Figueroa

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

BRAYAN EDUARDO PENA )

REBOLLEDO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-26-958-J

)

FRED FIGUEROA, et al., )

)

Respondents.1 )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Brayan Eduardo Pena Rebolledo, a noncitizen,2 seeks a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.3 United States District Judge

Bernard M. Jones, II referred the case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge

for initial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3. The

Government responded, Doc. 8, and Petitioner has replied, Doc. 9. So the

matter is at issue.

1 Warden Fred Figueroa is not a federal official, and the Government did

not file a response on his behalf. Doc. 8, at 1 n.1.

2 This Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as

equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578

n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).

3 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation

and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless

otherwise indicated.

For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends the Court grant

Petitioner’s habeas petition in part and order Respondents to immediately

release Petitioner subject to the same conditions of his earlier parole.

I. Factual background and Petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela. Doc. 1, at 4; Doc. 8, at 5. On January

14, 2025, he arrived at the border at San Ysidro, California. Doc. 1, at 9; Doc.

8, at 5. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued him a Notice to

Appear (NTA) charging him as removable under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),4 and placed him into removal

proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Doc. 1, at 9-10; Doc. 8, at 5-6 & Ex. 1.

United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents released him into

the country with an appearance date of June 17, 2026. Doc. 8, Ex. 1, at 2.

Respondents state they “paroled [Petitioner] into the United States until April

18, 2025.” Doc. 8, at 6; see Doc. 1, Ex. 2 (stating Petitioner arrived January 14,

2025, and was admitted until April 18, 2025). On May 27, 2025, Petitioner

applied for Asylum and Withholding of Removal. Doc. 8, Ex. 2.

4 This section is codified in the United States Code at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). This section provides that a noncitizen, who at the time of

application for admission, was not in possession of (1) a valid unexpired entry

document as required by the INA, and (2) a valid travel document/document of

identity and nationality as required by regulations is inadmissible.

2

Petitioner claims that since his release, he has appeared for all of his

scheduled check-ins and engaged in no unlawful activity. Doc. 1, at 10. On

January 21, 2026, during a regularly scheduled Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) check-in appointment, Respondents took Petitioner into

custody. Id.; Doc. 8, at 6 & Ex. 3 (arrest warrant).

Petitioner argues that his re-detention without process violated his due

process rights under the Fifth Amendment and violated the INA. Id. at 10-12.

He asks this Court to order Respondents not to transfer him outside this

district while this habeas petition is pending; issue an order requiring

Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within

three days5; order his immediate release “without additional alternatives to

detention;” declare his detention is unlawful; and award him attorney’s fees

and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412,

and on any other basis justified under law. Id. at 12-13.

II. Standard of review.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in

custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of

the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

5 The Court addressed this request in its Order for Response, Doc. 6.

3

475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are

properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d

1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88

(2001)).

III. Discussion.

A. The Court has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner presented himself at a port of entry and was released on

parole. Doc. 1, at 9. Respondents contend they are properly detaining

Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and that the Court has no jurisdiction

to review the discretionary decision to re-detain Petitioner during the

pendency of his removal proceedings. See Doc. 8, at 7 (citing 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)). The Court should disagree.

Petitioner does not challenge a discretionary decision to terminate his

parole. He instead argues he was arbitrarily detained in violation of his due

process rights and the regulations governing his parole. Doc. 1, at 10-12. So

the Court has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims. See Ghamoushi-

Ramandi v. Janecka, 2026 WL 1107385, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2026)

(“Respondents argue Section[] . . . 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strip[s] the Court of

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jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s custody determination and bond orders.

However, [the petitioner’s] claims are constitutional in nature and do not

challenge actions that fall within the discretion of the Attorney General or the

Secretary of Homeland Security. The first and second claims raise due process

and regulatory challenges to the procedures Respondents afforded Petitioner

when they re-detained him.”) (alteration omitted) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted); cf. Mwangi v. Terry, 465 F. App’x 784, 787 (10th Cir.

2012) (“[T]o the extent Mr. Mwangi challenges the agency’s discretionary bond

decision, the magistrate judge was correct that the court lacked jurisdiction.”).

B. Petitioner is entitled to due process.

Petitioner claims that his ongoing detention without a custody review

violates his due process rights and the INA. Doc. 1, at 10-12. To the extent that

Respondents substantively address Petitioner’s statutory and procedural due

process arguments, they assert that Petitioner is properly detained under 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) as an arriving alien at a port of entry. Doc. 8, at 7-9.

Additionally, they argue Petitioner’s re-detention without written notice or a

hearing implicates no due process rights because he “does not have a liberty

interest following parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).” Doc. 8, at 11-12.

Under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), “[i]f an immigration officer determines that [the

noncitizen] . . . who is arriving in the United States . . . is inadmissible under

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section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) . . ., the officer shall order the [noncitizen]

removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the

[noncitizen] indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of

persecution.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). An individual detained as

inadmissible upon inspection at the border can only be paroled into the United

States “‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.’”

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(5)(A)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (granting discretion to DHS

officials to “parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as

he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons

or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United

States”).

The parties appear to agree that Petitioner was temporarily paroled

under § 1182(d)(5)(A) after arriving at the border. See Doc. 1, at 9-10 & Ex. 2;

Doc. 8, at 7-8. His removal proceedings are ongoing, but Respondents re-

detained him in January 2026. Doc. 1, at 10.6

6 An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s request for asylum and

ordered his removal on May 11, 2026. See Doc. 8, at 6 & n. 5. Petitioner

appealed this order on June 3, 2026, and the appeal is pending before the Board

of Immigration Appeals. See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation

(last visited July 13, 2026).

6

Petitioner argues there was no reason to re-detain him and ICE violated

its own regulations and his due process rights when it arbitrarily revoked his

parole. Id. at 11-12. Respondents argue Petitioner’s mandatory detention

under § 1225(b)(1) does not implicate any due process rights because upon

termination of his parole, he was subject to detention under § 1225 as an

applicant for admission. Doc. 8, at 7-9. The Court should agree with Petitioner.

Because Petitioner was released on humanitarian parole, “it is illogical

to suggest that his re-detention is governed by § 1225(b)(1), which . . . governs

procedures for the inspection of aliens arriving in the United States who have

not been admitted or paroled.” See Rafibaev v. Noem, 2026 WL 607559, at *2

(D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, even if the

Court assumed Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention upon

termination of his parole, “Respondents must still comply with the

requirements of due process.” E-D-S-O- v. Hernandez, 2026 WL 1067036, at *3

(W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2026); cf. Qasemi v. Francis, 2025 WL 3654098, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (“[A] noncitizen paroled into the country—i.e., a

noncitizen residing in the United States—is not an arriving alien.”).

“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government to

deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. Freedom from

imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

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restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533

U.S. at 690 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); cf. Trump v.

J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (“‘It is well established that the Fifth

Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal

proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Individuals who have been

conditionally released from detention have a protected interest in their

“continued liberty.” Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147 (1997). “This is true

even when the released individual is subject to extensive conditions of release.”

Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2025).

When the government promulgates regulations “with the force and effect

of law,” agencies are bound to follow their own “existing valid regulations.”

United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265, 268 (1954).

Pertinent here, “[t]he statutes and regulations governing immigration and

removal proceedings afford important procedural safeguards to detainees.”

Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 698-99.

1. Statutory and regulatory framework.

Upon inspection at the time of his request for admission through a port

of entry, Petitioner was first detained and then “paroled” into the United

States under § 1182(d)(5). Doc. 8, at 6.

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Section 1182(d)(5) grants discretion to DHS officials to “parole into the

United States temporarily under such conditions as [they] may prescribe only

on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public

benefit any [noncitizen] applying for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(5)(A). Any revocation of this parole must be based on a decision by a

DHS official that either “the purpose for which parole was authorized” has been

accomplished or that “neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit

warrants the continued presence of the [noncitizen] in the United States.” 8

C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (stating the DHS

Secretary may revoke parole “when the purposes of such parole . . . have been

served”). And the parole will be terminated only when “written notice” of this

decision is served on the noncitizen. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i).

Respondents point out that Petitioner’s conditional parole was not

arbitrarily revoked upon his arrest but expired by its own terms on April 18,

2025. Doc. 8, at 11. So they argue that “any liberty interest . . . [Petitioner] had

[] automatically terminated when [his parole] expired.” Id.; see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 212.5(e)(1) (stating parole is automatically terminated without written notice

“at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized”). As a result,

Respondents argue they are lawfully detaining Petitioner under § 1225(b)(1).

9

See Doc. 8, at 8-9, 11-12. But the undersigned finds Petitioner remained on

parole even after the date of expiration. See Doc. 1, at 10.

“[T]he applicable regulatory scheme requires that, where parole has

automatically terminated upon expiration and the noncitizen is not returned

to custody for either the timely execution of a removal order or upon an

individualized decision by an authorized DHS official, continuation of

humanitarian parole may be implied and, thereafter, the procedures for on-

notice termination apply.” Caisa Telenchana v. Hermosillo, 2026 WL 696806,

at *7 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 12, 2026). So Respondents cannot rely on the automatic

termination clause to justify Petitioner’s detention.

The Court should also reject Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s

detention, upon termination of his parole, must have necessarily reverted to

the statute that governed Petitioner’s original detention. Doc. 8, at 8-9. Section

1182(d)(5)(A) “does not state that a noncitizen is returned to the ‘status’ they

held upon their parole, that they revert to status as an ‘arriving alien,’ or that

they must be detained.” Qasemi, 2025 WL 3654098, at *10. Rather, the statute

states that, following the expiration of parole, the noncitizen shall (1)

“forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled”

and (2) “thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner

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as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(5)(A).

Section 1182(d)(5)(A) “recognizes that the parole physically happened,

because it contemplates that the noncitizen must be returned to detention.”

Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 86 (D.D.C.

2025). Because § 1182(d)(5)(A) recognizes that noncitizens paroled under its

authority are released into the United States, it is not logical then to assume

they revert to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) as an arriving alien.

Especially given that § 1182(d)(5)(A) itself does not state that a noncitizen

reverts to the status he or she possessed before the grant of parole.

In fact, § “1182(d)(5)(A) suggests that rather than reverting to any prior

status, a noncitizen whose parole has expired is treated like the vast majority

of undocumented immigrants currently living in this country who are not

subjected to expedited removal.” Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 811 F. Supp.

3d 274, 302 (E.D.N.Y. 2025). The Court should find that § 1182(d)(5)(A) does

not require Petitioner to be detained under the same statutory status as his

original detention.

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2. Respondents did not comply with the applicable

regulations before revoking Petitioner’s parole.

Respondents do not submit that an appropriate official made the

discretionary decision to revoke Petitioner’s parole. Respondents issued the

NTA to Petitioner when he was first paroled. Doc. 8, Ex. 1. So it provided no

notice to Petitioner about the termination of his parole when he was detained

in January 2026, as § 212.5(e)(2)(i) requires.

The lack of an individualized determination violated the regulations

governing the termination of parole. See, e.g., E-D-S-O-, 2026 WL 1067036, at

*4 (“Nothing in the record shows Respondents provided Petitioner with written

notice of revocation of his humanitarian parole, that the original purpose of his

parole was accomplished, or that a DHS official with authority determined

‘neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit’ warranted continued

parole.”); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, 804 F. Supp. 3d 395, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)

(“Respondents provide no indication that an individualized determination was

made as to the revocation of Munoz Materano’s parole; nor do they articulate,

even now, either that the purpose for which Munoz Materano’s parole was

authorized has been accomplished, nor that neither humanitarian reasons nor

public benefit warrants his continued presence in the United States.”); see also

Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1137-38 (D. Or. 2025) (“This is a

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grant of discretionary authority, but it has a mandatory requirement—parole

may be terminated or revoked only when in the Secretary’s opinion the parole’s

purposes have been met.”).

3. Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process right

by summarily revoking his parole.

This Court analyzes Petitioner’s procedural due process claim to

determine whether he has a protected liberty interest, and what process is

necessary to ensure any deprivation of that liberty interest aligns with the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). In examining the necessary process, the Court turns

to the three factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge: (1) “the private interest

that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable

value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the

Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

“When the [G]overnment grants [a noncitizen] parole into the country, it

creates a liberty interest intimately tied to freedom from imprisonment.”

Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025); see also

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Iza v. Arnott, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2026) (“Individuals

released on parole or other forms of conditional release have a liberty interest

in their ‘continued liberty.’” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482

(1972))); Sahil v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2026 WL 560216, at *3 (D.N.M. Feb. 27,

2026) (finding “that noncitizens acquire a liberty interest once released from

immigration detention”). Petitioner’s interest in physical freedom “is the most

elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004);

see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (stating that an individual’s interest in

being free from detention “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process]

Clause protects”). DHS deprived Petitioner of his protected status when it re-

detained him.

Turning to the Mathews factors, the Court finds that Petitioner has a

significant private interest in remaining free from detention after spending

over a year on parole. By initially releasing Petitioner on parole, the

Government necessarily determined that he was “neither a security risk nor a

risk of absconding.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). Respondents have presented no

evidence that there was a change in this assessment. By permitting Petitioner

to remain at liberty for a year, the Government enabled Petitioner to develop

a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. To be sure, “Congress

may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”

14

Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003). But that power remains “subject to

important constitutional limitations.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. And it does

not erase Petitioner’s significant interest in remaining free from detention.

Respondents do not suggest Petitioner violated any laws while in the

United States. During his release, Petitioner’s interest in continued liberty

grew even stronger as he presumably “form[ed] the other enduring

attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. And “Petitioner’s

liberty interest does not evaporate when a term of parole expires.” Juan Carlos

V.B. v. Chestnut, 2026 WL 1224238, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2026); see also

Begaliev v. Warden of Otero Cnty. Processing Ctr., 2026 WL 837109, at *5

(D.N.M. Mar. 26, 2026) (finding a similarly situated petitioner “had a sufficient

liberty interest created by the regulations”). The first Mathews factor favors

Petitioner.

Second, the Court considers “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of

additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The

risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is considerable

where ICE arrested him at a scheduled check-in without any notice of the

reason or a pre-deprivation hearing.

15

“Constitutionally inadequate notice also often leads to constitutionally

inadequate opportunity to be heard, because opportunity to be heard must be

meaningful to be constitutionally sufficient.” Saqib v. Andrews, 2026 WL

350830, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026), adopted, 2026 WL 440566 (E.D. Cal.

Feb. 17, 2026). Respondents detained Petitioner with no procedural safeguards

to determine whether the revocation of his release was justified. This factor

weighs in Petitioner’s favor. See, e.g., E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d

1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“That the Government may believe it has a

valid reason to detain Petitioner does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate

the detention in a manner that comports with due process.”).

Finally, the Court considers the Government’s interest, including any

fiscal or administrative burdens. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. “While this Court

recognizes that the [G]overnment has an interest in enforcing immigration

laws,” the Government’s interest in arresting Petitioner without a

determination whether he posed a risk of flight or danger is low. Saqib, 2026

WL 350830, at *6; see, e.g., Diaz v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal.

June 14, 2025) (“[T[he Court concludes that the [G]overnment’s interest in re-

detaining Petitioner . . . is ‘low,’ particularly in light of the fact that Petitioner[]

has long complied with his reporting requirements.”). And the Court can

discern no significant administrative or fiscal burden associated with placing

16

the burden on the Government to follow its own laws and regulations. See, e.g.,

Iza, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (“An alien’s opportunity to be heard regarding the

revocation of his parole is only meaningful if the [G]overnment comports with

its own internal standards regarding parole revocation.”). Especially given that

Petitioner’s detention was not considered necessary for a year.

C. Remedy.

Habeas is “a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren,

553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). “The typical remedy for such detention is, of course,

release.” Id.; see also Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 (“Habeas has traditionally

been a means to secure release from unlawful detention.”). Federal district

courts have broad equitable powers to craft habeas relief. Burton v. Johnson,

975 F.2d 690, 693 (10th Cir. 1992). District courts have the power and

authority to dispose of habeas corpus matters “as law and justice require.” 28

U.S.C. § 2243; see also United States v. Allen, 139 F.3d 913 (10th Cir. 1998) (“If

the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental

requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release.”)

(quoting Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1284 (10th Cir.1990)).

The undersigned finds that ICE breached its own regulations and

violated Petitioner’s due process rights when it summarily revoked his parole.

Based on these findings, the undersigned recommends the Court grant the

17

habeas corpus petition in part and order Respondents to release Petitioner

from detention subject to the same conditions of his earlier parole. This view is

shared by numerous courts across the country.7

IV. Recommendation and notice of right to object.

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court

grant Petitioner’s habeas petition in part and order his immediate release

subject to the same conditions that governed his earlier parole. The

undersigned also recommends that the Court order the Government

to certify compliance by filing a status report within ten business days

of the Court’s order, and to promptly provide a copy of this order to Counsel

for the Warden of the Diamondback Correctional Facility. Finally, the Court

should order that Respondents cannot re-detain Petitioner without notice and

7 See, e.g., Singh v. Noem, 2026 WL 766228, at *10 (D.N.M. Mar. 18, 2026)

(“Petitioner’s . . . release is required to remedy the ongoing due process

violation caused by Petitioner being detained while his conditional parole has

not yet been terminated.”); Velasquez Montillo, 2026 WL 592355, at *10

(concluding immediate release was the appropriate remedy where “there has

been no notice of a change in circumstances requiring modification of the

November 2021 [order of release on recognizance]”); Vielma Uzcategui v.

Brooksby, 2026 WL 622751, at *13 (D. Utah Mar. 5, 2026) (same as to

petitioner ordered released on her own recognizance in September 2023);

Murzi v. Noem, 2026 WL 395111, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 2026) (ordering

petitioner’s immediate release where petitioner had previously been released

on parole).

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a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decision-maker where the

Government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence that

Petitioner is a flight risk and a danger to the community.8

The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to

this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by July 16, 2026,

in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72.9

The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely

objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate

review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United

States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation

8 As to Petitioner’s request for EAJA fees, Petitioner must seek those

separately after a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).

9 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has

reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that

rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas corpus

petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings under

Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x

227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be

applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they

need not be in every instance – particularly where strict application would

undermine the habeas review process.”).

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disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the

captioned matter.

ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2026.

hea tere _

SUZANNE MITCHELL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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