The opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, No. 24-5747
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellant,
2:11-cv-00283-
v.
JCM-NJK
BENJAMIN E. HOSKINS,
individually and as officer of OPINION
Defendants Dream Financial; Logic
Solutions, LLC; Oxford Debt
Holdings, LLC Sell It Vizions, LLC;
and Global Finance Group, LLC;
LEANNE RODGERS, F/K/A Leanne
Hoskins,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
IVY CAPITAL, INC., DREAM
FINANCIAL, OXFORD
FINANCIAL, LLC,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
Argued and Submitted October 22, 2025
Phoenix, Arizona
Filed August 4, 2026
Before: Susan P. Graber, Bridget S. Bade, and Kenneth K.
Lee, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Lee;
Partial Dissent and Partial Concurrence by Judge Bade
SUMMARY*
Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act / FTC
The panel reversed the district court’s rulings blocking
the Federal Trade Commission’s efforts to collect on a
money judgment it obtained against Benjamin Hoskins and
his wife Leann Rodgers stemming from a telemarketing
scam, and remanded for further proceedings.
The FTC obtained a money judgment of over $130
million against Hoskins and about $1.5 million against
Rodgers, who received proceeds from the scam. The FTC
later obtained a writ of execution under the Federal Debt
Collection Procedure Act (“FDCPA”) to levy on their house
in Las Vegas. The district court blocked the FTC’s collection
efforts, ruling that enforcement was barred by the Nevada
*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 3
statute of limitations. The district court also quashed the
writ of execution, holding that under Nevada law the FTC
had to file a separate action to establish that the trust holding
the house is Rodgers’s alter ego.
The panel held that the district court erred in ruling that
Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations precluded the FTC
from enforcing the judgment against Rodgers. The FDCPA,
which has no time limit for collecting debts owed to the
federal government by writ of execution, preempts state
statutes of limitations for enforcement of judgments. The
panel rejected the district court’s reasoning that the FDCPA
does not apply because a “debt” under the statute must be
owed to the United States—and here the proceeds from the
judgment will ultimately be disbursed to the victims. The
judgment against Rodgers on its face states that $1.5 million
is payable to the FTC, and is thus a “debt” owing to the
United States under the FDCPA.
The panel held that the district court erred in quashing
the writ of execution because, contrary to the district court’s
ruling, the FTC need not show that the trust holding the
house was Rodgers’s alter ego under Nevada law. Under the
FDCPA, the FTC may levy any property, however held, in
which Hoskins and Rodgers have a substantial nonexempt
interest. They have such an interest in the house because of
their status as trustees and beneficiaries of the trust.
Judge Bade dissented in part and concurred in part. She
dissented from the majority’s decision to reverse the order
quashing the writ of execution because she disagreed with
the majority’s conclusion that the FDCPA applied to the
enforcement of a disgorgement decree entered in favor of the
FTC. Because the disgorgement decree at issue did not fall
within the statutory definition of debt, the FDCPA did not
4 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
apply, and Nevada law governed the procedures of the writ
of execution sought by the FTC.
She concurred, however, in the majority’s decision to
reverse the district court’s order precluding future
enforcement of the judgment. As an incident of sovereignty,
the United States and its instrumentalities are not bound by
general statutes of limitations unless expressly named. The
Nevada statute of limitations for the enforcement of a
judgment does not expressly apply to the federal
government. Therefore, the district court erred in forbidding
the FTC from enforcing the disgorgement decree by means
under than the particular writ of execution sought below.
COUNSEL
Matthew M. Hoffman (argued), Crystal Ostrum, and
Matthew B. Weprin, Attorneys; H. Thomas Byron III,
Deputy General Counsel; Anisha S. Dasgupta and Lucas
Croslow, General Counsel; Federal Trade Commission,
Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Caleb Kruckenberg (argued) and Christian Clase, Center for
Individual Rights, Washington, D.C.; David R. Koch, King
Scow Koch Durham LLC, Henderson, Nevada; Jeffrey
Willis, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Tucson, Arizona; for
Defendants-Appellees.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 5
OPINION
LEE, Circuit Judge:
This appeal is the latest turn in the government’s long
and winding pursuit of telemarketing scam artists who bilked
consumers out of more than $130 million. For years,
Benjamin E. Hoskins and his co-defendants promoted
worthless “business coaching” services that amounted to tips
on how to sell items on eBay. In 2011, the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) sued them and obtained a money
judgment of over $130 million against Hoskins and about
$1.5 million against his wife, Leanne Rodgers, who received
proceeds from the scam.
But the defendants hampered the government’s efforts to
collect on the judgment by weaving a web of shell entities to
shield themselves. The FTC finally obtained a writ of
execution under the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3308 (“FDCPA”), to levy on Hoskin and
Rodgers’ house in Las Vegas. The district court blocked the
FTC’s collection efforts, ruling that the enforcement was
barred by the Nevada statute of limitations. It also quashed
the writ of execution, holding that under Nevada law the
FTC had to file a separate action to establish that the trust
holding the house is Rodgers’s alter ego.
We reverse both rulings. We have long held that the
FDCPA preempts a state statute of limitations for the
enforcement of judgments. See United States v. Gianelli, 543
F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2008). The district court,
however, reasoned that the FDCPA does not apply because
a “debt” under the statute must be owed to the United
States—and here the proceeds from the judgment will
ultimately be disbursed to the victims. But the judgment
6 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
against Rodgers on its face states that $1.5 million is payable
to the FTC. It is thus a “debt” owing to the United States
under the FDCPA, and the Nevada statute of limitations is
preempted.
We also reverse the order quashing the writ of execution.
Contrary to the district court’s ruling, the FTC need not show
that the trust holding the house is Rodgers’s alter ego under
Nevada law. Under the FDCPA, the FTC may levy any
property, however held, in which Hoskins and Rodgers have
a substantial nonexempt interest. They have such an interest
in the house because of their status as trustees and
beneficiaries of the trust. Accordingly, the writ of execution
was properly issued and should not have been quashed.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
A. The telemarketing scheme
Starting in 2007, Benjamin Hoskins and his co-
defendants operated a telemarketing scheme that scammed
consumers out of more than $130 million. Operating as Ivy
Capital, the defendants sold worthless “business coaching”
services with false promises that their program would enable
people to earn up to $10,000 per month. At the same time,
the defendants engaged in deceptive tactics to stymie
consumers’ efforts to receive refunds. The scheme played
out in four stages.
First, the defendants used “lead generators”—such as
promotional websites, blast emails, and internet
advertisements—to collect the contact information of
potential targets. The lead-generation materials promised
people that if they followed a work-from-home program that
cost between $50 and $250, they could make hundreds, if
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 7
not thousands, of dollars per week. Unsuspecting consumers
provided their contact information in response to the
materials.
Second, telemarketers called those consumers to
persuade them to spend thousands of dollars on a personal
business coaching program. Sales representatives promised
the consumers that they would receive everything they
needed to start internet businesses that would generate
substantial income with little effort. For example, as part of
the business coaching program, sales representatives
guaranteed that consumers would get weekly coaching
sessions with experts. The program’s price varied, ranging
from $2,000 to over $20,000.
The defendants falsely represented to consumers that the
coaches were experts who had their own profitable internet
businesses. The coaches did not have any formal education
or specialized training, and they were not even required to
complete the defendants’ own business coaching program.
The most that any “coaching expert” taught a consumer was
how to sell items on eBay—something that anyone could
research online without having to spend thousands of dollars
on a business coaching program.
To sell the program, sales representatives used
testimonials from “successful” consumers. But the
testimonials were deceptive. Several of the defendants’
employees testified that a “success story” included virtually
anyone who had sold anything on eBay for any amount.
Most, if not all, consumers who purchased the business
coaching program could not recoup the cost of the program
through eBay sales.
Third, the defendants upsold a variety of products and
services that produced little to no value to consumers who
8 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
had already purchased the business coaching program. In
one instance, a consumer testified that, after spending over
$7,000 on “upsell” products alone, he sold three items on
eBay. One was a legitimate sale that did not come close to
earning back his initial investment. And the other two were
purchases that the consumer made to confirm that his
website was working.
Fourth, the defendants engaged in deceptive strategies to
prevent consumers from receiving refunds and voicing
complaints. Many consumers, after making good-faith
efforts to establish a successful internet business using
defendants’ plans and services, became dissatisfied and
sought refunds from Ivy Capital. The defendants had a strict
three-day refund policy, but most consumers were not told
of this policy. And even when consumers did seek a refund
within three days, the defendants imposed substantial
obstacles, such as not responding to phone calls. Consumers
who were persistent enough to speak with someone at the
“Resolutions Department” were cajoled, intimidated,
berated, and often eventually denied a refund.
Portions of the tens of millions of dollars extracted
through this scam were funneled to entities controlled by the
defendants’ spouses, including Rodgers. Rodgers used a
company called Oxford Financial, LLC, to shift money from
the Ivy Capital enterprise into Hoskins’ and Rodgers’
personal accounts. Rodgers personally received over $1
million from Oxford between May 2007 and January 2011,
as well as additional financial benefits in the form of school
tuition, a personal credit card, IRS fees, a vehicle, and other
personal and household expenses.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 9
B. The judgments against Hoskins and Rodgers
In 2011, the FTC sued numerous defendants who
operated the scam and/or who received money from it. All
the defendants settled with the FTC except for Hoskins,
Rodgers, and their affiliated companies. The district court in
2013 granted summary judgment to the FTC and entered a
monetary judgment against these defendants. The court held
Hoskins and his company, Dream Financial, jointly and
severally liable with the settling defendants for
$130,375,057.52; Oxford liable for $1,529,292.25; and
Rodgers liable for $1,128,795.78. The judgment
characterized these awards as “equitable monetary relief.”
The judgment maintained an existing freeze on Hoskins’s
and Rodgers’s assets and provided that it would be lifted
only as necessary to affect the turnover of their assets in
partial satisfaction of the monetary relief awards.
On appeal, this court affirmed the liability determination
and the judgment against Hoskins but held that Rodgers
should be jointly and severally liable with Oxford because
the company was her alter ego. FTC v. Ivy Cap., Inc., 616 F.
App’x 360, 360–62 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpublished). On
remand, the district court entered an amended judgment
against Rodgers, holding her liable for $1,550,848.48
(including prejudgment interest). Consistent with its usual
practice, the FTC intends to use any funds that it recovers
from Hoskins and Rodgers to pay back the victims of
Hoskins’s business-coaching scam.
C. The FTC’s collection efforts
Hoskins and Rodgers satisfied little of their judgments.
The judgment balances on Hoskins and Rodgers as of July
2023 were about $131 million and $1.4 million, respectively.
The FTC spent years investigating their assets so that it could
10 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
collect the judgments and provide redress to victims of the
scam, but Hoskins and Rodgers have thus far evaded the
FTC’s collection efforts.
The property at issue is Hoskins and Rodgers’s current
residence (“the Corona Vista property”), which was bought
with the proceeds from the sale of their prior home (“the
Drifting Shadow property”) in violation of the court-ordered
asset freeze. In 2013, Hoskins and Rodgers moved for relief
from the asset freeze to permit them to sell the Drifting
Shadow property, claiming that they could not make
mortgage and homeowners-association payments and that
the property was at risk of foreclosure. The court said that it
would permit them to put the Drifting Shadow property up
for sale, but that it would not necessarily permit Hoskins and
Rodgers to buy a new house with the proceeds.
Faced with these restrictions, Hoskins and Rodgers did
not sell at that time. Instead, in 2016, they conveyed the
Drifting Shadow property to the Hambil Trust (“the Trust”),
of which Hoskins and Rodgers are trustees and beneficiaries.
The Trust, in turn, conveyed the property to an LLC of which
the Trust is the managing member. Although Hoskins and
Rodgers never sought court approval to sell the Drifting
Shadow property through the Trust, they eventually sold the
property.
In 2021, Rodgers bought the Corona Vista property
using some proceeds from the sale of the Drifting Shadow
property. Although Rodgers at first named herself as the
buyer on the purchase agreement, she later tried to obscure
her interest in the property through an elaborate web of shell
entities. Rodgers instructed the title company that the buyer
would be “Monte Bello, LLC,” and requested that the title
company “[l]eave my name off of [the deed] if possible.”
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 11
Monte Bello is owned by Resolute 21, LLC, which in turn is
owned by the Trust.
II. Procedural History
A. The writ of execution
In August 2023, after learning that Hoskins and Rodgers
had circumvented the court’s orders by selling the Drifting
Shadow property and purchasing the Corona Vista property,
the FTC applied for a writ of execution under the FDCPA.
The FTC sought to levy on the Corona Vista property to
satisfy part of the outstanding judgments against Hoskins
and Rodgers. The district court issued the writ.
Rodgers then moved to quash the writ of execution. The
magistrate judge granted the motion, holding that, under
Nevada law, the FTC had to “file a separate action for alter
ego” to establish Rodgers’s interest in the property. The FTC
objected, arguing that the FDCPA preempts state law, but
the district court denied the objection, agreeing that a
separate action for alter ego was required.
B. Relief from judgment
Rodgers separately moved for relief from the judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), arguing that
enforcement was barred by Nevada’s six-year statute of
limitations. The district court agreed and granted the motion,
rejecting the FTC’s argument that the FDCPA preempted
that state law. The court later entered an order stating that
the judgment against Rodgers was “of no further force or
legal effect, as any attempt to enforce the judgment is barred
by Nevada’s six-year period of limitation governing
enforcement of a judgment.” For these reasons, the court
held that “the FTC may no longer seek to collect or enforce
the judgment against Rodgers” and directed the FTC to
12 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
release any liens affecting real property or other recordings
of the judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court’s determination that the FDCPA does
not preempt Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations raises a
question of statutory construction that we review de novo.
U.S. Small Bus. Admin. v. Bensal, 853 F.3d 992, 996 (9th
Cir. 2017). For a motion to quash, we review for abuse of
discretion, United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1499 (9th
Cir. 1996), but an error of law is an abuse of discretion,
Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins., 594 F.3d 1087, 1091
(9th Cir. 2010).
DISCUSSION
I. The district court erred in barring enforcement of the
judgment against Rodgers.
The FDCPA0F establishes the exclusive procedures for
the United States to recover a judgment on a debt and
expressly preempts inconsistent state law. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 3001(a), 3003(d). Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1990
“to create a comprehensive statutory framework for the
collection of debts owed to the United States government.”
H.R. Rep. No. 101-736, at 23 (1990).0F1 Before that time, the
1
We cite H.R. Rep. No. 101-736 merely to provide general background
on an obscure statute that is distinct from a more commonly known
statute that shares the same acronym, the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (statute barring debt collectors from
engaging in abusive and deceptive tactics against consumers). But in
interpreting the meaning of the statutory provisions in the Federal Debt
Collection Procedure Act, we rely on the statutory text, not some larger
purpose not defined in the statute. See Salisbury v. City of Santa Monica,
998 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Vague notions of a statute’s ‘basic
purpose’ are inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 13
federal government had to rely on state-law procedures to
enforce its judgments. See FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1) (stating
that the procedure on execution of a money judgment “must
accord with the procedure of the state where the court is
located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it
applies”). By enacting the new law, Congress sought to
“bring an end to the . . . situation whereby a crazy patchwork
of laws in the 50 states dictate[s] the debt collection remedies
available to [the government] in collecting Federal debts.”
H.R. Rep. No. 101-825, at 19 (1990).
The FDCPA defines “debt” broadly to include any
amount “owing to the United States on account of a fee,
duty, lease, rent, service, sale of real or personal property,
overpayment, fine, assessment, penalty, restitution,
damages, interest, tax, bail bond forfeiture, reimbursement,
recovery of a cost incurred by the United States, or other
source of indebtedness to the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 3002(3)(B) (emphases added). The statute further defines
“United States” to include “an agency, department,
commission, board, or other entity of the United States.” Id.
§ 3002(15)(B).
The FDCPA provides several ways for the government
to enforce a judgment debt. See id. §§ 3202–3205. The one
at issue here is execution on property. Under the statute,
“[a]ll property in which the judgment debtor has a
substantial nonexempt interest shall be subject to levy
pursuant to a writ of execution.” Id. § 3203(a). A district
court may issue a writ of execution upon written application
of counsel for the United States. Id. § 3203(c)(1).
specific issue under consideration.”) (alterations adopted) (quoting
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993)).
14 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
The district court erred in holding that Nevada’s six-year
statute of limitations precludes the FTC from enforcing the
judgment against Rodgers. The FDCPA has a sweeping
preemption provision: “This chapter shall preempt State law
to the extent such law is inconsistent with a provision of this
chapter.” 28 U.S.C. § 3003(d). The FDCPA also has no time
limit for collecting debts owed to the federal government by
writ of execution. See id. § 3203. We have thus held that the
FDCPA preempts state statutes of limitations for
enforcement of judgments. See Gianelli, 543 F.3d at 1183
(“[T]he California state law at issue, . . . which would
preclude enforcement of a restitution judgment after ten
years from the entry of that judgment, is . . . an inconsistent
state law and is, therefore, preempted.”).
A. Gianelli controls here.
In Gianelli, a criminal defendant was ordered to pay
$125,000 in restitution to the United States. Id. at 1181.
More than a decade after the district court issued that order,
the government applied for a writ of execution under the
FDCPA, seeking to levy the writ on a house and land owned
by the defendant. Id. The defendant argued that a ten-year
California statute of limitations barred the government from
collecting on the balance of the debt. Id. at 1182.
We disagreed, noting that the FDCPA “provides no time
limit for the collection of debts by writ of execution” and
holding that it thus preempts state statutes of limitations. Id.
at 1183. As we explained, “because the purpose of the
FDCPA is to create a comprehensive statutory framework
for the collection of debts owed to the United States
government and to improve the efficiency and speed in
collecting those debts, . . . a state law limiting such
collection is inconsistent with the purpose of the act and is,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 15
therefore, preempted.” Id. (citation modified); cf. Bensal,
853 F.3d at 997–98 (holding that the FDCPA preempted a
California law concerning the disclaimer of an interest in a
trust).
The district court here, however, concluded that Gianelli
was not controlling because the judgment entered against the
defendant there was criminal rather than civil. But the
FDCPA explicitly defines “judgment” as “a judgment, order,
or decree entered in favor of the United States in a court and
arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt.”
28 U.S.C. § 3002(8) (emphasis added). By its plain text, the
FDCPA applies to judgments in both civil and criminal
cases. Indeed, another circuit has cited Gianelli when
holding that the FDCPA applied to a civil judgment. See
FTC v. Namer, 481 F. App’x 958, 960 (5th Cir. 2012)
(unpublished) (“We agree with Gianelli on the following
point [that the FDCPA preempts inconsistent state laws] as
well.”).
B. The judgment against Rodgers, which is payable to
the FTC, qualifies as a debt under the FDCPA.
The district court offered another reason why the
FDCPA purportedly does not apply here: It did not consider
Rodgers’s debt to be “owed to the federal government,” as
required under the statute, because “the purpose of . . .
disgorgement is to refund any ill-gotten gains to consumers,
not the federal government.” We disagree.
The FDCPA expressly defines “debt” to include “an
amount that is owing to the United States on account of . . .
restitution . . . or other source of indebtedness to the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B). Those are the words that
Congress chose, and we must heed them. “When interpreting
a statutory term, we first give effect to [the] statutory
16 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
definition[].” Salisbury, 998 F.3d at 860 (citation omitted).
In defining “debt” under the FDCPA, Congress used broad
terms that encompass the judgment here: Rodgers “ow[es]”
this amount because her judgment to pay money to the FTC
is obviously a “source of indebtedness to the United States.”
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, there is nothing
tautological about our reading of the statute.
The judgment in this case was expressly “entered in
favor of the commission.” Under the judgment, Rodgers has
a legal duty to pay the federal government. The debt is thus
owed to the federal government. The dissent is right in that
to determine the actual beneficiary of a monetary judgment,
we may at the very least look to the judgment itself and the
“face of the record.” Dissent at 38. The FDCPA explicitly
defines “judgment” as “a judgment, order, or decree entered
in favor of the United States in a court and arising from a
civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 3002(8). And the “face of the record” is abundantly clear:
the judgment in this case, by its terms, was “entered in favor
of the commission.”1F 2 Cf. FTC v. Lederman (In re
Lederman), No. SV 94-22688 AG, 1995 WL 792072, at *5
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 26, 1995) (concluding that the FTC
had “standing to assert the nondischargeability of its
judgment against [a debtor]” and could be “considered a
creditor when it ha[d] a claim against a debtor based on the
debtor’s alleged violation of the FTC Act”). That the FTC
intends to use any money that it collects from Rodgers for
2
When the district court issued abstracts of judgments in 2015 to enable
the FTC to obtain a lien on the Drifting Shadow property, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 3201, the court identified the FTC as the “Part[y] in whose favor
judgments have been obtained.”
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 17
restitution to consumers does not take the debt outside the
scope of the FDCPA.
The dissent contends that the catch-all provision in the
FDCPA’s definition of “debt”—“other source of
indebtedness to the United States”—should be read narrowly
to exclude the judgment owing to the FTC. 28 U.S.C.
§ 3002(3). Dissent at 32-35. But the structure of the statutory
provision reinforces the intended function of a catch-all
provision: it eliminates potential loopholes, fills in possible
gaps, and tries to minimize disputes arising out of unforeseen
circumstances. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of
Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 292 (2011) (“[T]he very purpose of
a catch-all provision . . . is to avoid the necessity of listing
each matter . . . falling within it.”); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe
v. Newsom, 919 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019)
(determining that, viewed in context, certain phrases that
“are naturally read as catch-all categories . . . are broader
than the more specific topics enumerated”). Here, the statute
defines “debt” broadly to include all sorts of debt—any
“amount that is owing to the United States on account of a
fee, duty, lease, rent, service, sale of real or personal
property, overpayment, fine, assessment, penalty,
restitution, damages, interest, tax, bail bond forfeiture,
reimbursement, recovery of a cost incurred by the United
States”—and then, as a catch-all provision, adds “or other
source of indebtedness to the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 3002(3)(B). The catch-all provision here thus eliminates a
potential loophole that Rodgers is trying to exploit.
The dissent also contends that our reading of the catch-
all provision renders superfluous the earlier phrase “an
amount that is owing to the United States.” Dissent at 33. It
goes as far as to say that the definition of debt has two
statutory requirements—(1) an amount “owing to the United
18 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
States” (2) “on account of a . . . source of indebtedness to the
United States,” the latter of which the dissent construes as a
debt that “will inure to the benefit of the United States.”
Dissent at 32. If Congress wanted to say a debt must
ultimately inure to the benefit of the United States, it could
have said so. But it did not. Further, the catch-all provision’s
reference to an “other source of indebtedness to the United
States” is not superfluous. 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B)
(emphasis added). If the provision merely stated “or other
source of indebtedness,” it could potentially add ambiguity,
as the term “other” could suggest that it includes a debt owed
to another party.3
Finally, the dissent leans on 28 U.S.C. § 3001(c) to argue
that the definition of “debt” under 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3) is not
what the plain text says. Dissent at 30-33. Section 3001(c)
states that the FDCPA “shall not apply to an amount owing
that is not a debt.” The dissent argues that the majority’s
interpretation of “debt” under § 3002(3) would render
§ 3001(c) a nullity. Dissent at 33. But the most plausible
reading of § 3001(c) is that it merely reinforces the definition
of “debt” under § 3002(3)—a belt-and-suspenders approach
to underscore that “debt” covers only what is included in that
definition. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. 395,
407 n.7 (2021) (“‘It is no superfluity,’ however, for Congress
3
Suppose, for example, Party A owes a debt to Party B, who in turn owes
a debt to the United States. By adding “indebtedness to the United
States,” the statute makes clear that the federal government cannot try to
collect on Party A’s debt to Party B because Party A’s debt is not an
“other source of indebtedness to the United States.” Similarly, the
previous clause in the laundry list of sources of debt—“recovery of a cost
incurred by the United States”—clarifies that a cost incurred by a party
other than the United States is not a debt under the FDCPA. 28 U.S.C.
§ 3002(3) (emphasis added).
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 19
to include both functions in the autodialer definition so as to
clarify the domain of prohibited devices. . . . [E]ven if [both]
functions often merge, Congress may have ‘employed a belt
and suspenders approach’ in writing the statute.” (citations
omitted)); United States v. Myers, 170 F.4th 1180, 1188 (9th
Cir. 2026) (“Congress may use a ‘belt and suspenders
approach’ to dispel any doubt about a statute's scope.”
(citation omitted)). This approach leaves little ambiguity for
what the text means. So, for example, the federal
government could not say that someone owes a “debt” to the
United States based on an unenforceable oral contract
because that would not fall within the statutory definition.
Importantly, § 3001(c) certainly does not support the
dissent’s view that the wording somehow creates a new
definition of debt beyond the statutory text to include the
requirement that “debt” must inure to the benefit of the
government. The dissent cites legislative history to support
its view that “debt” should be defined by a “direct
beneficiary test” and that such a definition is what would
most “make[] sense” in aligning with Congress’s intent.
Dissent at 36-37. But legislative history—no matter how
clear—cannot override statutory text. See Suzlon Energy
Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 671 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 2011).
Our decision today tracks the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
FTC v. National Business Consultants, Inc., 376 F.3d 317
(5th Cir. 2004). In that case, the Fifth Circuit held that the
FDCPA’s relevant text was “clear and unambiguous” and
that a judgment requiring defendants to make payments to
the FTC is a “debt” for purposes of the FDCPA even if “a
portion of the judgment representing the damages awarded
for consumer redress may ultimately be paid by the
government to the defrauded [victims].” Id. at 320. As the
court explained, where “[t]he terms of the judgment render
20 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
[defendants] . . . liable to the FTC, not to private individuals,
for the entire amount of the judgment[,] . . . the United
States, not any individual or group of individuals, is the
formal owner of the judgment.” Id. Further, “nothing in the
statutory text requires that the government be the exclusive
beneficiary of the judgment for the [FDCPA] to apply.”
Id.1F2F4
So too here. Because the judgment makes Rodgers liable
to the FTC—not to private individuals—it is an amount
owing to the United States and thus is subject to the FDCPA.
The defendants argue that we should look beyond the four
corners of the judgment and instead determine the ultimate
beneficiary of the judgment. We decline to do so. The
statutory text says nothing about the beneficiary of the
judgment but instead refers simply to money that is “ow[ed]
to the United States.” Here, the $1.5 million judgment
payable to the FTC is “an amount that is owing to the United
States on account of . . . restitution” or “other source of
indebtedness to the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B).
It falls squarely within the statutory definition of “debt.”
In any event, if we looked beyond the judgment itself to
try to determine the beneficiaries, it may not be possible to
identify or locate the victims, in which case the government
would retain the funds. Cf. Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71, 87
4
See also United States v. Pioch, 5 F.4th 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[A]
‘debt’ [under the FDCPA] can constitute the amount due to be paid
because of an assessment, an order of restitution (including restitution
owed to individuals arising out of criminal cases), or another source of
indebtedness to the United States.”); cf. United States v. Mays, 430 F.3d
963, 965 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act provides that the FDCPA can be used to enforce orders of
restitution).
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 21
(2020) (“The SEC, however, does not always return the
entirety of disgorgement proceeds to investors, instead
depositing a portion of its collections in a fund in the
Treasury.”). And even if the FTC might need judicial
approval to deposit any leftover funds into the U.S. Treasury,
the judgment is still “entered in favor of the commission,”
which is an amount “owing to the United States” and hence
a “debt” under the FDCPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15)(B)
(defining “United States” to include a “commission . . .of the
United States”).
Rodgers, and the dissent, rely on United States v. Bedi,
15 F.4th 222 (2d Cir. 2021), to argue that the judgment
against Rodgers is not a “debt” under the FDCPA. That
reliance is misplaced. Bedi involved an administrative law
judge’s order “requiring a private employer to remit back
pay to its former employee.” Id. at 223. In other words, the
order required payment directly to the employee, not to the
federal government, and thus the judgment was not a debt
owed to the United States. See id. at 228 (“[T]he
Administrative Order requires [defendants] to pay
‘Ingvarsdóttir,’ not ‘the United States.’”). Here, by contrast,
the judgment is payable to the FTC, not to a private party.
The dissent also relies on United States v. Bongiorno,
106 F.3d 1027 (1st Cir. 1997). There, the First Circuit
determined that “a debt cannot be eligible for inclusion
under the FDCPA if the United States is neither the formal
owner nor the direct beneficiary of it.” Id. at 1037 (emphasis
added). The court came to this conclusion in large part by
looking at the legislative history and the purported purpose
of the statute to protect the public fisc. Id. at 1036–37
(quoting floor statement of Rep. Brooks). The court reasoned
that if the money paid to the federal government is ultimately
disbursed to others, then it does not benefit the government
22 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
and thus the judgment should not be considered a “debt”
owing to the United States. Id.
But the FDCPA’s statutory text does not support the First
Circuit’s purposivist characterization of “debt.” See
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“[A]
statute is not to be confined to the ‘particular application[s]
. . . contemplated by the legislators.”’). Indeed, a judgment
that is owed to the government, that can be collected only by
the government, and that arises under a public-interest
statute that vests enforcement authority exclusively in the
government, is an amount “owing to the United States” and
hence is a “debt” under the FDCPA. 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B).
The First Circuit recognized as much when it suggested that
the result might have been different if the United States were
the “formal owner” of the debt, Bongiorno, 106 F.3d at 1037,
as is the case here, see Nat’l Bus. Consultants, 376 F.3d at
319 n.2, 320 (holding that a monetary judgment that the FTC
secured on behalf of defrauded franchisees was a “debt”
under the FDCPA and distinguishing Bongiorno, in part, on
the ground that the FTC was “the formal owner of the entire
debt” and “the only entity entitled to enforce the judgment”).
Moreover, Bongiorno was superseded by statute. See United
States v. Witham, 648 F.3d 40, 41 (1st Cir. 2011)
(recognizing that the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of
1996 authorizes the government to invoke the FDCPA to
enforce all orders of restitution in criminal cases).
Finally, Rodgers makes two more arguments, neither of
which is persuasive. First, she argues that the FTC was never
authorized to demand such payment from her in the first
place, given the Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital
Management, LLC v. FTC, 593 U.S. 67 (2021). She thus
contends that the agency lacks power under Section 13(b) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act to seek equitable
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 23
monetary relief. See id. at 70. That argument fails because
this court and others have recognized that pre-AMG
judgments for monetary relief under Section 13(b)—like the
judgment in this case—may remain valid. See, e.g., FTC v.
Hewitt, 68 F.4th 461, 465–70 (9th Cir. 2023) (affirming
denial of Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a pre-AMG monetary
judgment awarded under Section 13(b)); FTC v. Ross, 74
F.4th 186, 191–96 (4th Cir. 2023) (same); cf. Reynoldsville
Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758 (1995) (“New legal
principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to
cases already closed.”).2F3F5
Second, Rodgers raises a new theory on appeal, arguing
that under the Erie doctrine, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
5
While the Supreme Court in AMG held that the FTC cannot seek
equitable monetary relief under Section 13(b) because that provision
addresses only injunctive relief, it did not disturb the FTC’s power to
obtain monetary relief under Section 19. Although Section 19 imposes
additional requirements, it authorizes a court to “grant such relief as the
court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers,” including, but not
limited to, “the refund of money or return of property” and “the payment
of damages.” 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). It is not clear here if the court ordered
monetary relief under Section 13(b) exclusively or also under
Section 19. The district court mentions both Section 13(b) and
Section 19 in its decision, but the judgment refers to “equitable monetary
relief,” which may suggest that it was relying only on Section 13(b). If
the court relied on Section 19 to order monetary relief, then that is
another reason why AMG has no effect here. See, e.g., FTC v. Credit
Bureau Ctr., LLC, 81 F.4th 710, 714 (7th Cir. 2023) (affirming the FTC’s
use of Section 19 for seeking monetary relief, in the form of restitution,
post-AMG); FTC v. Hanley, Nos. 20-15143, 20-15144, 2022 WL
187848, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2022) (unpublished) (similarly
determining that, in the wake of AMG, the FTC still may obtain
restitution on behalf of consumers under Section 19(b)); FTC v. Elegant
Sols., Inc., No. 20-55766, 2022 WL 2072735, at *2–3 (9th Cir. June 9,
2022) (unpublished) (same).
24 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
U.S. 64 (1938), the FDCPA should not be read to preempt
Nevada’s statute of limitations. That argument is unavailing.
Erie held that when federal courts adjudicate state law
claims, “[t]here is no federal general common law.” Id. at
78. As a result, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by acts of Congress,” courts must apply state
law as determined by the state’s highest court or its
legislature. Id. But state law “does not control the resolution
of issues governed by federal statute.” Budinich v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 198 (1988). Put another
way, the Erie doctrine does not apply here because the
FDCPA is a federal statute that, by its terms, preempts
contrary state law. 28 U.S.C. § 3003(d).
II. The district court erred in quashing the writ of
execution.
The district court also erred in holding that the FTC had
to file a separate lawsuit under Nevada law to establish that
the Trust is Rodgers’s alter ego.
First, the district court misapplied and mistakenly relied
on Callie v. Bowling, 160 P.3d 878 (Nev. 2007), to conclude
that the FTC had to show that the Trust is Rodgers’s “alter
ego.” Under the FDCPA, the FTC merely had to show that,
as a trustee and beneficiary of the Trust, Rodgers has a
substantial nonexempt interest in the Corona Vista property.
Second, the district court failed to give preemptive effect to
the FDCPA based on a misreading of 28 U.S.C. § 3010(a)
concerning co-owned property.
A. The FDCPA’s broad definition of property
includes the Corona Vista property.
The FDCPA provides that “[a]ll property in which the
judgment debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest shall
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 25
be subject to levy pursuant to a writ of execution.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 3203(a). Thus, the question is whether Rodgers has a
“substantial nonexempt interest” in the Corona Vista
property. The FDCPA defines “property” using “broad
language so as ‘to reach every interest in property that a
[judgment debtor] might have.’” United States v. Harris, 854
F.3d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting
United States v. Nat’l Bank of Com., 472 U.S. 713, 720
(1985)). “Property” includes “any present or future interest,
whether legal or equitable, in real, personal . . . , or mixed
property, tangible or intangible, vested or contingent,
wherever located and however held (including community
property and property held in trust).” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(12)
(emphasis added).
It thus makes no difference for purposes of the FDCPA
whether Hoskins and Rodgers own the Corona Vista
property directly or through a trust or other legal entity. If
they have any substantial nonexempt interest in the property,
it is subject to levy by writ of execution under the FDCPA’s
procedures. Cf. Harris, 854 F.3d at 1056 (holding that a
beneficiary’s interest in two trusts was “property” under the
FDCPA’s definition of that term).
Here, the evidence shows that Rodgers has a substantial
interest in the Corona Vista property. She resides there and
is a trustee and beneficiary of the Trust. Rodgers admitted
that the property is her residence and that it was purchased
with the proceeds from the sale of her prior home. The
evidence submitted with the FTC’s writ application shows
that Rodgers paid $980,000 for the property, using her law
firm’s trust account to make deposit and closing payments,
and that she originally named herself as the buyer. At the last
moment, however, Rodgers decided that she did not want her
name on the deed and arranged to have Monte Bello, LLC,
26 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
take title. Monte Bello is owned by Resolute 21, LLC, which
in turn is owned by the Trust.
Hambil Trust (Hoskins and
Rodgers are trustees and
beneficiaries)
Resolute 21, LLC
Monte Bello, LLC
Corona Vista
property
Ownership scheme
The evidence also shows that Hoskins and Rodgers are
the architects behind the Trust. The Trust owned Hoskins
and Rodgers’ previous residence, and both received
proceeds from the sale of that property. And they have
admitted that they are beneficiaries (and trustees) of the
Trust. Despite their efforts, titling the property through a
series of entities and a trust does not put the property outside
the FDCPA’s reach. The FDCPA authorizes levy on their
property “however held.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 3002(12), 3203(a).
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 27
Hoskins and Rodgers continue to have an equitable interest
in the Corona Vista property as trustees and beneficiaries of
the Trust, and that interest qualifies as a substantial interest
for purposes of the FDCPA. See Harris, 854 F.3d at 1057
(holding that a beneficiary’s interest in irrevocable,
discretionary trusts qualified as property for purposes of the
FDCPA).
Moreover, in any event, Callie does not support the
conclusion that the FTC had to file a separate action to
establish that the Trust is Rodgers’s alter ego. Callie
involves a completely different issue that has nothing to do
with the FDCPA. There, a private plaintiff obtained a
judgment in California against a corporation and sought to
enforce it in Nevada. Callie, 160 P.3d at 879. The plaintiff
moved to amend the domesticated judgment to add the
president of the corporation under an alter ego theory, even
though he was not named as a defendant in the original suit
and was never served with a summons and complaint. Id.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that due process required
the plaintiff to file a new independent action against the
corporation’s president to assert her alter ego claim. Id. at
881.
Not so here. In this case, the FTC is not seeking to add
the Trust as a defendant to an existing judgment. The FTC
already has a judgment against Rodgers, and it is simply
seeking to enforce that judgment by levying on real property
in which Rodgers has an equitable ownership interest. The
FTC merely had to show that, as a trustee and beneficiary of
the Trust, Rodgers has an interest in the Corona Vista
property under Nevada law that qualifies as a “substantial
nonexempt interest” under the FDCPA. Callie has no
bearing on that question.
28 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
B. 28 U.S.C. § 3010(a) does not apply.
The district court further erred by rejecting the FTC’s
preemption argument based on its reading of an FDCPA
provision relating to co-owned property. The provision cited
by the district court states that “[t]he remedies available to
the United States . . . may be enforced against property
which is co-owned by a debtor and any other person only to
the extent allowed by the law of the State where the property
is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 3010(a). The district court held that
“[t]he property at issue here is a co-owned trust” and that,
“[t]herefore, Nevada law governing execution of property
applies.”
A better reading of § 3010(a) is that it protects the
interests of innocent co-owners. Under this provision, if a
judgment debtor and an innocent third party share ownership
interests in a single property, and state law protects co-
owned property from enforcement, federal law likewise will
protect the third party’s interests. For example, in Nevada, a
community property state, a spouse’s share of community
property is not “liable for the debts of the other spouse
contracted before the marriage.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.050.
So, under § 3010(a), the government could not levy
Rodgers’s share of community property to satisfy a debt
incurred by Hoskins before their marriage.
There is no indication in the record that the property in
question is co-owned by “any other person” than Hoskins
and Rodgers, both of whom are “debtor[s].” 28 U.S.C.
§ 3010(a). And as trustees and beneficiaries of the Trust,
Hoskins and Rodgers each have an equitable interest in the
Corona Vista property. Each of their interests is subject to
levy under the FDCPA pursuant to the writ of execution.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 29
CONCLUSION
We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
BADE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring
in part:
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion
that the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act (FDCPA)
applies to the enforcement of a disgorgement decree for
consumer redress entered in favor of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). While the FDCPA supplies the
exclusive procedures for collection of debts owed to the
United States, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001(a), 3203, not all amounts
owed to the government are “debts” subject to the statute, id.
§ 3001(c). Because the disgorgement decree at issue here
does not fall within the statutory definition of “debt,” the
FDCPA does not apply, and Nevada law governs the
procedures for the writ of execution sought by the FTC. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). The district court concluded that,
under Nevada law, the FTC must first bring a separate alter-
ego action before levying property in the hands of a third-
party artificial entity and the FTC fails to challenge this
ruling on appeal. Therefore, I must dissent from the
majority’s decision to reverse the order quashing the writ of
execution.
I concur, however, in the majority’s decision to reverse
the order precluding future enforcement of the judgment. As
an incident of sovereignty, the United States and its
instrumentalities are not bound by general statutes of
limitations unless expressly named. United States v.
Thornburg, 82 F.3d 886, 893 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The Supreme
30 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
Court has instructed that, as a sovereign, the United States is
subject to a limitations period only when Congress has
expressly created one.” (citing Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v.
United States, 304 U.S. 126, 133 (1938))). The Nevada
statute of limitations for the enforcement of a judgment does
not expressly apply to the federal government, nor could the
Nevada legislature even enact such a statute. Accordingly,
the district court erred in forbidding the FTC from enforcing
the disgorgement decree by means other than the particular
writ of execution sought below.
I
A
The FDCPA “provides the exclusive civil procedures for
the United States . . . to recover a judgment on a debt,”
including procedures for the issuance of writs of execution.
28 U.S.C. §§ 3001(a), 3203. The act, however, explicitly
provides that it “shall not apply to an amount owing that is
not a debt.” 28 U.S.C. § 3001(c). The statute defines “debt”
as follows:
“Debt” means—
(A) an amount that is owing to the United
States on account of a direct loan, or
loan insured or guaranteed, by the
United States; or
(B) an amount that is owing to the United
States on account of a fee, duty, lease,
rent, service, sale of real or personal
property, overpayment, fine,
assessment, penalty, restitution,
damages, interest, tax, bail bond
forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery of
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 31
a cost incurred by the United States, or
other source of indebtedness to the
United States, but that is not owing
under the terms of a contract originally
entered into by only persons other than
the United States;
and includes any amount owing to the
United States for the benefit of an
Indian tribe or individual Indian, but
excludes any amount to which the
United States is entitled under section
3011(a).
28 U.S.C. § 3002(3).
The majority suggests that the equitable monetary
judgment entered in favor of the FTC qualifies as a “debt”
for purposes of the FDCPA because that judgment qualifies
as a “source of indebtedness to the United States.”1 Maj. Op.
at 13, 15–22. In the majority’s view, anything that imposes
1
To the extent that the majority is also relying on “restitution” as a basis
for its holding, cf. Maj. Op. at 15, 20 n.4, it is incorrect. The FDCPA
only covers amounts owing on account of “restitution . . . to the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B) (emphasis added). As used in this
context, “[t]he word restitution means restoration.” Dan B. Dobbs &
Caprice L. Roberts, Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution
§ 4.1(1), at 370 (3d ed. 2018); see also Restitution, n., Oxford English
Dictionary (3d ed.) (Sense 1.a) (“The action of restoring or giving back
something to its proper owner, or of making reparation to a person for
loss or injury previously inflicted; . . . .”). The judgment in this case
does not restore to the United States money that rightfully belongs to the
public. Neither the FTC nor the United States was unjustly deprived of
the money disgorged from the defendants; that money rightfully belongs
to the consumers who had the misfortune of purchasing the defendants’
services and whose injury the disgorgement decree is designed to
redress.
32 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
“a legal duty to pay the federal government” qualifies as a
“source of indebtedness to the United States.” Id. at 15–16.
The majority thus reasons that because the disgorgement
decree (1) was entered in favor of the FTC and (2) imposes
a monetary obligation on the defendants, the amount owed
under that decree qualifies as a “debt” for purposes of the
FDCPA. Id.
The majority is misreading the statutory text. As defined
in the statute, “an amount that is owing to the United States
on account of a . . . source of indebtedness to the United
States” is generally a “debt” for purposes of the FDCPA. 28
U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B). This text plainly prescribes two
necessary conditions, not one. First, there must be “an
amount that is owing to the United States.” Second, the
amount must be owed “on account of a . . . source of
indebtedness to the United States.” Thus, as the text clearly
prescribes, not every “amount owing” is a “debt” within the
meaning of the FDCPA. 28 U.S.C. § 3001(c). In my view,
and consistent with how the First and Second Circuits have
interpreted the statute, a legal instrument is only a “source of
indebtedness to the United States” if the amount owed under
that instrument will inure to the benefit of the United States.
Accord United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1036 (1st
Cir. 1997); United States v. Bedi, 15 F.4th 222, 227–28 (2d
Cir. 2021) (overruling NLRB v. E.D.P. Med. Comput. Sys.,
Inc., 6 F.3d 951 (2d Cir. 1993)).
The term “source of indebtedness to the United States”
is a catch-all category appended to a long list of possible
types of debts. “When faced with a catchall phrase like that,
courts do not necessarily afford it the broadest possible
construction it can bear. Instead, we generally appreciate
that the catchall must be interpreted in light of its
surrounding context and read to ‘embrace only objects
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 33
similar in nature’ to the specific examples preceding it.”
Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. 204, 217
(2024) (citation omitted) (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
584 U.S. 497, 512 (2018)). Thus, the key to interpreting
“source of indebtedness to the United States” is determining
the essential quality (or qualities) shared by the specific
examples listed in § 3002(3)(B).
The majority implicitly suggests that the shared essential
quality of the specific examples listed in § 3002(3)(B)—and
thus the defining feature of a “source of indebtedness to the
United States”—is that they impose upon a person an
obligation to pay money to the government. This is
implausible for three reasons.
First, the majority’s interpretation would render
superfluous the separate definitional phrase “an amount that
is owing to the United States.” I agree with the majority that
a sum of money a person is legally obliged to pay the
government is “an amount that is owing to the United
States.” But under the majority’s interpretation, the second
element of the statutory definition—“on account of
a . . . source of indebtedness to the United States”—is
satisfied whenever a person has a legal obligation to pay the
government a sum of money. As a result, the majority is
interpreting the two distinct components of the statutory
definition to be entirely duplicative. “Interpretations that
nullify statutory provisions or render them superfluous are,
and should be, disfavored.” Patagonia Corp. v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 517 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir.
1975).
Second, giving the phrase “source of indebtedness to the
United States” its broadest possible construction would
defeat the Congress’s purpose in listing specific examples in
34 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
the statute. The canon of ejusdem generis “is based on the
theory that, if the Legislature had intended the general words
to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have made no
mention of the particular classes.” In re Bush Terminal Co.,
93 F.2d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1938); see also United States v.
Insco, 496 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he doctrine of
ejusdem generis[] warns against expansively interpreting
broad language which immediately follows narrow and
specific terms. To the contrary, this maxim of statutory
analysis counsels courts to construe the broad in light of the
narrow, in a commonsense recognition that general and
specific words, when present together, are associated with
and take color from each other.”); accord Harrington, 603
U.S. at 217. Had Congress intended “debt” to mean any
amount owing under a legal obligation, it would not have
bothered to define that term in such a complex manner.
Third, the majority’s interpretation is inconsistent with
the statutory provision stating that the FDCPA “shall not
apply with respect to an amount owing that is not a debt or
to a claim for an amount owing that is not a debt.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 3001(c). The clear implication of this provision is that not
every “amount owing” qualifies as a “debt” for purposes of
the FDCPA. While I agree with the majority that § 3001(c)
can be viewed as a “belt-and-suspenders” reminder to follow
the statutory definition of “debt,” Maj. Op. at 18–19, that
does not explain why Congress included this provision in the
first place. The best explanation comes from the statutory
text, which does not equate “debt” with “an amount owing.”
It is therefore inconsistent with § 3001(c) to interpret
“source of indebtedness” to refer broadly to anything that
creates a legal obligation to pay money to the government.
Cf. Rodriguez v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am., LLC, 801 F.3d
1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Courts must interpret the
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 35
statute as a whole, giving effect to each word and making
every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that
renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent,
meaningless or superfluous.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 652
(9th Cir. 2015))).
Instead, the common feature of the examples listed in
§ 3002(3)(B) of “source[s] of indebtedness to the United
States” is that they are all “payments in which the
government has a direct pecuniary stake.” Bongiorno, 106
F.3d at 1036; see also Bedi, 15 F.4th at 227–28 (holding that
“the ordinary meaning of [the statutory definition of ‘debt’]
requires the United States to be the holder of the
debt . . . such that it has a direct financial stake in the debt
itself”). This interpretation creates no redundancy with the
other parts of the statutory definition; it explains why
Congress would have chosen to define “debt” in such a
complicated way; and it does not conflict with § 3001(c). It
is therefore the most natural interpretation of the statutory
text.
This interpretation is also consistent with the general
purpose of the statute. As the majority notes, “Congress
enacted the FDCPA in 1990 ‘to create a comprehensive
statutory framework for the collection of debts owed to the
United States government.’” Maj. Op. at 12 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 101-736, at 23 (1990)). And as the next sentence
of that same committee report explains, Congress created
this “uniform federal framework for the collection of Federal
debts in the Federal courts [to] improve the efficiency and
speed in collecting those debts, thereby lessening the effect
of delinquent debts on the massive federal budget deficit
[that was] undermining the economic well-being of the
Nation.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-736, at 23 (emphasis added). It
36 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
therefore makes sense that Congress would have tried to
carefully circumscribe the definition of “debt” (with one
exception for Indian tribes) to cover only an amount owing
“which, when paid, swells the public fisc.” Bongiorno, 106
F.3d at 1036; accord Bedi, 15 F.4th at 229–30.
I agree with the majority (and practically every other
modern jurist) that neither abstract notions of statutory
purpose nor excerpts from a statute’s legislative history can
override a statute’s actual text. Maj. Op. at 12 n.1, 19, 21–
22; see also Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 Va. L.
Rev. 347, 364 & n.50 (2005) (“Nowadays . . . it is hard to
find anyone who advocates such untethered use of legislative
history.”). But a court does not depart from that principle by
merely considering a statute’s general purposes to guide the
interpretation of unclear statutory terms. See, e.g.,
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of
New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199–202 (2007) (Thomas, J.);
Bittner v. United States, 598 U.S. 85, 98–99 (2023)
(Gorsuch, J.). Similarly, “[l]egislative history may be useful
in showing the scope of an enactment,” so long as it is being
used to clarify the scope by reference to the statutory text.
Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell
Us?, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 441, 442–44 (1990). And that is
precisely how purpose and legislative history are being used
here—to confirm the meaning of “source of indebtedness to
the United States” that is suggested by the surrounding
statutory context, and to clarify the reach of the FDCPA as
set forth by the statutory definition of “debt.” All else being
equal, we should adopt the interpretation that “reflects the
most natural reading of the statutory language and [is] most
consistent with its purpose.” Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S.
474, 492 (2010); accord Connell v. Lima Corp., 988 F.3d
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 37
1089, 1097 (9th Cir. 2021). The direct beneficiary test
employed by the First and Second Circuits does just that.2
B
Because a legal obligation to pay an agent or
instrumentality of the federal government only qualifies as
an “an amount that is owing to the United States on account
of . . . [a] source of indebtedness to the United States” when
the money to be paid will inure to the benefit of the United
States, the equitable monetary judgment at issue here is not
a “source of indebtedness to the United States.” To
determine the actual beneficiary of a monetary judgment, we
may at the very least look to the judgment itself, the
2
The majority’s attempts to distinguish Bongiorno and Bedi are without
merit. The majority notes that “Bongiorno was superseded by statute.”
Maj. Op. at 21–22. Although it is true that the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act (MVRA) superseded Bongiorno’s holding by making the
FDCPA applicable to criminal restitution orders, “it did so independent
of the definition of ‘debt’ in the FDCPA itself.” United States v. Witham,
648 F.3d 40, 49 (1st Cir. 2011); accord United States v. Mays, 430 F.3d
963, 966 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that Congress “specifically import[ed]
the FDCPA’s procedures into the MVRA”). It therefore does not
undermine or abrogate Bongiorno’s interpretation of the FDCPA—the
meaning of the statutory definition has not changed since the time of its
enactment. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 654 (2020).
The majority also suggests that the reliance on Bedi is misplaced because
the administrative order “required payment directly to the employee, not
to the federal government.” Maj. Op. at 21. But the Second Circuit only
relied on this fact to show that “the Government has no claim to the debt
itself”—i.e., no “direct financial interest in recovering the sum”—and
there is no indication whatsoever that this fact was dispositive as to that
inquiry. Bedi, 15 F.4th at 228. This fact could not possibly have
influenced the court’s interpretation of § 3002(3)(B), which is a pure
question of law, nor does the absence of this fact here suggest that the
government has a direct financial interest in recovering the disgorged
funds. The purported distinction is therefore illusory.
38 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
dispositive order, the pleadings, and the statute(s) which
authorized the judgment. See Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S.
70, 88 (1921); see also 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 163
(describing what generally comprises “the judgment roll or
record”); United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 281 n.10
(1970) (describing what constitutes the “face of the record”);
Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 176 (1913) (referring to the
judgment roll as the “strict record”).
The final judgment “entered in favor of the Federal
Trade Commission,” as amended, ordered Rodgers to pay
$1,550,848.48 “as equitable monetary relief for ill-gotten
gains.” As the FTC’s complaint makes clear, such relief was
sought “to redress injury to consumers resulting from the
Defendants’ violations of the FTC Act, the Telemarketing
Act and the [Telemarketing Sales Rule].” The injury to
consumers will not be redressed if the government is the
direct beneficiary of the judgment—the consumers will still
be out of the funds wrongfully taken from them by the
defendants.
The consumer-redress purpose identified in the
complaint is consistent with the statutory provisions the
district court relied upon in issuing such relief—“Sections
13(b) and 19 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(b) and 57b.”
Section 19 authorizes courts “to grant such relief as the court
finds necessary to redress injury to consumers,” including
“the refund of money.” 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). The money is
not in any sense being refunded if the money owed by
Rodgers inures to the benefit of the United States. Similarly,
Section 13(b) authorizes a court to issue “a permanent
injunction” against “any [] act or practice” in violation of a
provision of law enforced by the FTC. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
Quite plainly, this statutory language authorizes only
prohibitory injunctions against actual violations of law and
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 39
does not authorize any monetary relief whatsoever, and we
should not assume that the district court exceeded its
authority absent a clear indication that it did so. See AMG
Capital Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 593 U.S. 67, 82 (2021); SEC v.
Worthen, 98 F.3d 480, 483 (9th Cir. 1996). But to the extent
the district court erroneously relied on this provision in
issuing the monetary relief, because injunctive relief is
“inherently an equitable remedy,” Knudson, 534 U.S. at 211
n.1, any such monetary relief ordered under that provision
would have to be equitable in character—precisely what the
district court ordered.
In light of the circumstances of this case, the monetary
relief ordered can only be considered equitable if it does not
inure to the government’s benefit. A monetary remedy is not
equitable in character if it is a penalty, Tull v. United States,
481 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1987), and a monetary remedy
qualifies as “a pecuniary penalty” when the remedy
“compel[s] the payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of
money in which the plaintiff has not as yet acquired any
specific right,” Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265,
291 (1888). In seeking this relief, the government made no
assertion of entitlement to the funds either on the basis of
title or as compensation for an actual injury. Thus, the only
way the relief here could possibly be equitable is if the
defendants’ obligation to transfer the specified funds to the
FTC was understood to impose a constructive trust on those
funds and to effectuate the substitution of the FTC as trustee
in place of the defendants, thereby imposing an obligation
upon the FTC to return the money to the victims of the
defendants’ scheme.3 Cf. SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109, 124
3
The majority suggests that even if we were to look beyond the four
corners of the judgment, “it may not be possible to identify or locate the
40 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
(2024) (“The final proof that this remedy is punitive [and not
equitable] is that the SEC is not obligated to return any
money to victims.” ). Accordingly, the money owed under
the regulatory disgorgement decree cannot be considered
“an amount that is owing to the United States on account
of . . . [a] source of indebtedness to the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B).
II
Because the FDCPA does not apply here, procedures for
the writ of execution are governed by Nevada law. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). The district court ruled that Nevada law
requires a judgment creditor to file a separate alter-ego
action to reach property held by a third-party entity, and the
FTC does not contest the correctness of that ruling in this
appeal. The appellant bears the burden of showing error in
the judgment or order appealed, and this court ordinarily will
not address an issue that the appellant fails to argue in its
victims, in which case the government would retain the funds.” Maj. Op.
at 20 (citing Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71, 87 (2020)). For one thing, “[i]t is
an open question” whether allowing the government to deposit disgorged
funds into the Treasury when it is infeasible to distribute them to injured
consumers would be “consistent with equitable principles” and other
limits on the FTC’s authority to seek disgorgement. Liu, 591 U.S. at 89–
90. For another, even if it would be permissible for such funds to
eventually be deposited into the treasury, based on the Court’s reasoning
in Liu, the government must first receive judicial approval (based on a
determination of infeasibility or other good cause) before taking such
action. See id. Contrary to the majority’s reasoning, the requirement
that the government seek judicial approval before depositing the funds
in the treasury means that the government does not yet have absolute title
to those funds, and therefore it does not presently have a direct financial
stake in the judgment. That the government may eventually acquire a
stake in a debt does not make the FDCPA available for enforcement of
that debt prior to acquisition.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 41
opening brief. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409
(2009); Lui v. DeJoy, 129 F.4th 770, 780 (9th Cir. 2025);
United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375–76
(2020). Accordingly, the district court’s order quashing the
writ of execution should be affirmed.
This is not to say that defendants subject to a regulatory
disgorgement decree can evade enforcement by placing the
funds in the control of shell entities or other similar
measures. Specific enforcement of the constructive trust
remains available “not only while it is in the hands of the
original wrongdoer, but as long as it can be followed and
identified in whosesoever hands it may come, except into
those of a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice.”
Pioneer Mining Co. v. Tyber, 215 F. 501, 505 (9th Cir. 1914)
(quoting 3 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence § 1051 (3d ed.
1905)). Given that the record suggests that none of the
entities with a property interest in the Corona Vista property
was a bona fide purchaser for value, it would appear that the
judgment could be enforced against those entities directly.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 71. Additionally, the monetary relief at
issue here is equitable in character, and a court may enforce
its decree in accordance with procedures traditionally
available in equity “without reference to state practice.”
Hamilton v. MacDonald, 503 F.2d 1138, 1149 (9th Cir.
1974) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 70). Thus, even though the writ
of execution was properly quashed, other enforcement
mechanisms remain available to the FTC.
III
Finally, even though I disagree with the majority about
the applicability of the FDCPA, I agree that the district court
erred in precluding future collection of the disgorged funds
based on Nevada’s statute of limitations governing
42 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS
enforcement of a judgment. Maj. Op. at 14–15. As an
incident of sovereignty, statutes of limitation are not
interpreted to run against a state or federal government
unless the statute explicitly provides otherwise. Guar. Tr.,
304 U.S. at 132–33; Thornburg, 82 F.3d at 893; BP Am.
Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 96 (2006). Thus, “[i]n the
absence of a federal statute expressly imposing or adopting
one, the United States is not bound by any limitations
period.” United States v. Dos Cabezas Corp., 995 F.2d
1486, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993).
The Nevada statute does not expressly provide that the
federal government is subject to its six-year limitation
period. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190.1(a). “If it did, it would
be beyond the power of the State to pass it, a gross
usurpation, and void.” United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S.
(8 Otto) 486, 490 (1878). And the incorporation of state
procedure under Rule 69(a)(1) should not be interpreted to
abrogate the federal government’s “implied immunity . . . to
local statutes of limitations.” Guar. Tr., 304 U.S. at 133
(interpreting the Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17
Stat. 196, 197 (codified at Rev. Stat. § 916 and the former 28
U.S.C. § 727)); see also Hamilton, 503 F.2d at 1148
(explaining that this section of the Conformity Act was “the
predecessor of Rule 69”); 28 U.S.C. § 727 (1946) (noting
abrogation of this section in light of Rule 69’s
promulgation). Accordingly, the order precluding future
enforcement of the judgment should be reversed.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part and
concur in part.