KNIGHT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DELVON KNIGHT,

Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-1508

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

GINA CLARK, et al., :

Respondents :

MEMORANDUM

Currently before the Court is pro se Petitioner Delvon Knight

(“Knight”)’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254. For

the reasons stated below, the Court will order Knight to show cause why the

Court should not dismiss his petition due to his failure to exhaust his state-

court remedies or because it is time barred.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 19, 2019, Knight was sentenced to a term of state

incarceration for a minimum of 21 months to a maximum of 42 months after

pleading guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to

manufacture or deliver in the Court of Common Pleas of York County

(“YCCP”). See (Doc. 1 at 4—5, 8); Docket, Commonwealth v. Knight, No. CP-

67-CR-4280-2019 (York Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.) (“YCCP Dkt.”).’ Knight did not

appeal from his sentence, and he has not pursued any petitions for post-

conviction collateral relief to date. See (Doc. 1 at 5-8; YCCP DKt.).

On May 12, 2026, Knight, who is currently incarcerated at

Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution Chester, commenced the instant

action by filing his Section 2254 petition in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (“EDPA”).? On June 2, 2026, the

EDPA transferred Knight’s Section 2254 petition to this Court. (Docs. 4, 5.)

' The Court takes judicial notice of the docket entries in Knight's

underlying state-court criminal cases. See Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.,

738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“We may take judicial

notice of the contents of another Court’s docket.”); Mickell v. Lycoming Cnty.

Cent. Collections Off. & Admin., 821 F. App’x 74, 75 (3d Cir. 2020)

(unpublished) (taking judicial notice of Court of Common Pleas criminal

docket); Wilson v. McVey, 579 F. Supp. 2d 685, 688 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 2008)

(taking judicial notice of court docket). These dockets are publicly accessible

through the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania Web Portal

(https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch) (the “Portal”). See Zedonis v.

Lynch, 233 F. Supp. 3d 417, 422 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (“Pennsylvania’s Unified

Judicial System provides online access to the docket sheets for criminal

cases, and this Court may take judicial notice of those public dockets.”

(citations omitted)).

2 The federal “prisoner mailbox rule” provides that a pro se prisoner's

habeas petition is deemed filed “at the time petitioner delivered it to the

prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S.

266, 276 (1988). Here, Knight included a declaration that he placed his

habeas petition in the prison mail system on May 12, 2026. See (Doc. 1 at

19). As such, the Court uses May 12, 2026, as the petition’s filing date, even

though the EDPA’s Clerk of Court did not docket it until May 18, 2026.

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In his habeas petition, Knight raises a single claim. He asserts that he

is currently confined in state prison beyond his maximum sentence date,

which was purportedly October 6, 2024. See (Doc. 1 at 8). For relief, he

seeks his immediate release from incarceration. See (id. at 18).

ll. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Preliminary Review of Section 2254 Habeas Petitions

District courts are tasked with conducting a preliminary review of

Section 2254 habeas petitions. See R. 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254. When

conducting this review, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any

attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,

the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the

petitioner.” /d.; see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994)

(explaining that district courts are “authorized to dismiss summarily any

habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.” (citing R. 4, 28

U.S.C. foll. §2254)).

B. Section 2254 Habeas Petitions Generally

A petition for writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy for

a state prisoner challenging the “very fact or duration” of their confinement

and seeking “immediate release or a speedier release from □ that

imprisonment.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973); Leamer

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v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542-44 (3d Cir. 2002). A district court is authorized

to “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

[they are] in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). Claimed violations of state law standing

alone, will not entitle a petitioner to relief, absent a showing that those

violations are so great as to be of a constitutional dimension. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (‘I]t is not the province of a federal

habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding

whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.”). Furthermore, a state prisoner seeking to invoke the power of this

Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus must have exhausted the remedies

available to them in the courts of the state. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A).

lll. DISCUSSION

Before addressing the exhaustion issue apparent from the Court’s

initial review of Knight’s Section 2254 petition, the Court must preliminarily

discuss the precise nature of his habeas claim because it is implausible on

its face. As indicated above, Knight asserts that he remains incarcerated in

a Pennsylvania state correctional institution despite his maximum sentence

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purportedly expiring on October 6, 2024, i.e., an over-detention claim. This

claim is implausible for multiple reasons. First, the instant habeas petition

appears to be Knight's first attempt to seek release from confinement. In

other words, Knight had not challenged his continued incarceration despite

allegedly being detained for approximately 18 months beyond his maximum

sentence. Second, Knight does not allege that prison officials interfered with

his attempts to seek his release through habeas relief, so he apparently had

the means to challenge his confinement at any time prior to filing his petition

in this case. Third, it is highly improbable that the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections would continue to confine Knight

for more than 18 months after the expiration of his maximum sentence.

Fourth, and finally, Knight’s claim is inconsistent with other aspects of the

petition and the publicly available dockets from Knight’s other Pennsylvania

state criminal cases.

Concerning his habeas petition, although Knight asserts that his

maximum release date was October 6, 2024, this date is inconsistent with

the sentence imposed by the YCCP on December 19, 2019. As explained

above, the YCCP sentenced Knight to a period of state confinement that

should have lasted no more than 42 months, /.e., until June 19, 2023. See

(Doc. 1 at 4). Yet, Knight does not allege that his maximum sentence date

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was June 19, 2023: instead, he claims it was October 6, 2024. See (id. at 8).

He does not attempt to explain the more-than-one-year discrepancy between

his asserted maximum sentence date and the Court’s calculated release

date.

In addition, and perhaps more importantly, Knight indicates in his

petition that his maximum sentence date was “altered” after he received a

“new conviction” on August 29, 2025. See (id. at 17). Thus, his

representation that his maximum sentence date was October 6, 2024,

appears to be incorrect if his maximum sentence date somehow changed

after his “new conviction” on August 29, 2025.

As for Knight's criminal records available on the Portal, they show that

at the time of Knight’s sentencing in the YCCP, he was already serving a

state sentence of a minimum of one year to a maximum of five years after

the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas (“LCCP”) determined that he

committed a probation/parole violation on September 15, 2017. See Docket,

Commonwealth v. Knight, No. CP-36-CR-941-2016 (Lancaster Cnty. Ct.

Com. PI.).° It is unclear from Knight’s YCCP docket whether the YCCP

3 On September 21, 2016, Knight pleaded guilty to escape (18 Pa. C.S.

§5121(a)), and he was sentenced to a period of county incarceration for a

minimum of nine months to a maximum of 23 months, along with a

consecutive period of two years’ probation. See id.

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directed that Knight’s sentence would run consecutively or concurrently with

the LCCP’s sentence. See YCCP Dkt. However, if the YCCP imposed a

consecutive sentence, it could explain why Knight’s reference to his

maximum sentence date is inconsistent with the maximum sentence date

calculated by reviewing his YCCP sentence in isolation.

Knight also pleaded guilty to multiple narcotics and other criminal

offenses in four separate criminal cases prosecuted in Lancaster County in

2024 and 2025. See Docket, Commonwealth v, Knight, No. CP-36-CR-3098-

2024 (Lancaster Cnty. Ct. Com. PI.) (possession of a controlled substance

(35 P.S. §780-113(a)(16)) and possession of drug paraphernalia (35 P.S.

§780-113(a)(32))); Docket, Commonwealth v. Knight, No. CP-36-CR-3185-

2024 (Lancaster Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.) (possession of a controlled substance

with intent to deliver (35 Pa. C.S. §780-113(a)(30)) and possession of

marijuana (35 Pa. C.S. §780-113(a)(31))); Docket, Commonwealth v. Knight,

No. CP-36-CR-4007-2024 (Lancaster Cnty. Ct. Com. PI.) (possession of a

controlled substance with intent to deliver, criminal use of a communication

facility (18 Pa. C.S. §7512(a)), and driving while operating privilege is

suspended or revoked (75 Pa. C.S. §1543(a))); Docket, Commonwealth v.

Knight, No. CP-36-CR-1409-2025 (Lancaster Cnty. Ct. Com. PI.)

(possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and conspiracy

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to possess a controlled substance with intent to deliver (18 Pa. C.S. §903)).

He was sentenced in each case on August 29, 2025. Docket,

Commonwealth v, Knight, No. CP-36-CR-3098-2024 (Lancaster Cnty. Ct.

Com. Pl.) (sentenced to a period of county incarceration for a minimum of

time served to a maximum of 12 months); Docket, Commonwealth v. Knight,

No. CP-36-CR-3185-2024 (Lancaster Cnty. Ct. Com. PI.) (sentenced to a

period of county incarceration for a minimum of one year less one day to a

maximum of two years less one day, to be followed by two years of county

probation); Docket, Commonwealth v. Knight, No. CP-36-CR-4007-2024

(Lancaster Cnty. Ct. Com. PI.) (sentenced to an aggregate period of county

incarceration for a minimum of one year less one day to a maximum of two

years less one day, to be followed by two years of county probation); Docket,

Commonwealth v. Knight, No. CP-36-CR-1409-2025 (Lancaster Cnty. Ct.

Com. PI.) (sentenced to an aggregate period of county incarceration for a

minimum of six months to a maximum of 23 months). These criminal

convictions and sentence, particularly Knight’s conviction for driving while his

operating privileges were suspended or revoked, show that Knight has not

been continually incarcerated in state prison since October 6, 2024. They

also might explain why Knight asserts that his maximum sentence in his

YCCP case was “altered” on August 29, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 17.)

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Based on the Court’s review of the totality of Knight’s petition and his

criminal records on the Portal, it appears that he was released on parole at

some point after commencing his YCCP sentence. It also appears that while

on parole, Knight committed several criminal offenses in Lancaster County,

resulting in the Pennsylvania Parole Board holding a parole revocation

hearing during which it revoked his parole, recalculated his maximum

sentence on his YCCP sentence, and recommitted him to state prison. See,

e.g.,61 Pa. C.S. §6138 (setting forth Pennsylvania Parole Board’s authority

for parole violations). Thus, it appears that Knight is currently confined due

to a parole violation.

The Court recognizes that Knight does not reference parole

proceedings in his petition. Nevertheless, the only reasonable interpretation

of Knight’s petition is that he is challenging a Parole Board decision to

recommit him to state prison after revoking his parole. So construed, Knight’s

petition has a procedural issue that he must address. Namely, it does not

appear that he exhausted his state-court remedies prior to filing his petition.

A state prisoner such as Knight, who is seeking to invoke the power of

this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, must have exhausted the

remedies available to them in the courts of the state. See 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

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person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted unless it appears that[] . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State.”). “It is axiomatic that a federal court may

not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has first

exhausted the remedies available in the state courts.” Lambert v. Blackwell,

134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see a/so 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1). A federal court may consider a habeas petition only after the

petitioner “fairly present[s’ their] claim in each appropriate state court

(including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review),

thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

365-66 (1995)). In other words, to fully exhaust their state remedies, a

habeas petitioner must invoke “one complete round of the state’s established

appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999);

see also 28 U.S.C. §2254(c) (“An applicant shall not be deemed to have

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the

meaning of this section, if [they] ha[ve] the right under the law of the State to

raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.”).

Habeas petitioners are required to exhaust state remedies because

exhaustion “addresses federalism and comity concerns by afford[ing] the

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state courts a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error

without interference from the federal judiciary.” Lambert, 134 F.3d at 513

n.18 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, although the

exhaustion requirement is a comity concern and not a jurisdictional concern,

it “should be strictly adhered to because it expresses respect for our dual

judicial system.” Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted). In addition, “[e]qually as important, federal claims that have been

fully exhausted in state courts will more often be accompanied by a complete

factual record to aid the federal courts in their review.” Rose v. Lundy, 455

U.S. 509, 519 (1982). The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that

they have satisfied the exhaustion requirement. See Lines v. Larkins, 208

F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The burden of establishing that [Section 2254

habeas] claims were fairly presented falls upon the petitioner.” (citing

Lambert, 134 F.3d at 513)).

To properly exhaust a claim challenging the Parole Board’s revocation

of parole, recommitment, and recalculation of the sentence, a Section 2254

habeas petitioner must first file an appeal or a petition for administrative

review with the Parole Board. See 37 Pa. Code §73.1(a) (“An interested

party, by counsel unless unrepresented, may appeal a_ revocation

decision.”); id. §73.1(b) (“A parolee, by counsel unless unrepresented, may

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petition for administrative review under this subsection of determinations

relating to revocation decisions which are not otherwise appealable under

subsection (a).”). The filing of an appeal or a petition for administrative review

postpones the finality of the Parole Board’s revocation decision “for purposes

of appeal to a court until the [Parole] Board has mailed its decision on the

appeal [or] . . . . response to the petition for administrative review.” /d.

§§73.1(a)(1), (b)(1). Once the Parole Board resolves the appeal or petition

for administrative review, the petitioner must file a petition for review in the

Commonwealth Court. See 42 Pa. C.S. §763(a) (establishing

Commonwealth’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction in certain cases, such as

in, inter alia, “[a]ll appeals from . . . any Commonwealth agency having

Statewide jurisdiction’); Commonwealth v. Fells, 518 A.2d 544, 544 (Pa.

1986) (explaining that challenges to the Parole Board’s revocation of parole

“are in the appellate jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court”); Borsello v.

Colleran, 833 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (“Appeals of the

[Parole] Board’s parole revocation and recommitment orders are within the

exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court.”). If the

petitioner is unsuccessful in the Commonwealth Court, they must seek

further review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court before bringing a federal

habeas action. See Williams v. Wynder, 232 F. App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2007)

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(unpublished) (concluding that Pennsylvania Supreme Court's

Administrative Order 218 does not apply to appeals from Commonwealth

Court decisions); Jones v. Tritt, No. 16-cv-1741, 2019 WL 314718, at *2

(M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2019) (“If a petitioner . . . fails to seek review from the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court of an unfavorable disposition by the

Commonwealth Court, then the claim remains unexhausted.” (citing

Williams, 232 F. App’x at 180)); see also Jackson v. Clark, No. 17-cv-249,

2018 WL 3040369, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 16, 2018) (explaining that petitioner

claiming that the Parole Board “erred in calculating his parole violation

maximum sentence date” had to exhaust state-court remedies before filing

Section 2254 petition), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL

3037189 (W.D. Pa. June 19, 2018).

Here, Knight does not indicate that he has filed any appeal from the

Parole Board’s decision with the Commonwealth Court, which is unsurprising

considering the way he phrases his habeas claim in his petition. As such, it

appears that the Court should dismiss his petition without prejudice to him

refiling it once he fully exhausts his claim. See Buxton v. Pennsylvania, 398

F. App’x 704, 707 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (concluding that district court

properly determined that Section 2254 petitioner’s “challenge to [his] parole

revocation [w]Jas unexhausted because [the petitioner did] not claim to have

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appealed” the Parole Board’s decision to the Commonwealth Court).

Nevertheless, because it is possible that the Court has misconstrued

Knight’s habeas petition, the Court will provide him with the opportunity to

challenge the Court’s construction of his habeas claim and direct him to show

cause why the Court should not dismiss his petition without prejudice for

failure to exhaust.

As an aside, if Knight actually raises a straight forward over-detention

claim in his petition, /.e., that he has been continually incarcerated past his

maximum sentence date on October 6, 2024, the petition still presents an

exhaustion issue insofar as Knight does not indicate in his petition that he

has already litigated his claim in the Pennsylvania state courts, or that (1)

“there is an absence of available State corrective process” or (2)

“circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect” his

rights. 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(B). Moreover, the applicable statute of

limitations potentially bars Knight’s over-detention claim. See 28 U.S.C.

§2244(d)(1) (providing applicable one-year statute of limitations for Section

2254 habeas petitions).

Overall, there are several issues with Knight's petition that he must

address for this matter to proceed further. He must inform the Court whether

his current state confinement is the result of parole revocation proceedings.

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In addition, he must identify the steps, if any, he has taken to pursue his over-

detention claim in the state courts, and explain why the Court should not

dismiss his petition without prejudice due to his failure to exhaust.

Furthermore, if he still contends that he has been continually incarcerated

since October 6, 2024, on his YCCP sentence, he must explain why the

Court should not dismiss his petition for his failure to exhaust or as time

barred.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will direct Knight to provide

more information about the circumstances surrounding his habeas claim and

order him to show cause why the Court should not dismiss the petition for

failure to exhaust or because it is time barred. An appropriate Order follows.

United States District Judge

DATE: i(2¢

26-1508-01

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