Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ROBBIN YVETTE MILLER CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS No. 26-1156

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES LLC SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is pro se plaintiff Robbin Yvette Miller’s (“plaintiff”) second

motion1 for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction.

Defendant Carrington Mortgage Services LLC (“defendant”) filed a response in

opposition,2 and plaintiff filed a reply3 and supplemental memorandum.4

For the following reasons, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion and dismisses

this action for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 29, 2026, plaintiff filed a verified complaint and “Emergency Motion

for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.”5 Plaintiff’s motion

requests that this Court enjoin defendant “from proceeding with any foreclosure sale,

sheriff’s sale, auction, seizure, eviction, or transfer of title to the immovable property

located at 3534 Blair Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70131” (the “property”).6

1 R. Doc. No. 9.

2 R. Doc. No. 13.

3 R. Doc. No. 15.

4 R. Doc. No. 11. Plaintiff did not request leave to file a supplemental memorandum.

However, the Court accepted plaintiff’s additional materials and considered them in

rendering this order and reasons.

5 R. Doc. No. 1.

6 Id. ¶ 6.

The Court has previously discussed the factual background of this case in a

prior order and reasons.7 This matter arises out of foreclosure proceedings initiated

against the property, which plaintiff inherited from her mother. At the time of her

mother’s death, the property was encumbered by a “reverse mortgage,” a home equity

conversion mortgage whereby plaintiff’s mother received a line of credit secured

against the property.8 Pursuant to the terms of the mortgage, the lender has the

option to require immediate payment of the outstanding loan balance in full when

certain events occur—such as the sale of the property or the borrower’s death.9

Similarly, the terms indicate that a failure to pay the balance in full or to negotiate

an alternative resolution with the lender, after the lender exercises its option, places

the mortgage in default.10 The parties do not dispute that plaintiff’s mother, Celestine

Dobbs, signed and agreed to the terms of the loan.

After plaintiff’s mother passed away, defendant notified the decedent’s estate

via letter, on or around September 11, 2024, that a balance of approximately one

hundred thousand dollars remained on the reverse mortgage.11 The letter requested

a response by October 16, 2024, and provided alternatives to foreclosure for resolving

the default, including: paying off the loan, selling the home without a deficiency

judgment, or providing the “[l]ender with a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.”12 It also

7 See generally R. Doc. No. 3.

8 R. Doc. No. 13-1, at 11.

9 Id. at 12–13.

10 Id. at 12–13, 34–36.

11 Id. at 48–55; see also Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC v. Est. of Dobbs, No. 2025-

0728, 2026 WL 1077631, at *1 (La. App. 4 Cir. Apr. 21, 2026).

12 R. Doc. No. 13-1, at 48–55.

provided contact information for counseling resources, within the United States

Department of Housing and Urban Development, available to assist estates in

resolving a decedent’s reverse mortgage.13

However, the default was not resolved and defendant, the current holder of the

mortgage note, ultimately initiated foreclosure proceedings through the state court

executory process, on January 8, 2025.14 Shortly thereafter, the state court ruled in

favor of defendant in the foreclosure action and issued “a writ of seizure and sale” on

March 25, 2025.15 Plaintiff attempted to halt the state executory process and

foreclosure, but she was unsuccessful before both the Louisiana trial and appellate

courts.16 In affirming that the executory process was valid, the Louisiana Fourth

Circuit of Appeal noted that the original lender, Reverse Mortgage Funding L.L.C.,

“assigned its rights in the [n]ote and [m]ortgage” to defendant Carrington Mortgage

Services LLC.17 The state appellate court also found that defendant provided the

“authentic evidence” necessary to prove its right to the mortgage, and that plaintiff

had in fact received the requisite notice of the property seizure.18

Plaintiff subsequently brought the present lawsuit in federal court alleging

four causes of action to support her position that defendant’s foreclosure on the

property was unlawful. First, plaintiff claims that defendant violated due process

13 See id. at 52, 54.

14 See generally id. at 2–7.

15 See R. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 13; R. Doc. No. 1-4. See also R. Doc. No. 15-3; Est. of Dobbs, 2026

WL 1077631, at *1–2.

16 See generally id.

17 Id. at *1.

18 Id. at *2–3.

protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, through its efforts to foreclose on, seize, and sell the

property (“count one”).19 Second, plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the

procedural requirements of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”),

12 U.S.C. § 260520 (“count two”).21 Third, plaintiff avers that the clause requiring full

payment of the outstanding mortgage on her mother’s death was invalid pursuant to

the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act (“Garn-St. Germain”), 12 U.S.C. §

1701j-3, and thus defendant’s foreclosure on the property was unlawful (“count

three”).22 Finally, plaintiff asserts that defendant lacked standing to initiate

foreclosure on the property because it never established a “valid chain of title” (“count

four”).23

Plaintiff’s complaint requests temporary and preliminary injunctive relief

halting the seizure and foreclosure sale of the property, declaratory relief stating that

defendant lacks standing to foreclose on the property, and actual and statutory

damages resulting from defendant’s alleged “unlawful conduct.”24 Plaintiff’s present

motion requests preliminary injunctive relief, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

19 R. Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 17–18.

20 Plaintiff also alleges regulatory violations that are duplicative of, or enforced

through, her § 2605 cause of action. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a) (“A borrower may

enforce the provisions of this section pursuant to . . . 12 U.S.C. 2605(f).”). Accordingly,

the Court will limit its analysis of plaintiff’s RESPA claims to the private cause of

action provided in § 2605.

21 Id. ¶ 22.

22 Id. ¶¶ 25–26.

23 Id. ¶¶ 28–29.

24 Id. at 6–7.

Procedure 65, and argues that she is likely to ultimately succeed on the merits

because defendant’s foreclosure on the property was not “valid” and it “violated” the

law.25 Plaintiff asserts that she faces the irreparable loss of her residence26 and

“entire inheritance,”27 and that because defendant has violated the law and is

attempting an “unlawful foreclosure,” the balance of hardships and public interest

weigh in her favor.28

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

a. TRO and preliminary injunction

The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable

harm until the court makes a final decision on injunctive relief. Granny Goose Foods,

Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70 of Alameda Cnty., 415

U.S. 423, 439 (1974). TROs29 and “[p]reliminary injunctions are ‘extraordinary

remedies’ only to be granted when the moving party establishes” the following four

elements:

25 R. Doc. No. 9 ¶ 31.

26 R. Doc. No. 15 ¶ 22. At the time of filing this action, plaintiff stated that she lived

in Fort Worth, Texas. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff has since represented to this Court that she

currently resides at the 3534 Blair Street property. R. Doc. No. 15 ¶ 2.

27 R. Doc. No. 9 ¶¶ 32–33. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion that the property amounts

to her “entire inheritance,” the succession and judgments of possession that she

submitted as proof of her entitlement to the property indicates that she also inherited

two additional real estate properties located in New Orleans, two automobiles, three

financial accounts, and “[a]ny and all jewelry, finances . . . and all personal

belongings” that belonged to her mother. R. Doc. No. 1-2, at 3.

28 R. Doc. No. 9 ¶¶ 33–34.

29 TROs and preliminary injunctions are considered under the same standard. See,

e.g., Alvarado v. Noem, No. 25-1048, 2025 WL 1519124, at *1 (E.D. La. May 28, 2025)

(Africk, J.) (utilizing the same four elements to determine if the plaintiff was entitled

to a TRO). Accordingly, the authority the Court cites within this section is applicable

to both plaintiff’s request for a TRO and her request for a preliminary injunction.

(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial

threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the

threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that

will result if the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an

injunction will not disserve the public interest.

Texas Trib. v. Caldwell Cnty., Texas, 121 F.4th 520, 525 (5th Cir. 2024). Plaintiff’s

failure to meet her burden on any element is enough for the Court to deny the request

for a TRO or a preliminary injunction. See Davis v. Thompson, No. 19-493, 2020 WL

5775147, at *1 (M.D. La. Sept. 28, 2020) (citing Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356,

261 (5th Cir. 1990)) (“If a plaintiff fails to meet his burden regarding any of the

necessary elements, the Court need not address the other elements necessary for

granting a preliminary injunction.”). Moreover, “[c]ourts have wide discretion with

respect to whether to grant preliminary injunctions.” Jones v. Gusman, No. 12-859,

2015 WL 5714619, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2015) (Africk, J.) (citing Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir.1987)).

b. Subject matter jurisdiction

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred

by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims.” In re FEMA Trailer

Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012). Under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “a claim is ‘properly dismissed for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to

adjudicate’ the claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Courts are to consider a Rule 12(b)(1)

jurisdictional argument before addressing any other arguments on the merits. Id.

(citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a court may dismiss an action for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction “on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint

alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record;

or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of

disputed facts.” Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 565–66 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting

St. Tammany Par., ex rel. Davis v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 556 F.3d 307, 315

(5th Cir. 2009)). “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the

party asserting jurisdiction.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. When a court determines

that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over an action, the action is dismissed

without prejudice. See, e.g., id.; Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608

(5th Cir. 1977).

III. ANALYSIS

For the following reasons, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,30 over plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

(count one), her Garn-St. Germain claim (count three), and her challenges regarding

the sufficiency of the state court executory process (count four). Similarly, the Court

finds that plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her RESPA claim (count two) against

defendant. As such, the Court will deny plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive

relief and dismiss her complaint against defendant.

a. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Defendant advances various arguments for denying plaintiff’s motion, chief

among them is that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims

30 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

pursuant to Rooker-Feldman. Defendant argues that because a state court has

already permitted it to proceed with the foreclosure process and denied the same

injunctive relief that plaintiff now seeks in federal Court, her federal lawsuit amounts

to an impermissible collateral attack on the state court’s prior decision.31 Plaintiff

counters that her injury “flows independently from [d]efendant’s own conduct.”32

However, she also readily admits that a decision in her favor from this Court “would

undermine[] the validity of[] any state court judgment [d]efendant relies upon.”33

For the foregoing reasons, the Court agrees with defendant that Rooker-

Feldman precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction over any claims seeking to

invalidate the state court judgment against her, namely counts one, three, and four

of her complaint. However, the Court finds that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable to

count two, plaintiff’s RESPA claims.

Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “federal district courts lack

jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments.” Liedtke v. State

Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994). The doctrine “deprives federal courts

of subject matter jurisdiction to review a final state court decision arising out of a

judicial proceeding unless a federal statute specifically authorizes such review.” Pease

v. First Nat’l Bank, 335 F. App’x 412, 415 (5th Cir. 2009). If a state court errs in

judgment, the judgment must be “reviewed and corrected by the appropriate state

appellate court. Thereafter, recourse at the federal level is limited solely to an

31 R. Doc. No. 13, at 8–9.

32 R. Doc. No. 15 ¶ 17.

33 Id.

application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.” Id. (citations

omitted).

Here, plaintiff’s claims are the “paradigm” example for which Rooker-Feldman

precludes federal jurisdiction: “[s]he does not like the result reached in state court

and ‘repaired to federal court to undo the [state] judgment in [her] favor.’” T. M. v.

Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1748 (2026) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp.

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005)). She asks the Court to find that

the executory proceedings violated her Due Process rights, that the terms of the

mortgage agreement are unlawful and unenforceable pursuant to the Garn-St.

Germain Act, and that defendant lacked standing to initiate foreclosure on the

property. As such, her claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court

judgment because her requested relief is that this Court intervene to provide

injunctive and declaratory relief “that would allow [her] to retain, or reclaim,

possession” of the property, negating the “preexisting state judgment” granting

defendant’s petition for executory process. See Salinas v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 585

F. App’x 866, 867 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that Rooker-Feldman applied because

plaintiff sought to “attack collaterally and to seek enjoinment of a preexisting state

judgment” through a federal lawsuit that “implicat[es] the validity of the state

foreclosure judgment,” and reasoning that such the federal proceedings are

“‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment”); Magor v. GMAC Mortg.,

L.L.C., 456 F. App’x 334 (5th Cir. 2011) (same).

Notably, “[a] party seeking federal review of a state court foreclosure

proceeding is not uncommon, and courts in this circuit have consistently held that

claims such as [p]laintiff’s are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because

subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.” Thomas, Tr. for Derrick Thomas Tr. v. Sticker,

No. 25-289, 2025 WL 1170725, at *3 & n.36 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 2025) (Morgan, J.)

(collecting cases). Beyond direct attacks on the legitimacy of state foreclosure

judgments, courts have found that plaintiffs may not, as plaintiff attempts here,

circumvent Rooker-Feldman by alleging procedural due process claims pursuant to

§ 1983. See Batista v. Carter, 796 F. App’x 209, 210 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Liedtke, 18

F.3d at 317–18) (“When a § 1983 suit is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state-court

judgment such that the suit is, essentially, an attack on that judgment, district courts

lack original jurisdiction over the suit.”). Furthermore, Rooker-Feldman precludes

plaintiff’s attempt to use an alleged violation of Garn-St. Germain, which she argues

invalidates defendant’s authority to foreclose on the property, to obtain relief from

the state executory proceedings. See Morris v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 443

F. App’x 22, 24 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding an otherwise independent federal claim

brought pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was barred pursuant to

Rooker-Feldman “because, crucially, the only relief he sought was the setting aside of

the state foreclosure judgment and staying of the execution of the writ of possession”).

However, Rooker-Feldman does not bar plaintiff’s RESPA claims because she

alleges unlawful conduct and requests statutory money damages that are

independent from the state executory process.34 See Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717

F.3d 377, 383 (5th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that Rooker-Feldman was inapplicable

because the plaintiff raised “independent claims . . . [that] did not seek to overturn

the state-court judgment,” and because “the damages she requested were for injuries

caused by the banks’ actions, not injuries arising from the foreclosure judgment”).

The “Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from which

the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” See Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. at 1748 (quoting

Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284). Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim (count one), Garn-St. Germain claim

(count three), and her challenges regarding the sufficiency of the state court executory

process (count four) necessarily require that the executory proceedings be “re-opened

and re-litigated in federal court and, ultimately, [she] seeks to nullify the state-court

judgment averse to her.” See Turner v. Chase, 334 F. App’x 657, 660 (5th Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, these claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the state-court

judgment such that they are essentially an attack on that judgment and must be

dismissed for a want of subject matter jurisdiction. See Batista, 796 F. App’x at 210.

34 RESPA provides statutory damages in the amount of “any actual damages to the

borrower . . . [and] any additional damages, as the court may allow . . . in an amount

not to exceed $2,000,” for each violation of the act. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1). To the extent

plaintiff seeks relief implicating the executory process on the property for her RESPA

claims, such claims would be barred pursuant to Rooker-Feldman. See Morris, 443 F.

App’x at 224.

b. Standing

Although Rooker-Feldman does not preclude this Court’s jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s RESPA claims, the Court identifies a different jurisdictional deficiency—

standing,

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and federal jurisdiction is

limited to cases and controversies where “the party invoking federal jurisdiction [has]

standing—the ‘personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the

litigation.’” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 733 (2008) (quoting Friends

of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189

(2000)). “A preliminary injunction, like final relief, cannot be requested by a plaintiff

who lacks standing to sue . . . . At the preliminary injunction stage, the movant must

clearly show only that each element of standing” is satisfied. Speech First, Inc. v.

Fenves, 979 F.3d 319, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2020). A court must, where necessary, address

standing sua sponte, even if neither party has contested the issue. Adarand

Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001).

To establish standing, a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2)

that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is

likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578

U.S. 330, 339 (2016). The alleged injury must be “‘concrete and particularized’ and

‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Failure to establish one element alone is enough

to find that a plaintiff lacks standing. Louisiana v. Biden, 64 F.4th 674, 684 (5th Cir.

2023).

Plaintiff’s RESPA claims are deficient with respect to all three elements of

standing. She alleges a private cause of action, created by the statute, whereby

“[w]hoever fails to comply with [the requirements of the section] shall be liable to the

borrower for each such failure.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f) (emphasis added). Similarly, each

of the procedural duties that plaintiff claims defendant violated are owed to the

borrower. See, e.g., § 2605(c) (“Each transferee servicer to whom the servicing of any

federally related mortgage loan is . . . transferred shall notify the borrower . . .”);35

§ 2605(e) (“If any servicer . . . receives a qualified written request from the borrower

. . . the servicer shall provide a written response . . .”). Therefore, “[i]n order to recover

for a violation, a borrower must show ‘actual damages to the borrower as a result of

the [servicer’s] failure’ to comply with RESPA.” Law v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C.,

587 F. App’x 790, 795 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting § 2605(f)(1)).

Per the terms of the mortgage note, plaintiff is not a “borrower” to whom

defendant, the loan servicer, owed any duties.36 The only “borrower” to whom

defendant was obligated was plaintiff’s mother.37 As such, plaintiff in her individual

35 Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated § 2605(b). However, § 2605(b) applies to a

servicer that transfers a loan to a subsequent party. This claim is more appropriately

analyzed as an alleged violation of § 2605(c), which applies obligations similar to

those in § 2605(b) to servicers, like defendant, that were on the receiving end of a loan

transfer.

36 See R. Doc. No. 13-1, at 11 (“‘Borrower’ means each person signing at the end of

this Note. The term does not include his or her successors or assigns.”); id. at 14

(reflecting that Celestine Dobbs signed above the line denoting her as “Borrower.”).

37 Id.

capacity could not have suffered an injury in fact stemming from defendant’s alleged

RESPA violations. Nor would paying monetary damages to plaintiff redress the

injuries caused by defendant’s alleged violations, as such damages would have been

owed to her mother, not plaintiff.

Furthermore, the injuries that plaintiff complains of are purely procedural and

alone are “insufficient to create Article III standing.” Louisiana, 64 F.4th at 683

(citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009)). A plaintiff does not

“automatically satisfy[y] the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a

person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that

right.” Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 341. “Article III standing requires a concrete injury

even in the context of a statutory violation.” Id. With respect to violations of § 2605,

the requirements of Article III standing and the elements of a private cause of action

pursuant to the statute both require an actual injury. See Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan

Servicing, LLC, 839 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that for a § 2605 claim “[t]he

injury must be ‘actual,’ both for standing purposes and for purposes of the statute”).

An actual injury in these circumstances is the harm the borrower actually suffers as

a result of the servicer’s procedural violation. See Law, 587 F. App’x at 795 (reasoning

that a servicer’s alleged violation of § 2605(c) causing a plaintiff to suffer foreclosure

because they sent loan payments to the wrong servicer establishes an actual injury);

Diedrich, 839 F.3d at 590 (finding that allegations the plaintiffs “suffered damage to

their credit” and were “forced to pay . . . more money and higher interest rates”

because of the servicer’s alleged violation of § 2605(e) is an injury in fact). Plaintiff’s

allegations are insufficient to establish standing because although she claims that

defendant violated § 2605’s procedural requirements, she has not claimed to have

suffered any actual harm stemming from the violation.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, as plaintiff lacks standing to bring her RESPA claims and her

remaining claims are precluded due to Rooker-Feldman, the Court concludes that it

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the instant action in its entirety. The Court will

therefore dismiss all of plaintiff's claims against defendant, and it need not reach the

merits of plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. See Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494,

497 (5th Cir. 2021) (“sua sponte dismissal is mandatory when a court discovers that

it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)).

For the preceding reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion?° for a temporary restraining order

and preliminary injunction is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of plaintiffs claims? against defendant

are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

New Orleans, Louisiana, July 16, 2026.

en

UNITED STAFES DISTRICT JUDGE

39 R. Doc. No. 1.

15