Amendment rights are

implicated’ in the commission of an alleged constitutional tort.”), Ziegler v. Martin

Cnty. Sch. Dist., 831 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding no

retaliation where student was summoned into dean’s office so school officials could

express their displeasure at student saying negative things to media about school, but

school did not otherwise punish student), and Benedek v. Adams, 725 Fed. Appx.

755, 761 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding no retaliation where defendant stated to media

that plaintiff’s allegations were frivolous), with Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson,

595 U.S. 468, 469, 478–83 (2022) (citations omitted) (noting that “[i]t may be . . .

that government officials who reprimand or censure students, employees, or

licensees may in some circumstances materially impair First Amendment freedoms,”

while finding that school board’s formal censure of board member could not qualify

as retaliation for board member’s speech because the First Amendment “cannot be

used as a weapon to silence other representatives seeking to” exercise their own First

Amendment rights), and Huggins v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty., 151 F.4th 1268,

1281–83 (11th Cir. 2025) (considering, in determining that plaintiff had adequately

alleged retaliation, the public “humiliat[ion]” of “being ordered out of a meeting

room by a chief of security and a police officer” in addition to “a credible threat of

arrest” and accompanying use of force).

For causation, “[i]t is not enough to show that an official acted with a

retaliatory motive and that the plaintiff was injured—the motive must cause the

injury. Specifically, it must be a ‘but-for’ cause, meaning that the adverse action

against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.”

Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398–99 (2019) (emphasis in original) (citation

omitted). In other words, “action colored by some degree of bad motive does not

amount to a constitutional tort if that action would have been taken anyway.”

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006).5 If the plaintiff complains of an action

taken by a municipal council, the plaintiff must show that “a majority of the members

of the [municipal council] acted with an unconstitutional, retaliatory motive,” Bates

v. Islamorada, Vill. of Islands, 243 Fed. Appx. 494, 496 (11th Cir. 2007), or at least

that those who acted with retaliatory motives were the deciding votes. “Because

producing direct evidence of an official’s inner motivations is often not possible,

[courts] have relied on circumstantial evidence to establish the causal link.”

Huggins, 151 F.4th at 1282. Although not dispositive, one circumstantial factor

courts may consider is the temporal proximity between plaintiff’s speech and the

alleged retaliation. Huggins, 151 F.4th at 1282–83.

Here, each of the retaliatory acts Ms. Perry alleges fails to meet the second

5 If the plaintiff alleges that the defendant retaliated by instituting legal proceedings against the

plaintiff, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had no probable cause to take the action, a

higher bar than but-for causation. See, e.g., DeMartini, 942 F.3d at 1288–309 (extending rule

previously applied in criminal settings to defendant town’s filing of a civil lawsuit).

and/or third elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim, a sufficiently adverse

action and causation.

For example, Ms. Perry has not linked her requests for Irondale to issue

military and birthday proclamations for her daughter to an adverse action. For

starters, because Ms. Perry has not alleged she engaged in protected activity prior to

her first request for a proclamation, Irondale officials’ first denial cannot be

interpreted as a form of retaliation. Because Ms. Perry has not identified a relevant

change in town policy between her first and second requests for a proclamation, no

reasonable juror could find that Irondale would have granted Ms. Perry’s second

request for a proclamation but for Ms. Perry’s First Amendment activities. Nor

would a denial of a celebratory proclamation deter a person of ordinary firmness

from exercising First Amendment rights. The same analysis applies to Ms. Perry’s

requests for a proclamation celebrating her authorship—denial of this sort of

proclamation would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising First

Amendment rights. Thus, Ms. Perry has not stated a claim based on town officials’

denial of her proclamation requests.

Ms. Perry’s claim for retaliation based on Irondale’s denial of sponsorship

does not include plausible allegations of causation. Ms. Berry and Mr. Sims told

Ms. Perry that Irondale could not sponsor her book signing because it was not in

Irondale and was not the type of activity the town could fund. (Doc. 18, p. 6, ¶¶ 30,

32). Ms. Perry has not alleged that this rationale was pretextual. Ms. Perry has not

given an example of Irondale deviating from this norm.

Ms. Perry cannot state a First Amendment retaliation claim based on the

City’s alleged “shifting or selectively enforced procedural requirements” for

obtaining a service agreement with the city, (Doc. 18, p. 12), because she has not

pleaded facts from which a factfinder could conclude that a procedural requirement

was “shifting or selectively enforced.” Ms. Perry has not shown, for example, that

the requirement that she submit a proposal before a city council meeting was unusual

or unreasonable or that other citizens were not required to submit proposals before

city council meetings or to attend the meetings to advocate for their proposals.

Irondale’s municipal code requires advance notice of proposals and contemplates in-

person attendance:

Any person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or

other entity desiring to have the city council formally

consider a matter or to address the city council at a regular

or pre-council meeting must first make written request or

application with the city clerk by 5:00 p.m. on the Tuesday

preceding the city council meeting on the following

Tuesday. The purpose of such written request or

application is to provide members of the city council with

advance notice of the presentation and then afford them

the opportunity to study and investigate the matter prior to

the meeting. The [president of the city council or other]

presiding officer shall determine if a matter should be

considered an agenda item or if it can be properly

presented under public comments to the council.

. . . .

There may be allotted a maximum of 30 minutes, after

council approval of the agenda, for any citizen or other

party in interest to present comments to the council on any

matter appearing on the agenda, subject to the discretion

of the presiding officer. . . . Public comments shall be

limited to two minutes per individual speaking.

. . . .

Comments of the public prior to adjournment is an

opportunity for the public to inform the council of matters

the public is concerned about, action desired and

conditions or situations existing in the city of which the

public feels the council should be aware and consider

addressing. Public comments shall be limited to two

minutes per individual speaking.

Irondale, Ala., Mun. Code. § 2-156(a), (f), (g) (Feb. 2026),

https://library.municode.com/al/irondale/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COO

R_CH2AD_ARTIVMACO_DIV2COME_S2-156AG. In addition, Ms. Perry

admits that Ms. Danielson offered to move consideration of Ms. Perry’s proposal to

a later city council meeting that Ms. Perry would be able to attend in-person; Ms.

Perry refused. (Doc. 18, p. 7, ¶ 48). Accordingly, at most, Ms. Perry has pled a “de

minimis inconvenience,” not an action which would deter a person of ordinary

firmness from exercising their First Amendment Rights. Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1252.

Accordingly, Ms. Perry cannot show causation for her claim that the

defendants retaliated against her by denying her service agreement proposal. Ms.

Perry’s failure to follow Irondale’s procedural requirements provided an

independent, non-retaliatory reason for the denial. Causation is also lacking because

Ms. Perry has not pleaded that “a majority of the members of the [city council] acted

with an unconstitutional, retaliatory motive,” Bates, 243 Fed. Appx. at 496, or at

least that those who acted with alleged retaliatory motives were the deciding votes.

Irondale has five city council members. Irondale, Ala., Mun. Code. § 2-

132 (Feb. 2026). Mr. Sims is the only defendant who is a city council member. Ms.

Perry has not alleged that the four non-defendant city council members had

retaliatory motives. Thus, Ms. Perry cannot show that Mr. Sims’s or the other

defendants’ actions caused the city council to deny her request.

Ms. Perry cannot base a First Amendment retaliation claim on defendant’s

unresponsiveness because unresponsiveness would not deter a person of ordinary

firmness from exercising their First Amendment rights. Similarly, Ms. Perry cannot

base a First Amendment retaliation claim on defendants’ contact with her daughter.

This contact would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising their

First Amendment rights. In addition, finding a First Amendment violation in this

circumstance would improperly restrict public officials’ own First Amendment

rights to say what they wish to whom they wish.

Accordingly, Ms. Perry has not pleaded a valid First Amendment retaliation

claim.

The Court dismisses Ms. Perry’s due process claim for the reasons stated in

Judge England’s prior orders. (Docs. 5, 7, 10). Ms. Perry’s third amended complaint

has not cured the deficiencies identified by Judge England in the second amended

complaint. Ms. Perry’s procedural due process claim fails because she has not

shown that she had a constitutionally-protected property or liberty interest in

receiving any of the items she requested from Irondale or the defendants.

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Perry’s

state-law claims for negligence, wantonness, and breach of ministerial duty. Under

28 U.S.C 1367(c)(3), “the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim . . . [if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which

it has original jurisdiction.” The Court lacks original jurisdiction over Ms. Perry’s

negligence, wantonness, and breach of ministerial duty claims because these claims

arise under state law, and Ms. Perry has not pled a basis for diversity jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.6

***

The Court denies as moot Ms. Perry’s motions for status conferences and

status updates, (Docs. 9, 13, 25), motion for clarification, (Doc. 12), motion to

require notice of appearance by identified counsel, (Doc. 14), motion to withdraw

consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction, (Doc. 15), motion for limited discovery and

for issuance of subpoena duces tecum to the Alabama state bar, (Doc. 16), motion

6 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs, and is between[] (1) citizens of different states. . . .” Ms. Perry and the defendants appear

to be citizens of Alabama.

to initiate service of process, (Doc. 17), motion for permission to file electronically

using the CM/ECF system, (Doc. 20), motion to submit memorandum opinion and

order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and proposed order to facilitate service of

process, (Doc. 22), motion for limited discovery and for issuance of subpoena duces

tecum to the United States Air Force, (Doc. 23), motion requesting the court to

proceed with service of process and to conclude pending preliminary matters, (Doc.

31), motion to supplement the record with exhibit index and exhibits, (Doc. 34),

motion to supplement the record, (Doc. 36), motion to supplement record to support

Count I federal retaliation, (Doc. 37), motion to supplement the record with an

exhibit-claim correlation table and memorandum of law rebutting qualified

immunity, state-agent immunity, and satisfying the ordinary firmness test, (Doc. 38),

emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, (Doc.

39), and motion regarding compliance with the court’s reassignment order and

amended complaint, (Doc. 40). Although styled as a motion, Ms. Perry’s “motion

advising court of related appellate filing” does not ask the Court to take action and

is thus a notice. (Doc. 21). Ms. Perry’s “notice to the district court of appellate

motions filed and request for immediate record entry” likewise does not ask the

Court to take an action other than docketing the notice. (Doc. 27). Ms. Perry’s

request for a refund of PACER fees incurred to date, (Doc. 25, p. 2; Doc. 29), is

denied because a plaintiff can prosecute their case without incurring PACER fees.

Pro se litigants receive one free electronic copy of filings and can view case

information for free at courthouse public access terminals. Ms. Perry’s “notice of

clarification regarding filed amended complaint on March 4th, 2026 and statements

in support of plausibility,’ (Doc. 30), and “memorandum of law regarding

defendants’ anticipated defenses to plaintiff's amended complaint,” (Doc. 41),

pertain to claims that the Court has addressed in this order.

2K 3

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Ms. Perry’s federal claims for failure to state

a claim and for failure to follow court orders. The Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Perry’s state law claims. The Clerk of Court

shall please TERM all pending motions and close this case. The Clerk of Court shall

please mail a copy of this order to the mailing address Ms. Perry has provided.

DONE and ORDERED this August 3, 2026.

debi Si Hosa

Madi SO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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