Ford

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BOBBY FORD,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 25-cv-02136-SPM

v.

LATOYA HUGHES, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on a motion filed by Plaintiff Bobby Ford asking the Court

to reconsider the denial of his Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 14, 15). For

the following reasons, the Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.

On May 6, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis (IFP). (Doc. 14). Plaintiff has had three cases dismissed with prejudice for failure to state

a claim, and therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), he can no longer proceed IFP unless he is

under imminent danger of serious physical injury. (Id. at p. 2). The Court found that Plaintiff had

failed to plead facts supporting the conclusion that he was in imminent danger at the time of

initiating this lawsuit. In the Complaint, which is 47 pages and includes over 100 pages of exhibits

(Doc. 1, 6), Plaintiff named over 50 Defendants and alleged a variety of constitutional violations

that occurred at Menard Correctional Center (Menard) from 2023 until 2025. The latest specific

instance of a constitutional deprivation that Plaintiff described occurred on March 14, 2025, eight

months prior to the filing of this lawsuit. (Id. at p. 2-3). Although Plaintiff asserted that his

constitutional rights continue to be violated, the Court observed that he did not describe a

discernable specific emergency or physical threat to his safety that he was experiencing when he

filed his Complaint. He also did not request any form of injunctive relief in the Complaint or by

motion. And furthermore, the Court would not consider Plaintiff’s new allegations of imminent

danger that he believed he faced now that he has been transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center

(Pontiac). Based on these findings, Plaintiff did not qualify to proceed IFP under the imminent

danger exception, and his motion was denied. Plaintiff was given until June 6, 2026, to pay the

full filing fee of $405.00. (Id.).

Plaintiff has not paid the filing, and instead, on May 12, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion

asking the Court to reconsider the denial of his Motion to Proceed IFP. (Doc. 15). Plaintiff argues

that he should be allowed to proceed under the imminent danger exception because of his untreated

“prostate/colon cancer.” (Doc. 15, p. 1). Plaintiff clarifies that denial of medical treatment for

cancer began while he was at Menard and has continued after his transfer to Pontiac. (Id. at p. 5)

Plaintiff recounts how in October 2024, while at Menard, he discovered blood in his stool and

urine; he began losing weight and experiencing pain in his hips and lower back. (Id. at p. 4).

Medical staff took a urine sample but would not take him to the hospital. Finally in November

2024, after laying down in his cell, unresponsive, he was taken to a hospital and diagnosed with a

urinary tract infection. He claims that at the hospital “it was discovered that [he] had cancer,” and

he was subsequently also told by several doctors at the prison that he had cancer. (Id.). Following

his return to Menard from the hospital, Plaintiff states that he was repeatedly scheduled to see a

doctor, but the appointments were cancelled. (Id.). He was last scheduled to see a urologist on

September 9, 2025. (Id. at p. 5). Plaintiff asserts that as of filing the Complaint, he has been in

imminent danger of death due to ongoing denial of care for his cancer. (Id.). Plaintiff asks the

Court to issue a preliminary injunction directing Pontiac to provide him with “cancer treatment

medication” before “it reaches fatal deadly stage four cancer.” (Id.).

Unrelated to his assertion that he was under imminent danger from untreated cancer at the

time of initiating this lawsuit, Plaintiff also asserts that on December 2, 2025, prior to his transfer

to Pontiac, three security officers at Menard retaliated against him by beating him and forcing him

to perform oral sex on them. (Doc. 15, p. 1). According to Plaintiff, the officers told him to

withdraw the lawsuit or “die,” and they called him derogatory names. (Id.).

On June 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion in which he alleges that in May 2026, two

individuals who said they work at Menard took him from his cell at Pontiac and beat and

sodomized him. (Doc. 16, p. 1-2). The individuals told him to “drop the lawsuit or die.” (Id.). After

the attack, his Dovato medication, prescribed to treat his HIV, was “cut-off.” (Id. at p. 2). Plaintiff

asks the Court to issue an injunction forcing medical staff at Pontiac to renew the Dovato

prescription and ordering that he be given cancer treatment. (Id. at p. 16).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the Court may revise any order adjudicating

fewer than all the claims at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and

the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Motions to reconsider an order under Rule 54(b) are

judged largely by the same standards as motions to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e),

“to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Rothwell Cotton

Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). “Reconsideration is

not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that could

have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole

v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate error of law or fact made by the Court in denying his

Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP. Neither has he presented newly discovered evidence. The facts

in the Complaint fail to state a claim or show imminent danger regarding inadequate treatment for

Plaintiff’s cancer diagnosis. The 47-page complaint contains only two passing statements

regarding his cancer. At one point he asserts that he suffers from “ongoing excessive force,

retaliations, degradations, medical denials, slander, defamation of [his] character for filing

grievances, and [he] could die from the cancer untreated.” (Doc. 1, p. 13). Later, he states that

since November 1, 2024, he has been informed that he “may” have cancer and its spreading, but

“the Defendant” will not send him out for actual testing and treatment. (Id. at p. 32). These

allegations, however, are too ambiguous and not clearly asserted against any of the 50 named

Defendants. Although Plaintiff states that “[Defendant] Wexford Inc. is the med-service provider

[and] multiple times in 2 ½ years deny [him] care,” (Id. at p. 13), this statement is not sufficient to

state a claim against a corporation, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436

U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978), and Wexford was not the healthcare service provider at the time the

Complaint was filed.1 Plaintiff could not, therefore, be in imminent danger due to any conduct on

the part of Wexford when he initiated this litigation. Because Plaintiff’s claims regarding

inadequate treatment for cancer are vague and conclusory, the Court correctly determined that he

had not demonstrated imminent danger at the time of filing. See Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d

328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003).

The Court will not consider Plaintiff’s new facts or his elaborations on earlier factual

assertions. As stated, “[r]econsideration is not appropriate for…arguing matters that could have

been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.” Ahmed v. Aschcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249

(7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Caisse Nationale de Credi Agricole, 90 F.3d at 1270 (7th Cir. 1986)).

1 As of July 30, 2025, Centurion Health became the comprehensive healthcare services provider for the Illinois

Department of Correction. See Memorandum from Director Latoya Hughes on Update on Transition of

Comprehensive Healthcare Services Provider (July 24, 2025) (https://idoc.illinois.gov/news/memos-to-

population.html).

Additionally, the allegations regarding his lack of cancer treatment at the time of filing included

in Plaintiff’s motion are also as unclear as the allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiff again does

not attribute his lack treatment to any named Defendant and simply states, “Repeatedly Menard

C.C. denied prostate/colon cancer treatment.” (Doc. 15, p. 4). He states that he went to a urologist

on September 9, 2025, but was “not treated.” (Id. at p. 5). If he was seen by a urologist, it is not

clear what he means by “not treated.” Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an error of law

or fact in the Court’s Order denying his Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP, the motion seeking

reconsideration is DENIED. (Doc. 15).2 Plaintiff shall have until July 30, 2026, to pay the

$405.00 fee, failing which this case will be dismissed in full.

The Court further DENIES any request for emergency injunctive relief. Plaintiff’s

underlying Complaint pertains to events that occurred at Menard, and he now asserts allegations

regarding inadequate medical care and mistreatment at Pontiac against individuals who are not

named in this Complaint. A motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary

injunction is not a proper avenue for Plaintiff to add claims and individuals to this lawsuit.

Accordingly, because the requests for emergency injunctive relief pertaining to recent events that

are outside the scope of the Complaint, the requests are denied. (Doc. 15, 16).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 16, 2026

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge

2 The Court notes that on April 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit that suffers from the same issues as his Complaint in

this case. Ford v. Hughes, No. 26-cv-00451-DWD (S.D. Ill.). The Amended Complaint describes a variety of

constitutional violations that have occurred since 2023, and Judge Dugan found that Plaintiff had not established that

he was in imminent danger at the time of filing. (Id. at Doc. 9).