Belgrove

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ROSEMARY BELGROVE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 26-332

FIDELITY BANK SECTION: “J”(4)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendant Fidelity Bank’s Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 9)

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pro se Plaintiff,

Rosemary Belgrove, opposed the motion (Rec. Doc. 11), and Fidelity filed a reply

memorandum (Rec. Doc. 12). Having considered the motion and legal memoranda,

the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that Fidelity Bank’s motion to

dismiss should be GRANTED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In February of 2025, Plaintiff, Rosemary Belgrove, submitted an online

application requesting pre-approval for $1.5 million in “mortgage credit” to NOLA

Lending Group, which was a division of Fidelity Bank at the time. (Rec. Doc. 3, at

¶ 5). In her First Amended Verified Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she expressly

denied authorization for Fidelity to obtain her consumer credit report. Plaintiff

brought this action against Fidelity in February of 2026, claiming violations of the

Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”).

Her primary allegations are that Fidelity accessed her consumer credit report

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without her authorization, and that when Fidelity decided to deny her loan

application, Fidelity failed to provide her with a lawful adverse action notice. Plaintiff

contends that Fidelity’s actions caused her concrete injury consisting of “(a) invasion

of privacy interests protected by federal statute; (b) impairment of credit opportunity;

and (c) loss of statutory consumer protections intended to govern and constrain credit

decision-making.” Id. at ¶ 20.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead sufficient

facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim

is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The

factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[D]etailed factual allegations” are

not required, but the pleading must present “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court must

accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of the plaintiff. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).

However, “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual

conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Beavers v. Metro. Life Ins.

Co., 566 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

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DISCUSSION

A. CLAIM UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

“Congress enacted FCRA in 1970 to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting,

promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins.

Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681). The Act primarily

governs the conduct of consumer credit reporting agencies, but it also prohibits any

person or entity from using or obtaining a consumer credit report for an

impermissible purpose, as defined by the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. To state a claim

for impermissible obtainment or use of a credit report, a plaintiff must allege “(i) that

there was a ‘consumer report’ within the meaning of the statute; (ii) that the

defendant used or obtained it; and (iii) that the defendant did so without a permissible

statutory purpose.” Migliore by Migliore v. Vision Solar LLC, 160 F.4th 79, 91 (3d

Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied sub nom.,

Migliore v. Sunlight Fin. LLC, No. 25-1194, 2026 WL 1717969 (2026).

In this case, the parties agree that Defendant accessed and used Plaintiff’s

“consumer report, so it is the third element that forms the basis of this dispute,

although Plaintiff does not necessarily challenge Defendant’s purpose for accessing

her consumer credit report. In her complaint, Plaintiff simply alleges that when she

submitted her application for pre-approval for a $1.5 million mortgage loan, she

expressly denied authorization for a credit report but that Defendant accessed her

report nonetheless. Plaintiff’s complaint is sparse in terms of facts, and it remains

unclear to the Court what damages she has sustained as a result of this alleged

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breach of the FCRA. But, notwithstanding these issues, Defendant Fidelity correctly

points out that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim under the FCRA upon

which relief can be granted.

The FCRA delineates the permissible purposes for accessing a consumer’s

credit report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. In part, the statute authorizes a consumer reporting

agency to furnish a report to an entity, such as a lender, when the agency reasonably

believes that the entity “intends to use the information in connection with a credit

transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and

involving the extension of credit to . . . the consumer.” § 1681b(a)(3)(A). Here, Plaintiff

acknowledges that she “submitted an online mortgage pre-approval application to

Defendant . . . seeking approximately $1.5 million in mortgage credit.” (Rec. Doc. 3,

at ¶ 5). However, Plaintiff also contends that on the application, she chose not to

authorize Defendant to perform a credit check. Specifically, when asked whether she

granted “credit authorization,” Plaintiff clicked “no.” Conversely, Defendant

maintains that “[o]nce Plaintiff submitted the pre-approval request, Fidelity had a

permissible purpose to access her credit report in order to determine whether Plaintiff

qualified for a mortgage loan” (Rec. Doc. 9-1, at 12), and that Fidelity did not need

Plaintiff’s consent or authorization for this permissible purpose under the FCRA.

As a clear and established matter of law, Fidelity is correct. The FCRA provides

for two types of civil liability. Under § 1681n, civil liability attaches only when a

person obtains a consumer credit report “under false pretenses or knowingly without

a permissible purpose.” § 1681n. In this case, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant

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pulled her credit report under false pretenses, nor does she claim that Fidelity did so

without a permissible purpose. In fact, Fidelity’s purpose in obtaining Plaintiff’s

credit report is one that is expressly recognized by the FCRA: Fidelity intended to use

the information in connection with a credit transaction involving Ms. Belgrove and

the extension of credit to her. Although Ms. Belgrove cites § 1681n in her complaint,

she has not alleged any facts that would make such a claim plausible on its face.

Indeed, accepting all of Ms. Belgrove’s facts as true and drawing all inferences in her

favor, the Court finds that it would be impossible for her to plead a plausible claim

that Fidelity obtained her credit report under false pretenses or knowingly without a

permissible purpose.

Plaintiff also brings a claim under Section 1681o, which applies when a person

negligently fails to comply with the Act. However, Plaintiff is mistaken as to what

the FCRA requires concerning compliance. When a lender, such as Fidelity, obtains

a consumer’s credit report for a permissible purpose, that lender has complied with

the FCRA, regardless of whether the consumer authorized the lender to pull the

report. In her First Amended Verified Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that

Fidelity obtained her TransUnion credit report for the permissible purpose of a credit

transaction, so the fact that she clicked “no” when asked to provide authorization for

a credit report is irrelevant under the statute. (Rec. Doc. 3, at ¶¶ 23–26).

Next, should the Court decide to grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff

seeks leave to amend her complaint. When considering a motion to dismiss, a district

court should freely grant leave to amend the complaint unless amendment would be

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futile. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262,

270 (5th Cir. 2010). “An amendment is futile if it would fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378

(5th Cir. 2014) (citing Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2003)). Here,

the statute is clear that a lender may permissibly obtain a consumer’s credit report

in connection with a credit transaction. Plaintiff concedes that she completed an

application for pre-approval of a $1.5 million mortgage loan from Defendant. Under

these circumstances, and as a matter of law, Plaintiff could not possibly amend her

claim under the FCRA such that it would survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because a

“showing of a permissible purpose is a complete defense.” Rhodes v. McCall-N Ltd,

No. 21-cv-04221, 2022 WL 3349229, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2022) (quoting Stonehart

v. Rosenthal, No. 01 Civ. 651, 2001 WL 910771, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2011)).

Therefore, dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim under the FCRA is warranted, and the Court

finds that Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend her FCRA claim should be denied.

B. CLAIM UNDER THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT

Next, Plaintiff brings a claim against Defendant under the Equal Credit

Opportunity Act. However, this claim lacks merit and any conceivable basis in law or

fact.

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must restrict its

analysis “to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto.” Collins v.

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6)). Typically, if the movant presents “matters outside the pleadings” and the

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court chooses not to exclude them, the court must treat the motion as one for

summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). There are narrow

exceptions to this rule, however. For one, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[d]ocuments

that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings

if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim.” Causey

v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Collins,

224 F.3d at 498–99); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.

2007).

As an attachment to its motion to dismiss, Defendant Fidelity included an

email between one of its Senior Loan Officers and Bryan Erthyn Belgrove, Plaintiff’s

husband and agent, concerning a link that the Loan Officer had sent to Mr. Belgrove.

(Rec. Doc. 9-2, at 29). When Mr. Belgrove asked the Loan Officer what the link was,

she explained that it would take him to the documents that were sent concerning Ms.

Belgrove’s loan application, id. at 30, which comprised the statement of denial, which

Defendant also attached to its motion, id. at 25–27. This statement constitutes the

adverse action notice that forms the basis of Ms. Belgrove’s complaint under the

ECOA.1 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d), (e); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.9. Accordingly, this document that

Defendant attached to its motion to meets the Fifth Circuit’s criteria to be considered

part of the pleadings: (1) Plaintiff references this adverse action notice, or alleged

lack thereof, in her complaint; and (2) this notice is central, and in fact crucial, to

1 Plaintiff acknowledges that she consented to electronic communications in connection with her loan

application. Therefore, Defendant was legally authorized to provide the adverse action notice

electronically. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(d)(2).

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Plaintiff’s complaint. Therefore, the Court will consider this document in ruling on

Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits any creditor from discriminating

against an applicant “on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or

marital status, or age . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). Furthermore, the statute requires

that “[w]ithin thirty days . . . after receipt of a completed application for credit, a

creditor shall notify the applicant of its action on the application.” § 1691(d)(1).

Moreover, when the creditor has taken an “adverse action” against the applicant,

including denying or revoking a credit offer, the creditor must provide a statement of

reasons, in writing, for the adverse action. § 1691(d)(2). This statement must include

“the specific reasons for the adverse action taken.” § 1691(d)(3). A provision in the

Code of Federal Regulations further specifies the form that the ECOA notice and

statement of reasons should take. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.9(b).

Here, Defendant provided a Statement of Credit Denial, Termination, or

Change on February 20, 2025, approximately four days after Plaintiff submitted the

online application, which was well within the thirty days required by statute.

Further, the statement contains a section entitled “Part I. Principal Reason(s) for

Credit Denial, Termination, or Other Action Taken Concerning Credit,” followed by

a two-column list of potential reasons and check boxes. (Rec. Doc. 9-2, at 25). On the

statement concerning Plaintiff’s loan request, the following specific reasons were

selected: limited credit experience, collection action or judgment, delinquent past or

present credit obligations with others, unable to verify employment, unable to verify

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income, and inadequate collateral, or more specifically, value or type of collateral is

not sufficient. Id. Additionally, on the third page of the statement, Defendant

included a notice that recites the language suggested by the federal regulation almost

verbatim, which would be considered legally compliant because the statute requires

only that the creditor include a notice that is “substantially similar” to the language

contained in the regulation. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.9(b).

Moreover, in the statement, Defendant explained that its “credit decision was

based in whole or part on information obtained in a report from the consumer-

reporting agency listed below” and then informed Plaintiff of (1) her rights under the

Fair Credit Reporting Act and (2) her right to a free copy of the credit report if

requested within sixty (60) days. Then, the statement contains a list of the consumer-

reporting agencies on whom Defendant relied in making its credit decision, along with

dates of the reports, score ranges, and key factors that adversely affected the

applicant’s credit scores. In sum, Defendant complied with the Equal Credit

Opportunity Act’s requirements to the letter.

In her opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff urges the Court

not to consider the adverse action notice that Defendant attached to its motion

because “Plaintiff disputes whether the February 20, 2025 text link or electronic

communication was clearly presented, opened, received, or understood as a legally

compliant adverse-action notice.” (Rec. Doc. 11, at 4). Furthermore, in response to

Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff’s husband-agent requested clarification from

Defendant’s Senior Loan Officer concerning the text link, Plaintiff contends that this

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“request for clarification about the purpose of the text link does not establish, as a

matter of law, that Plaintiff received a complete and compliant adverse-action notice.”

Id.

Plaintiff is technically correct that her agent’s questions about the text link do

not establish that Defendant provided an ECOA-compliant adverse action notice.

However, Defendant has supplied the Court with the actual adverse action notice to

which the text link led, and this notice fully complies with the requirements of the

ECOA. Whether this notice, which was sent and accessible electronically, was “clearly

presented, opened, received, or understood” as being legally compliant is beside the

point. The ECOA does not require a creditor to ensure that a consumer open a link or

understand an adverse action notice; instead, the Act simply requires that the

creditor provide the consumer with one. Here again, Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim to relief under the ECOA that is plausible on its face, and as a matter of law,

amendment of this claim would prove futile.

Plaintiff correctly acknowledges the well-established principle that the Court

must evaluate her complaint “with the liberal construction owed to pro se filings.”

(Rec. Doc. 11, at 2 (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007))). However, equally well-established is the principle

that when a court accepts a pro se plaintiff's allegations as true and construes them

liberally but still “cannot draw the reasonable inference that the [defendant] is liable

for the misconduct alleged,” the plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to make a

plausible claim. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470–71 (5th Cir. 2016)

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(internal quotation marks omitted). This is one of those cases, and therefore, the

Court finds that Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be granted. Moreover, the

Court concludes that amendment of the complaint would be futile because Plaintiff

will be unable to state a plausible claim on which relief can be granted “as no

amendment of the facts will establish any liability against Fidelity under either the

FCRA or the ECOA.” (Ree. Doc. 12, at 2).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Fidelity Bank’s Motion to Dismiss (Rec.

Doc. 12) is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are hereby

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of July, 2026.

CARL J. BARBI

UNITED STAT ISTRICT JUDGE

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