The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
HASANI JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:26-cv-01339-KKM-LSG
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE CHILD SUPPORT
PROGRAM, and TIMOTHY SIERRA,
in his official capacity,
Defendants.
______________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The pro se plaintiff Hasani Jackson sues the the defendants “Florida
Department of Revenue Child Support Program” and Timothy Sierra, under Section
1983, of Title 42, United States Code, and the Fourteenth Amendment, for actions
arising from child support proceedings.1 Doc. 7. Jackson moves to proceed without
pre-paying the filing fee. Doc. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Because the complaint fails to
state a claim for relief under Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I recommend
(1) denying the motion without prejudice and (2) dismissing the complaint without
prejudice.
1 Jackson’s initial complaint failed to comply with Rule 11(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Docs. 1, 3, 5. After filing two amended complaints, he cured the defect in his second amended
complaint. See Docs. 6, 7.
I. BACKGROUND
Jackson invokes federal question jurisdiction and sues under Section 1983 to
challenge the constitutionality of his child support proceedings in state court. Docs.
7, 9; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. § 1331. During child support establishment and
enforcement proceedings between 2022 and 2025, the Florida Department of
Revenue Child Support Program and attorney or representative Timothy Sierra
evaluated Jackson’s income, employability, and earning capacity. Doc. 7, ¶¶ 4–5, 10.
Jackson presented medical evidence of his 2015 workplace injury, spinal surgeries,
and ongoing Social Security disability claims. Doc. 7, ¶¶ 7–10. The defendants
acknowledged the existence of Jackson’s medical issues and disability but ultimately
discounted this evidence, characterized his unemployment as “voluntary,” and drew
money from his workers’ compensation proceeds. Doc. 7, ¶¶ 11–13 (explaining that
“substantial portions of those proceeds were intercepted, depleted, or otherwise
unavailable”).
Jackson seeks relief and argues that the defendants violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to procedural due process by using “unfair” and unconstitutional
methods to adjudicate his child support obligations. Doc. 7, ¶¶ 13–14, 19 (alleging
that the defendants relied on “selective financial inferences and isolated temporary
resources in support of earning-capacity assumptions”). Jackson clarifies that he
seeks no appellate review nor modification of any domestic-relations action or state
family-court order. Doc. 7 at 1.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of review.
In a civil action, the clerk of court must collect a filing fee from the initiating
party. 28 U.S.C. § 1914. A party may avoid paying the fee by submitting an affidavit
showing that “the person is unable to pay such fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). However, before a party can proceed without
paying the fee, Section 1915 requires review and dismissal if the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–
(iii); Martinez v. Kristi Cleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004); Mitchell
v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).
To state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the
grounds for jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader
is entitled to relief, and a demand for the relief sought. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1)–(3);
McCurry v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1255 (M.D. Fla. 2016). A
pleading must “state its claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as
practicable to a single set of circumstances” and must state “each claim founded on a
separate transaction or occurrence . . . in a separate count.” FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b).
These pleading requirements work together “to require the pleader to present his
claims discretely and succinctly, so that his adversary can discern what he is claiming
and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine which facts support which
claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can be
granted.” Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 1996).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the facts, as pleaded, fail
to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). A plaintiff must allege facts supporting an entitlement to relief, which
“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). If
the complaint’s legal theories lack merit or if the complaint’s factual allegations fail
to state a plausible claim for relief, dismissal may occur before service of process.
Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
Although pro se pleadings receive a favorable construction, a pro se plaintiff must
nonetheless satisfy the pleading requirements. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,
113 (1993).
B. The complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1983 against
Timothy Sierra and the Florida Department of Revenue Child
Support Program.
Section 1983 creates civil liability for any person who, under color of state
law, violates a person’s constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The purpose of
[Section] 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to
deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to
victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
Traditionally, a state actor is a government entity or public official acting in an
official capacity. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). However, a private
individual or entity may also qualify as a state actor if they engage in certain actions,
such as acting under State compulsion, performing a traditionally exclusive public
function, or participating jointly with the State in an interdependent enterprise. See
Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001). Only in rare
circumstances can a private party be viewed as a ‘state actor’ for [S]ection 1983
purposes.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Hogue, 241
F.3d at 1347.
Timothy Sierra is not a state actor subject to liability under Section 1983.
Jackson claims that Timothy Sierra acted under color of state law when Sierra
participated as an attorney or representative in the underlying child support
proceeding. Doc. 7, ¶ 5. A private attorney, however, does not act under color of law
when representing a client in domestic relations or other civil matters. See Huls v.
Llabona, 437 F. App’x 830, 832 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also Lewis v. Castro,
No. 24-CV-1608, 2024 WL 5673709, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 24-CV-1608, 2024 WL 5673724 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25,
2024) (explaining that a “[p]laintiff cannot state a claim against the attorney who
represented the petitioner in the state child support proceeding.”).
Jackson also fails to satisfy any of the rare circumstances where a private
individual may qualify as a state actor. Jackson does not show (1) that “the State
coerced or significantly encouraged” the alleged constitutional violation of due
process; (2) that Timothy Sierra “performed a public function that was traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the State[;]” or (3) that the State acted as a “joint
participant” in an interdependent enterprise with Timothy Sierra. See Hogue, 241
F.3d at 1347.
Additionally, Jackson’s claim against the Florida Department of Revenue
Child Support Program is barred under the Eleventh Amendment, which provides
immunity to states from federal lawsuits. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Fla. State
Athletic Comm’n, 226 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000). This immunity extends to
the Florida Department of Revenue. Royster v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, No. 23-CV-614,
2023 WL 6882344, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2023), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 23-CV-614, 2023 WL 6878992 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2023) (explaining
that as a State agency, the Florida Department of Revenue is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
Furthermore, Jackson’s amended complaint contains no factual allegation
to overcome Eleventh Amendment immunity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
recognizes an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity when a party sues for
prospective injunctive relief in “challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s
action,” because such a lawsuit is deemed a lawsuit against the official and
“not . . . against the State.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99
(1984). However, the Ex parte Young exception applies only to a claim against a state
official and not to a claim against “the States or their agencies, which retain their
immunity against all suits in federal court.” Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). For this exception to apply, a
complaint must allege “an ongoing violation of federal law and seek[] relief properly
characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S.
635, 645 (2002). Because the amended complaint seeks an award of damages, Doc. 7
at 5, cites no “ongoing violation of federal law[,]” and seeks no “prospective” relief,
the exception recognized in Ex parte Young is inapplicable. See Doc. 7, ¶¶ 18–21.
The two other exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity are similarly
inapplicable. An exception applies if a state expressly waives its immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 99. Although Florida
has expressly waived immunity for lawsuits raising traditional tort claims under
Section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes, Florida has not waived immunity for a civil
rights action against a state agency under Section 1983. Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health
& Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1515 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that Florida’s waiver
of immunity is limited to traditional torts and “does not constitute consent to suit in
federal court under [Section] 1983.”). For the final exception, “Congress has power
with respect to the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity[.]” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 99.
However, Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for Section
1983 claims. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). Thus, none of the
exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply to Jackson’s Section 1983 claim
against the Florida Department of Revenue Child Support Program.
Finally, Jackson appears to challenge the defendants’ removal of his workers’
compensation benefits to pay his child support obligations. Doc. 7, ¶ 12. Although
Section 440.22, Florida Statutes, generally shields workers’ compensation benefits
from creditors, this exemption “does not extend to claims based on an award of child
support or alimony.” Therefore, the Florida Department of Revenue may lawfully
garnish workers’ compensation settlements to satisfy outstanding child support.
C. Because this action derives from an ongoing domestic relations
dispute over child support, abstention may be warranted.
“The federal judiciary has traditionally abstained from deciding cases
concerning domestic relations.” Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 369, 369 (11th Cir. 1988).
Because of this, “federal courts generally dismiss cases involving divorce and
alimony, child custody, visitations rights, establishment of paternity, child support,
and enforcement of separation or divorce decrees still subject to state court
modification.” Id. at 369. The policies favoring abstention include “‘the strong state
interest in domestic relations matters, the competency of state courts in settling
family disputes, the possibility of incompatible federal and state decrees in cases of
continuing judicial supervision by the state, and the problem of congested dockets in
federal courts.’” Id. at 369–70 (quoting Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir.
1978)). As directed in Ingram, abstention and dismissal are warranted “if hearing the
claim would mandate inquiry into the marital or parent-child relationship.” Id. at
370.
Although Jackson appears to seek no relief directly impacting his underlying
domestic-relations action in state court, the relief Jackson seeks could result in
incompatible or conflicting state and federal orders. His state domestic-relations
action is ongoing, with the most recent order occurring in that case on June 9, 2026.2
Jackson v. Jackson, No. 20-DR-006521, Doc. 204 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. May 28, 2020).
To the extent that Jackson challenges the procedures used to calculate his child
support payments, Doc. 7, ¶ 19, that court is in the best position to evaluate the claim
of improper calculation or unconsidered medical evidence and, if necessary, to
modify or enforce the order. See Glegg v. Van Den Hurk, 379 So. 3d 1171, 1173 (Fla.
4th DCA 2024) (recognizing that, “[i]n the time that a defendant in a civil suit has to
file a motion to dismiss, a family court judge can hold a hearing, take evidence, and
fashion a remedy.”). Thus, dismissal appears warranted under the abstention
principle articulated in Ingram.
D. Leave to amend should be denied.
A district court typically must provide a pro se plaintiff with notice of the intent
to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. See Quire v. Smith, No. 21-10473, 2021 WL
3238806, at *1 (11th Cir. July 30, 2021); Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336
(11th Cir. 2011). “An exception to this requirement exists, however, when amending
the complaint would be futile, or when the complaint is patently frivolous.” Quire,
2 See Fed. R. Evid. 201; United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (approving judicial
notice of a document filed in another court “not for the truth of the matters asserted in the litigation,
but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.”).
2021 WL 3238806, at *1; Davis v. Kvalheim, 261 F. App’x 231, 234 (11th Cir. 2008).
Jackson amended his complaint twice already. Docs. 6, 7; FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
Based on the absence of a plausible Section 1983 claim under any construction of the
facts and the abstention doctrine articulated in Ingram, I find that further amendment
would be futile. Thus, I recommend dismissing the amended complaint without
leave to amend.
I. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained in this report, I recommend denying the motion to
proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 2; dismissing the amended complaint without leave to
amend; terminating any pending motion; and closing the case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on this 11th day of June, 2026.
NDSAY S. GRIBF
United States Magistrate Judge
10
NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party has fourteen days from the day of service of this report either to file
written objections to the proposed findings and recommendation or to seek an
extension of the fourteen-day deadline. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Under Eleventh
Circuit Rule 3-1, a party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations “waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). If the parties wish to expedite the resolution of this matter, they may
promptly file a notice of no objection.