Hicks

July 13, 2026

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

LEROY HICKS, JR, § CIVIL ACTION NUMBER

(TDCJ # 02544416) § 4:23-cv-02034

Plaintiff, §

§

§

versus § JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE

§

§

ED GONZALEZ, et al, §

Defendants. §

OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL

The motion for summary judgment by Defendant Ed

Gonzalez is granted. Dkt 27.

The motion for summary judgment by Plaintiff Leroy

Hicks, Jr, is denied. Dkt 32.

The civil rights action by Plaintiff Leroy Hicks, Jr, is

dismissed. Dkt 1.

1. Background

Plaintiff is currently detained in the Texas Department

of Criminal Justice–Correctional Institutions Division. He

proceeds here pro se and in forma pauperis.

Plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 USC §1983 in June

2023, when a pretrial detainee in the Harris County Jail.

He alleges that Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez and the

unnamed “Director of the Harris Health” were violating his

constitutional rights by failing to provide him with timely

and proper medical care. Dkt 1. Specifically, he alleges that

he submitted numerous requests for medical care between

November 2020 and May 2023, complaining of back,

shoulder, and wrist pain. He alleges that jail staff failed or

refused on several occasions to escort him to the triage

unit, the medical clinic, or medical appointments, and that

medical staff on several occasions either ignored his

requests for care or refused to see him. Id at 4.

Plaintiff attaches as example a grievance report from

March 2021, in which he reported that jail staff refused to

escort him to a medical appointment for his back pain on

March 17, 2021. He alleges that this grievance was

determined to be founded. Id at 5, 9.

He also attaches a grievance report from April 2021, in

which he reported that medical staff refused to treat his

back pain on March 17, 2021. He alleges that this grievance

was determined to be unfounded, which he contends

conflicts with the earlier founded grievance about not being

escorted to medical on the same date. He relies on this

alleged conflict as evidence that medical staff were

falsifying records to cover up the lack of care. Id at 5, 11.

He also attaches a grievance report from October 2022,

when he complained that detention officers confiscated

wrist splints that had been prescribed for his carpal tunnel

syndrome. Id at 13. He alleges that the splints were taken

despite a medical pass for them issued by medical staff.

Id at 13, 15.

Plaintiff also provides a list of dates and times when he

alleges that he submitted requests for medical care

through the jail kiosk system that were acknowledged but

then ignored. Id at 17–18. He contends that these records

show that both Gonzalez and the Director were

deliberately indifferent to his need for timely and proper

medical care. Id at 3, 6.

Plaintiff provided upon request a supplemental

statement of his claims. Dkt 9. He there alleges that he

suffers from shoulder pain, back pain, leg and hip pain,

carpal tunnel syndrome, and neuropathy in his feet. Id

at 4–5. He admits that medical staff issued a medical pass

for certain shoes to help him with the neuropathy. Id at 5,

12. He admits that medical staff prescribed wrist splints

for his carpal tunnel syndrome. Id at 4. He also admits that

medical staff prescribed naproxen, ibuprofen, and

gabapentin at various times to treat his pain. Ibid. But he

asserts that he has never been formally evaluated by a

physician to determine the cause of his pain nor ever

effectively been treated for it. Id at 4–5, 9, 16.

Plaintiff describes Gonzalez as “the ultimate authority

in the jail system” and alleges that detention officers under

his supervision intentionally denied or delayed access to

medical treatment by failing to escort Plaintiff to obtain

medical care. Id at 2. He alleges that Gonzalez violated his

civil rights by failing to have enough staff on duty to escort

him to the medical clinic as needed. Id at 1. He also alleges

that the same officers, again under Gonzalez’s supervision,

interfered with treatments ordered by medical staff. Id

at 2. He further alleges that before Harris Health took over

medical services in 2022, Gonzalez oversaw the medical

staff, who regularly ignored his pleas for care and

treatment. Id at 1–2.

As relief, he seeks an award of compensatory and

punitive damages, from Gonzalez and the Director. Dkt 1

at 4.

Service of process was ordered on Gonzalez in February

2025. Dkt 14. Gonzalez answered the complaint and filed a

motion for summary judgment. Dkts 20 & 27. Gonzalez

contends that Plaintiff’s action is barred by the statute of

limitations and by his failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies. Dkt 27 at 14–16, 20–23. He also contends that

qualified immunity pertains. Id at 16–20. He filed as

evidence the Harris County Jail Inmate Handbook,

Plaintiff’s grievance records, and a portion of Plaintiff’s

medical records. Dkts 27-1 through 27-9.

Plaintiff filed a pleading that he titled a motion for

summary judgment, but which is more in the nature of a

response. Dkt 32. He contends that his action isn’t barred

by limitations because Gonzalez’s deliberate indifference

continued within two years of the filing of the complaint.

Id at 2. He also contends that he should be deemed to have

sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies

because jail officials acted to thwart full exhaustion. Id

at 4–6. And he contends that Gonzalez isn’t entitled to

qualified immunity because jail officials under his

leadership intentionally deprived Plaintiff of his rights. Id

at 4. He also alleges for the first time that Gonzalez had a

custom or policy of tolerating the unconstitutional actions

of his subordinates. Id at 3, 7. He also alleges for the first

time, and without specific facts, that Gonzalez was

negligent in supervising his subordinates and was

deliberately indifferent by failing to act on Plaintiff’s

grievances. Id at 2, 7.

Gonzalez responded further, stating that Plaintiff’s

unsworn and conclusory allegations are legally insufficient

to entitle him to relief. Dkt 33.

Service of process wasn’t ordered on the Director of

Harris Health, and Plaintiff’s claims against the Director

have been disposed of by separate order. Dkt 35.

2. Legal standard

Plaintiff’s complaint is construed liberally because he

proceeds pro se. Coleman v United States, 912 F3d 824, 828

(5th Cir 2019), citing Erickson v Pardus, 551 US 89, 94

(2007, per curiam).

To state a valid claim under §1983, a plaintiff must

(i) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States, and (ii) demonstrate that the

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law. West v Atkins, 487 US 42, 48 (1988);

Gomez v Galman, 18 F4th 769, 775 (5th Cir 2021,

per curiam). The first element recognizes that “state tort

claims are not actionable under federal law; a plaintiff

under [§]1983 must show deprivation of a federal right.”

Nesmith v Taylor, 715 F2d 194, 195 (5th Cir 1983,

per curiam). The second element means that generally only

state actors—not private parties—can be liable for

violations of civil rights. Frazier v Board of Trustees of

Northwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center, 765 F2d

1278, 1283 (5th Cir 1985).

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires a court to enter summary judgment when the

moving party establishes that “there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” A fact is material if it “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”

Sulzer Carbomedics, Inc v Oregon Cardio-Devices Inc,

257 F3d 449, 456 (5th Cir 2001), quoting Anderson v

Liberty Lobby Inc, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is

genuine if the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Royal v CCC &

R Tres Arboles LLC, 736 F3d 396, 400 (5th Cir 2013),

quoting Anderson, 477 US at 248.

The summary judgment stage doesn’t involve weighing

the evidence or determining the truth of the matter.

Anderson, 477 US at 249. Disputed factual issues must be

construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Little v Liquid

Air Corporation, 37 F3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir 1994, en banc).

All reasonable inferences must also be drawn in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Carter v Dupuy,

173 F4th 561, 565 (5th Cir 2026), citing Griggs v Brewer,

841 F3d 308, 312 (5th Cir 2016). But conclusory and

unsupported statements aren’t evidence, and in the

absence of any evidence, it won’t be assumed “that the

nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.”

Little, 37 F3d at 1075, citing Lujan v National Wildlife

Federation, 497 US 871, 888 (1990).

The moving party typically bears the entire burden to

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Nola Spice Designs LLC v Haydel Enterprises Inc,

783 F3d 527, 536 (5th Cir 2015); see also Celotex Corp v

Catrett, 477 US 317, 322–23 (1986). But when a motion for

summary judgment by a defendant presents a question on

which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to proffer summary judgment

evidence establishing an issue of material fact warranting

trial. Nola Spice, 783 F3d at 536. To meet this burden, the

evidence must be both “competent and admissible at trial.”

Bellard v Gautreaux, 675 F3d 454, 460 (5th Cir 2012).

3. Discussion

Gonzalez raises three bases for entry of summary

judgment in his favor, which are considered in turn.

a. Statute of limitations

Gonzalez first contends that he’s entitled to entry of

summary judgment in his favor because Plaintiff filed his

action too late. The evidence shows this argument is only

partially correct.

Section 1983 doesn’t contain an explicit limitations

period, so federal courts borrow the forum state’s general

personal injury limitations period. See Bargher v White,

928 F3d 439, 444 (5th Cir 2019), citing Wallace v Kato,

549 US 384, 387 (2007). “Texas has a two-year statute of

limitations for personal injury claims[,]” so a civil rights

plaintiff in Texas has two years from the date his claims

arose to file suit. Balle v Nueces County, Texas, 952 F3d

552, 556 (5th Cir 2017), citing Piotrowski v City of Houston,

237 F3d 567, 576 (5th Cir 2001) (Piotrowski II); see also

Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §16.003(a).

While “state law supplies the applicable limitations

period and tolling provisions,” federal law governs when

the cause of action arises. Harris v Hegmann, 198 F3d 153,

156–57 (5th Cir 1999, per curiam). Generally, a claim

arises when “the plaintiff becomes aware that he has

suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know

that he has been injured.” Matter of Hoffman, 955 F3d 440,

444 (5th Cir 2020, per curiam), quoting Piotrowski v City of

Houston, 51 F3d 512, 516 (5th Cir 1995) (Piotrowski I). The

plaintiff only needs to know the facts that would ultimately

support a claim—not that he has a legal cause of action.

See Piotrowski II, 237 F3d at 576.

As a result, a civil rights action brought by an injured

Texas plaintiff more than two years after he knew or had

reason to know of his injury is barred by limitations and

subject to dismissal unless he can show grounds for

equitable tolling of the limitations period. See Gonzales v

Wyatt, 157 F3d 1016, 1019–20 (5th Cir 1998); Rotella v

Pederson, 144 F3d 892, 897 (5th Cir 1998) (noting that

Texas equitable-tolling principles apply to §1983 cases filed

by plaintiffs injured in Texas).

Gonzalez contends that Plaintiff’s injury arose in

January 2021, when he filed his first grievance about an

alleged denial of medical care. Because this action wasn’t

filed until June 2023—more than two years after Plaintiff

filed his first grievance—Gonzalez contends that the entire

action is barred by limitations. Dkt 27 at 14–16. Plaintiff

responds that while he was first aware of the injury at that

time, the violations and his ensuing injuries continued

with no relief until he filed this complaint. Dkt 32 at 2.

Plaintiff’s response raises the question of whether the

limitations period was tolled under the continuing-tort

doctrine. A continuing tort under Texas law is one that

“involves wrongful conduct inflicted over a period of time

that is repeated until desisted.” Exxon Mobil Corporation v

Rincones, 520 SW3d 572, 592 (Tex 2017), quoting First

General Realty Corp v Maryland Casualty Company,

981 SW2d 495, 501 (Tex App—Austin 1998, pet denied). It

generally arises when the plaintiff alleges facts

demonstrating “continuous wrongful conduct on an almost

daily basis.” Brown v Cain, 546 F Appx 471, 474 (5th Cir

2013, per curiam). When the facts show a continuing tort,

the cause of action doesn’t arise for limitations purposes

until the defendant’s wrongful conduct ends. Rincones,

520 SW3d at 592; see also Lavellee v Listi, 611 F2d 1129,

1132 (5th Cir 1980).

Plaintiff’s allegations don’t support his claim for

equitable tolling. He admittedly received medical attention

on various dates between January 2021 and May 2023, so

he doesn’t show the continuous denial of medical care

necessary to support tolling under the continuing-tort

doctrine. The continuing-tort doctrine thus doesn’t save his

claims that arose before June 2, 2021. See Nottingham v

Richardson, 499 F Appx 368, 375 (5th Cir 2012).

But without the continuing-tort doctrine, “each

instance of potentially deliberate indifference” arising from

allegedly inadequate medical care starts with the request

for medical care and ends when the inmate receives

medical attention. Ibid. Each instance of deliberate

indifference thus constitutes a discrete act for limitations

purposes. Plaintiff’s action is timely as to any alleged acts

of deliberate indifference that arose after June 2, 2021.

The motion for summary judgment by Gonzalez on the

defense of limitations will thus be granted to the extent

that it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims arising from

alleged incidents that occurred before June 2, 2021. But it

will be denied to the extent that it seeks dismissal of the

entire action as barred by limitations.

b. Exhaustion

Gonzalez next contends that Plaintiff’s action is barred

by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act bars an inmate’s

§1983 action concerning prison conditions until “such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

42 USC §1997e(a). The phrase prison conditions has been

interpreted to include all types of constitutional claims. See

Porter v Nussle, 534 US 516, 532 (2002): “[W]e hold that

the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate

suits about prison life, whether they involve general

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they

allege excessive force or some other wrong.” See also

Valentine v Collier, 956 F3d 797, 804 (5th Cir 2020,

per curiam) (exhaustion requirement applied in deliberate

indifference case). Exhaustion is mandatory, regardless of

the forms of relief sought or available through

administrative avenues. See Porter, 534 US at 524.

Courts also require “proper exhaustion of

administrative remedies.” Woodford v Ngo, 548 US 81, 84

(2006). An inmate doesn’t properly exhaust the grievance

process “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally

defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Id at 83–84.

Nor does he do so unless administrative remedies are

pursued to their conclusion. Wright v Hollingsworth,

260 F3d 357, 358 (5th Cir 2001).

Unlike some circuits, the Fifth Circuit takes “a strict

approach” to the exhaustion requirement. Johnson v Ford,

261 F Appx 752, 755 (5th Cir 2008, per curiam). If an

inmate doesn’t properly exhaust the available

administrative remedies, “a court may not excuse a failure

to exhaust” regardless of the circumstances. Ross v Blake,

578 US 632, 639 (2016). Instead, claims filed before an

inmate has properly exhausted his administrative

remedies must be dismissed. See Gonzalez v Seal, 702 F3d

785, 788 (5th Cir 2012, per curiam): “District courts have

no discretion to excuse a prisoner’s failure to properly

exhaust the prison grievance process before filing their

complaint.”

The Harris County Jail has a three-step administrative

remedies procedure outlined in its Inmate Handbook.

Dkt 27-1 at 6–7. Inmates must first try to resolve the issue

informally with “the Detention Officer, Deputy, or Staff

Member on duty.” If that doesn’t resolve the issue, the

inmate should ask to speak with the Floor Supervisor. If

the issue still isn’t resolved, the inmate may file a formal

grievance. Id at 7. A formal grievance may be submitted on

either a grievance form or any piece of paper. Inmates will

receive an interim response within fifteen days of receipt.

After the investigation is complete, the inmate will be

provided with a copy of the final decision. If a grievance is

determined to be either unfounded or founded/resolved,

the inmate may appeal to the Grievance Board within five

working days of the investigator’s decision. All

founded/unresolved grievances will be automatically

appealed to the Grievance Board. Ibid.

Gonzalez provided a copy of Plaintiff’s grievance

history, which shows that Plaintiff didn’t pursue the

grievance process to conclusion for any of the grievances he

filed between June 2, 2021, and the filing of this complaint.

Dkt 27-7. Plaintiff thus didn’t exhaust his administrative

remedies as to any of his live claims before filing this

action. This requires dismissal of the action, for the Fifth

Circuit clearly holds, “Pre-filing exhaustion is mandatory,

and the case must be dismissed if available administrative

remedies were not exhausted.” Gonzalez, 702 F3d at 788.

Plaintiff admits that he didn’t exhaust his available

grievance remedies as to all of his claims. Dkt 9 at 23–24.

But he responds that exhaustion should be excused

because jail officials sometimes failed to timely notify him

of decisions. He also contends that he didn’t need to file an

appeal when he obtained relief by filing the initial

grievance. Dkt 32 at 4–6.

Exhaustion isn’t required when “prison administrators

thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance

process through machination, misrepresentation, or

intimidation.” Ross, 578 US at 644. Courts take the

position that those circumstances render the

administrative process unavailable. Ibid.

But exhaustion will be excused only upon evidence that

prison officials actually thwarted the process. Plaintiff

offers no such evidence. He doesn’t allege that jail officials

dismissed his appeals as untimely after he was belatedly

notified of an adverse decision. He instead admits that he

simply never filed an appeal. Exhaustion was thus

thwarted by his own failure to act rather than by the

actions of jail officials. See Washington v Texas Department

of Criminal Justice, 2006 WL 3245741, *5 (SD Tex)

(rejecting argument that, because grievance appeal would

have been untimely had it been made, failure to file it

should be excused).

Plaintiff points to no evidence sufficient to raise a

genuine dispute of material fact as to his lack of

exhaustion. The motion for summary judgment by

Gonzalez on the basis of a failure to exhaust administrative

remedies is granted.

c. Qualified immunity

Dismissal for lack of exhaustion alone would dispose of

Plaintiff’s action only without prejudice. Consideration of

qualified immunity is thus necessary to determine whether

dismissal with prejudice is instead appropriate.

Qualified immunity protects government officials

“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 231 (2009),

quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982).

Analysis of the defense involves two inquiries. See Aguirre

v City of San Antonio, 995 F3d 395, 406 (5th Cir 2021). A

court “first asks whether the facts, taken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, show the

officer’s conduct violated a federal right.” Ibid, quoting

Tolan v Cotton, 572 US 650, 655–56 (2014, per curiam).

Second, it “asks whether the right in question was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the violation.” Tolan, 572 US

at 656, citing Hope v Pelzer, 536 US 730, 739 (2002). “‘The

salient question is whether the state of the law’ at the time

of an incident provided ‘fair warning’ to the defendants

‘that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.’” Ibid,

quoting Hope, 536 US at 741 (cleaned up). Immunity bars

the claim if the plaintiff fails to satisfy either step. See

Spikes v Wheat, 141 F4th 662, 668 (5th Cir 2025,

per curiam).

Plaintiff alleges that Gonzalez is liable for the acts of

his subordinates because he “is the ultimate authority to

the jail system.” Dkt 9 at 2. He also alleges that Gonzalez

failed to ensure that there were enough staff to escort him

to medical appointments as needed, failed to ensure that

medical staff responded to his requests for care, and failed

to prevent his officers from interfering with medical

treatment that was ordered. Id at 1–2.

Under §1983, supervisory officials aren’t responsible

for the actions of their subordinates on a theory of either

vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Hicks v LeBlanc,

81 F4th 497, 504 (5th Cir 2023), quoting Thompkins v Belt,

828 F2d 298, 303 (5th Cir 1987). Plaintiff thus can’t hold

Gonzalez liable based solely on actions taken or not taken

by his subordinates.

But supervisors can be held liable under §1983 for their

own actions. See Alton v Texas A&M University, 168 F3d

196, 200 (5th Cir 1999). To state a claim against a

supervisory official under §1983, a plaintiff must allege

facts showing either (i) the supervisor’s personal

involvement in a constitutional deprivation and a causal

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and

the deprivation, or (ii) the supervisor’s decision to

implement an unconstitutional official policy that resulted

in a constitutional injury. See Thompkins, 828 F2d at 304;

see also Gates v. Texas Department of Protective and

Regulatory Services, 537 F3d 404, 435 (5th Cir 2008).

An official policy includes “the decisions of a

government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking

officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to

practically have the force of law.” Connick v Thompson,

563 US 51, 61 (2011). Liability attaches when “supervisory

officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy

itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the

moving force of the constitutional violation.” Thompkins,

828 F2d at 304, quoting Grandstaff v City of Borger,

767 F2d 161, 169, 170 (5th Cir 1985) (cleaned up).

This standard requires more than conclusory

assertions. As framed by the Fifth Circuit, “a complaint’s

description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the

underlying constitutional violation . . . cannot be con-

clusory; it must contain specific facts.” Peña v City of Rio

Grande City, 879 F3d 613, 622 (5th Cir 2018), quoting

Spiller v City of Texas City, Police Department, 130 F3d

162, 167 (5th Cir 1997).

In addition, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that

the supervisory official implemented the official policy with

deliberate indifference to the likelihood of constitutional

violations by subordinates complying with the policy. See

Porter v Epps, 659 F3d 440, 446 (5th Cir 2011). Deliberate

indifference is “a stringent standard of fault,” one

“requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a

known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id at 446–47,

quoting Connick, 563 US at 61. The allegations necessary

to show a supervisor’s deliberate indifference to a

likelihood of further constitutional violations generally

must include at least a pattern of similar violations. Rios v

City of Del Rio, Texas, 444 F3d 417, 427 (5th Cir 2006),

quoting Johnson v Deep East Texas Regional Narcotics

Trafficking Task Force, 379 F3d 293, 309 (5th Cir 2004).

Plaintiff doesn’t allege facts showing that Gonzalez had

any personal involvement with any of the events described

in his complaint. Indeed, he doesn’t allege facts showing

that Gonzalez was even aware of the alleged problems with

his treatment or medications. Plaintiff points to the

grievances he filed, but those grievances don’t show that

Gonzalez personally knew of the alleged violations of

Plaintiff’s rights. See Blackmon v Kukua, 758 F Supp 2d

398, 411 (SD Tex 2010), citing Kidd v Livingston, 2010 WL

2208247, *3 (ED Tex) (filing grievances with prison unit

wasn’t sufficient to put executive director on notice of

alleged violations); see also Reagan v Burns, 2019 WL

6733023, *8 (ND Tex): “A failure to respond to a letter or

grievance does not rise to the required level of personal

involvement for liability.”

Plaintiff also doesn’t allege facts showing that

Gonzalez implemented an unconstitutional policy that was

the moving force behind the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s

rights. He identifies no specific policy that caused the

alleged violations. He includes no allegations of prior

similar incidents that might show a custom or practice

adopted or endorsed by Gonzalez. And he alleges no facts

showing that Gonzalez knew of any similar violations and

responded to them with deliberate indifference to the

likelihood of further violations. Reagan, 2019 WL 6733023

at *8 (courts will impute to supervisory officials the

knowledge necessary to find deliberate indifference only

when “there is evidence of a history of widespread abuse”).

He thus fails to state a claim of supervisory liability upon

which relief can be granted.

Gonzalez admittedly relies on facts different from those

discussed above to support his claim of qualified immunity,

taking issue with the accuracy of Plaintiff’s allegations

rather than their adequacy. But a district court may “grant

summary judgment on the basis of facts shown by

competent evidence in the record, even if those facts are not

highlighted in the motion for summary judgment.” United

States v Houston Pipeline Co, 37 F3d 224, 227 (5th Cir

1994). Summary judgment may thus be granted on any

ground supported by the record, even if that ground isn’t

specifically raised by the movant. Ibid.

Plaintiff’s response alleges for the first time that

Gonzalez had a custom or policy of tolerating the

unconstitutional actions of his subordinates, that he was

negligent in supervising his subordinates, and that he was

deliberately indifferent by failing to act on Plaintiff’s

grievances. Dkt 32 at 2–3, 7. This is properly rejected, if

only because the Fifth Circuit holds, “A claim which is not

raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only in

response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly

before the court.” Bye v MGM Resorts International Inc,

49 F4th 918, 925 (5th Cir 2022), quoting Jackson v

Gautreaux, 3 F4th 182, 188 (5th Cir 2021). But even if

these new allegations could be considered, Plaintiff offers

no evidence to support them. His unsupported and

conclusory allegations of wrongdoing are insufficient to

raise the genuine issues of material fact necessary to avoid

entry of summary judgment in favor of Gonzalez.

The record doesn’t establish a basis for a claim of

supervisory liability against Gonzalez. Absent such a basis,

Plaintiff fails to overcome the first element of the qualified

immunity defense. Analysis of the second element is thus

unnecessary.

Gonzalez is entitled to summary judgment on the

defense of qualified immunity. His motion for summary

judgment on that basis will be granted, and the claims

asserted by Plaintiff against him will be dismissed with

prejudice.

4. Conclusion

The motion for summary judgment by Defendant Ed

Gonzalez is GRANTED. Dkt 27.

The putative motion for summary judgment by

Plaintiff Leroy Hicks, Jr, is DENIED. Dkt 32.

The claims by Plaintiff Leroy Hicks, Jr, against

Defendant Ed Gonzalez are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Dkt 1.

Any other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

Final judgment will enter separately.

SO ORDERED.

Signed on July 13, 2026 , at Houston, Texas.

Alida

Honorable Charles Egkridge

United States District Judge

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