Dixon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER J. DIXON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:24-cv-00183-NAD

)

CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

For the reasons stated below and on the record in the oral argument motion

hearing, the court GRANTS Defendant City of Birmingham’s motion for summary

judgment. Doc. 36. The court separately will enter final judgment.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural background

On February 15, 2024, Plaintiff Christopher J. Dixon initiated this action by

filing a complaint against the Defendant City. Doc. 1. Plaintiff Dixon’s complaint

alleged three claims for relief: (1) race discrimination pursuant to Title VII; (2) race

discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; and (3) retaliation pursuant

to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Doc. 1 at 4–9.

On April 26, 2024, the City moved to dismiss only the retaliation claim. Doc.

3. After an oral argument hearing, the court granted the City’s motion to dismiss the

retaliation claim, and granted Dixon leave to amend his complaint. Doc. 20. On

September 24, 2024, Dixon filed a notice of voluntary dismissal (Doc. 21), so

Dixon’s retaliation claim was dismissed (Doc. 22), and the case proceeded on only

his two discrimination claims (Doc. 22).

The complaint alleges that, in May 2022, Dixon “was informed that he was to

be transferred from his Narcotics Detective position on the Interdiction Team.” Doc.

1 at 3. The complaint alleges that white officers who were members of the

Interdiction Team “and who were transferred received desirable positions within the

criminal investigation division, including the regular narcotics unit.” Doc. 1 at 3.

The complaint also alleges that on May 16, 2022, Dixon “filed a [complaint]

with the City of Birmingham’s Human Resources Department stating that his

transfer was discriminatory in that he was slated to be transferred to a less desirable

position within the Birmingham Police Department’s [BPD] patrol division, while

white officers received more prestigious and desirable re-assignments.” Doc. 1 at 3.

The complaint alleges that on June 6, 2022, Dixon’s complaint “regarding

discriminatory re-assignments was ignored and he was permanently assigned to the

patrol division.” Doc. 1 at 3.

On January 5, 2026, the City filed this summary judgment motion (Doc. 36),

with a supporting brief (Doc. 37), and evidentiary materials (Doc. 35). The parties

fully briefed the motion. See Doc. 42 (Dixon’s opposition); Doc. 43 (Dixon’s

evidentiary materials); Doc. 43 (City’s reply); Doc. 38 (briefing schedule). The

parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction (Doc. 15), and the court held

an oral argument hearing on this summary judgment motion. See minute entry,

entered: 05/19/2026; Doc. 44 (order setting hearing).

B. Factual background

On this summary judgment motion, the following facts are undisputed: Dixon

is a black police officer who began working for the BPD in 2017. Doc. 37 at 3; Doc.

42 at 7. In the spring 2022, Dixon was assigned to the Interdiction Team, which was

responsible for patrolling interstates to search for narcotics. Doc. 35-1 at 10; Doc.

37 at 3; Doc. 42 at 7.

In June 2022, the Interdiction Team was disbanded. Doc. 37 at 3–5; Doc. 42

at 10. The City stated that the disbandment of the Interdiction Team was due to

staffing shortages in the Patrol Bureau, and all eight Interdiction Team officers were

reassigned to Patrol. Doc. 37 at 3; Doc. 42 at 7, 10. At the time of the reassignment,

three of the eight officers voluntarily chose to retire. Doc. 37 at 3.

On August 18, 2022, Dixon filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which states, in relevant part,

In May 2022, I was notified that I was to be transferred out of my

assigned position as a narcotics detective with the interdiction unit.

Despite open positions in various areas of the criminal investigation

division, including the narcotics unit, I was transferred to a less

desirable position with the patrol division. . . . I believe that I have been

discriminated against by the employer based on my protected group –

race: African American – violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended.

Doc. 1-1. On November 17, 2023, the EEOC issued a determination and notice of

rights on Dixon’s charge. Doc. 1-2.

C. Legal background

Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1).

In the Eleventh Circuit, “so long as a plaintiff offers enough evidence for a

reasonable jury to infer illegal discrimination, [his] Title VII claim will survive

summary judgment.” McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1340 (11th Cir.

2024).

“Section 1981 prohibits intentional race discrimination in the making and

enforcement of public and private contracts, including employment contracts.”

Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999). “Race

discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

brought through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are subject to the same framework as race

discrimination claims brought under Title VII.” Cobb v. Floyd, No. 21-10535, 2022

WL 856074, at *2 (11th Cir. March 23, 2022) (citing Lewis v. City of Union City,

Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 n.5 (11th Cir. 2019)). “Thus, those claims ‘rise and fall’

with the success or failure of a plaintiff’s Title VII claim.” Id. (citing Flowers v.

Troup Cty. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1335 n.7 (11th Cir. 2015)).

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant establishes that “there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” and that the movant “is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of

the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).1 And a dispute

about a material fact is “genuine,” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must go beyond mere

allegations to offer specific facts creating a genuine dispute for trial. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 324–25. The court’s responsibility is not to “weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The court must construe all evidence and

1 Accord, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23 (“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c)

mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue

as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.”).

draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Centurion Air Cargo, Inc.

v. UPS Co., 420 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 2005).

Where there is no genuine dispute of material fact for trial, the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c).

DISCUSSION

I. There is no genuine dispute of material fact for trial on Dixon’s race

discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII.

There is no fact issue for trial on Dixon’s Title VII race discrimination claim.

As a preliminary matter, no reasonable jury could find or infer that the City

discriminated against Dixon when he was reassigned in June 2022 from the

disbanded Interdiction Team to Patrol.

As explained above, it is undisputed that, in June 2022, the Interdiction Team

was disbanded (Doc. 37 at 3–5; Doc. 42 at 10), and that all eight of the officers on

the Interdiction Team were reassigned to Patrol (Doc. 37 at 3; Doc. 42 at 7, 10). It

also is undisputed that, at the time of that reassignment, three of the eight officers

voluntarily chose to retire, and that if those three officers had not retired they also

would have been reassigned to Patrol. Doc. 37 at 3; Doc. 35-2 at 2 (Declaration of

Scott R. Thurmond, Chief of Police of the BPD) (“[A]ll the officers who were on

the Interdiction Team were re-assigned to the Patrol Bureau . . . . The only exception

to all of the Interdiction Team Members being reassigned to the Patrol Bureau are

three Officers, Joe Fenison, Jr., William Harrington, and Robert Walker, Jr. who

voluntarily chose to retire. If those Officers had not retired, they also would have

been reassigned to the Patrol Bureau.”).

Thus, while Dixon alleged in his EEOC charge that the City discriminated

against him because “[he] was transferred to a less desirable position with the patrol

division” (Doc. 1-1), every officer on the Interdiction Team was reassigned to Patrol.

Because the entire Interdiction Team was disbanded in June 2022 and reassigned to

Patrol (or retired), no reasonable jury could find or infer that Dixon’s reassignment

to Patrol was discriminatory.

Dixon appears to recognize as much, arguing instead that “all Interdiction

Unit members were initially reassigned to patrol,” but that the “court[] must examine

the full sequence of events—not isolate a single moment.” See Doc. 42 at 15

(citation omitted).

Dixon argues that “the record here [must be] considered holistically.” Doc.

42 at 13.2 But, even construing all evidence and reasonable inferences in Dixon’s

2 For instance, Dixon argues that “[w]hen the record here is considered holistically—

including the 2020 leapfrogging of a higher-ranked Black officer, inconsistent

explanations for disbandment, selective restoration of white officers, unexplained

scoring downgrades, and a discretionary system operating outside Human Resources

oversight—a jury could reasonably conclude that race influenced how reassignment

authority was exercised” (Doc. 42 at 13–14), and that “the mosaic includes:

(1) leapfrogging of a higher-ranked African-American officer; (2) detective

assignment only after complaint; (3) disbandment under shifting rationales;

(4) selective reassignment of white officers; (5) continued exclusion of Dixon;

(6) unexplained scoring downgrade; and, (7) subjective scoring system lacking

oversight. Taken together, these facts permit a reasonable inference of

favor (as the court must at this stage, see Centurion Air Cargo, 420 F.3d at 1149),

no reasonable jury could find or infer that the City discriminated against Dixon.

Primarily, Dixon argues that—even though all eight of the officers on the

Interdiction Team either retired or were assigned to Patrol—the City later reassigned

white comparators to more favorable positions, while Dixon remained in Patrol. But

no reasonable jury could find or infer that the City treated similarly situated

employees outside of Dixon’s protected class more favorably.

“[O]rdinarily a similarly situated comparator and the plaintiff will: have

engaged in the same basic conduct or misconduct, be subject to the same

employment policies, have the same supervisor(s), and share an employment or

disciplinary history.” Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2022).

Again, it is undisputed that there were eight officers on the Interdiction Team,

when it was disbanded in June 2022: (1) Dixon; (2) Joe Fenison, Jr.; (3) William

Harrington; (4) Robert Walker, Jr.; (5) Michael Turner; (6) Larry Foster; (7) Chad

Hallman; and (8) Todd Southerland. See, e.g., Doc. 37 at 5.

Fenison, Harrington, and Walker retired. See, e.g., Doc. 37 at 5; Doc. 35-2 at

2.

Dixon does not identify Turner—who is white, and who was reassigned to

Patrol—as a comparator or otherwise argue that any evidence related to Turner is

discriminatory intent” (Doc. 42 at 21).

relevant on this motion. See, e.g., Doc. 37 at 5.

Dixon testified in his deposition that Foster—who is black, and who was

reassigned to Patrol—later was “sent to narcotics over [Dixon].” Doc. 43 at 3; Doc.

35-1 at 41.

In this regard, Dixon has identified as comparators the following: Adam

Smith, Hallman, and Southerland. See Doc. 42 at 15–16.

But, because Dixon acknowledges that Smith was not one of the eight

“member[s] of the Interdiction Unit” (Doc. 42 at 16), a jury could not consider Smith

as a similarly situated comparator in this case. See, e.g., Jenkins, 26 F.4th at 1249.

With respect to Hallman and Southerland (both of whom are white), Dixon

argues that—after the disbandment of the Interdiction Team—Southerland and

Hallman eventually “both received assignments to other units.” Doc. 42 at 15.

However, the City has introduced evidence—and it is undisputed—that

Hallman was assigned to Patrol from June 4, 2022, until December 17, 2023;

Hallman transferred to Narcotics on December 18, 2023. Doc. 43-1 at 2 (Declaration

of Rodarius Mauldin, Deputy Chief of Police of the BPD, summarizing staffing

records).

Likewise, Southerland was assigned to Patrol from June 4, 2022, until October

20, 2023. Doc. 43-1 at 1–2. While Southerland transferred to Tactical Operations

as a Motor Scout on October 21, 2023, he transferred back to Patrol on June 15,

2024, before transferring again to Tactical Operations as a Motor Scout on January

25, 2025. Doc. 43-1 at 2.

So, after June 2022, both Hallman and Southerland were assigned to Patrol

for more than a year—Hallman until December 2023, and Southerland until October

2023. Doc. 43-1 at 1–2. Southerland then was reassigned again to Patrol for another

seven months from June 2024 to January 2025. Doc. 43-1 at 1–2. Given these

undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could find or infer that the City more favorably

treated any similarly situated comparator.

Moreover (even if this comparator evidence were sufficient to create a fact

issue for trial, and it is not), Dixon’s assertions regarding eventual officer

reassignments and his alleged failures to promote—after the June 2022 disbandment

of the Interdiction Team and assignment of all remaining officers to Patrol—are

beyond the scope of his EEOC charge and any reasonable investigation into that

charge.

For example, Dixon argues that, after the Interdiction Team was disbanded,

white officers later were “restored to specialized assignments while Dixon was not.”

Doc. 42 at 15–16. Dixon argues that, in August 2022, he applied for a vacancy

within the Investigative Bureau but was not selected. Doc. 42 at 11. Dixon also

argues that, in May 2023, he applied and interviewed for a vacancy within the

Special Operations Bureau, but he was not selected. Doc. 42 at 11–12. Dixon argues

further that, in February 2024, he applied for a detective position, but was not

selected. Doc. 42 at 12.

While the court “must liberally construe EEOC charges that are prepared

without the assistance of counsel, a plaintiff’s civil complaint remains ‘limited by

the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out

of the charge of discrimination.’” Green v. Elixir Indus., Inc., 152 F. App’x 838,

840 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Gregory v. Georgia Dep’t of Hum. Res., 355 F. 3d 1277,

1279–80 (11th Cir. 2004)); accord Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455,

466 (5th Cir. 1970) (old Fifth Circuit) (cited by Dixon for the rule that “the ‘scope’

of the judicial complaint is limited to the ‘scope’ of the EEOC investigation which

can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination”).

But, under Sanchez, “the crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the

factual statement contained therein.” 431 F.2d at 466.

Dixon’s EEOC charge only contains facts regarding his transfer from the

Interdiction Team to Patrol in June 2022, and does not contain any facts about any

subsequent officer reassignments or alleged failures to promote. As explained

above, Dixon’s EEOC charge alleges, “I was notified that I was to be transferred out

of my assigned position as a narcotics detective with the interdiction unit. Despite

open positions in various areas of the criminal investigation division, including the

narcotics unit, I was transferred to a less desirable position with the patrol

division. . . . I believe that I have been discriminated against by the employer.” Doc.

1-1.

While Dixon’s EEOC charge also alleges a “Continuing Action,” the charge

identifies “05/13/2022” as the earliest date discrimination took place, and

“06/03/2022” as the latest date—i.e., the June 2022 disbandment of the Interdiction

Team and reassignment of all remaining officers to Patrol. Doc. 1-1. And the charge

is dated “08/18/2022.” Doc. 1-1.

As such, Dixon filed his EEOC charge—in August 2022—more than 1 year

before Hallman or Southerland was reassigned out of Patrol (December 2023 and

October 2023, see Doc. 43-1 at 1–2), approximately 9 months before Dixon applied

for a position in the Special Operations Bureau (May 2023, see Doc. 42 at 11–12),

and approximately 18 months before Dixon applied for a detective position

(February 2024, see Doc. 42 at 12), and the charge contains no facts about Dixon’s

application for a position in the Investigative Bureau (August 2022, Doc. 42 at 11).

A plaintiff’s “claims are allowed if they amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus

the allegations in the EEOC complaint, but . . . new acts of discrimination are

inappropriate.” Gregory, 355 F. 3d at 1279–80. And, in this regard, “[a]n

employer’s failure to promote is a discrete act or single occurrence and therefore the

continuing violation doctrine does not apply. For [a plaintiff’s] claims to be timely,

[the plaintiff] [is] required to file his EEOC complaint within 180 days of each

discrete employment decision.” Stuart v. Jefferson Cty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 152 F.

App’x 798, 800–01 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see National R.R. Passenger

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (“[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not

actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed

charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges

alleging that act.”).3

Consequently, any claim or assertion regarding the City’s alleged failure to

promote Dixon in August 2022, May 2023, or February 2024 is factually remote and

discrete from his transfer from the Interdiction Team to Patrol in June 2022 and was

not properly exhausted in his August 2022 EEOC charge. See Doc. 1-1.

Dixon also points to “scoring downgrades” related to the alleged failures to

promote, and “a discretionary system operating outside Human Resources

oversight.” Doc. 42 at 14. But there is no evidence based on which a reasonable

3 Accord Woods v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 1:18-CV-3501-LMM-CCB, 2019

WL 13078831, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 4, 2019) (“Plaintiff did not include a failure-

to-promote claim in her EEOC charge . . . . Therefore, Plaintiff’s failure-to-promote

claim is unexhausted because the charge did not put the EEOC and Defendant on

notice of this claim.”), aff’d, No. 21-13882, 2022 WL 2972852 (11th Cir. July 27,

2022); Anderson v. Embarq/Sprint, 379 F. App’x 924, 927 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[The

plaintiff] did not include a failure to promote claim in his EEOC charges. In his

EEOC charges, [the plaintiff] complained only of race discrimination, age

discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation. . . . Because this new

allegation of discrimination does not clarify the allegations in his EEOC charges, the

district court properly dismissed this claim for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies.”).

jury could find or infer discrimination as to the scoring or system for promotions,

and “inferences in favor of a plaintiff can be based only on evidence—not on

speculation.” Martin v. Financial Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1058 (11th

Cir. 2020).

Similarly, Dixon argues that he was assigned to the Narcotics Division only

after filing an internal complaint alleging race discrimination in 2020, and that

“those facts are properly considered as background evidence bearing on the City’s

later actions.” See, e.g., Doc. 42 at 5. But “Dixon does not seek relief for the initial

2020 staffing decisions” (Doc. 42 at 5), and Dixon testified in his deposition that the

decisionmakers in 2020 left the BPD before the Interdiction Team was disbanded in

June 2022 (Doc. 35-1 at 13–14).

Furthermore, there is no direct evidence of discrimination. Dixon testified in

his deposition that he never heard a supervisor or manager make race-based

statements or use racial slurs, and that he never saw any racially offensive symbols

displayed at work. Doc. 35-1 at 16. Rather, Dixon argues that the totality of the

circumstantial evidence in the record could support a reasonable inference of

discrimination. See, e.g., Doc. 42 at 23–24; Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84

F.4th 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 2023) (“To survive summary judgment, the employee

must present a story, supported by evidence, that would allow a reasonable jury to

find that the employer engaged in unlawful [discrimination] against the employee.”).

In his deposition, Dixon testified that he believed Deputy Ron Sellers, Chief of

Patrol, “disbanded the interdiction unit specifically to get [Dixon] down to patrol.”

Doc. 35-1. But, when Dixon was asked if he believed that Sellers had a racial

motivation in disbanding the Interdiction Team, Dixon responded, “I wouldn’t say

he had a racial motivation.” Doc. 35-1 at 15–16.

In fact, the record evidence shows that the Interdiction Team was disbanded

because the Patrol Bureau was understaffed. In his deposition, Chief Michael Pickett

testified that, “at the time, there was a critical need for personnel in Patrol, and [the

Interdiction Team], as well as several other units, were sent back to patrol to assist

with the numbers in staffing.” Doc. 41-1 at 11; see Doc. 41-1 at 26, 28.

Dixon asserts that there were “inconsistent explanations for disbandment” of

the Interdiction Team (Doc. 42 at 13–14), arguing that Pickett “offered multiple

explanations for dissolving the Interdiction Unit: patrol staffing shortages and

performance issues within the unit.” Doc. 42 at 17; see also Springer v. Convergys

Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th Cir. 2007) (a plaintiff can

show pretext “by revealing such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies or contradictions in [the employer’s] proffered legitimate reasons for

its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence”

(citation and quotation marks omitted)).

While Pickett did testify that he had “heard discussion of [the Interdiction

Team’s] performance, and it ha[d] not always been good,” Pickett then confirmed

that the disbandment of the Interdiction Team “was about staffing” and had nothing

to do with performance. Doc. 41-1 at 26. Pickett also testified that other officers

outside of the Interdiction Team were reassigned to Patrol during the same time

period, stating that “there were several black officers and white officers that were

reassigned from the Crossplex assignment and the City Jail assignment all pushed

back to Patrol during that time.” Doc. 41-1 at 29.

II. There is no genuine dispute of material fact for trial on Dixon’s race

discrimination claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C §§ 1981 and 1983.

As explained above, “[t]he analysis under [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983]

claims mirrors that under Title VII.” Brown v. Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d

1160, 1174 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). When “a plaintiff attempts to

use Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as parallel remedies for the same allegedly

unlawful employment discrimination, the elements of the two causes of action are

identical.” Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020).

Thus, because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact on Dixon’s

discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII, there can be no genuine dispute on his

claim pursuant to §§ 1981 and 1983.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the City’s summary judgment motion (Doc. 36)

is GRANTED. Dixon’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Separately, the court will enter final judgment.

DONE and ORDERED this July 28, 2026.

NICHOLAS A. DANELLA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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