The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
LYNDON WINN CARTER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00 271
) Judge Aleta A. Trauger
METRO NASHVILLE POLICE )
DEPARTMENT et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM
Before the court are two sets of Objections (Doc. Nos. 107, 129) filed by plaintiff Lyndon
Winn Carter to two different recommended rulings (Doc. Nos. 104, 128) by the Magistrate Judge,
recommending that defendant Amazon Logistics, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. No.
87) be denied without prejudice, that the defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 85, 86, 115)
be granted, that the plaintiff’s construed motion for the State of Tennessee to Waive Eleventh
Amendment Immunity (Doc. No. 92) and his Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. No. 108) be
denied, and that all claims against all properly named and served defendants be dismissed. For the
reasons set forth herein, the court will overrule the plaintiff’s Objections, accept in their entirety
the Magistrate Judge’s recommended disposition of the various pending motions, and will dismiss
the claims against the named defendants. In addition, the plaintiff is given notice that his claims
against the unidentified and unserved John Doe defendants will be dismissed without prejudice
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), unless the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure
to effect timely service of process.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lyndon Winn Carter initiated this lawsuit in March 2025, asserting claims arising
out his allegedly unlawful detention by police officers with the Metro Nashville Police Department
(“MNPD”) in the parking lot of “Amazon’s Station DTN6” in Madison, Tennessee on April 4,
2024. (See Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 5; Third Am. Compl., Doc. No. 106 at 2.) At the time, the plaintiff
was an independent contractor for Amazon Flex, apparently meaning defendant Amazon Logistics,
Inc. (“Amazon Logistics”), and was sitting in his vehicle at an Amazon facility. He alleges that
police officers surrounded his car and then detained him at gunpoint, without probable cause, and
he claims that the State and Amazon Logistics were somehow involved in a conspiracy with the
Metro defendants to violate his civil rights. The defendants identified in the Third Amended
Complaint, in addition to Amazon Logistics, include the “Office of Professional Accountability –
Metro Nashville Police Department,” the “City of Nashville,” the State of Tennessee, and “John
Doe Officers 1–8.” (Doc. No. 106.1)
In April 2026, Magistrate Judge Evans issued a Report and Recommendation (“1st R&R”)
(Doc. No. 104), recommending (1) that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the State of Tennessee (the
“State”) (Doc. No. 85) be granted on the grounds of sovereign immunity and, alternatively, for
failure of the operative pleading to state a colorable claim against the State; (2) that Carter’s
Request for the State of Tennessee to Waive Eleventh Amendment Immunity in the Interest of
Justice (Doc. No. 92), insofar as this request can be construed as a motion, be denied; (3) that the
Motion to Dismiss filed by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
(“Metro Nashville”), the Metro Nashville Police Department (“MNPD”) and the Metro Office of
1 This document is entitled “Corrected Second Amended Complaint.” The Magistrate
Judge granted the plaintiff leave to correct the pleading and ordered that it be docketed as the Third
Amended Complaint. (See Doc. No. 105.)
Professional Accountability (“OPA”) (collectively, the “Metro defendants”) (Doc. No. 86) be
granted on the grounds that the plaintiff has not pleaded enough factual detail to set forth a legally
cognizable claim against these defendants;2 and (3) that defendant Amazon Logistics’ Motion to
Compel Arbitration (Doc. No. 87) be denied without prejudice, pending a then-anticipated ruling
by the Supreme Court that would resolve the issue of whether “last leg” delivery drivers are subject
to the Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption for “workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce,” 9 U.S.C. § 1. (Doc. No. 104.)
Carter filed Objections to the 1st R&R (Doc. No. 107), objecting to the recommended
dismissal of the claims against the State and the Metro defendants; he also sought leave to file a
Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 108). Metro Nashville filed a Response (Doc. No. 109) to
the plaintiff’s Objections. All three defendants oppose the plaintiff’s Motion to Amend on the
grounds of futility (see Doc. Nos. 110, 111, 118), while Amazon Logistics also filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 115). In this motion, Amazon Logistics stated
that it did not waive its contractual right to arbitrate but filed its Rule 12(b)(6) motion in the
alternative, arguing that the Third Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations giving rise
to liability.3 The plaintiff opposes Amazon Logistics’ Motion to Dismiss and also filed a
2 The Magistrate Judge entered a separate Order granting the plaintiff’s motion to replace
all three Metro defendants currently on the docket with the single defendant “Metropolitan
Nashville and Davidson County,” and directed the Clerk to terminate the MNPD, the “City of
Nashville,” and the OPA and to replace them with Metro Nashville. (Doc. Nos. 89 (motion), 105
(Order).)
3 The anticipated ruling by the Supreme Court was issued approximately one month after
Amazon Logistics filed its Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, holding that “final
leg” transportation workers—that is, workers who transport goods on an intrastate leg of an
interstate journey—can qualify for the Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption in 9 U.S.C. § 1 without
crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that do. Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, 146 S. Ct.
1358, 1363–66 (May 28, 2026). Amazon Logistics’ Motion to Compel Arbitration contends that,
even if the FAA does not apply, the plaintiff is contractually obligated to arbitrate his claims
against Amazon Logistics under state law. (See Doc. No. 87-1 at 15–18.)
Supplemental Notice of Filing Regarding Amazon ER Investigator Communications (Doc. No.
121), with additional documents that he contends support his claim against Amazon Logistics.
In June 2026, the Magistrate Judge issued another Report and Recommendation (“2nd
R&R”), recommending that Carter’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. No. 108) be denied as
“futile” and that Amazon Logistics’ Motion to Dismiss be granted on the grounds that the
“allegations in the third amended complaint are far too conclusory to support a legally cognizable
theory of liability against Amazon” (while also noting that the proposed Fourth Amended
Complaint “omits any mention of Amazon [Logistics] in the events of the police encounter”).
(Doc. No. 128 at 3, 4.) The plaintiff filed Objections to the 2nd R&R as well. (Doc. No. 129.)
Metro Nashville and Amazon Logistics both filed Responses to the plaintiff’s Objections (Doc.
Nos. 130, 131), and the plaintiff filed a Reply to each (Doc. Nos. 132, 133).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
If a party files “specific written objections” to an R&R on a dispositive matter, the district
judge must consider those objections and determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s
disposition “that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), (3); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). In conducting its review, the district court “may accept, reject, or modify the
recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.” Id. However, the district court is not required to review those aspects of the
report and recommendation to which no objection is made. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150
(1985). The district court generally should accept the magistrate judge’s findings and rulings to
which no specific objection is filed, id. at 151, so long as the court is “satisf[ied] that there is no
clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72
advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
“The filing of vague, general, or conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of
specific objections and is tantamount to a complete failure to object.” Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x
354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Langley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 502 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir.
2007) (issues raised in a “perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation,” are waived (quoting Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250
F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000))). Likewise, “[a] general objection to the entirety” of a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation has the same effect as a complete failure to object. Howard v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Finally, arguments made in
an objection to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that were not first presented to the
magistrate judge for consideration are deemed waived. Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902
n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).
Although pro se pleadings and filings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted
by lawyers, see, e.g., Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), pro se litigants are not
entirely exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The 1st R&R
1. Amazon Logistics’ Motion to Compel Arbitration
No party objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Amazon Logistics’
Motion to Compel Arbitration be denied without prejudice. Finding no clear error in that
recommendation, the court will accept it without discussion, and the Motion to Compel Arbitration
(Doc. No. 87) will be denied without prejudice.
2. The State’s Motion to Dismiss
Carter does not address the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the State cannot be deemed to
have waived sovereign immunity. His motion to compel or request it to do so (Doc. No. 92) will
be denied without further discussion.
Carter does object to the recommendation that the State’s Motion to Dismiss be granted.
He argues that his claims against the State fall within the purview of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), because he alleges an ongoing constitutional violation and seeks prospective injunctive
relief. Implicitly recognizing that he has not named as a defendant a state official in his official
capacity, Carter maintains that he should be granted leave to amend his pleading to name the
Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security as the official
charged with “law enforcement oversight.” (Doc. No. 107 at 7.)
Carter filed not one but three Responses to the State’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 93–
95), and he raised all of his Ex parte Young arguments therein. The Magistrate Judge addressed
and rejected them, and Carter does not meaningfully challenge the legal conclusions in the R&R.
Regardless, the court has conducted a de novo review of the plaintiff’s filings and finds that Ex
parte Young does not apply and that the State is entitled to sovereign immunity, for the reasons set
forth in the 1st R&R. The Magistrate Judge also considered and rejected the plaintiff’s request to
file a Fourth Amended Complaint, finding that his multiple amendments and supplemental filings,
considered in their totality, fail to allege facts that make out a colorable claim against the State.
The court agrees. Even if he had named an appropriate state official in his official capacity as a
defendant in this case, the Third Amended Complaint, even considered with all of the plaintiff’s
various supplemental filings, does not allege facts that plausibly show that the State had any
involvement in the events that took place in the Amazon parking lot on the night of April 4, 2024.
The plaintiff’s objections to the recommended disposition of the State’s Motion to Dismiss are
without merit, and the State’s motion will be granted.
3. Metro Nashville’s Motion to Dismiss
The 1st R&R also recommends that the claims against Metro Nashville be dismissed for
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. The plaintiff objects, arguing that the 1st
R&R “overlooked specific factual allegations establishing a plausible constitutional violation”
(Doc. No. 107 at 2 (quotation modified)), specifically including the “date, time, location, officer
conduct, and outcome of the incident” (id.). He purports to “clarify” the allegations in the “factual
record already pled,” explaining that, while he was “detained at gunpoint, a responding officer
informed Plaintiff that the Madison Police Department had received a call alleging that a male
suspect driving a black vehicle on Amazon property had argued with a female employee and
pointed a firearm at her.” (Id. at 3.) According to the plaintiff, his vehicle was gray, not black, and
the responding officers “relied on unverified and materially inaccurate information and proceeded
to use high-risk, deadly force tactics without confirming the suspect description or establishing
reasonable suspicion.” (Id.) The plaintiff also argues that he “identified John Doe Officers 1–8 as
the officers directly involved in the unlawful detention and use of force” and should be permitted
to conduct discovery to ascertain the actual identity of the officers involved.
Metro Nashville responds that, even considering the plaintiff’s new “clarification,” the
plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that his temporary detention, resulting from a mistaken
identification, violated his constitutional rights. More to the point, Metro argues that the Magistrate
Judge correctly found that the Third Amended Complaint “contains no factual allegations of events
that could suggest municipal liability through policies or practices.” (Doc. No. 109 at 2 (quoting
1st R&R, Doc. No. 104 at 17).)
The court finds, on de novo review, that the Third Amended Complaint fails to state a
colorable claim against Metro Nashville for violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Section
1983 does not support a claim against a municipality based on respondeat superior. Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Consequently, “merely employing a tortfeasor
is insufficient to impose Monell liability.” Chick v. Taylor Cnty., No. 25-5168, 2026 WL 384165,
*2 (6th Cir. 2026). Instead, to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983 against a municipality,
the plaintiff must allege “facts sufficient to make out one of four theories of municipal liability:
‘(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final
decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate
training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal
rights violations.’” Id. (quoting Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 828 (6th Cir. 2019)).
The plaintiff here simply fails to do so. He alleges some facts concerning the actions of individual
(unidentified) police officers, but he fails to allege any facts that would support liability on the part
of the municipality.
The court will overrule the plaintiff’s Objections and grant Metro Nashville’s Motion to
Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
B. The 2nd R&R
The 2nd R&R addresses two motions filed after the 1st R&R was issued: the plaintiff’s
motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 108), and Amazon Logistics’
Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint.
1. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
The 2nd R&R expressly acknowledges the liberal pleading standard embodied by Rule
15(a)(2) but finds that the proposed amendment would be futile, as it “does not cure defects that
the Court noted in the previous report and recommendation.” (Doc. No. 128 at 2.) Specifically, the
proposed amendment “adds a few factual details . . . confirm[ing] that the police encounter in
question had to do with police officers responding to a 911 call” and that “the officers detained
[Carter] without arresting him because they thought he might be the suspect whom they were
seeking.” (Id.) However, the proposed amendment still not indicate “how long the encounter
lasted, whether the officers said anything about what they thought the suspect did, and whether
[the plaintiff] said anything in response.” The Magistrate Judge found that the new facts alleged
in the proposed amendment, accepted as true, did not cure the problem identified in the 1st R&R:
“that a general failure of oversight and accountability” are not sufficient to “overcome state
sovereign immunity or create liability for Metro.” (Id. at 2–3 (citation omitted).)
The plaintiff objects on the grounds that the 2nd R&R “applies an excessively rigid
pleading standard at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage against a pro se litigant who has not yet been afforded
discovery.” (Doc. No. 129 at 1.) He specifically objects that his proposed Fourth Amended
Complaint (Doc. No. 112) now asserts sufficient facts to plausibly state a claim that his
constitutional rights were violated by his detention on April 4, 2024. He asserts that the proposed
amendment now alleges that he was detained at gunpoint for approximately fourteen minutes and
was detained for approximately thirty-two minutes, even though he repeatedly informed the
officers that he had done nothing wrong. (See Doc. No. 129 at 5.)4
The plaintiff fails to bring to the court’s attention any flaw in the Magistrate Judge’s legal
analysis. Having conducted a de novo review of the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, the
court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the proposed amendment would be futile with respect
to the claims against Metro, does nothing to change the sovereign immunity analysis that applies
4 Assuming the plaintiff is referring to his proposed Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. No.
112), this document does not allege that the plaintiff was detained for any particular length of time.
to the State, and includes effectively no factual allegations at all showing that Amazon Logistics
was involved in the event. The only apparent connection to Amazon Logistics is that the event
took place on “private property owned or operated by Amazon in Madison, Tennessee.” (Doc. No.
112 ¶ 1; see also id. ¶ 15.) The plaintiff’s Objections will be overruled, and his Motion for Leave
to Amend yet again will be denied as futile.
2. Amazon Logistics’ Motion to Dismiss
The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing the claims against Amazon Logistics in the
Third Amended Complaint, as the pleading’s allegations that MNPD officers “coordinated” with
Amazon employees in detaining the plaintiff and “facilitated th[e] ambush by summoning law
enforcement and failing to protect [his] safety on their premises” are “far too conclusory to support
a legally cognizable theory of liability against Amazon.” (Doc. No. 128 at 4 (quoting Doc. No.
106 at 2).)5
The plaintiff objects that the 2nd R&R “did not fully account for Plaintiff’s April 24, 2026
supplemental filings and exhibits.” (Doc. No. 129 at 9.) He claims that these “supplemental filings”
demonstrate that his allegations reflect an ongoing good-faith effort to provide additional factual
support for his claims and that such claims are not frivolous or “incapable of clarification.” (Id.)
While acknowledging that private corporations are “not ordinarily liable under § 1983 absent
sufficient joint participation or coordinated activity with state actions,” he maintains that he should
be entitled to discovery to further substantiate his claims. He also continues to object to the
dismissal of his claims against Metro and the State.
5 The R&R also points out that the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint does not allege
the involvement of Amazon employees at all.
1]
The court finds, in short, that the plaintiff's supplemental filings, even if the court were to
deem them part of the pleadings, are not sufficient to state a colorable claim against Amazon
Logistics under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff has been given multiple opportunities to amend
his pleading. His status as a pro se litigant does not justify endless attempts to clarify his claims.
While the court understands that the plaintiff's detention on April 4, 2024 was likely a terrifying
experience, the plaintiff has not plausibly stated a claim against the State, Metro, or Amazon
Logistics.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiff’s various Objections to the two R&Rs issued
by the Magistrate Judge will be overruled, and the R&Rs will be accepted in their entirety. As a
result, Amazon Logistics’ Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. No. 87) will be denied without
prejudice; the defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 85, 86, 115) will be granted; and the
plaintiffs construed motion for the State of Tennessee to Waive Eleventh Amendment Immunity
(Doc. No. 92) and his Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. No. 108) will be denied.
Resolution of these motions does not resolve the case in its entirety, because the plaintiff’ s
claims against the John Doe defendants who have never been served or identified remain pending.
Through this Memorandum (and the accompanying Order), the plaintiff is placed on notice that
his claims against the John Doe defendants will be dismissed without prejudice unless the plaintiff
shows good cause for the failure to serve them within 90 days after the Complaint was filed. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(m).
An appropriate Order is filed herewith.
United States District Judge