Dong

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

LIPING DONG, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

Case No. CIV-26-905-D

)

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Liping Dong, a noncitizen,1 seeks a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.2 United States District Judge Timothy D.

DeGiusti referred the case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge under 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3. The Government responded, Doc. 8, and the

time for Petitioner to reply has lapsed, Doc. 6. So the matter is at issue.

For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends the Court deny

Petitioner’s habeas petition, Doc. 1.

1 This Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as

equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578

n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).

2 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation

and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless

otherwise indicated.

I. Factual background and Petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner is a citizen of China who entered the United States on August

25, 2015, on a nonimmigrant visitor visa (B-2), with authorization to remain

in the United States until February 24, 2016. Doc. 8, Exs. 1, 2. On or about

October 26, 2015, Petitioner filed an I-589 application for asylum. Doc. 1, at 5.

On May 30, 2025, Petitioner attended her Form I-589 interview at the

Los Angeles Asylum Office. Id. Following the interview, U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services (USCIS) issued a Request for Evidence regarding two

arrests in the United States. Id.

Petitioner obtained a minute order dismissing a charge in Fresno,

California, on June 10, 2025. Id. However, on July 7, 2025, when she appeared

at the Lubbock County, Texas, Sheriff’s Office to post bond in connection with

another matter, she was taken into custody. Id. at 5-6. That office detained her

without bond until January 6, 2026, when her criminal charge was dismissed.

Id. at 6. The Sheriff’s Office transferred her to Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) custody on that same date. Id.

At an April 3, 2026, custody redetermination hearing, an Immigration

Judge (IJ) denied bond to Petitioner, stating: “Denied because did not establish

not a flight risk.” Id. Ex. 2.

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Petitioner asserts that the IJ’s conclusory denial of bond violated her

procedural due process rights. Doc. 1, at 6-7. She also argues that her

prolonged detention after an unconstitutional bond hearing and without any

end date violates her substantive due process rights. Id. at 8-9.

She requests that the Court assume jurisdiction over this matter, order

that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Western District of

Oklahoma while this habeas petition is pending; issue an order to show cause

ordering Respondents to explain why this Petition should not be granted

within three days3; grant her release, or in the alternative, provide her with

an individualized bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five days;

declare that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful; and award Petitioner attorney’s

fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, as amended, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412, and on any other basis justified under law. Id. at 9-10.

II. Standard of review.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in

custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of

the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

3 The Court addressed the transfer and response requests in its Order for

Response, Doc. 6.

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475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are

properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d

1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88

(2001)).

III. Discussion.

A. Section 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention.

The parties agree that § 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention. Doc. 1, at

7; Doc. 8, at 1. Respondents argue this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the

IJ’s decision and that “there is no evidence that the bond hearing was

conducted in a manner that violated Petitioner’s due process rights.” Doc. 8, at

5-7.

B. The Court should deny Petitioner’s claims.

Respondents urge the Court to deny Petitioner’s due process claim

because she received a bond hearing and the IJ determined that Petitioner was

a flight risk. Doc. 8, at 5-7.

In determining whether a noncitizen is a flight risk, the IJ may consider

the following factors:

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(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2)

the alien’s length of residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s

family ties in the United States, and whether they may entitle the

alien to reside permanently in the United States in the future; (4)

the alien’s employment history; (5) the alien’s record of appearance

in court; (6) the alien’s criminal record, including the extensiveness

of criminal activity, the recency of such activity, and the

seriousness of the offenses; (7) the alien’s history of immigration

violations; (8) any attempts by the alien to flee prosecution or

otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) the alien’s manner of

entry to the United States.

In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006).

When a noncitizen like Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a) “the

Attorney General may exercise his discretion to either detain or release an

alien on bond or conditional parole.” Mwangi v. Terry, 465 F. App’x 784, 786

(10th Cir. 2012). “But the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion is not

subject to judicial review.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“The Attorney

General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section

shall not be subject to review.”)). “In the context of an immigration bond

hearing, district courts have jurisdiction to review [an IJ’s] discretionary bond

denial only ‘where that bond denial is challenged as legally erroneous or

unconstitutional.’” Diaz-Calderon v. Barr, 535 F. Supp. 3d 669, 676 (E.D. Mich.

2020) (quoting Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).

“To be sure, ‘[d]ue process is not satisfied by rubberstamp denials [of bond].’”

Kumar v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. CIV-26-164-R, 2026 WL 753944, at *2 (W.D.

5

Okla. Mar. 17, 2026) (quoting Chi Thon Ngo v. I.N.S., 192 F.3d 390, 398 (3d

Cir. 1999)). But “a district court sitting in habeas . . . review[ing] due process

challenges to immigration bond hearings must proceed carefully, as it ‘has no

authority to encroach upon an IJ’s discretionary weighing of the evidence.’”

Diaz-Calderon, 535 F. Supp. 3d at 676 (quoting Arellano v. Sessions, 2019 WL

3387210, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)).

Petitioner received a bond hearing, in which she was represented by

counsel, and the IJ heard arguments by the parties as to the Guerra factors.

See Doc. 11 (recording of bond hearing). The IJ, based on those factors, denied

Petitioner’s request for bond, determining she was a flight risk. Id. The IJ

noted a lack of documented employment history, vague information about her

sponsor, and her husband’s lack of legal status in making his decision. Doc. 11.

Although the form may appear conclusory in the IJ’s checking a box, the

undersigned concludes the hearing comported with due process. Petitioner

reserved her right to appeal that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA), but she did not do so. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(f)

(authorizing appeals to the BIA from IJ bond decisions); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(3)

(discussing circumstances when a noncitizen may appeal a bond order to the

BIA). Given the IJ’s finding that Petitioner was a flight risk, the undersigned

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recommends the Court deny Petitioner habeas relief as she has not been

deprived of an individualized custody determination.

Petitioner also argues that her “detention has become prolonged because

relief proceedings remain ongoing and adjudication of Petitioner’s I-589 has no

definite near endpoint.” Doc. 1, at 9. “[D]etention during deportation

proceedings [remains] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation

process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Any assessment of the

private interest at stake therefore must account for the fact that the Supreme

Court has never held that noncitizens have a constitutional right to be released

from custody during the pendency of removal proceedings, and in fact has held

precisely the opposite. Id. at 530; see, e.g., Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d

1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he procedural safeguards are minimal because

aliens do not have a constitutional right to enter or remain in the United

States.”).

Petitioner overstayed her visa and remained in the United States in

violation of its immigration laws. Because she has already received a

constitutionally adequate bond hearing, the Court should deny her petition for

habeas corpus relief. See, e.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 312 (2018)

(holding lower court had “erroneously concluded that periodic bond hearings

[were] required under [§1226(a)]”).

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IV. Recommendation and notice of right to object.

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court

deny Petitioner’s habeas petition, Doc. 1.

The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to

this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by July 29, 2026,

in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 686 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. The

undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely objections

to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of

both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950

F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation disposes of

the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned

matter.

ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2026.

ga Ler

SUZANNE MITCHELL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE