Coleman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

JA’VEL COLEMAN CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-0512

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

BURLINGTON INSURANCE MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

CO, ET AL.

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is Plaintiff Ja'Vel Coleman's ("Coleman") Daubert Motion to

Exclude and/or Limit Expert Testimony of Dr. Douglas Brown (“Dr. Brown”) (Record

Document 104). Defendants Tara National, Inc. (“Tara National”), Marckson Saint Fleur

(“Saint Fleur”), and Navigators Insurance Company (“Navigators”) (collectively,

“Defendants”) oppose the Motion. See Record Document 118. Coleman replied. See

Record Document 121. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This litigation arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred during the early

morning hours of May 10, 2023, on Interstate 20 in Bienville Parish, Louisiana. See

Record Document 16 at 1. Coleman alleges that she sustained injuries when her vehicle

struck the rear of a tractor-trailer operated by Saint Fleur. See id. at 3.

During discovery, Defendants retained Dr. Brown, an orthopedic surgeon and

certified independent medical examiner, to perform an independent medical examination

of Coleman and provide expert opinions regarding her injuries, future medical treatment,

functional limitations, and ability to return to work. See Record Document 104-3. Dr.

Brown examined Coleman on January 15, 2026, and subsequently issued an expert

report setting forth his findings and opinions. See id.

Coleman now seeks to exclude Dr. Brown’s testimony under Federal Rule of

Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Coleman argues that Dr. Brown's testimony should be excluded because: (1) his opinions

regarding future medical costs lack a reliable foundation; (2) his opinions concerning

Coleman's neurological condition are unreliable because he allegedly failed to adequately

account for an October 2023 EMG report; (3) he lacks the qualifications necessary to offer

opinions regarding future medical costs; and (4) his opinions regarding future surgical

treatment and Coleman's ability to return to work are unreliable because he no longer

actively performs orthopedic surgery and allegedly deferred to the opinions of Coleman's

treating physicians. See Record Document 104.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Applicable Standards

The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rules of Evidence

702 and 703 and the standards articulated in Daubert. See 509 U.S. 579. Rule 702

provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the

proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert's opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and

methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. According to the Daubert Court, Rule 702 “assign[s] to the trial judge

the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is

relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will

satisfy those demands.” 509 U.S. at 597; see Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Rule 703 provides that “[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or data … that

the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.” Fed. R. Evid. 703.

Additionally, Rule 703 states that those facts or data need not be admissible for the

opinion of the expert to be admissible. See id. However, when the underlying facts or data

are inadmissible, they may be disclosed to the jury “only if their probative value in helping

the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.” Id.

Daubert provided an illustrative list of factors for courts to use when evaluating an

expert’s reliability. See Jackson v. N. Caddo Hosp. Serv. Dist., 2024 WL 697587, at *2

(W.D.La., 2024) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94). The factors include “whether [the

expert’s opinion] has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential

error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and

whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community.”

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580. The Daubert Court added, that “[t]he inquiry is a flexible one

….” Id. “In short, expert testimony is admissible only if it is both relevant and reliable.”

Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2002).

The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that expert testimony must be grounded in “the

methods and procedures of science” rather than “subjective belief or unsupported

speculation.” Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 1998). The

proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden of proving its admissibility by a

preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 276. However, the proponent need not prove

that the expert’s opinion is correct, but only that it is reliable. See id.

Ultimately, the Court must determine whether the expert is qualified, whether the

methodology is reliable, and whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact. If these

conditions are not met, exclusion is warranted, but “[t]he rejection of expert testimony is

the exception rather than the rule.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee's note (2000).

II. Analysis

a. Future Medical Costs

Coleman first seeks exclusion of Dr. Brown's opinions regarding future medical

costs. In their opposition, Defendants expressly stipulate that Dr. Brown will not testify or

offer opinions regarding Coleman’s future medical costs and represent that they have

retained a separate expert to address those issues. See Record Document 118 at 2.

Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Dr. Brown's future medical cost opinions, and

Dr. Brown shall not offer testimony concerning future medical costs at trial.

b. Coleman’s Neurological Condition and the October 2023 EMG

Coleman challenges Dr. Brown's opinions regarding Coleman’s neurological

condition, arguing that Dr. Brown failed to adequately account for an October 2023 EMG

report showing radial neuropathy and performed an insufficient neurological examination.

See Record Document 104-1 at 4. Coleman further argues that Dr. Brown could not recall

during his deposition whether he reviewed the EMG before preparing his report. See id.

The Court finds that these criticisms go to the weight of Dr. Brown's testimony

rather than its admissibility. Dr. Brown acknowledged the EMG findings during his

deposition and provided an explanation for why the study did not alter his clinical

conclusions during his January 2026 examination. See Record Document 104-4 at 17–

20. Coleman has not demonstrated that Dr. Brown employed an unreliable methodology

such that exclusion is warranted under Rule 702. Any alleged shortcomings in Dr. Brown's

review of the medical records, interpretation of the EMG, or physical examination may be

explored through cross-examination. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED on this subject.

c. Return to Work

Coleman also seeks exclusion of Dr. Brown's opinion that Coleman is capable of

returning to her pre-injury sedentary occupation to the extent that opinion relies upon his

neurological findings. Because the Court finds that Coleman has not established a basis

for excluding Dr. Brown's neurological opinions, the Court likewise declines to exclude his

opinions regarding Coleman’s functional capacity and work restrictions. Any alleged

weaknesses in the underlying examination may be presented to the jury. Accordingly, the

Motion is DENIED on this topic.

d. Future Treatment

Coleman next seeks to exclude Dr. Brown's opinions regarding future surgical

treatment and the appropriate surgical approach to Coleman’s anticipated hip

arthroplasty. Coleman emphasizes that Dr. Brown no longer performs orthopedic surgery

and testified regarding certain physical limitations.

The Court finds no basis for exclusion of this testimony. The record reflects that Dr.

Brown is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon who practiced orthopedic surgery for

decades, performed the type of procedures at issue during his career, remains licensed,

and continues to practice medicine and perform independent medical examinations. See

Record Document 104-3. Any reduction in his surgical practice or disagreement regarding

the appropriate surgical approach affects the weight of his testimony rather than its

admissibility. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED on this ground.

CONCLUSION

Based on the reasons explained above, Coleman’s Daubert Motion (Record

Document 104) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED

to the extent that Dr. Brown shall not offer testimony regarding Coleman's future medical

costs. The Motion is DENIED in all other respects.

An order consistent with this ruling shall issue herewith.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 13" day of July, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT