Bean

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BETTIE BEAN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC NO. 25-00140-BAJ-EWD

D/B/A MR. COOPER

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, d/b/a Mr. Cooper’s

Rule 12(c) Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 19). Plaintiff Bettie Bean opposes the Motion.

(Doc. 21). Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum. (Doc. 22). For the reasons stated

herein, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Defendant’s servicing of Plaintiffs mortgage loan (the

“Loan’). On February 9, 2024, Plaintiff sold the mortgage property by Cash Sale Deed

to Hollins Housing, LLC, which conveyed the property that same day to another

individual; Accent Title, LLC, Plaintiffs closing agent, closed both conveyances. (Doc.

1-1 at 20). Plaintiff alleges that, on or about February 5, 2024, Defendant gave

Plaintiff a mortgage payoff quote in the amount of $34,026.35, valid through April 1,

2024. (Doc. 1-1 at J 3). This payoff quote allegedly included a March 2024 payment.

Plaintiff disagreed with the quoted amount, apparently because it included the

March 2024 payment, and directed her closing agent, Accent Title, LLC, not to pay

the quoted amount in full at closing. (Ud. at 4] 3-4). On February 17, 2024, Plaintiff

received a second payoff quote from Defendant in the amount of $39,160.37, which

still included a March 2024 payment. (/d. at {J 5- 6). Plaintiff alleges this new quote

also reflected erroneous “lender paid charges” totaling $6,701.24, a $5,163.24

difference from the original quote, without itemization or explanation. (/d.). On or

about February 19, 2024, Accent Title tendered, and Defendant cashed, a check for

$34,026.35, the amount of the original February 5, 2024 payoff quote. Ud. at 13). On

or about March 4, 2024, Defendant issued an uncertified check to Accent Title in the

same amount, its remittance stub marked “SHORT PAYOFF REFUND,” which

Accent Title never cashed. (/d. at {J 7-8).

Plaintiff further alleges that, “[a]fter numerous attempts to obtain an itemized

invoice of lender paid expenses,” she received a payoff demand letter dated June 10,

2024, from Defendant. Ud. at § 9). Plaintiff alleges that she never received a fully

itemized breakdown of all lender paid expenses, but did receive an invoice from

Cyprexx Services, LLC, for tree removal work totaling $5,071.24. Ud. at § 10).

Plaintiff alleges that these amounts exceed the maximum property preservation cost

reimbursements allowable under the United States Department of Housing and

Urban Development (“HUD”) guidelines. (/d.). Defendant thereafter filed a Petition

for Executory Process without Appraisal, and a Notice of Constructive Seizure was

served on Plaintiffon August 19, 2024, with a sheriffs sale set for November 138, 2024.

(Id. at § 11). On October 10, 2024, Accent Title received a third payoff quote from

Defendant, directed to Plaintiff, in the amount of $47,069.82, which included interest

charges of $1,987.48 calculated from December 1, 2023 to October 31, 2024, as well

as an additional lender paid expenses report, including property inspection fees of

$2,369.10, maintenance fees of $3,147.14, and repair fees of $30.00. Ud. at 12). At

Plaintiffs direction, Accent Title reinstated the Loan by wire transfer to Defendant

in the amount of $17,918.65 in order to stop the foreclosure sale from taking place on

November 18, 2024.! Ud. at § 18).

On January 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit in the 19th Judicial District Court,

East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, alleging that Defendant violated Housing and

Urban Development Guidelines, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the

Fair Debt Collection Practice Act. (Doc. 1-1). Thereafter, Defendant removed the case

to this Court, asserting removal and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§

1331, 1867. (Doc. 1 at 2). Now, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs claims through

judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc. 19).

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are

closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the

pleadings.” A motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(c) is designed to “dispose of cases

where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be

rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.”

Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 318 F.3d 305, 312

(5th Cir. 2002) (citing Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76

1 Plaintiffs narrative timeline in her Petition ends here and does not elaborate on any events that

may have occurred after this wire transfer regarding the mortgage property or the mortgage itself.

The Court presumes the next relevant action in this matter was her filing of the Petition.

(5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 13867, at 509-10 (1990)). “[T]he central issue is

whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim

for relief.” Great Plains Tr. Co., 313 F.3d at 312 Gnternal citations omitted).

“Pleadings should be construed liberally, and judgment on the pleadings is

appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of fact and only questions of law

remain.” Jd. (internal citations omitted). “The [district] court may dismiss a claim

when it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that

would entitle him to relief.” Id. (citing Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.8d 322, 324

(5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990)).

“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as

true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jd. at 312-18 (internal

citations omitted). The Court will not, however, “accept as true conclusory allegations

or unwarranted deductions of fact.” Id. at 313 (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter, 224 F.8d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (addressing Rule 12(b)(6) standard))

(quoting Tuchman v. DSC Comm. Corp., 14 F.8d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994)). “The

issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled

to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the court should not dismiss the claim

unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible

theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Jd.

(internal citations omitted).

Ill. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for a judgment on the pleadings and argues that Plaintiff has

not alleged a valid claim under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C.

§ 2601, et seq. (“(RESPA”), that Plaintiffs claims under the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. “FDCPA”), fails as a matter of law, and that

there is no private right of action for alleged violation of HUD regulations. (Doc. 19

at 1; Doc 19-1 at 5-12). Plaintiff responds that she has satisfied each element for a

RESPA claim, that dismissing the FDCPA claim would be premature, and that her

references to HUD regulations are illustrative of Defendant acting in bad faith. (Doc.

21 at 3-6). The Court will take each argument in turn.

A. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged a Valid Claim Under RESPA

RESPA is a consumer protection statute that, among other things, imposes

duties on mortgage loan servicers to respond to certain borrower inquiries regarding

the servicing of their loans. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

violated RESPA by failing to timely and adequately respond to her requests for an

itemized accounting of the lender paid expenses added to her Loan balance. (Doc. 1-

1 at § 9). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs allegations are insufficient in three

respects: 1) Plaintiff does not allege that the Loan is a federally related mortgage

loan, 2) Plaintiff does not allege that she submitted a qualified written request, and

3) Plaintiff does not allege actual damages caused by any failure to respond. (Doc. 19-

1 at 4-8). Plaintiff responds that the Loan’s federally related status is established by

an invoice attached to her Petition that denotes the loan type as “FHA”, that her

alleged requests for an itemized invoice constitute a qualified written request, and

that her damages are sufficiently pled in the Petition. (Doc. 21 at 4—5; see Doc. 1-1 at

18). The Court will take each element in turn.

1. Plaintiff has not alleged a federally related

mortgage loan

RESPA applies only to “federally related mortgage loan[s].” 12 U.S.C. §

2602(1). The statute defines a “federally related mortgage loan” to include any loan,

other than temporary financing, that is secured by a first or subordinate lien on

residential real property, and that, among other alternatives, “is made in whole or in

part by any lender the deposits or accounts of which are insured by any agency of the

Federal Government, or is made in whole or in part by any lender which is regulated

by any agency of the Federal Government,” or “is made in whole or in part, or insured,

guaranteed, supplemented, or assisted in any way, by the Secretary or any officer or

agency of the Federal Government.” 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1)(A)—(B); see also 12 C.F.R. §

1024.2(b) (defining “federally related mortgage loan” for purposes of Regulation X). A

residential mortgage loan insured by the Federal Housing Administration, an agency

within HUD, falls within the statutory definition. See 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1)(B)ai).

Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has not yet

addressed the issue, district courts within this Circuit, including this Court, have

consistently held that a plaintiff who does not specifically allege that the mortgage

loan at issue is a “federally related mortgage loan” fails to state a claim under RESPA.

LaBauve v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV 17-259-SDD-RLB, 2018 WL

1125660 at *3 (M.D. La. Mar. 1, 2018) (holding that a plaintiff may have standing to

assert a RESPA claim only if he or she pleads that the mortgage at issue is federally

related); Loraso v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 13-4734, 2013 WL 5755638 at

*8 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2013); Middleton v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 1:10CV146-LG-

RHW, 2010 WL 2658293 at *4 (S.D. Miss. June 24, 2010); Washington v. Nationstar

Morigage, LLC, No. 21-1716, 2022 WL 98617, at *8 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2022) (holding,

in an action against this same Defendant, that “based on the statutory language of

section 2605(e), plaintiff must allege that his mortgage is federally related in order

to have standing under RESPA”).

Plaintiffs Petition contains no allegation that the Loan is a federally related

mortgage loan. (See Doc. 1-1). Instead, in her opposition brief, she argues that the

Loan is “identified as an FHA loan” in an invoice provided by Defendant, and that an

FHA loan necessarily meets the definition of a federally related mortgage loan. (Doc.

21 at 4; see Doc. 1-1 at 18).

It is true that, in ruling on the Motion, the Court may consider “the complaint,

its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and

matters of which the Court may take judicial notice.” LaBauve, 2018 WL 1125660, at

*2 (quoting Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir.

2011)); see also Scanian v. Tex. A&M Univ., 3438 F.3d 533, 5386 (5th Cir. 2003).

However, a reference to the loan type in an exhibit attached to the pleadings is not a

factual allegation by the Plaintiff that her Loan satisfies the statutory definition set

forth in 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1). Simply mentioning that the alleged violations were “in

connection with a transaction involving a federally related mortgage loan” would be

sufficient to satisfy this element, but Plaintiff has not even done that. Gardner v.

First Am. Title Ins. Co., 294 F.3d 991, 993-94 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that referencing

alleged violations related to a federally related mortgage loan “is a sufficient

allegation of RESPA standing.”). While the Court may consider exhibits attached to

the pleadings, it will not supply an essential element of a federal statutory claim that

the Plaintiff herself has not pleaded. Cf. Loraso, 2013 WL 57556388, at *8 (dismissing

RESPA claim where complaint did “not specifically allege that the mortgage in

question is federally-related" notwithstanding plaintiffs’ argument that notice

pleading sufficed). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plead an essential element of

her RESPA claim.

2. Plaintiff has not alleged that she submitted a

qualified written request

Section 2605(e) of RESPA obligates a loan servicer to acknowledge receipt of a

borrower’s qualified written request within five days and to respond substantively,

by correcting the account or explaining its position, within thirty days. See 12 U.S.C.

§ 2605(e)(1)(A), (2). That duty is triggered only by a “qualified written request”

(“QWR”), which the statute defines as “written correspondence, other than notice on

a payment coupon or other payment medium supplied by the servicer, that ()

includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify the name and account of the

borrower, and (ii) includes a statement of the reasons for the borrower's belief, to the

extent applicable, that the account is in error, or provides sufficient detail to the

servicer regarding other information sought by the borrower.” 12 U.S.C. §

2605(e)(1)(B) (emphasis added). A valid QWR must also relate to the servicing of the

loan. Matter of Parker, 655 F. App’x 998, 997-98 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); 12

U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A).

To recover for a loan servicer’s failure to respond to a QWR, a plaintiff must

show “that their correspondence met the requirements of a QWR, that [the servicer]

failed to make a timely response, and that this failure caused them actual damages.”

Parker, 655 F. App’x at 997 (quoting Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 560 Fed.

App’x 238, 241 (5th Cir. 2014)). Consistent with these requirements, courts in this

District have dismissed RESPA claims where the plaintiff failed to plead facts

establishing that the communication at issue constituted qualified written requests

under the statute. Satterfeal v. LoanCare, LLC, No. 18-1021-JWD-EWD, 2019 WL

2857998, at *38 (M.D. La. July 1, 2019) (dismissing RESPA claim where “plaintiffs

ha[d] failed to properly allege that their communications constituted qualified

written requests under the statute”); Clinton v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 12-433-

BAJ-SCR, 2013 WL 12239528, at *3 (M.D. La. Mar. 19, 2013) (letter requesting a

breakdown of payments and fees was not a QWR where plaintiffs “did not articulate

that they disputed any part of their account or why they believed their account may

be in error as required by statute.”). By contrast, a borrower sufficiently alleges a

QWR by identifying specific written correspondence, sent on an identified date, that

enabled the servicer to identify the account and stated the basis of the borrower's

dispute. See Williams, 560 F. App’x at 241-42 (January 28 letter to servicer’s

foreclosure counsel sufficiently alleged a QWR).

Here, the Petition alleges only that Plaintiff made “numerous attempts to

obtain an itemized invoice of lender paid expenses” and that she thereafter received

a payoff demand letter dated June 10, 2024. (Doc. 1-1 at { 9). The Petition does not

allege that any of these requests were made in writing, when they were made, or

what any request specifically entailed. Absent an allegation of a written request, the

statutory definition is not satisfied on the face of the pleading. 12 U.S.C. §

2605(e)(1)(B). Additionally, absent any allegation of the timing of the request, the

Petition cannot plausibly allege that any response fell outside the statutory response

period. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2).

Plaintiff's opposition does not cure these deficiencies. (See Doc. 21). Plaintiff

argues that her allegation of numerous requests for an itemized invoice is itself a

QWR because such a request would enable the servicer to identify the name and

account of the borrower and the reasons for her belief that the account is in error, as

required by statute. (Doc. 21 at 5); 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). However, Plaintiff does

not assert, even in argument, that any request was written, and she identifies no

date, method, or content of any correspondence. Moreover, the Petition affirmatively

alleges that Plaintiff did receive correspondence from Defendant following her

requests, the June 10, 2024 payoff demand letter. (Doc. 1-1 at 9). Cf. Clinton, 2013

WL 12239528, at *3 (even where servicer treated borrower correspondence as a QWR,

a written response stating the servicer’s position and providing a contact for further

assistance satisfies the statute). Plaintiff has therefore failed to allege the submission

of a qualified written request, and her RESPA claim fails for this independent reason.

8. Plaintiff has not alleged actual damages caused by a

failure to respond to a QWR

Plaintiffs RESPA claim fails for a third, independent reason: she has not

alleged actual damages resulting from the claimed violation. RESPA provides that a

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servicer who fails to comply with § 2605 is liable to the borrower for “any actual

damages to the borrower as a result of the failure,” and, in the case of a pattern or

practice of noncompliance, additional statutory damages. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1). “To

recover, a claimant must show that actual damages resulted from a RESPA

violation.” Whittier v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 594 F. App’x 833, 836 (5th Cir.

2014) (per curiam) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e), (f); see also Parker, 655 F. App’x at

998 (RESPA claim failed where plaintiffs did not show facts “giving rise to a

reasonable inference that [they] suffered actual damages from the alleged violation

of the RESPA”); Satterfeal, 2019 WL 2857998, at *4 (“The mere inference of damage

from a § 2605 violation is not sufficient.”). RESPA does not define “actual damages”;

however, Courts construe the term as synonymous with compensatory damages,

requiring facts that plausibly demonstrate injury proximately caused by the alleged

violation itself. Payne v. Seterus, Inc., No. 16-0203, 2016 WL 6270761, at *4 (W.D. La.

Oct. 26, 2016) (collecting cases). Cognizable actual damages could include, for

example, postage incurred in following up on an incomplete response to a QWR, or

concrete credit consequences flowing from the failure to respond, but not costs

incurred before, or independent of, the alleged violation. Id. at *4—5.

In her opposition, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s conduct caused

$13,043.47 in damages arising from continued interest and unexplained fees, and

that the $17,918.65 she paid to reinstate the Loan and prevent foreclosure constitutes

actual damages. (Doc. 21 at 5). While the $17,918.65 reinstatement payment is

pleaded (Doc. 1-1 at 4 18), the $13,043.47 figure appears nowhere in the Petition.

11

Upon quick calculation, the Court assumes it corresponds to the difference between

the October 10, 2024 payoff quote and the original February 5, 2024 quote ($47,069.82

less $34,026.35), each of which is pleaded. (Id. at 143, 12). Even crediting both figures

as flowing from well-pleaded allegations, as the Court must at this stage, they still

do not supply the causal element the statute requires. The Petition references the

disputed “lender paid” charges, payments associated with the foreclosure proceeding,

and the reinstatement payment. However, it does not plead any fact connecting any

of those sums to a failure to respond to correspondence as required by § 2605(e).

Section 2605(f)(1) compensates “actual damages to the borrower as a result of the

failure” to comply; it does not reach every sum a borrower disputes. On the face of the

pleading, the causal link between any alleged non-response and the claimed damages

is simply absent. See Whittier, 594 F. App’x at 836-37 (affirming summary judgment

on RESPA claim where borrowers failed to show actual damages resulting from the

servicer’s response); Parker, 655 F. App’x at 998 (complaint must plead facts giving

rise to a reasonable inference of actual damages from the alleged violation); cf. Payne,

2016 WL 6270761, at *4-5 (damages element satisfied where borrower alleged

postage incurred after an insufficient response and credit denials caused by the

servicer’s failure to respond).

Nor does Plaintiff's invocation of statutory damages salvage the claim. Plaintiff

contends that the facts alleged describe a pattern of noncompliance permitting an

award of $2,000 in statutory damages under § 2605(6)(1)(B). (Doc. 21 at 5). Additional

damages under § 2605(f)(1)(B) presuppose a properly pleaded violation, and an

12

allegation of repeated requests cannot establish a pattern or practice of

noncompliance with response obligations that were never triggered by a qualified

written request. Cf. Satterfeal, 2019 WL 2857998, at *3 (allegation of repeated

requests “may reach the threshold for showing a ‘pattern or practice of

noncompliance,” but claim failed because plaintiffs did not properly allege that their

communications were qualified written requests). Because the Petition alleges no

damages attributable to a failure to respond to a QWR, Plaintiffs RESPA claim fails

for this reason as well. In sum, Plaintiffs RESPA claim is deficient in three

independent respects and these claims are dismissed.

B. Plaintiffs FDCPA Claim Fails as a Matter of Law

The FDCPA Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.

(“FDCPA”), prohibits “debt collectors” from using abusive, deceptive, or unfair

practices in the collection of consumer debts. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated

the FDCPA by continuing to collect the disputed charges, including through

foreclosure, without providing verification of the debt after she disputed it. (Doc. 1-1

at 9). The threshold question, however, is whether Defendant is a “debt collector”

subject to the Act at all.

The FDCPA applies only to “debt collectors,” defined as “any person who uses

any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal

purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts

to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due

another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). In Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S.

13

79 (2017), the United States Supreme Court explained that “by its plain terms this

language seems to focus our attention on third party collection agents working for a

debt owner—not on a debt owner seeking to collect debts for itself.” Id. at 83. “All that

matters is whether the target of the lawsuit regularly seeks to collect debts for its

own account or does so for ‘another.” Jd. The Act also expressly excludes from the

definition of “debt collector” any person collecting a debt to the extent such activity

“is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F).

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant’s foreclosure action sought to collect

a debt owed directly to Defendant. Instead, she argues that dismissal is premature

because the Cyprexx invoice attached as Exhibit F to her Petition reflects $5,071.24

in labor performed by a third party, such that Defendant’s inclusion of that amount

in its payoff quotes “amounts to being the recovery of a debt on behalf of a third party.”

(Doc. 21 at 5-6).

Plaintiffs own pleading forecloses this argument. The Petition repeatedly

characterizes the disputed sums as “lender paid” charges or expenses; that 1s,

amounts Defendant paid to Cyprexx and then added to the balance owed by Plaintiff

to Defendant. (Doc. 1-1 at 6, 9, 10). The invoice itself is directed from Cyprexx to

Defendant. (Doc. 1-1 at 17). Nothing in the Petition or its exhibits alleges that

Defendant ever demanded payment from Plaintiff on Cyprexx’s behalf, or that

Cyprexx retained any interest in the amounts at issue. On the face of the pleadings,

Defendant sought to collect a debt owed to itself, including sums it had advanced.

Under Henson, such an entity is not a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA. 582 U.S.

14

at 81-83. Thus, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Defendant is a debt collector

subject to regulation under the FDCPA and Plaintiffs FDCPA claim fails

preliminarily for this reason.

C. Plaintiff's Claims Premised on HUD Regulations and Guidelines

HUD promulgates regulations and servicing guidelines governing loans

insured by the Federal Housing Administration, including limits on property

preservation and inspection costs a servicer may charge to a borrower's account. U.S.

DeEpP’t Hous. & URBAN DEV., FED. Hous. ADMIN., SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING POLICY

HANDBOOK 4000.1 (2025). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated those guidelines

by charging costs for tree and debris removal exceeding permissible amounts, and on

that basis seeks damages, costs, fees, and punitive damages. (Doc. 1-1 at {J 10, 14).

It is well settled in this Circuit that there is not a private right of action for violations

of HUD regulations or guidelines. Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co. 556 F.2d 356, 360-

62 (5th Cir. 1997).

In her opposition, Plaintiff concedes as much, but recasts her allegations to

contend that she “does not assert a private right of action based on violation of HUD

regulations,” and that the alleged violations are instead “indicative of the invalidity

of the invoice and [Defendant] acting in bad faith.” (Doc. 21 at 6). The words “bad

faith” appear nowhere in the Petition, and Plaintiff identifies no legal basis for a

freestanding “bad faith” claim. To the extent the Petition asserts a claim for relief

predicated on violations of HUD regulations or guidelines, it is dismissed with

prejudice.

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D. Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiffs demand for attorney's fees is not an independent cause of action.

Under Louisiana law, attorney’s fees are not recoverable absent authorization by

statute or contract. Frank L. Beier Radio, Inc. V. Black Gold Marine, Inc., 499 So. 2d

1014, 1015 (La. 1984). Plaintiff acknowledges that her fee demand rests entirely on

RESPA and the FDCPA. (Doc. 21 at 6); see 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(8). Because these

claims are dismissed with prejudice, any fee demand premised on these statutes is

likewise dismissed.

E. Leave to Amend

In the conclusion of her opposition, Plaintiff requests, in the alternative, that

the Court grant leave to amend her complaint. (Doc. 21 at 6). Defendant argues leave

should be denied because the deadline for amended pleadings and exchange of

discovery have both expired, such that amendment at this late date would unduly

prejudice Defendant, and because Plaintiffs request for leave to amend, raised in a

single sentence in the conclusion of her opposition without any indication of how the

deficiencies would be corrected, is procedurally improper. (Doc. 22 at 9); see Thomas

v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 590-91 (5th Cir. 2016). The Court agrees.

First, Plaintiffs request is insufficient under the standards set for this Circuit.

“A movant is required to give the court some notice of the nature of his or her proposed

amendments.” Thomas, 832 F.3d at 590 (quoting United States ex rel. Doe v. Dow

Chem. Co., 348 F.3d 325, 330-31 (5th Cir. 2003)). Even absent a formal motion, the

requesting party must “set forth with particularity the grounds for the amendment

16

and the relief sought.” Jd. While the Fifth Circuit has “not provided strict guidance

as to what constitutes a sufficient request for leave to amend, it is clear that some

specificity is required.” Id. at 590-91 (quoting Doe, 348 F.8d at 331). A “one-page,

three-sentence motion” that “offers no grounds on which an amendment should be

permitted” is insufficient. Id. Here, Plaintiff's single-sentence request for leave to

amend identifies no proposed amendment and no explanation of how any deficiency

would be corrected. It “offers no grounds” upon which this Court could permit leave.

Second, the request is untimely, and Plaintiff has not shown good cause to

modify the Court’s scheduling order. Plaintiffs request for leave, embedded in her

opposition to a motion to dismiss, was filed January 3, 2026. (See Doc. 22 at 9). The

deadline to join other parties or to amend the pleadings expired on May 8, 2025, and

fact discovery closed on November 15, 2025. (Doc. 12 at 9 1,2(b)). Indeed, the Court’s

Scheduling Order expressly provides that “[a]Jmendments sought after this deadline

may be permitted in accordance with the good cause standard of Rule 16 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” and that “[a]ny proposed amended pleading shall

be comprehensive.” (Doc. 12 at p. 1 n. 1). The Fifth Circuit has likewise made “clear

that Rule 16(b) governs amendment of pleadings after a scheduling order deadline

has expired. Only upon the movant’s demonstration of good cause to modify the

scheduling order will the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a) apply to the district

court’s decision to grant or deny leave.” S@W Eniters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of

Ata., N.A., 315 F.8d 538, 5386 (5th Cir. 2008). In assessing good cause, the Court

considers “’(1) the explanation for the failure to [timely move for leave to amend]; (2)

17

the importance of the [amendment]; (8) potential prejudice in allowing the

[amendment]; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.” Id.

(quoting Reliance Ins. Co. v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 110 F.3d 258, 257 (5th Cir.

1997)).

Plaintiff offers no explanation for her failure to timely seek amendment. In

S&W Enterprises, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of leave where the movant’s

proffered explanation was “tantamount to no explanation at all.” 315 F.3d at 536. Nor

does her litigation posture supply one. Plaintiff devoted her opposition to insisting

that her Petition is sufficient as pleaded, seeking amendment only as a fallback in

reaction to Defendant’s Motion. See Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir.

2010) (affirming the denial of leave where the plaintiff maintained his pleadings were

sufficient, “failed to apprise the district court of the facts that he would plead in an

amended complaint, if necessary, to cure any deficiencies in his pleadings,” and

tendered no proposed amended complaint). The remaining factors do not rescue the

request. The exchange of discovery has closed, so amendment would require

reopening discovery on a new pleading, prejudicing Defendant and further delaying

resolution of a case already past its pretrial deadlines. The Court acknowledges that

while some district courts confronting insufficiently pled federally-related-mortgage

allegations have permitted amendment, see LaBauve, 2018 WL 1125660, at *3;

Loraso, 2013 WL 5755688, at *8; Middleton, 2010 WL 26532938, at *4, none of those

decisions confronted a request made after the expiration of a scheduling order’s

amendment deadline. Each instead applied Rule 15’s liberal standard, not Rule

18

16(b)(4)’s higher burden, and none involved a wholly unexplained delay measured

against a closed discovery record.

Lastly, as to Plaintiffs FDCPA claim and her claims premised on HUD

regulations and guidelines, amendment would in any event be futile. The defects in

those claims are legal, not factual. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant collected a debt

owed to itself and is therefore not a “debt collector” under Henson (582 U.S. at 88),

and no private right of action exists for violations of HUD guidelines. Thus, Plaintiffs

request for leave to amend is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Rule 12(c) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this pe of July, 2026

Ava. a

JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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