MONTOYA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

JULIANA MILENA )

OJEDA MONTOYA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) 2:25-cv-00558-SDN

)

KEVIN JOYCE, )

Sheriff, Cumberland County )

Sheriff’s Office, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND EXPENSES

On November 7, 2025, Petitioner Juliana Milena Ojeda Montoya filed a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging Respondents unlawfully re-

detained her under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) when they should have detained her, if at all,

only discretionarily under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See ECF No. 6-1 at 5. The Court granted her

petition on November 17, 2025, holding section 1226(a) governs her situation as a

noncitizen who has resided continuously in the United States for more than two years,

which rendered her re-detention unlawful from the outset.1 ECF No. 17 at 4. Ms. Ojeda

Montoya now timely moves for an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of

$10,487.562 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. ECF

No. 22.

1 Although the parties initially contested the applicability of the Laken Riley Act to Ms. Ojeda Montoya’s

case, the Government conceded she was not subject to mandatory detention under

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). See ECF No. 15 at 2.

2 Petitioner originally sought $9,735.61 for litigating the underlying habeas petition, but her reply increased

that request to $10,487.56 to cover the costs of litigating the instant fees motion. See ECF No. 30 at 7.

ANALYSIS

The EAJA requires a court to award fees, costs, and other expenses to the

prevailing party in a civil action against the United States “unless the court finds that the

position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances

make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The “position of the United States”

covers both the underlying agency action and the United States’ litigation position. Id.

§ 2412(d)(2)(D). To recover fees, a party must show (1) the petitioner prevailed in the civil

case; (2) the petition was filed on time; (3) the Government’s position was not

substantially justified; and (4) no special circumstances exist that would make awarding

fees against the Government unjust. Castañeda-Castillo v. Holder, 723 F.3d 48, 57 (1st

Cir. 2013). Neither party disputes the first two factors are satisfied.3 See ECF No. 22 at

1–4; ECF No. 30 at 7; see generally ECF No. 29. Respondents nonetheless resist the

award of fees on two fronts. First, they argue the EAJA does not waive the Government’s

sovereign immunity for fee awards in immigration habeas petitions—a position that runs

headlong into this Court’s own, repeated, precedent holding the opposite. Second, they

argue that even if the EAJA applies, their litigation position to re-detain Ms. Ojeda

Montoya was substantially justified.

I. EAJA

The threshold issue is whether the District Court possesses subject matter

jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees under the EAJA for a habeas corpus petition arising

3 A fee petition is timely if filed within thirty days after the deadline to appeal the final judgment expires.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (EAJA requires fee application be filed within 30 days of “final judgment”);

id. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (“final judgment” means “a judgment that is final and not appealable”); Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(1)(B) (party has 60 days after judgment is entered by the district court to file an appeal); Pierce v.

Barnhart, 440 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he thirty-day EAJA clock ‘begins to run after the time to

appeal that final judgment has expired.’” (quoting Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 96 (1991)).

from civil immigration detention. The EAJA provides in relevant part: “a court shall

award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . .

incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort).”

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The dispositive question is whether Petitioner’s challenge to

her immigration detention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 constitutes a “civil action” under

the EAJA.

Two courts in this District have already fulsomely considered and rejected

Respondents’ core argument that habeas challenges to civil immigration detention fall

outside of the EAJA’s definition of “civil action.” See Bernardo-Rodrigues v. Hyde, No.

25-CV-00553, 2026 WL 370863, at *2 (D. Me. Feb. 10, 2026); Pérez Piña v. Stamper,

Dkt. No. 25-CV-00509, ECF No. 34, at *6 (D. Me. May 20, 2026). The reasoning bears

repeating. The EAJA’s text sweeps broadly, covering “any civil action (other than cases

sounding in tort).” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Respondents themselves

concede as much, quoting the Supreme Court’s own observation that “habeas corpus is

technically ‘civil.’” ECF No. 29 at 5 (quoting Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4

(1971)). The statute’s use of the word “any” does the rest of the work: once a habeas action

qualifies as civil in nature, even partially, the EAJA covers it. Every district court in this

Circuit to address the question has reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Ndongala v.

Wesling, No. 26-cv-10194, 2026 WL 1534981, at *1 (D. Mass. June 1, 2026) (“[H]abeas

petitions are civil actions within the meaning of the EAJA.”); Peruano v. Wesling, No. CV

26-10300, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2026 WL 1413758, at *12 (D. Mass. May 20, 2026) (“[I]t is

well settled that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding,” such that “the EAJA unambiguously

applies to habeas challenges to immigration detention.” (quotation modified)); Orrego

Orrego v. Hyde, No. CV 26-10260, 2026 WL 1480362, at *2 (D. Mass. May 27, 2026)

(concluding “habeas actions are civil actions for the purposes of EAJA”); Nguyen v.

Lyons, No. CV 25-631, 2026 WL 2137874, at *2 (D.R.I. July 24, 2026) (“[A] habeas

proceeding is a civil action for purposes of EAJA fees and costs.”); Bernardo-Rodrigues,

2026 WL 370863, at *1.

Respondents ask the Court to revisit that conclusion, arguing the better reading of

the EAJA’s text treats habeas actions challenging civil immigration detention as “hybrid”

in nature. ECF No. 29 at 14. The Court remains unpersuaded, at least where the detention

stems from civil immigration detention, rather than criminal proceedings. Cf. O’Brien v.

Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 505 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o the extent that a habeas proceeding

reviews a criminal punishment with the potential of overturning it, the habeas proceeding

necessarily assumes part of the underlying case’s criminal nature . . . .”). And even

granting Respondents’ framing, a “hybrid” proceeding still qualifies as civil to fall within

the EAJA’s use of “any”; nothing in the statute’s text demands an action be “purely a civil

action” in order to qualify. ECF No. 29 at 9 (quoting Barco v. Witte, 65 F.4th 782, 785

(5th Cir. 2023)) (emphasis added).

To the extent Respondents lean on Barco, 65 F.4th 782, and Obando-Segura v.

Garland, 999 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 2021), the Court has already explained why those cases

are unpersuasive. See Pérez Piña, ECF No. 34, at *5–6. A civil immigration habeas

petition exists to protect individual liberty and redress unlawful detention. Because Ms.

Ojeda Montoya’s detention arose from a civil immigration process, her challenge to it is

likewise an adversarial civil proceeding. See Ryan v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 974

F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[I]mmigration arrests are undeniably civil in nature.”);

Bernardo-Rodrigues, 2026 WL 370863, at *1 (“Through a civil habeas petition, an

individual in custody on civil process challenges the lawfulness of their detention through

an adversarial civil proceeding.”). Barco and Obando-Segura fail to grapple with this

distinction. See Pérez Piña, ECF No. 34, at *6.

In sum, EAJA’s text unambiguously classifies Ms. Ojeda Montoya’s habeas petition

as a “civil action” such that the statute’s waiver of sovereign immunity reaches

Respondents for the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees. The Court thus retains

jurisdiction over the motion.

II. Substantially Justified

Respondents’ second objection contends their litigation position—that Ms. Ojeda

Montoya faced mandatory re-detention without a bond hearing under section 1225(b)—

was substantially justified. The Government bears the burden of proving substantial

justification by a preponderance of the evidence. Saysana v. Gillen, 614 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.

2010). To be “substantially justified,” the Government’s position need not be “justified to

a high degree,” rather, it suffices if it is “justified in substance or in the main.” Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

The Court sets out the facts here because they inform, and ultimately undercut,

Respondents’ claim of substantial justification.4 Ms. Ojeda Montoya entered the country

uninspected on February 22, 2023. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Within a day, the U.S. Department

of Homeland Security (“DHS”) apprehended her and placed her into removal

proceedings, ECF No. 8-1 at 1, classifying her as “a[] [noncitizen] present in the United

States who has not been admitted or paroled” under section 236 of the Immigration and

4 The Court’s earlier order granting Petitioner’s release recounts the factual circumstances in greater detail.

See Ojeda Montoya v. Joyce, Dkt. No. 25-cv-00558, ECF No. 14, at *1–4 (D. Me. Nov. 10, 2025).

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226.5 ECF No. 1-1 at 1. The Immigration Court subsequently

held a bond hearing and released her on $1,500 bond and subject to conditions of release.

ECF No. 1-3 at 1.

On August 1, 2025, Massachusetts filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Ojeda

Montoya. ECF No. 8-4 at 5. On November 6, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) agents pulled over her car, which her husband was driving. ECF No.

6-1 at 3. A bystander captured the scene on video: an ICE agent attempting to pry Ms.

Ojeda Montoya’s young daughter from her husband’s arms while he suffered an apparent

seizure. See id. at 4. Agents then re-detained Ms. Ojeda Montoya and placed her into ICE

custody, id., where she remained until this Court ordered her release on November 10,

2026, ECF No. 14. Before her arrest, Ms. Ojeda Montoya lawfully resided in the interior

of the country under conditional release and held a valid work authorization document

that permitted her to maintain gainful employment at Burger King. ECF No. 1-5 at 1; ECF

No. 6-1 at 3. Ms. Ojeda Montoya challenged her re-detention in the habeas petition filed

on November 7, 2025, ECF No. 1, and the Court granted that petition on November 17,

2025, holding section 1226(a)’s discretionary detention scheme governed her case, ECF

No. 17.

Respondents now argue that re-detaining Ms. Ojeda Montoya without notice or an

opportunity to be heard was substantially justified. This Court already rejected that same

defense in Pérez Piña, where Respondents raised an identical substantially-justified

5 Under section 1226, a noncitizen who is “arrested and detained” faces three potential outcomes during the

pendency of their removal proceedings: the Attorney General “may continue to detain the arrested

[noncitizen]”; “may release the [noncitizen] on bond of at least $1,500”; or “may release the [noncitizen]

on conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). It therefore “establishes a discretionary detention framework for

noncitizens.” Gomes v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *1 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025).

argument in response to a fees motion. See Pérez Piña, ECF No. 34, at *6–11. Their

continued reliance on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Yajure

Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (B.I.A. Sept. 5, 2025), provides no refuge for their decision

to re-detain Petitioner for the reasons this Court has already stated. See Pérez Piña, ECF

No. 34, at *9–10.

More importantly, at the time of Petitioner’s re-detention, Respondents were

bound by—and continue to be beholden to—Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent

that conclusively foreclosed their attempts to re-detain Petitioner without due process,

regardless of the statutory construction of the text of sections 1225 and 1226. Because

DHS had already initially detained and released Ms. Ojeda Montoya on conditional

release in March 2025, ICE’s regulations on revocation of conditional release governed

the decision to re-detain her in November 2025. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2); Kong v.

United States, 62 F.4th 608, 619–20 (1st Cir. 2023) (section 241.13(i)(2) requires “(1) an

individualized determination (2) by ICE that, (3) based on changed circumstances, (4)

removal has become significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future”). Kong,

decided in 2023, sits squarely on point and should have guided Respondents’ conduct:

before re-detaining her, Ms. Ojeda Montoya was entitled to an individualized

determination to revoke conditional release that required consideration “prior to re-

detention.” Huynh v. Wesling, No. 25-CV-13794, 2026 WL 183467, at *3 (D. Mass. Jan.

23, 2026) (emphasis added) (collecting cases). ICE failed to follow its own regulations—

regulations designed precisely to protect noncitizens’ due process rights.

Respondents assert “there was no appellate guidance whatsoever” on the issue of

detention. ECF No. 29 at 14. But that claim ignores Kong and decades of Supreme Court

and First Circuit precedent, unequivocally guaranteeing noncitizens due process in

immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (“But

this [Supreme] [C]ourt has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that

administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of

persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as

understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. One of these principles is that

no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be

heard . . . .”); Pérez Piña, ECF No. 34, at *8. To the extent Respondents take umbrage with

the application of Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021), to this case

because it does not explicitly address the statutory construction of sections 1225 and 1226,

the Court reiterates that Hernandez-Lara stands for the simple proposition that due

process applies in immigration detention cases. See Pérez Piña, ECF No. 34, at *10–11;

Bernardo-Rodrigues, 2026 WL 370863, at *3 (“[T]he preexisting law in this Circuit

required Respondents to afford a noncitizen like Petitioner access to a discretionary

detention regime on due process grounds.” (emphasis in original)). Respondents point to

no evidence in the record that they supplied Ms. Ojeda Montoya the process she was due.

Their litigation position was not substantially justified then, and it is not now.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.

ECF No. 22. Pursuant to the Court’s authority under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A),

the Court ORDERS the United States to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,487.56,

in full satisfaction of any and all attorney’s fees and expenses under the EAJA in this

action.

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 4th day of August, 2026.

/s/ Stacey D. Neumann

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE