CLINE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

BUCCIE CLINE III,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:25cv2684/TKW/ZCB

DEPUTY BANKS, et al.,

Defendants.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this

case by filing a civil rights complaint. The Court informed Plaintiff of

deficiencies in his previous two complaints and ordered him to file a

second amended complaint. (Docs. 4, 6). Plaintiff has now filed a second

amended complaint. (Doc. 8).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is

required to review the second amended complaint to determine whether

this action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Having reviewed the second

amended complaint, the Court believes dismissal of Plaintiff’s excessive

force claim (Claim 2) is warranted for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1

I. Plaintiff’s Allegations2

Plaintiff names two Defendants in the second amended complaint:

(1) Deputy Banks, and (2) Deputy Swoboda. (Doc. 8 at 3). Both are from

the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that on

August 12, 2023, he was “stopped or parked” in a parking lot at Pensacola

Beach. (Id. at 9). Defendant Banks informed Plaintiff that the registered

owner of the vehicle’s license had been suspended. (Id.).

Plaintiff “questioned the basis for the encounter and requested a

supervisor.” (Id.). Defendant Banks then ordered Plaintiff to get out of

the vehicle. (Id.). Plaintiff responded by “question[ing] the legality of the

order.” (Id.). Defendant Banks then forcibly removed Plaintiff from the

vehicle. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Banks forced

1 The Court previously advised Plaintiff of deficiencies with his excessive

force claim and provided him with an opportunity to amend. (Doc. 6 at

6-7). Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint, but the excessive

force claim remains deficient. Thus, dismissal of that claim is warranted.

See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating

that “[o]rdinarily, a party must be given at least one opportunity to

amend before the district court dismisses the complaint”).

2 Because this case is at the pleading stage, the Court assumes the truth

of Plaintiff’s allegations. DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285, 288 n.1 (2024).

Plaintiff’s arm behind him and twisted his arm in an excessive manner,

which resulted in pain. (Id.).

Plaintiff was then placed under arrest for driving on a suspended

license and resisting arrest without violence. (Id.). Next, Defendant

Swoboda arrived. The two officers allegedly proceeded to search

Plaintiff’s vehicle without his consent or a warrant. (Id. at 10). According

to Plaintiff, the search yielded no contraband. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that

the charges against him were later dismissed. (Id.). And he claims that

he sought medical treatment through the VA for shoulder pain resulting

from the arrest. (Id. at 11).

In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff claims he suffered the

following Fourth Amendment violations: (1) “Unlawful Seizure/Arrest”

against Defendant Banks; (2) “Excessive Force” against Defendant

Banks; and (3) “Unlawful Vehicle Search” against Defendants Banks and

Swoboda. (Id. at 12-13). As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

(Id. at 14).

II. Statutory Screening Standard

To survive dismissal at the screening phase, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plausibility standard is

met only where the facts alleged enable “the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Plausibility means “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely

consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up).

III. Discussion

In Claim 2 of the second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Banks violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive

force when he pulled Plaintiff out of the car and bent his arm behind him.

(Doc. 8 at 12-13). “Officers are permitted to use some force to effectuate

an arrest.” Bolton v. Sheriff of Coweta Cnty., __ F.4th __, 2026 WL

1429373, at *4 (11th Cir. May 21, 2026). “The use of de minimis force

does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. “For even minor offenses,

permissible force includes physical restraint, use of handcuffs, and

pushing into walls.” Id. (cleaned up).

Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Defendant Banks

used de minimis force to effectuate Plaintiff’s arrest when he pulled

Plaintiff from his vehicle and twisted his arm behind his back. Indeed,

courts have repeatedly rejected similar excessive force claims. See, e.g.,

Bolton, __ F.4th at __ , 2026 WL 1429373, at *4 (holding deputy used de

minimis force when he “removed [plaintiff] from his vehicle, laid him on

the ground, put his knee on his back, and handcuffed his hands behind

his back”); Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 740 (11th Cir. 2010)

(finding de minimis force was used when an officer grabbed a suspect’s

arm, twisted it around his back, jerked it up high to the shoulder, and

then handcuffed him); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir.

2000) (holding the amount of force used by the arresting officer when he

grabbed plaintiff from behind, threw him against a van, kneed him in the

back, searched his groin area in an uncomfortable manner, and

handcuffed him was de minimis and “the application of de minimis force,

without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of

the Fourth Amendment.”); Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1327-28

(11th Cir. 2013) (finding excessive force was not used by officer who

grabbed the plaintiff by the arm, forced him to the ground, and then

placed him in handcuffs). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly

allege a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant

Banks.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant Banks

(Claim 2) be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

2. This matter be returned to the undersigned for further

proceedings regarding Plaintiff’s remaining claims (Claims 1

and 3).

At Pensacola, Florida, this 23rd day of June 2026.

/s/

Zachary C. Bolitho

United States Magistrate Judge

Notice to the Parties

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must

be filed within fourteen days of the date of the Report and

Recommendation. Any different deadline that may appear on the

electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not

control. An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on all

other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s

findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation

waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28

U.S.C. § 636.