Bowen

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

ROBERT DRAYTON BOWEN, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 1:26-cv-113

)

v. ) Judge Atchley

)

WESTON WAMP, et al., ) Magistrate Judge Steger

)

Defendants. )

)

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed by Plaintiff Robert Bowen, who

has paid the filing fee. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is now before the Court for screening in

compliance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has

also filed a motion for an extension of time to serve summonses in this action [Doc. 9]. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court will DISMISS the amended complaint for failure to state a claim

and DENY Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time as moot.

I. PLRA SCREENING STANDARD

Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss

any claims that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted,” or “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).

The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure to state a

claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language

tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630

F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Thus, to survive an initial review under the

PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS1

While housed at the Hamilton County Jail, Plaintiff “exhaust[ed] all means of having the

‘spicy’ meals changed” but was unable to affect any change. [Doc. 11 at 4]. So, on May 1, 2025,

Plaintiff refused to accept the “spicy” lunch tray and handed the corrections officer (“CO”) a note

with three Bible verses related to “things not consumable” and instructions “not to mark the meals

as accepted, in order to keep track of which meals are not consumable.” [Id.].

Plaintiff made a kiosk request for the Chaplain to come read his note, and Chaplain Waters

responded. [Id.]. Plaintiff asked Chaplain Waters to change his meal, but “Defendant Waters said

there was nothing he could do.” [Id.].

Nurse Shannon, Deputy Ryan Chastain, and “other deputies” questioned Plaintiff, and

Nurse Shannon “acted like she had no idea of what Plaintiff Bowen said, even though it is entered

in the kiosk system.” [Id.]. “Defendant Chastain said he heard enough” and told Plaintiff “to come

with him.” [Id.]. Deputy Chastain did not permit Plaintiff to pack his personal property but told

Deputy John Doe #1 to secure Plaintiff’s property. [Id. at 5]. When Plaintiff and Deputy Chastain

passed Chaplain Waters, Plaintiff loudly said, “They are relocating me[] because I am ‘fasting’”

in hopes that Chaplain Waters would speak up. [Id.]. But Chaplain Waters did not respond. [Id.].

1 In its prior Memorandum and Order requiring Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, the

Court advised Plaintiff that the “amended complaint will be the sole operative complaint that the

Court considers, and therefore, it must be complete in and of itself and must not refer to any

previously filed allegations or pleadings” [Doc. 7 p. 8]. Therefore, the Court limits its recitation

of the facts of this case to those recounted in the amended complaint.

Deputy Chastain moved Plaintiff to “suicide watch” as punishment for not accepting one

meal that would have made Plaintiff sick. [Id.]. There were “up to 18 inmates” in the 15 x 20-foot

cell—more inmates than the floor space accommodated. [Id. at 6]. For the “9.5 days” Plaintiff was

housed in this cell, Plaintiff was given “only food that was making him sick”; was only permitted

clean water at “pill call”; was denied showers or told he would have to dry off with a wash cloth;

had nothing with which to brush his teeth; was “naked except for a blanket/robe which left private

parts easily exposed”; and was not given a clean blanket/robe. [Id.]. During this period, Plaintiff

was not allowed his commissary food, Kool-Aid, his prescription bifocals, hygiene supplies,

religious materials, or any personal property. [Id. at 5].

Plaintiff was then moved to G-2-24. [Id. at 6]. No one could locate Plaintiff’s personal

property, nor would they replace it. [Id.]. And no one “viewed the housing unit footage” like

Plaintiff requested. [Id.]. Plaintiff mailed a letter to the Deputy Chief of Corrections, Tim A.

Davis, and Captain Rodney Terrell admitted to having a letter Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Davis.

[Id.]. But no real attempt at an investigation was made [Id. at 8].

Aggrieved, Plaintiff filed this amended complaint against Mayor Weston Wamp, Sheriff

Austin Garrett, Deputy Chief Timothy Davis, Captain Rodney Terrell, Quality Correctional Health

Care (“QCHC”), Chaplain John Waters, Dr. Little, Nurse Shannon, Deputy Ryan Chastain, and

John Doe #1 seeking monetary and injunctive relief. [Id. at 2–3, 8–9, 11–12].

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has raised official-capacity claims against all Defendants, and both individual and

official capacity claims against Defendants Terrell, Waters, Little, Shannon, Chastain, and Doe

[Id.]. The Court will address Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims first before turning to the question

of the individual liability of the remaining Defendants.

A. Official-Capacity Claims

To sustain an official-capacity claim, often referred to as a Monell claim, a plaintiff must

allege facts from which a court could plausibly infer that his constitutional rights were violated

because of an unconstitutional policy or custom of the entity being sued. See Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 708 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining a municipality can only

be held liable for harms that result from a constitutional violation when that underlying violation

resulted from “implementation of its official policies or established customs”); Rojas v.

Alexander’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Although Monell dealt with

municipal employers, its rationale has been extended to private businesses.”). In this case, that is

QCHC and Hamilton County, because official-capacity claims against the individual Defendants

employed by the County is equivalent to suit against the County itself. See Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (holding “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to

be treated as a suit against the entity”).

But to sustain suit against either QCHC or Hamilton County, “[P]laintiff must identify [a]

policy, connect the policy to the [County or company] itself and show that the particular injury

was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d

358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff may make a

showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of

an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) an official with final decision making

authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision;

or (4) the existence of a custom or tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations. Burgess

v. Fisher, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts at all against QCHC, much less any that would

permit the inference that a QCHC policy or custom violated Plaintiff’s rights. This Defendant will

be dismissed.

Neither has Plaintiff alleged any facts that would permit the plausible inference that

implementation of Hamilton County’s own policies or customs caused a deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Weston Wamp and Sheriff Austin

Garrett are “indirectly responsible” for the wrongdoings alleged because of their respective

responsibilities to oversee operations at the Hamilton County Jail. [See Doc. 11 at 7]. But

Hamilton County cannot be held liable for the wrongdoings of persons they have employed under

a theory of respondeat superior. See Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 505–06 (6th Cir. 1996).

Rather, the County may be liable only for its “own illegal acts.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.

51, 60 (2011). And the allegations of the amended complaint do not permit the plausible inference

that either the Sheriff or the Mayor, acting in their respective official capacities, implemented a

policy or custom that deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, all official-

capacity claims against Defendants will be DISMISSED.

B. Individual-Capacity Claims

To state a claim against any Defendant in his or her individual capacity, Plaintiff must

adequately plead that each Defendant’s own actions violated the Constitution. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

676; see also Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (providing that “a

complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of

federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted).

1. Captain Rodney Terrell

Plaintiff alleges that Captain Rodney Terrell was in possession of a letter Plaintiff wrote to

Deputy Chief of Corrections Tim A. Davis. [Doc. 11 at 6, 8]. The Court assumes Plaintiff intends

this allegation to form a claim that Defendant Terrell violated Plaintiff’s rights by failing to

respond to or remedy Plaintiff’s grievances concerning the loss of his personal property, despite

having been informed that it occurred. But a “failure to act . . . do[es] not constitute ‘active

constitutional behavior’ as required [under § 1983] and thus, [is] not actionable” under the statute.

Frodge v. City of Newport, 501 F. App’x 519, 532 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167

F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)). And Plaintiff does not otherwise have a constitutional right to

an investigation as to what happened to his property. Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th

Cir. 2007) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)) (“There is no statutory or

common law right, much less a constitutional right, to an investigation.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

claims against Captain Rodney Terrell will be DISMISSED.2

2. Chaplain Waters

Plaintiff alleges that Chaplain Waters (1) “said there was nothing he could do” when

Plaintiff requested for his meals to be changed; and (2) failed to respond when Plaintiff yelled to

him from the sidewalk. [Doc. 11 at 4]. Neither of these allegations state a plausible constitutional

claim. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would permit the inference that Defendant Waters

has any control over the food Plaintiff is served. And Defendant Waters is not subject to liability

for failing to respond when Plaintiff yelled from the sidewalk that he was being relocated. Even

if the Court presumes Defendant Waters heard Plaintiff and ignored him, Plaintiff has again not

pled any facts suggesting that Defendant Waters had any control over Plaintiff’s housing such that

his intervention could have changed Plaintif’s placement. Moreover, as noted above, Defendant

Waters cannot be held constitutionally liable for a failure to act. See Frodge, 501 F. App’x at 532.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Waters will be DISMISSED.

2 Although Plaintiff has sued Defendant Davis solely in his official capacity, any intended

individual-liability claim against Defendant Davis would fail for the same reasons.

3. Dr. Little

The only reference to Dr. Little in Plaintiff’s amended complaint is that “[m]ental health

had to receive approval by Dr. Little” for Plaintiff’s suicide watch. [Doc. 11 at 6]. Such conclusory

allegations are insufficient for the Court to infer that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated

by Dr. Little’s alleged conduct, and this Defendant will be DISMISSED. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

564–65 (noting that allegations must be supported with factual allegations that render the claim

“plausible on its face”).

4. Nurse Shannon

Plaintiff alleges that when he was questioned about refusing his meal on May 1, Nurse

Shannon “acted like she had no idea of what Plaintiff Bowen said, even though it is entered in the

kiosk.” [Doc. 11 at 4]. Such vague allegations are insufficient to permit the plausible inference

that Nurse Shannon’s conduct violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and all claims against

Defendant Shannon will be DISMISSED.

5. John Doe #1

Plaintiff maintains that John Doe #1was directed to pack his personal property, which then

wound up missing. [Doc. 11 at 5, 6]. Such an allegation is too vague and conclusory to state a

claim. But even if Plaintiff’s allegations were filled out with additional factual detail, any potential

remedy for Plaintiff would lie in state, not federal, law. The United States Supreme Court has held

that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a government

employee deprives an individual of property, provided that the state provides a post-deprivation

remedy. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (extending

Parratt’s holding to intentional deprivations of property). Tennessee law provides for the recovery

of personal property. See McQuiston v. Ward, No. 2001-201-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 839037, at

* 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2001) (citing to Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-30-101 and § 29-30-201).

Plaintiff has not pled that Tennessee’s procedures are inadequate for addressing the alleged wrong,

as is necessary to sustain his claim. See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Doe will be DISMISSED.

6. Ryan Chastain

Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Ryan Chastain relocated him to suicide watch because he

refused to accept one meal, which (1) resulted in the loss of Plaintiff’s personal property and (2)

caused Plaintiff to suffer various disagreeable conditions of confinement. [See Doc. 11 at 4–8].

However, Plaintiff cannot sustain a § 1983 claim against Defendant Chastain for the loss

of his personal property under the Parratt/Hudson doctrines addressed above. See Parratt, 451

U.S. at 543; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. So, this allegation does not permit a § 1983 claim against

Deputy Chastain. Therefore, the Court turns to a consideration of the alleged conditions under

which Plaintiff was confined.

Conditions of confinement claims “are highly fact-specific[.]” Lamb v. Howe, 677 F.

App’x 204, 209 (6th Cir. 2017). The Sixth Circuit has held:

[A] conditions-of-confinement claim has two elements. First, the deprivation

alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official’s act or omission

must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.

Second, the prison official’s state of mind [must be] one of deliberate indifference

to inmate health or safety.

Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). As to the first

element, it is well-established that “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.”

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Rather, only “extreme deprivations” that deny a

prisoner “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” will establish a cognizable

conditions-of-confinement claim. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). And regarding the second element, a defendant demonstrates

deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee3 by acting “deliberately” and “recklessly ‘in the face

of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.’”

Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff maintains that he was denied his personal property, had limited access to practice

hygiene, and/or was left with only a “blanket/robe” while on “suicide watch” for “9.5 days” in an

overcrowded cell. [Doc. 11 at 5, 6]. But such temporal deprivations that do not result in a physical

injury are not the types of conditions that are objectively, sufficiently serious to constitute a

constitutional violation. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (holding that an

“overcrowding” claim must allege that the overcrowding denied him “the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities” (citing Rhodes, 337 U.S. at 347)); Agramonte v. Shartle, 491 F.

App’x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding “overcrowding is not, in itself, a constitutional violation”);

Richmond v. Settles, 450 F. App’x 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2011) (providing that the denial of bedding,

running water, toothpaste, and a shower for a brief period of time is not constitutionally “actionable

conduct”); Dellis v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001) (providing that

temporary inconveniences “did not demonstrate that the conditions fell beneath the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities as measured by a contemporary standard of decency”); see

also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a

jail. . . for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical

injury[.]”).

3 Plaintiff does not disclose his custodial status in his amended complaint. [See generally

Doc. 11]. The Court presumes—to Plaintiff’s benefit—that he was a pretrial detainee at all

relevant times and thus subject to the less demanding test of the Fourteenth Amendment. Morgan

ex. rel Morgan v. Wayne Cnty., 33 F.4th 320, 326 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting the Eighth Amendment

standard is “more demanding”).

Plaintiff also contends that while on suicide watch he was “given only food that was

making him sick.” [Doc. 11 at 5]. This allegation is impermissibly conclusory. And notably,

Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any physical injuries as a result of the food he was served

while on suicide watch, nor does he allege any facts from which the Court could infer that the food

he was served rendered him malnourished. Therefore, this allegation also fails to state a viable §

1983 claim. See Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 659–60 (6th Cir. 1977) (providing that

where a prisoner’s diet is sufficient to sustain the prisoner’s good health, no constitutional right

has been violated); Sims v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 23 F. App’x 214, 216 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding

inmate not denied “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” where he failed to allege he

could not maintain health on diet provided) (citation omitted).

Thus, the Court finds that the adverse conditions Plaintiff allegedly experienced on suicide

watch are of an insufficient nature and duration to constitute “punishment” or to be “objectively,

sufficiently serious” in the constitutional sense. Bell, 441 U.S at 535; Spencer, 449 F.3d at 728.

As such, all Plaintiff’s conditions-of-confinement claims will be DISMISSED.

This leaves Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Chastain moved him to suicide watch “as

punishment for not accepting one (1) meal that would make Plaintiff Bowen sick.” [Doc. 11 at 5].

The Court finds such an allegation may seek to raise either a due process claim and/or a retaliation

claim. The Court will consider each possible claim in turn.

To the extent Plaintiff intends to allege that it violated his due process rights to be placed

on suicide watch, Plaintiff must show that he had a protected interest in avoiding such placement.

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its

procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.”). That is, Plaintiff must

show that being deprived of an interest imposes on him an “atypical and significant hardship”

relative to the ordinary circumstances of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

However, Plaintiff has no liberty interest in his housing placement. See, e.g., Montanye v.

Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). And courts in the Sixth Circuit have held that mere placement

on suicide watch does not implicate a liberty interest protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., Jones

v. Lee, No. 2:09-CV-11283, 2012 WL 683362, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2012), rep. and rec.

adopted, No. 09-11283, 2012 WL 1048541 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2012) (finding that “[t]emporary

placement on suicide watch, even when not necessary, does not implicate a liberty interest

protected by the Due Process Clause,” and observing that “there is no constitutional right to avoid

being placed on suicide watch”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Jones v. Blackburn, No. 3:14-

CV-01229, 2014 WL 2480601, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. June 2, 2014) (“[B]ecause there is no liberty

interest in assignment to any particular prison, or housing unit within a prison, the plaintiff has no

due-process claim for being placed on suicide watch or precautionary watch.”). Therefore, any

claim based on the fact Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch fails.

Plaintiff also alleges, however, that he was moved to suicide watch as punishment for

refusing a meal. Thus, the Court considers whether Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give

rise to a plausible retaliation claim. To state a viable retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege that

(1) he “engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter

a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal

connection between elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in

part by the plaintiff’s protected conduct.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir.

1999).

Plaintiff may have engaged in protected conduct by filing grievances complaining that the

food he was being served made him sick. See, e.g., Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 264 (6th Cir.

2018). However, refusing a meal tray—which is the conduct which Plaintiff says caused him to

be placed on suicide watch—is not protected conduct. See Brown v. Panasiewicz, 84 F. App’x

579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding prisoner’s refusal to take a meal tray is not conduct “protected

by the Constitution”). This is, at least in part, because government officials possess a legitimate

penological objective in ensuring that inmates under their care receive adequate nutrition. And a

prisoner’s exercise of conduct that threatens a legitimate penological objective is not protected.

See, e.g., Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001). And even if Plaintiff’s conduct

was protected, Plaintiff has not presented any facts that would permit the plausible inference that

any retaliatory animus motivated Defendant Chastain’s decision to place Plaintiff on suicide

watch. See Cantley v. Armstrong, 391 F. App’x 505, 507 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s

holding that a prisoner’s complaint was insufficient to demonstrate a causal relationship between

protected activity and adverse action because “‘bare allegations of malice on the defendants’ parts

are not enough to establish retaliation claims’ that will survive § 1915A screening” (quoting Lewis

v. Jarvie, 20 F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001))); see also Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398–

99 (2019) (to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, the defendant’s retaliatory motive

must be a “but-for cause” of the plaintiff’s injury, meaning that the adverse action against the

plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive). Therefore, any retaliation claim

against Defendant Chastain fails.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible § 1983 claim against Defendant

Chastain under any constitutional theory, and all claims against him will be DISMISSED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Even liberally construing the amended complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983;

2. Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A;

3. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time within which to serve summonses [Doc. 9]

is DENIED AS MOOT; and

4. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good

faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.

/s/ Charles E. Atchley, Jr. c

CHARLES E. ATCHLEY, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE