Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JEROME JONES CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL. NO. 24-00363-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

(Doc. 26). Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on all twelve of Defendants’

affirmative defenses. Defendants filed an Opposition to the Motion. (Doc. 30).

Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of the Motion. (Doc. 32).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at the Louisiana State

Penitentiary, facility employee Defendant Sergeant Joseph Davis (“Defendant”)

violated state and federal law by using unreasonable force against him.! (Doc. 1-2 at

10). Plaintiff alleges that on October 19, 2022, while he was “standing against the

wall in front of his cell” “in full restraints and not resisting[,]” Defendant “grabbed”

him and “forcefully threw him to the concrete on his head.” (Doc. 26-2 at 3). He further

alleges that as a result, he suffered bruising and a lump and gash to his head that

Parties recently filed a joint pretrial order stating that they are only in agreement over

two facts: (1) that “at all times relevant to this suit, Plaintiff was an inmate housed at

Louisiana State Penitentiary[,]” and (2) that “[o]n October 19, 2022, Msgt. Joseph Davis was

employed by DPSC at Louisiana State Penitentiary[.|” Indeed, “[a]ll] other facts asserted by

Plaintiff are in dispute.” (Doc. 26-5 9 5, 6; Doc. 44 at 4). Therefore, the Court primarily

makes reference to Plaintiffs allegations, not undisputed facts, in this section.

required staples. (/d.). Plaintiffs medical records indicate that on the date of the

altercation, he had a 3 centimeter laceration to the right side of his head that required

6 staples, and that he told medical personnel that he was thrown to the ground by

security and hit his head on the floor. (Doc. 26-3 at 5-6). Plaintiff then alleges that

the altercation was recorded on surveillance video taken at the penitentiary, which

he finally alleges that he “requested in his [Administrative Remedy Procedure].”2

(Doc. 26-2 at 8).

Plaintiffs Petition for Damages requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for

violations of the Eighth Amendment and state law claims of battery and negligence.

Plaintiff also alleges that Louisiana is vicariously liable for the state law torts of

Defendant Davis. Ud. at 11-12). Defendants asserted twelve affirmative defenses,

which Plaintiff now challenges with the instant Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

“A partial summary judgment order [] is not a final judgment but is merely a

pre-trial adjudication that certain issues are established for trial of the case.”

Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 737 (5th Cir. 2000). Partial summary judgment exists

to “root out, narrow, and focus the issues” for trial. See Calpetco 1981 v.

Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir. 1998).

2 It is not clear from the ARP that Plaintiff “requested” his video, as his Motion for Summary

Judgment claims. Though his ARP is hand-written and thus a bit hard to read, it appears

that he stated: “reviewed the tier, camera footage show[s] what happened on the tier between

Set. Davis and Jerome Jones.” (Doe. 26-4 at 2).

A district court should “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fep. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Funches v.

Progressive Tractor & Implement Co., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2018) (“This

occurs when a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial.”).

For issues on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, they “must

come forward with evidence which would entitle [them] to a directed verdict if the

evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Intl Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc.,

939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the

motion by either countering with evidence establishing a genuine dispute of material

fact, or “showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade

the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at

1265.

Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must

offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant’s claim or point out the absence of

evidence supporting essential elements of the claim. See Lujan _ v.

Natl Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Once the movant shows

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant must bring forward

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed,

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Darden v.

City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on all twelve affirmative

defenses asserted by Defendants:

1. That Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants assert that

their conduct did not violate any of Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional

or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known. (Doc. 8

q 1).

2. Defendants deny any and all liability unto Plaintiff in this matter.

Ud. □ 2).

3. That Plaintiff is not entitled to monetary relief, or any other relief asserted

and/or inferred in the petition for damages. Ud. { 3).

4. That Plaintiffs damages, if any, are not of the nature or extent alleged. The

Defendants also aver that Plaintiff failed to mitigate any damages which he

claims to have incurred. (/d. § 4).

5. That any and all claims seeking monetary damages from Defendants in their

official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (/d. { 5).

6. That Defendants did not use any force. (/d. § 6).

7. That Defendants did not use any force which was unnecessary or excessive

under the circumstances, or which rises to the level of a constitutional

violation. (Id. § 7).

8. That if Defendants are found by the Court to have violated Plaintiffs civil

rights, then Defendants are immune from a judgment for damages because

they acted at all times reasonably and in good faith and in accordance with the

laws and institutional rules and regulations. (Ud. {| 8).

9. That if Defendants are found to have violated Plaintiffs rights, and are not

entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, then Plaintiff, through

intentional and negligent acts and failure to act as a reasonable person,

contributed to his own injuries or damages. (Id. § 9).

10. The petition for damages fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

(Id. {| 10).

11. An inmate confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility cannot

recover for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Ud. § 11).

12. Finally, Defendants assert their right to any affirmative defense delineated in

Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not specifically enumerated

herein. (/d. § 12).

A. General Denials of Liability and Good Faith.

Plaintiff first argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Defendants’

second, third, sixth, seventh, and eighth affirmative defenses, which are, respectively:

a general denial of liability, that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief, that Defendants did

not use any force, that Defendants did not use an unnecessary or unconstitutional

amount of force, and that Defendants acted in good faith. (Doc. 26-2 at 4-5). Plaintiff

argues he is entitled to summary judgment because “[a]n affirmative defense is not

raised through a general denial. As a matter of law, the affirmative defenses are

actually not affirmative defenses.” (Id. at 5).

Defendants, in turn, “acknowledge that it was inartful pleading when previous

counsel [representing] Defendants asserted broad denials as affirmative defenses.”

(Doc. 30 at 3). However, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be entitled to

summary judgment on these defenses. In Sam v. Byrd, a recent Middle District of

Louisiana decision, Defendants similarly asserted a general denial of liability as an

affirmative defense. The court there noted that while “Defendants technically erred

in describing this as an affirmative defense, [Plaintiff] suffers no prejudice, and

granting summary judgment on this issue [of liability] merely invites confusion for

trial, where Defendants will be allowed to offer evidence contesting liability.” Sam v.

Byrd, No. CV 23-1485-JWD-EWD, 2025 WL 3144744, at *8 (M.D. La. Nov. 10, 2025).

Other courts have held the same with respect to motions to strike affirmative

defenses. See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Kmart Corps., 756 F. Supp. 2d 421, 481 (S.D.N.Y.

2010) (denying a motion to strike similar affirmative defenses because while the

“Plaintiffs are correct that the [] defenses are ‘nothing more than mere denials’ of

liability[,] the inclusion of these defenses, although redundant, does not prejudice

Plaintiffs.”); Nickens v. State Emps. Credit Union, Inc., No. CIV.A. RDB-13-1430,

2014 WL 3846060, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2014) (denying a motion to strike similar

affirmative defenses because “[g]iven [that] all of these issues will continue[] to be

litigated, are logically related to the proceedings, and Plaintiff has experienced no

measurable prejudice, [a motion is strike] is clearly unnecessary.”).

Similarly, the Sam court denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment

with respect to the good faith defense because, in its view, the defense was “simply

redundant to the qualified immunity defense asserted by Plaintiff. In that respect,

the inclusion of this redundant defense [was] harmless, and granting summary

judgment on it merely invites confusion.” Sam, 2025 WL 3144744, at *8. Plaintiff

replies that the six assertions are not legally cognizable affirmative defenses. (Doc.

32 at 1-8).

While Plaintiff correctly asserts that Defendants’ general denials of liability

and good faith defenses are not true affirmative defenses, because the Parties will

dispute issues of liability and qualified immunity at trial, the Court agrees that

granting summary judgment on these defenses may cause confusion at trial. Thus,

the Court rules-in line with this Court’s previous ruling and denies Plaintiffs motion

with respect to these six affirmative defenses.

B. Sovereign Immunity.

Plaintiff next argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Defendants’

fifth affirmative defense: that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to Defendants.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity was waived when

Defendants removed the case to federal court. (Doc. 26-2 at 5-6). In response,

Defendants concede that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply.

As the Fifth Circuit has ruled, “[a] state’s voluntary appearance in federal

court, including through removal, constitutes [a] waiver [of Eleventh Amendment

immunity].” Butler v. Denka Performance Elastomer, L.L.C., 16 F.4th 427, 436

(5th Cir. 2021). Because Defendants removed this matter to federal court in May

2024, Plaintiffs Motion is granted with respect to Defendants’ affirmative defense of

sovereign immunity.

C. Qualified Immunity.

Next, Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment on Defendants’

first and ninth affirmative defenses: that Defendants are shielded by qualified

immunity. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that qualified immunity does not apply to

Defendants’ state law claims because qualified immunity applies to federal

constitutional claims. Plaintiff also argues that qualified immunity does not apply to

his federal law claim, analogizing to the facts in Wingard v. Louisiana through Dep't

of Pub. Safety & Corr., 594 F. Supp. 3d 704, 722-23 (M.D. La. 2022) and Aucoin v.

Ellis, No. 16-CV-00064-BAJ-EWD, 2019 WL 919010 (M.D. La. Feb. 25, 2019).

With respect to the state law claims, Defendants respond that “[t]his is not a

contested issue in this case. While the pleading of the affirmative defense of qualified

immunity could, perhaps, have been more clearly stated that it was addressed to the

federal law claims to which it applies, this argument from Plaintiff is a moot point as

‘Plaintiff seeks summary judgment regarding a state law affirmative defense that

Defendants are not asserting.” (Doc. 30 at 4). Thus, Defendants concede that

qualified immunity does not apply to the state law claims. Because Defendants aver

that they never asserted qualified immunity for the state law claims to begin with,

the Court will deny Plaintiffs motion in this respect.

With respect to the federal law claim, Plaintiff asks the Court to find that

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. “In determining whether an

official enjoys immunity, [courts] ask (1) whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a

violation of a clearly established federal constitutional or statutory right and (2)

whether the official’s actions violated that right to the extent that an objectively

reasonable person would have known.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 (5th

Cir. 2006) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)).

This inquiry is undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a

broad, general proposition. Berry v. Sanders, No. CV 17-318-BAJ-EWD,

2020 WL 1034627, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 14, 2020), report and recommendation

adopted, No. CV 17-00318-BAJ-EWD, 2020 WL 1033654 (M.D. La. Mar. 3, 2020). This

Court has emphasized: “Corrections officers are faced with myriad situations where

they must exercise discretion, including situations where they must choose whether

to exercise force against a prisoner. When force is used, a corrections officer must also

exercise discretion to determine the appropriate amount of force.’ Id. (internal

citations omitted).

Force is considered excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment of the

United States Constitution ifit is applied maliciously and sadistically for the purpose

of causing harm rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.

Berry, 2020 WL 10384627, at *2 (citing Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010);

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). “An inmate who is gratuitously beaten

by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because

he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Berry, 2020 WL 1034627,

at *2 (citing Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against

cruel and unusual punishment, however, necessarily excludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that such force is not

“repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Berry, 2020 WL 1034627, at *2 (citing

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10).

Factors to be considered in determining whether an alleged use of force is

excessive include the extent of injury sustained, if any; the need for the application

of force; the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force utilized;

the threat reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper

the severity of a forceful response. Berry, 2020 WL 1034627, at *2 (citing Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). The law governing excessive force is clearly

established; thus, whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity turns on the

reasonableness of his conduct. See Berry, 2020 WL 1034627, at *2.

Given this body of law, it is a violation of clearly established law for a prison

official to use excessive force against a compliant and restrained prison inmate who

poses no threat. See Wingard at 724 (“it was clearly established that an officer may

not use force on a restrained, compliant inmate”) and Aucoin at *3 (“Defendants are

also not entitled to qualified immunity because at the time of the incident, it was

clearly established that inmates have a constitutional right to be free from the use of

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excessive force, and it is objectively unreasonable to assault a compliant and

restrained inmate.”). If Plaintiffs version of events is true—that he was thrown onto

the ground while he was in full restraints, not resisting, and not a threat—Plaintiff

will have suffered a violation of his clearly established law sufficient to overcome

qualified immunity.

However, after reviewing the record before the Court, the Court finds that a

genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on the issue of qualified

immunity. While Plaintiff describes the altercation between himself and Defendant

in his Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (see Doc. 26-5 {§ 5, 6), it is clear that

these facts are not actually undisputed. Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs

rendition of the altercation in their Opposition, and, as previously noted, the Parties

recently filed a joint pretrial order indicating that they are only in agreement over

two facts: (1) that “at all times relevant to this suit, Plaintiff was an inmate housed

at Louisiana State Penitentiary[,]” and (2) that “[o]n October 19, 2022, Msgt. Joseph

Davis was employed by DPSC at Louisiana State Penitentiary[.]” Indeed, “[a]ll other

facts asserted by Plaintiff are in dispute.” (Doc. 26-5 {{ 5, 6; Doc. 44 at 4).

Based on the Parties’ conflicting descriptions of the altercation, the Court

cannot determine whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of

law. It will be for the finder of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses to determine

the reasonableness of Defendant’s actions at the time of the physical altercation at

issue. See Cole v. Carson, 985 F.3d 444, 457 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (Aug. 21, 2019)

(affirming the district court’s denial of summary judgment on an excessive force

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claim, finding that “genuine disputes of fact regarding . . . entitlement to qualified

immunity remain.”); see also Kelly v. Stassi, 587 F. Supp. 3d 409, 426 (M.D. La. 2022)

(Dick, C.J.) (As in Cole, the existence of competing factual narratives in this case

means that “the full reach of qualified immunity gives way to a trial, the first point

at which its application is determinable.”); Rios v. Perez, 777 F. Supp. 3d 727, 749

(W.D. Tex. 2025) (“Based on . . . parties’ conflicting testimony about the events that

preceded the recordings, the Court cannot determine qualified immunity as a matter

of law.”).

Given the discrepancies between Plaintiff and Defendants’ rendition of the

altercation, the Court will deny Plaintiffs Motion with respect to Defendants’ federal

law qualified immunity affirmative defense.’ This will allow the evidentiary record

to develop for the jury at trial, and the Court will consider including a qualified

immunity jury instruction.

D. Failure to Mitigate.

Plaintiff next seeks summary judgment on Defendants’ fourth affirmative

defense: failure to mitigate. Plaintiff argues that he was unable to obtain medical

treatment at any other location because he was incarcerated, and so a failure to

mitigate defense is inapplicable. Defendants respond that “Plaintiff's medical records

3 While Plaintiff briefed Defendants’ ninth affirmative defense as a qualified immunity

defense, this affirmative defense states that if Defendants are not entitled to the defense of

qualified immunity, then Plaintiff contributed to his own injuries or damages. Because

Plaintiff did not brief this issue, the Court will not grant the Motion in Plaintiffs favor on

this defense. “[F]ailure to brief an argument in the district court waives that argument in

that court.” JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of Com. & Indus., 336 F. Supp. 3d 620, 634

(M.D. La. 2018).

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show that several times in the days following the alleged use of excessive force,

Plaintiff refused treatment and was involved in subsequent altercations,” citing to

Plaintiff medical records passim. (Doc. 30 at 5). Plaintiff replies summarily that

“Defendants offer no evidence to support their affirmative defense of failure to

mitigate.” (Doc. 32 at 4). Because Defendants have pointed to record evidence that

creates a genuine dispute as to material fact, the Court finds the issue of failure to

mitigate will be more appropriately decided by a jury, denying Plaintiffs Motion with

respect to this affirmative defense.

E. Failure to State a Claim.

Next, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on Defendants’ tenth affirmative

defense: failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff notes that the Rule 12(b)(6) defense is untimely because it was asserted after

Defendants filed their Answer. Defendants respond that while the framing of the

affirmative defense pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) would be more

appropriate than pursuant to 12(b)(6), “[c]ourts usually recast a post-answer Rule

12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings[,]” citing

Robinson v. ADM Gromark River Sys., Inc., CIV. A. 96-0410, 1996 WL 162077, at *1

(E.D. La. Apr. 4, 1996) and Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp.,

833 F. Supp. 587, 588 (W.D. La. 1998). Plaintiff summarily replies “[D]efendants offer

no evidence or argument to support their claim that the petition removed to this court

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” (Doc. 32 at 4).

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Even if the Court were to recast the Rule 12(b)(6) affirmative defense as a Rule

12(c) defense, the Court will grant Plaintiffs Motion with respect to this affirmative

defense for another reason. Rule 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the

pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed,” “but early enough not to delay trial[.]” A

Rule 12(c) Motion would delay trial at this point in time and thus is inapplicable.

Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion with respect to this affirmative defense is granted.

F. Showing of Injury.

Plaintiff further seeks summary judgment on Defendants’ eleventh affirmative

defense: that an inmate cannot recover for injury suffered while in custody without a

prior showing of a physical injury. Defendants note that it is “a correct statement that

Plaintiff appears to have suffered an injury as a result of the incident between himself

and Defendant Davis[,]” and that the Parties do not contest that point.” (Doc. 30 at

6). “Rather, the issue that will remain for trial are whether the injury was the result

of an excessive use of force.” (Id.). Because Defendants concede that a physical injury

occurred and that this affirmative defense is inapplicable, the Court will grant

Plaintiff's Motion with respect to this affirmative defense.

G. Preservation of Affirmative Defenses.

Finally, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on Defendants’ twelfth affirmative

defense: that Defendants assert their right to any affirmative defense delineated in

Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not specifically enumerated in any

of the other affirmative defenses. Plaintiff argues that “[t]he deadline to amend the

answer has run. Summary [j]udgment on this affirmative defense should be granted

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as a matter of law.” (Doc. 26-2 at 15). Defendants respond that “Plaintiffs argument

is moot.” They clarify that this affirmative defense “is commonly used to preserve the

right to amend an Answer to include any applicable affirmative defense that may be

deemed applicable over the course of litigation[,]” and “[a]s Defendants have not

amended to assert any of these defenses, Plaintiff is seeking summary judgment

as to Defenses that Defendants are not actually asserting.” (Doc. 30 at 6). The Court

finds this to be an irrelevant dispute with no real bearing on the litigation in this

matter. But because this affirmative defense is not a true affirmative defense, and

granting the Motion in Plaintiffs favor will not create confusion at trial, the Court

will grant it.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

(Doc. 26) is DENIED IN PART with respect to Defendants’ first through fourth and

sixth through ninth affirmative defenses and GRANTED IN PART with respect to

Defendants’ fifth affirmative defense and tenth through twelfth affirmative defenses.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 2 of July, 2026

fa. Qa.

bea f—

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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