Springs

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

RYAN SPRINGS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:24-cv-01440-JEH

MINDI NURSE, et al.,

Defendants.

Order

Plaintiff brought this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment,

specifically a small growth or cyst on his left eyelid and related headaches.

Before the Court are Defendants’ summary judgment motions. Docs. 102,

107. Plaintiff has filed a response to each. Docs. 109, 119. And Defendants have

filed replies. Docs. 116, 122. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’

summary judgment motions are granted.

I

Plaintiff was in prison at Pontiac Correctional Center at all relevant times.

UMF 1.1 Relevant to this lawsuit he was in prison at Pontiac from April 24, 2024,

through July 16, 2024. UMF 6.

Defendant Dr. Alford was the medical director at Pontiac, and Hutcheson

and McGrath were nurses at Pontiac. UMF 7.

1 “UMF” refers to the individually listed facts in medical Defendants Hutcheson, McGrath, and Alford’s

summary judgment motion, Doc. 102.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hutcheson, McGrath, and Alford exhibited

deliberate indifference to his left eyelid cyst and headaches. UMF 3. Plaintiff’s eye

and headache condition predated his transfer to Pontiac. UMF 4. Plaintiff purports

to dispute this fact, asserting that these conditions “were not fully acknowledged

at Pontiac,” but UMF 4 has nothing to do with anything that happened at Pontiac.

Indeed, Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 109) provides the following background

regarding his medical conditions: In June 2020 Plaintiff was severely injured, and

hospitalized, before he was taken into custody. Doc. 109 at 2, ¶ 1. While at Hill

Correctional Center Plaintiff received “extended treatments,” including medical

and specialist services for macular degeneration, headaches, and a painful cyst

which formed in the upper right corner of Plaintiff’s left eye. Doc. 109 at 2, ¶ 2.

Plaintiff’s medical plan was authorized by Hill’s medical director and an

optometrist. Doc. 109 at 2, ¶ 3. Plaintiff’s medical provider, Wexford Health

Sources, Inc., approved specialist Bond Eye and Associates to treat Plaintiff. Doc.

109 at 2, ¶ 4. Plaintiff transferred from Hill to Pontiac on April 24, 2024. Doc. 109

at 2, ¶ 5.

Plaintiff asserts that at the time of his transfer from Hill to Pontiac he was

scheduled for surgery, corrective vision treatments, injections, medical for

headaches, “etc.” but he provides no citation to evidence to support this assertion

which is therefore disregarded. Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b)(5); Zoretic v. Darge, 832 F.3d

639, 641 (7th Cir. 2016). Future instances of unsupported assertions are likewise

disregarded for the same reason.

Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that prior to his transfer to Pontiac he

repeatedly refused care for his left eye. UMF 5. Plaintiff asserts without citation to

evidence that he never refused care related to his left eye, Doc. 109-1 at 1, but the

medical records Defendants cite in their motion plainly note that Plaintiff refused

care for his left eyelid issues. Doc. 102-5 at 2, 6, 90. Whether he in fact refused

medical care (as opposed to the records being incorrect) is immaterial to the issues

before the Court.

Dr. Alford was not responsible for receiving and handling inmates’ sick call

requests or grievances; rather, he saw inmate patients and reviewed their charts,

which were brought to him by other staff or nurses. He was not responsible for

scheduling inmate visits to medical or to outside providers or for ensuring their

appearance at medical appointments. UMF 8. Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact

but provides no applicable evidentiary support. Here, for the first time of many,

Plaintiff references Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Directive

04.03.101, Offender Physical Examinations. Doc. 110-2 at 180-187. AD 04.03.101

does not bear on the issues in this action – it relates to initial intake examinations

upon entry into the Illinois Department of Corrections, periodic examinations, and

certain chronic disease treatment protocols. Its language does not indicate any

applicability to examinations to be performed upon transfer between facilities.

And its language does not establish Dr. Alford’s job duties as relevant here.

As nurses, McGrath and Hutcheson did not have the ability to diagnose

medical conditions or prescribe medications. UMF 9. Plaintiff purports to dispute

this fact, however his general citation to these Defendants’ declarations (Doc. 110-

3 at 510-516) does not substantiate any dispute.2

The Health Status Transfer Summary filled out by medical at Hill on April

22 listed a history of headaches and indicated Zyrtec 10mg as the sole current

medication; it did not list Tylenol or Motrin. UMF 10, citing Doc. 102-5 at 9.

Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact and cites Doc. 110-2 at 31, which is the next

2 Some case participants may have been confused because Plaintiff submitted his summary judgement

response exhibits along with a proposed amended complaint, but read in context, and considering his table

of exhibits at Doc. 109-2, his summary judgment response exhibits are clearly Doc. 110-1 through 110-3.

page in the medical records, a health status transfer summary completed by

Defendant McGrath at Pontiac on April 24. That document indicates in the

“subjective” section that Plaintiff told McGrath that he had left eye pain and that

he told her he was taking Motrin and Robaxin. Id.; UMF 15. McGrath wrote down

what Plaintiff told her, but was not required to credit his statements, particularly

to the extent they differed from the health transfer form completed at Hill.

On the day he arrived at Pontiac, Plaintiff was seen by Hutchison and

McGrath, they examined him, asked questions regarding his medical condition,

took vitals, and completed intake paperwork, and as noted immediately above,

McGrath documented that Plaintiff reported complaints of left eye pain. In his

deposition Plaintiff also testified he told them he was suffering headaches. UMF

11. Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact but does not support his dispute with

admissible evidence.

To request medical care at Pontiac, inmates are to submit sick call request

slips. UMF 12. Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact again citing the unrelated AD

04.03.101. Prior to being seen by Hutchison and McGrath Plaintiff had not

submitted a sick call request slip. UMF 13. Again Plaintiff purports to dispute this

fact but does not demonstrate any genuine issue. The purpose of McGrath’s visit

with Plaintiff on April 24, 2024, was to collect the necessary information to fill out

the “receiving facility” portion of the Health Status Transfer Summary, not to treat

any specific non-emergency medical condition. UMF 14. Plaintiff purports to

dispute this fact, citing a declaration he wrote, Doc. 110-3 at 2-5, but the declaration

does not create an issue this fact. On April 24, Nurse McGrath saw the Plaintiff,

took his vitals (which were normal), asked questions regarding his medical

condition, and completed the “receiving facility” portion of the Health Status

Transfer Summary. UMF 15. Again Plaintiff’s purported dispute is unsupported.

McGrath used her medical judgment at that time to determine that the Plaintiff

was not in need of any emergency medical care; McGrath did not have the ability

within her scope of practice to diagnose Plaintiff, prescribe medications, or to

order that he be provided non-emergency care by medical professionals outside

of Pontiac. UMF 16. Plaintiff purports to dispute the fact based on his declaration

that her actions were in violation of an administrative directive and his

constitutional rights, which is conclusory and not within Plaintiff’s personal

knowledge and does not create a genuine issue of fact.

On April 24 Hutcheson saw Plaintiff, or reviewed his chart, for the purpose

of documenting the medications listed upon Health Status Transfer Summary

filled out by medical at Hill, and to fill out the Orientation Screening form. UMF

17. The purpose of Hutcheson’s visit with Plaintiff and / or her review of his chart

was not to treat any specific non-emergency medical condition. UMF 17. Plaintiff

purports to dispute this fact, arguing that “Defendant has already lied about being

RN, LPN” and asserts Hutcheson was not authorized to change his medical

treatment plan, but neither attack create an issue as to this fact. Hutcheson used

her medical judgment at that time to determine that Plaintiff was not in need of

any emergency medical care; she did not have the ability within her scope of

practice to diagnose Plaintiff, prescribe medications, or to order that he be

provided non-emergency care by medical professional outside of Pontiac. UMF

18. Plaintiff again raises a purported dispute, citing his conclusory declaration,

which does not in fact create a genuine dispute.

Hutcheson and McGrath then advised the Plaintiff that he should file a sick

call request slip if he wished to seek medical care specifically for his left eye and

headache conditions as this was the proper way to request medical care at Pontiac.

UMF 19. Again Plaintiff’s purported dispute fails because he does not provide any

material that actually creates an issue of fact.

Hutcheson and McGrath did not see or speak with Plaintiff after April 24.

UMF 20. They were not involved with Plaintiff’s care or requests for care in any

way after April 24: They were not asked to see Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s care or condition

was not brought to their attention, they were not made aware of any medical

complaints or requests by Plaintiff, and they were not aware of Plaintiff having

any issues seeking or receiving care. UMF 21. Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact

but his dispute is, essentially, a statement that he does not know if it is true since

he was in prison 24/7, which is insufficient to create an issue of fact.

Plaintiff did not see or speak with Dr. Alford during his incarceration at

Pontiac. UMF 22. Plaintiff does not seek to dispute this fact. Defendants assert,

“During Plaintiff’s relevant incarceration at PCC Dr. Alford was never made

aware of Plaintiff nor his medical conditions or requests.” UMF 23. Plaintiff

disputes this fact, citing Alford’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses which admit

that Alford “was involved in Plaintiff’s care during the relevant time period,”

while denying that Plaintiff was denied care and denying that the care provided

failed to meet the standard of care or constitutional standards. Doc. 30 at 1.

No act or omission on the part of Hutcheson or McGrath caused any

improper delay in treatment, undue pain or suffering, degradation of Plaintiff’s

condition, nor any poor outcome for Plaintiff. UMF 24. Plaintiff purports to

dispute this fact but he does not identify any admissible evidence that

demonstrates Hutcheson and McGrath’s involvement with Plaintiff on April 24,

2024, caused any of these things to occur.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were in violation of administrative

directives and the Constitution. Doc. 109 at 2-4. The only Administrative Directive

he cites in this part of his brief is AD 04.03.101, which as discussed above does not

relate to transfers between prisons for individuals already in IDOC custody, and

in any case, does not establish constitutional parameters of medical care. His

assertion that his constitutional rights were violated is entirely conclusory.

Plaintiff asserts that he repeatedly requested medical care and pain

medication and that his medical needs were ignored, Doc. 109 at 4, but he provides

no evidence beyond his affidavit in support of these assertions and no specifics in

his affidavit as to when or where these purported requests occurred.

Plaintiff also pursues deliberate indifference to a serious medical need

claims against IDOC Defendants Pontiac Warden Mindi Nurse and healthcare

administrators Ginger Davis and Nikki Rambo. The following facts are from these

Defendants’ summary judgment motion and Plaintiff’s response.

Health Care Unit Administrators (HCUAs) and Directors of Nursing

(DONs), including Defendants Davis and Rambo, are administrative functionaries

in the prison health care system; they do not provide care to inmates, nor do they

determine what care an inmate needs. IDOC-UMF 1.3 Plaintiff purports to dispute

this fact but his blanket citation to twenty-four pages of his affidavits is the only

evidentiary support he provides, and those affidavits do not in fact create an

identifiable issue here; Plaintiff also appears to agree with the fact based on writing

that he “acknowledges” it to be the case. HCUAs and DONs, including Davis and

Rambo, do not personally schedule outside appointments for individuals in

custody, but rather refer such matters to the medical records director, who

coordinates the actual scheduling of appointments. IDOC-UMF 2. Plaintiff again

purports to dispute this fact but his blanket citation to over thirty pages of his

affidavits does not create a genuine issue as to this fact.

3 “IDOC-UMF” is used to refer to facts listed in IDOC Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Doc. 107.

When Nurse was informed of issues with Plaintiff receiving care, she

investigated those claims and was informed by medical providers that Plaintiff,

and not medical staff, was refusing to participate in medical care. IDOC-UMF 3.

Plaintiff again seeks to dispute this fact by referencing affidavits that he wrote, but

these affidavits again do not establish a genuine dispute as to this fact. Plaintiff

repeatedly asserts Warden Nurse lied but stating that conclusion is of no

evidentiary value because the affidavits do not include any specifics to

demonstrate Plaintiff’s personal knowledge regarding what Warden Nurse did or

did not do. See Doc. 117-1 at 59-62, 117-2 at 21-23. Plaintiff also cites to, and

includes a copy of, Judge McDade’s Merit Review Order (Doc. 18) in support of

his claim, but that document is only a summary of Plaintiff’s allegations – it is not

admissible now to prove those same allegations are factually true.

When Defendants Davis and Rambo are informed of issues with individuals

in custody receiving care, they investigate those claims by discussing them with

medical providers, and, as necessary, reviewing medical records. IDOC-UMF 4, 5.

Plaintiff purports to dispute these facts by calling Davis and Rambo liars and

asserting various non-responsive allegations. Doc. 117 at 21 ¶5-6. Plaintiff does not

raise a genuine dispute as to these facts.

To the extent that Defendant Davis was informed of and investigated

Plaintiff’s claims about being refused medical care, she did not find information in

his medical records which supported that claim, but rather the medical providers

disputed Plaintiff’s claims. IDOC-UMF 6. Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, but

his blanket citation to his entire complaint and proposed amended complaint do

not establish a genuine issue as to this fact.

To the extent that Defendant Rambo was informed of and investigated

Plaintiff’s claims about being refused medical care, she did not find information in

his medical records which supported that claim, but rather the medical providers

disputed Plaintiffs claims. IDOC-UMF 7. Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact by

citing again to affidavits that are entirely conclusory, lack any indication of dates

or times of the occurrences alleged therein, and again acknowledge that Rambo

may well have not known about his situation but should be held responsible based

on her supervisory role within the healthcare system. Doc. 117-1 at 17. There is no

genuine dispute as to IDOC-UMF 7.

Defendants Nurse and Rambo seek to aver that no act or omission on their

part caused any improper delay in treatment, undue pain or suffering,

degradation of Plaintiff’s condition, or any poor outcome for Plaintiff, but they do

not establish a basis for their conclusory statement so IDOC-UMF 9-10 are not facts

properly before the Court. At the same time, though Plaintiff purports to dispute

these facts by calling Nurse and Rambo liars and asserting that their actions or

inactions did in fact cause pain and suffering and prolonged a scheduled surgery,

his affidavits are again a regurgitation of his allegations and do not indicate with

any specificity how anything these Defendants did or did not do impacted him,

aside from asserting he continued suffering from headaches during this period.

The IDOC Defendants UMF 10, 11, 12, and 14 are covered earlier in the facts

recited above regarding Plaintiff’s medical condition and care prior to his transfer.

Plaintiff refused mandatory care while at Pontiac – specifically a TB skin test

attempted on June 6, 2024. IDOC-UMF 13. Plaintiff’s purported dispute fails to

raise a genuine issue as to this fact.

Plaintiff purchased a number of items from the commissary at Pontiac, but

his memory failed him during his deposition as to whether ibuprofen or Tylenol

were available at the commissary. Doc. 107-7 at 32:3-14.

To the extent Plaintiff attempts to provide any additional material facts in

response to the IDOC Defendants’ summary judgment motion they are

unsupported by citation to admissible evidence. Plaintiff sometimes cites to the

many affidavits he authored but those affidavits are recitations of his allegations

as to matters that he has not established personal knowledge of or are otherwise

so non-specific as to lack any evidentiary value.

Plaintiff was ultimately seen at Marion Eye Center in January 2025, after he

was transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center, and he described the condition

to the provider there as “annoying,” said it had existed for years, and that

physician’s plan was to monitor the ongoing development of the 6 – 7 mm growth

and for Plaintiff to take ibuprofen as needed. 107-5 at 43-47.

II

A

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court “has one task

and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any

material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24

F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). In making this determination, the court must construe

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2010).

“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment imposes a duty on the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, ‘to

provide adequate medical care to incarcerated individuals.’” Johnson v. Dominguez,

5 F.4th 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).

“Prison officials can be liable for violating the Eighth Amendment when they

display deliberate indifference towards an objectively serious medical need.”

Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2021). “Thus, to prevail on a

deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) an objectively serious

medical condition to which (2) a state official was deliberately, that is subjectively,

indifferent.’” Dominguez, 5 F.4th at 824 (citing Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources,

Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016)).

“To be ‘serious,’ a medical condition must be one that a physician has

diagnosed as needing treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Knight v. Wiseman,

590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). “To show deliberate

indifference, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was actually aware

of a serious medical need but then was deliberately indifferent to it. Deliberate

indifference requires a showing of more than mere or gross negligence, but less

than purposeful infliction of harm.” Id.

B

First, there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that that Plaintiff suffered from a serious medical need. Plaintiff alleges

a cyst or growth on his left eyelid caused him headaches. That cyst was entirely

unrelated to Plaintiff’s vision loss which was caused by an assault in 2020 before

Plaintiff was in custody. Common ailments such as headaches are generally

insufficient to reach the level of an objectively serious medical need. See Henderson

v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999); Willis v. Pfister, No. 18-CV-333, 2024

WL 216672, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2024). Plaintiff described varying levels of pain

from this condition, and while pain can be difficult to assess, the record does not

indicate severe or debilitating pain. Plaintiff later described his condition as

merely an “annoying” condition he had been dealing with for years and was at

that point prescribed ibuprofen.

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff has

not put forth evidence from which any reasonable jury could determine that he

suffered from an objectively serious medical need, such that any delay in

treatment could rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment.

Second, even if a jury could determine that Plaintiff’s headache and eyelid

growth were objectively serious medical conditions, no reasonable jury could

determine that any Defendant sued here was deliberately indifferent to it.

As to the medical defendants, Nurses Sarah Hutcheson and Rebekah

McGrath saw Plaintiff on one occasion – April 24, 2024. The purpose was Plaintiff’s

immediate assessment upon transferring to Pontiac from Hill. Though Plaintiff

repeatedly argues – without any specifics and without citation to any prescription

or other medical records – that he was receiving prescription Tylenol and Robaxin

at Hill, and that he had outside eye appointments scheduled at the time he left

Hill, the record does not substantiate or support those assertions. The transfer

summary from Hill did not mention any outstanding medical writs or specialist

appointments, nor did it indicate any medication aside from Zyrtec, an allergy

medication, which Plaintiff does not assert that he was denied. There is no

indication that Plaintiff required emergency or urgent care on April 24, and

Hutcheson and McGrath had nothing to do with Plaintiff’s care after that date.

These two nurses told Plaintiff how to request medical care for his non-urgent

condition. No reasonable jury could find either to have exhibited deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs, to the extent such needs could be

determined to be objectively serious.

Plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Alford presents an interesting situation: Alford

admitted in his answer that he was “involved” with Plaintiff’s care, but aside from

that admission, there is no shred of evidence that Alford knew about, much less

failed to properly address, Plaintiff’s medical needs. To prove liability, there must

be evidence of record to demonstrate personal involvement with improper or

insufficient medical treatment of the plaintiff, and also evidence to support a

finding that the medical provider acted with a mental state bordering on complete

disregard for the plaintiff’s medical needs. No reasonable jury could construe

Alford’s bare admission of “involvement” in Plaintiff’s care to find him to have

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Aside from that single broad admission of

involvement there is nothing in the record about anything Alford did or did not

do. So, while Plaintiff has won on the evidentiary battle of preserving Alford’s

admission, he must lose the claim for want of evidence that Alford did or did not

do anything with a sufficiently culpable mental state to warrant imposition of

Eighth Amendment liability.

Finally, Plaintiff’s claims also fail as to the IDOC Defendants, Nurse, Davis,

and Rambo, on the issue of deliberate indifference, again in the alternative to the

Court’s finding that Plaintiff did not suffer an objectively serious medical need.

Warden Nurse is not a medical professional, and as such, unless Plaintiff’s

medical need would have been obvious to a lay person, she is entitled to defer to

the medical professionals’ reports regarding Plaintiff’s care. Greeno v. Daley, 414

F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2005) (declining to hold complaint examiner liable for failing

to “remedy the medical defendants’ failure to provide appropriate treatment”);

Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that wardens and

grievance officers are “entitled to relegate to the prison’s medical staff the

provision of good medical care”). Rather than exhibit deliberate indifference to

Plaintiff’s complaints the record demonstrates that Nurse investigated those

complaints, including by speaking to medical providers who reported Plaintiff

had been refusing to engage in receiving medical care. Plaintiff was then

transferred to another facility, at which point Nurse had no power to further

resolve his medical concerns.

As to Davis and Rambo, the record is devoid of detail regarding when or

how either were placed on notice of Plaintiff’s condition, much less that they acted

with deliberate indifference to his situation. Plaintiff broadly alleges that they

should have known based on their involvement with healthcare at Pontiac, and

generally asserts that at some unspecified time and location he spoke to Davis,

relating that he was not receiving treatment. This record is insufficient for any

reasonable jury to find these Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a

serious medical need. There is a record of Plaintiff’s chronic eye growth condition

stretching back some years prior to his transfer to Pontiac, a history of medical

records from Hill noting Plaintiff refusal to attend medical appointments,

including specialist appointments related to his eye, and a generalized assertion

by Plaintiff that by being employed in the healthcare department at Pontiac, Davis

and Rambo could be found liable for violating his constitutional rights. No

reasonable jury could so find.

A final note as to Plaintiff’s arguments about the impact of prison policies

on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff discusses the contents of various IDOC

Administrative Directives at length and asserts that Defendants failed to follow

those internal IDOC protocols and policies. Those policies and directives do not

appear applicable to Plaintiff’s situation: AD 04.03.101 on its face relates to intake

into the IDOC rather than protocols for transfer between facilities. Plaintiff makes

an argument about an assessment he believes he should have undergone pursuant

to policies related to his approval to be a food handler within the prison – but that

entry and those policies are entirely divorced from the facts of this case and

Plaintiff’s eye and headache condition. Where none of the policies at issue are

clearly applicable to Plaintiff’s medical care for his eye cyst and headaches, they

do not create a reasonable inference that Defendants violated his constitutional

rights regarding these conditions.

Finally, the IDOC Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity.

But since all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the merits as

discussed above, that analysis is unnecessary.

III

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ summary judgment motions

[102], [107] are GRANTED.

It is so ordered.

Entered: July 22, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge