The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ABDULLAH JONES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:25cv651
)
ALTON PRILLIMAN, et. al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on three motions to dismiss
(Docket Entries 12, 19, 25) (the “Motions”) for, inter alia, lack
of personal jurisdiction (see id.). For the reasons that follow,
the Court should dismiss this action as to all Defendants.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Abdullah Jones (the “Plaintiff”), “a North Carolina
resident” (Docket Entry 1 (the “Complaint”), ¶ 1), seeks relief for
violations of his “civil rights, fraud, and intentional tort[ious
conduct]” (id.) against four out-of-state defendants: “Defendant
Alton Prill[a]man[, ] an individual and private lender who resides
in Roanoke, Virigina” (id. ¶ 5), “Defendant John [ ]
Prill[a]man[, ] an attorney . . . [who] resides and practices law
in Roanoke, Virginia” (id. ¶ 6 (all-caps font omitted)), “Defendant
David B. Carson [(‘Defendant Carson’),] a Virginia Circuit Court
[j]udge who, at all relevant times, was presiding in the City of
Roanoke Circuit Court” (id. 7 7), and “Defendant Bank of Botetourt
[(the ‘Bank’),] a financial institution headquartered in Buchanan,
Virginia” (id. 97 8) (collectively, the “Defendants”).'
According to the Complaint:
“At the core of this case is a materially altered promissory
note submitted by Defendant[ ] Alton Prillaman and Defendant John
[ ]} Prillaman[,] his son and [a]ttorney[,] to a Virginia state
court in a petition for an ex parte injunction” (id. @ 1).
“Plaintiff entered into [that] promissory note ... at the office
of Defendant Alton Prillaman .. . [in] Roanoke, V[irginia]” (id.
{ 9) to effect “the closing [of] a multi-property real estate
transaction in Danville, Virginia” (id. ¢ 11). After learning of
a “delay in closing” (id.), “Defendant Alton Prillaman by counsel
Defendant John [ ] Prillaman submitted a Verified Petition For
Injunction and Asset Freeze” (id. 7 13; see also Docket Entry 1-2
at 2-15) in Virginia state court, which Defendant Carson thereafter
granted (see Docket Entry 1, 47 18; see also id. FI 14 (alleging
that the petition “contained multiple material misrepresentations
of fact,” including an “altered” promissory note), 24-64 (alleging
various deficiencies in Virginia state-court proceedings); Docket
1 As noted in one of the Motions (see Docket Entry 12 at 1
n.1), the Complaint misspells Defendants Alton and John Prillaman’s
last name as “Prilliman” (see, e.g., Docket Entry 1, IT 5-6).
Further references to those Defendants in this Opinion, including
quotations from the Complaint, use the correct spelling and omit
alterations.
Entry 1-1 at 2 (attaching copy of original promissory note); Docket
Entry 1-3 at 2-6 (attaching copy of temporary injunction order);
Docket Entry 1-5 at 2-10 (attaching copy of motion to dissolve
injunction); Docket Entry 1-6 at 2 (attaching copy of letter from
Plaintiff’s then-attorney to Defendant Carson)).
The Bank thereafter received Defendant Carson’s order, which
the Complaint alleges “was facially invalid” (Docket Entry 1, ¶ 1;
see also id. ¶¶ 18-19 (alleging various conflicts of interest)) and
“transmitted to the Bank [ ] by improper and unlawful means” (id.
¶ 1; see also id. ¶ 22 (alleging that the Bank “relied solely on an
email transmission [of the order, rather than] a properly served
court order”)), and “immediately froze Plaintiff’s accounts without
confirming [the order’s] legality or providing notice” (id. ¶ 1),
which caused the “collapse of [Plaintiff’s] $1.4 million real
estate transaction, the loss of business revenue, and significant
financial damage” (id.; see also id. ¶ 27 (alleging that “the
freeze [ ] paralyzed Plaintiff’s financial operations, prohibiting
routine business transactions and even the ability to pay for basic
necessities”); Docket Entry 1-4 at 2-3 (attaching demand letter
from Plaintiff’s then-attorney to Defendant John Prillaman); Docket
Entry 1-8 at 2-5 (attaching copies of release and termination of
“Danville, VA” real estate contract)).
The Complaint further alleges that, “[a]fter the injunction
was dissolved” (Docket Entry 1, ¶ 65; accord Docket Entry 1-7 at 2-
3
3), “Defendant Alton Prillaman continued to engage in harassment,
intimidation, and coercion . . . to force Plaintiff into a
settlement . . . , including placing hundreds of unwanted and
repeated phone calls to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s legal counsel”
(Docket Entry 1, @ 65; accord id. {@ 76 (alleging that “Defendant
[Alton] Prillaman left a voicemail on Plaintiff’s phone” to
“harass[]” Plaintiff)), “unlawfully appear[ing] at the residence of
Plaintiff’s minor children approximately 50 times” (id. { 65), and
“contact[ing Plaintiff’s] . . . business associate” (id. 7 67; see
also id. 97 69 (alleging that “Defendant [Alton] Prillaman issued
direct threats” to Plaintiff)). Additionally, the Complaint
alleges that “Defendant Alton Prillaman, through [| ] newly retained
counsel .. ., initiated a civil lawsuit [against Plaintiff] in [ ]
Roanoke County Circuit Court” (id. {7 72; see also Docket Entry 1-9
at 2-9 (attaching copies of summons and complaint) and
“reintroduced the same altered note as a central exhibit” (id.
73; accord Docket Entry 1-9 at 10), and that, in the course of
that litigation, the “Bank [ ] processed and honored [a] subpoena
. . . [for] Plaintiff’s banking records[,] . . . result[ing] ina
gross violation of Plaintiff’s right to privacy and due process”
(Docket Entry 1, I 79).
The Complaint seeks relief against all Defendants for the
“[v]iolation of [Plaintiff’s c]Jivil [rJights [u]Jnder 42 U.S.C.
§[ ]1983” (id. at 26; see also id. at 26-28 (asserting claims for
“[d]eprivation of [d]ue [p]rocess,” “[a]buse of [p]rocess,”
“[f]raud [u]pon the [c]ourt,” and “[i]ntentional [i]nfliction of
[e]motional [d]istress”), 30 (asserting claim for “[c]ivil
[c]onspiracy”)). Additionally, the Complaint brings claims against
“Defendants Alton[ and] John Prillaman and the Bank” (id. at 29)
for “[i]nvasion of [p]rivacy and [u]nlawful [d]isclosure of
[f]inancial [r]ecords” (id.), and against Defendant Alton Prillaman
for “[c]ivil [e]xtortion” (id. at 30) and “[m]aterial [a]lteration
of a [n]egotiable [i]nstrument” (id. at 31; see also id. at 32
(asserting same claim against “Defendant Alton Prillaman[’s
a]gents”)).
Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for, inter alia,
lack of personal jurisdiction. (See Docket Entry 12 at 1
(requesting dismissal for failure to “establish basis for personal
jurisdiction” and, alternatively, “dismiss[al] under Fed[eral]
R[ule of] Civ[il] P[rocedure (the ‘Rules’)] 12(b)(3)” in light of
Plaintiff’s “sign[ing of] a settlement agreement that encompasses
the [Complaint’s] claims . . . and sets the exclusive forum in
Roanoke, Virginia”); Docket Entry 20 at 7 (requesting, “pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1),” dismissal “under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine” and
dismissal for “failure to demonstrate personal jurisdiction”), 9
(requesting “dismiss[al] for failure to state a claim”); Docket
Entry 25 at 1 (requesting dismissal “pursuant to [ ] Rules [ ]
12(b)(2), (3), and (6)” for “fail[ure] to . . . [establish]
5
personal jurisdiction,” “[improper] venue,” and “fail[ure] to state
a claim”).) Should Plaintiff fail to make a prima facie showing of
personal jurisdiction over Defendants, “the [C]Jourt need not
address the [Motions’ ] remaining arguments for dismissal.”
Iannucci _v. Alstate Process Serv., Inc., No. 1:06cv30, 2006 WL
2792228, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 27, 2006); see also Levi_v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., No. 3:16cv129, 2017 WL 1227933,
at *4 n.9 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Unless waived, ‘a court must
find personal jurisdiction before determining the validity of a
claim.’” (alterations omitted) (quoting Guidry v. United States
Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1999))).
Despite receiving notice of his right to respond to each of
the Motions under Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1975)
(see Docket Entries 14, 22, 27), Plaintiff did not submit a
response in opposition to any of the Motions (see Docket Entries
dated Sept. 17, 2025, to present). By Local Rule, the Court may
treat any motion lacking a timely response as an uncontested
motion, which the Court may grant without further notice. see
M.D.N.C. LR 7.3(k).° Pursuant to the precedent of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, the Court
2 More specifically, Local Rule 7.3(k) provides that, “[ilf
no response brief is filed within the time required by [Local Rule
7.3(£)], the motion will be considered and decided as an
uncontested motion, and ordinarily will be granted without further
notice.” M.D.N.C. LR 7.3(k); see also M.D.N.C. LR 7.3(f)
(requiring response “within 21 days after service of the motion”).
must evaluate the propriety of granting the Motions regardless of
whether Plaintiff opposed dismissal. See Stevenson v. City of Seat
Pleasant, Md., 743 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining
that, “[e]ven though [the plaintiffs] did not challenge the motions
to dismiss, . . . the district court nevertheless has an obligation
to review the motions to ensure that dismissal is proper”); accord
Gardendance, Inc. v. Woodstock Copperworks, Ltd., 230 F.R.D. 438,
449 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (“As with summary judgment motions, a court
does not grant a motion for dismissal merely because it is
uncontested. Rather, a district court should review a motion to
dismiss on its merits to determine whether the pleadings are
sufficient.”).3
3 On March 26, 2026, counsel for Defendant Alton Prillaman
informed the Court “that Defendant Alton Prillaman passed away”
(Docket Entry 29 at 1) by filing a notice with “the Court’s CM/ECF
system . . . and [notifying Plaintiff via] email and U.S. Mail”
(id. at 2). Under Rule 25(a), “[i]f a party dies and the claim is
not extinguished, . . . [a] motion for substitution [of the proper
party] may be made by any party . . . . [However, i]f [such a]
motion is not made within 90 days after service of a statement
noting the death, the action [ ] against the decedent must be
dismissed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
5(b)(2) (allowing for service by, inter alia, “sending [document]
to a registered user by filing it with the court’s electronic-
filing system” or “mailing [document] to the person’s last known
address”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(3) (requiring “[a] statement
noting death [ ] be served in the same manner” as “provided in Rule
5”). Here, even assuming that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
Alton Prillaman “[are] not extinguished,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1),
“more than 90 days have passed since the notice of death was filed
with th[e C]ourt and served upon Plaintiff, and no motion to
substitute [Defendant Alton Prillaman’s] estate as a defendant has
been filed,” Graham v. Hurst, Civ. Action No. 5:13-3109, 2015 WL
670321, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2015) (see Docket Entries dated
(continued...)
7
DISCUSSION
I. Rule 12(b) (2) Standards
Each of the Motions seeks dismissal for, inter alia, lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2). In response toa
defendant’s Rule 12(b) (2) challenge, a plaintiff must ultimately
prove the existence of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of
the evidence. See Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy
Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003). If a court
considers a pretrial personal jurisdiction challenge without
conducting an evidentiary hearing, though, the plaintiff need only
“mak[e] a prima facie showing in support of [his] assertion of
jurisdiction.” Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d
553, 558 (4th Cir. 2014). In such circumstances, the “[C]ourt must
construe all relevant pleading allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, assume credibility, and draw the most
favorable inferences for the existence of jurisdiction.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[b]Jare allegations
of sufficient contacts [with the forum state] cannot establish
personal jurisdiction [over a defendant],” Kennedy Krieger Inst.,
Inc. v. Brundage Mgmt. Co., Civ. No. 14-1680, 2015 WL 9261339, at *3
3(...continued)
March 26, 2026, to present; see also Docket Entry 3 at 1
(indicating Plaintiff’s consent Lo receive documents
electronically)). In light of these circumstances, and pursuant to
Rule 25(a), the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Alton Prillaman.
n.19 (D. Md. Mar. 3, 2015) (citing Lolavar v. de Santibanes, 430
F.3d 221, 230 (4th Cir. 2005)), and, “[iJf a complaint does not
present a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, it must be
dismissed,” Murray v. Bierman, Geesing, Ward & Wood, LLC, No.
1l:llevl623, 2012 WL 4480679, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2012) (citing
Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 396).
II. Analysis
“A federal district court can exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant only if ‘(1) such jurisdiction is
authorized by the long-arm statute of the state in which the
district court sits; and (2) application of the relevant long-arm
statute is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.’” Pathfinder Software, LLC v. Core Cashless, LLC, 127
F. Supp. 3d 531, 538 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (quoting Universal Leather,
773 F.3d at 558); see also VICOF II Tr. v. Estate of Ladenheim by
Dector, 716 F. Supp. 3d 381, 384 (M.D.N.C. 2024) (“The North
Carolina Supreme Court has emphasized that the two-step process is,
in fact, a two-step process, and that jurisdiction under North
Carolina’s long-arm statute must first be determined.” (internal
brackets, ellipsis, and quotation marks omitted)).
A. North Carolina’s Long-Arm Statute
“North Carolina’s long-arm statute provides twelve possible
bases for asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants.”
Mountain Funding, LLC v. Blackwater Crossing, LLC, No. 3:05cv513,
2006 WL 1582403, at *1 (W.D.N.C. June 5, 2006); see also N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-75.4. Although Plaintiff has not indicated which of
those bases applies to Defendants (see Docket Entry 1, ¶¶ 2-8),
Defendant John Prillaman and the Bank challenge personal
jurisdiction on due-process grounds alone (see Docket Entry 13 at
7-11; Docket Entry 26 at 4-12). Thus, as to those Defendants,
“th[e C]ourt’s sole inquiry is whether personal jurisdiction is
proper under the Due Process Clause.” Lillie v. Guerra, 559 F.
Supp. 3d 464, 470 (M.D.N.C. 2021) (citing Christian Sci. Bd. of
Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d
209, 215 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Defendant Carson, on the other hand, contends that “there are
no allegations against [him] in [the] Complaint that implicate even
one of the[ long-arm statute’s] options for personal jurisdiction”
(Docket Entry 20 at 8) and seeks “dismiss[al] for lack of personal
jurisdiction on that basis . . . [i]n addition to . . . the Due
Process Clause” (id.). Considering even “the best argument[s] to
be made in invoking in personam jurisdiction under the long-arm
statute,” Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. Income Fund II v. Home
Owners Funding Corp. of Am., 753 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (W.D.N.C.
1990), the statute proves inapplicable to Defendant Carson’s out-
of-state actions.4
4 As noted above, Plaintiff has not specified a basis in the
long-arm statute for personal jurisdiction over Defendant Carson;
(continued...)
10
As alleged in the Complaint, Defendant Carson’s actions
pertain solely to his involvement in Virginia state-court
proceedings (see Docket Entry 1, 77 1, 7, 18-19, 24, 26, 28-42, 45,
49-64), including his “order[] granting” the “[i]njunction and
[a]sset [f]reeze” (id. 7 32). That out-of-state conduct eliminates
several grounds for personal jurisdiction under the long-arm
statute, including a defendant’s “[l]ocal [p]resence or [s]tatus,”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(1), “[l]ocal [a]lct or [o]mission,”
id. S$ 1-75.4(3), and “{l]ocal [s]lervices, [g]oods[, ] or
[c]ontracts,” id. § 1-75.4(5). Likewise, the statute’s ostensibly
relevant provision concerning “injury to person or property within
[North Carolina] arising out of an act or omission outside th[e]
State,” id. § 1-75.4(4), requires Defendant Carson to have
“[s]lolicitfed] or [performed] services activities . . . within
thle] State,” produced “thing[s] . . . used or consumed[] within
th[fe] State,” or “sent [emails] into or within th[e] State,” id.,
none of which occurred on the facts alleged. Finally, the
Complaint fails to implicate even the portions of the long-arm
4(...continued)
however, “‘[that] failure to plead the particulars of jurisdiction
is not fatal to [Plaintiff’s] claim[s against Defendant Carson] so
long as the facts alleged permit the inference of jurisdiction
under the statute,’” Dmarcian, Inc. v. Dmarcian Eur. BV, No.
1:2lev67, 2021 WL 2144915, at *6 (W.D.N.C. May 26, 2021) (quoting
Williams v. Institute for Computational Stud. at Colo. State Univ.,
85 N.C. App. 421, 428, 355 S.E.2d 177, 182 (1987)), amended in
part, 2021 WL 3561182 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 11, 2021), aff’d, 60 F.4th 119
(4th Cir. 2023), modified sub nom. dmarcian, Inc. v. DMARC Advisor
BV, 2024 WL 5188766 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2024).
11
statue pertaining to (A) “action[s ] aris[ing]” from “[l]ocal
[p]roperty,” id. § 1-75.4(6), as it does not allege any connection
between North Carolina and “Plaintiff’s [frozen] accounts” or
“financial damages” resulting from the temporary injunction order
(Docket Entry 1, ¶ 1) beyond Plaintiff’s “domicile[]” (id. ¶ 3), or
(B) the existence of a “loan [ ] secured by a mortgage or deed of
trust on real property [ ] in [North Carolina],” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1-75.4(6)(d) (see Docket Entry 1, ¶ 10 (alleging Plaintiff’s
intentional “omission of any secured instrument” in original
promissory note)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to present a
prima facie showing that North Carolina’s long-arm statute confers
jurisdiction over Defendant Carson.5
B. Due Process
“A court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant comports with due process if the defendant has ‘minimum
contacts’ with the forum, such that to require the defendant to
defend its interests in that state ‘does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Carefirst, 334
F.3d at 397 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)). “In judging minimum contacts, a court properly
focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
5 Alternatively, and for reasons stated in the analysis that
follows above, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the application
of North Carolina’s long-arm statute to Defendant Carson’s actions
complies with due process.
12
litigation.” Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In particular, two methods for achieving personal jurisdiction
exist: (1) “specific jurisdiction,” in which the defendant’s
qualifying contacts with North Carolina constitute the basis for
the litigation, and (2) “general jurisdiction,” which arises when
a defendant’s “affiliations with [North Carolina] are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home
in [North Carolina].” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). “For a corporate (or other
entity) defendant, ‘at home’ will usually mean their domicile and
their principal place of business.” Powers v. One Techs., LLC, No.
3:21cv89, 2021 WL 3519282, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 2021) (citation
omitted). As “for individuals, ‘the paradigm forum for the
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.’”
Reddy v. Buttar, 38 F.4th 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924).
“When general personal jurisdiction does not apply, a court
may still exercise specific personal jurisdiction . . . .” Powers,
2021 WL 3519282, at *2 (citation omitted). “In determining whether
specific jurisdiction exists, [courts] consider (1) the extent to
which the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the state; (2) whether the
plaintiff[’s] claims arise out of those activities directed at the
13
state; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would
be constitutionally ‘reasonable.’” Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 397.
“The purposeful-availment test is flexible, and [the] analysis
proceeds on a case-by-case basis.” Tire Eng’g & Distrib., LLC v.
Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2012).
In the context of intentional torts, courts may assess purposeful
availment through the so-called “‘effects test.’” Carefirst, 334
F.3d at 398 n.7. Under this test, the plaintiff must show “that:
(1) the defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) the plaintiff
felt the brunt of the harm in the forum, such that the forum can be
said to be the focal point of the harm; and (3) the defendant
expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum, such that the
forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity.”
Id.
Here, despite the Complaint’s allegation that Defendants
“caused direct and ongoing harm to [ ] Plaintiff in this district”
(Docket Entry 1, ¶ 3), each of the Motions contends that the
Complaint fails for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendants
(see Docket Entry 12 at 1 (seeking dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction as to Defendants Alton and John Prillaman); Docket
Entry 20 at 1, 7-9 (same as to Defendant Carson); Docket Entry 25
14
at 1 (same as to the Bank)). Defendants’ contentions entitle them
to dismissal.®
First, as a threshold matter, the allegation that Defendants
“harm[ed ] Plaintiff in this district” (Docket Entry 1, FI 3) “is
insufficient alone to establish personal Jurisdiction” over
Defendants, Woods Int’l, Inc. v. McRoy, 436 F. Supp. 2d 744, 749
(M.D.N.C. 2006); see also 12 Mktg., LLC v. White, No. 7:24cv660,
2025 WL 2302136, at *4 (W.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2025) (“[T]he mere fact
that an injury is felt in a forum state is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction.”).’ Rather, that harm “must ultimately be
accompanied by [each D]efendant’s own contacts with the state” to
support a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. ESAB Grp.,
Inc., v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 626 (4th Cir. 1997); see
also Walden _v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014) (“The proper
question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury
6 Thus, the instant recommendation obviates the need for
resolution of issues beyond personal jurisdiction raised in the
Motions. See Iannucci, 2006 WL 2792228, at *7.
7 Plaintiff’s “domicile[ ] in [ ] North Carolina” (Docket
Entry 1, @ 3) constitutes an equally insufficient basis for
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,
285 (2014) (“[The] ‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the
defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”); Estate of
Bank v. Swiss Valley Farms Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520 (D. Md.
2003) (“[Hl]laving a plaintiff domiciled in the forum state is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.”).
15
or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the
forum in a meaningful way.”).
Accordingly, assessing each Defendant’s contacts with the
forum state individually, see Calder, 465 U.S. at 790, and
beginning with Defendant John Prillaman, the Complaint fails to
allege any facts to render him essentially at home in North
Carolina (see Docket Entry 1, 7 6 (alleging Virginia domicile)) for
purposes of general personal jurisdiction. As to specific personal
jurisdiction, the Complaint alleges a host of improper actions by
Defendant John Prillaman while representing his father, Defendant
Alton Prillaman, such as submitting “false[]” documents to a
Virginia state court (Docket Entry 1, @ 14; accord id. at 28, 32-
33), attempting “to coerce [Plaintiff into] settlement” (id. 7 47),
“transmi[tting] .. . [Defendant Carson’s] court order” to the Bank
(id. 7 22), and causing Plaintiff to “suffer[] the collapse of a
$1.4 million real estate transaction” (id. 7 1). None of those
actions, as alleged in the Complaint, appear “purposefully
directed” at the state of North Carolina, Burger King, 471 U.S. at
472; instead, the Complaint confines its allegations against
Defendant John Prillaman — who “practices law in Roanoke, Virginia”
(Docket Entry 1, I 6) — to a dispute over a Virginia real estate
transaction (see id. 11), “a promissory note .. . [executed in]
V[irginia]” (id. @ 9), and subsequent state-court litigation in
Virginia (see id. 77 13-64). Plaintiff also “suffered the collapse
16
of a [ ] real estate transaction” (id. 97 1) in Virginia (see id.
11) and therefore “felt the brunt of [Defendant John Prillaman’s
tortious actions] in [that state, rather than] the forum,”
Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 398 n.7. Morever, none of Defendant John
Prillaman’s actions to litigate a dispute in Virginia can support
personal jurisdiction over him in North Carolina, as “[c]lourts
routinely reject personal jurisdiction premised solely on prior
judicial actions in other states .. ., even when brought against
a forum resident” such as Plaintiff, AU Optronics Corp. Am. v.
Vista Peak Ventures, LLC, No. 18cv4638, 2019 WL 690282, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 19, 2019) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and
citation omitted).
Specific personal jurisdiction as to Defendant Carson fails
for similar reasons.?® As alleged in the Complaint, “at all
relevant times, [Defendant Carson] presid[ed over Defendant Alton
Prillaman’s suit against Plaintiff] in the City of Roanoke Circuit
Court” (Docket Entry 1, @ 7), “issued [an] unlawful injunction”
(id. 7 1; accord id. 3, 18-19, 26), and “act[ed] in a clear
conflict of interest” (id. @ 7; accord id. 77 19, 28-61; see also
id. @ 3 (alleging that “issuance and enforcement of an unlawful
injunction ...harm[{ed ] Plaintiff in this district”)). As noted
8 The Complaint fails to allege Defendant Carson’s domicile
(see Docket Entry 1, QI 7 (alleging only that Defendant Carson
“preside[s] in the City of Roanoke Circuit Court”)) and,
accordingly, fails to demonstrate a basis for general personal
jurisdiction over him in North Carolina.
17
above, such allegations represent, for present purposes,
impermissible attempts to establish “personal jurisdiction premised
solely on prior judicial actions in [an]lother state[,]” AU
Optronics, 2019 WL 690282, at *3 (internal quotation marks
omitted), and, in any event, bear no relation to the forum state of
North Carolina beyond “the mere fact that [Plaintiff sustained]
injur[ies ] felt [there],” 12 Mktg., LLC, 2025 WL 2302136, at *4.
The Complaint likewise fails to establish personal
jurisdiction over the Bank. First, as to general personal
jurisdiction over the Bank, which maintains its “headquarter[s] in
Buchanan, Virginia” (id. @ 8), the Complaint fails to allege any
“continuous and systematic’ [affiliations with North Carolina] to
render [the Bank] essentially at home in the forum state,”
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. As to specific personal jurisdiction,
the Complaint alleges that the Bank “froze Plaintiff’s accounts”
(Docket Entry 1, @ 1), causing “financial damage” (id.) and “the
collapse of a $1.4 million real estate transaction” (id.) “in
Danville, Virginia” (id. @ 11), as well as that the Bank “honored
[a Virginia state-court] subpoena[ by] . . . releasing Plaintiff’s
banking records” (id. 7 79). Such allegations do not indicate that
the Bank directed its actions at the State of North Carolina or
“expressly aimed [its] tortious conduct at the forum,” Carefirst,
334 F.3d at 398 n.7, or even that “[P]laintiff felt the brunt of
the harm in the forum,” id., as the asset freeze allegedly caused
18
the collapse of a real estate transaction in Virginia (see Docket
Entry 1, GI 1, 11), and the Bank complied with a subpoena arising
from state-court litigation in that same state (see id. 72-79) □□
CONCLUSION
Rule 25(a) mandates dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Alton Prillaman, and Plaintiff has not made a prima facie
showing of personal jurisdiction as to the remaining Defendants.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED (A) that the Court dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Alton Prillaman pursuant to
Rule 25(a) and (B) that the Court grant in part the Motions (Docket
Entries 12, 19, 25) by dismissing this action as to Defendants John
Prillaman, Carson, and the Bank pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2) for lack
of personal jurisdiction.
This 29° day of July, 2026.
/s/_L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
9 Relatedly, even if the subpoena arose from litigation
within North Carolina, which it did not (see Docket Entry 1, II 72-
79), “several courts have found that responding to a subpoena
issued during litigation in the forum State does not subject the
respondent to personal jurisdiction in that State,” Farooq v.
Standard Chartered Bank, No. 4:24cv336, 2026 WL 120674, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 15, 2026), recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 531743 (E.D.
Tex. Feb. 25, 2026); see also id. (reasoning that “compliance with
a subpoena can be compelled — and is therefore not voluntary” and
collecting cases), further evincing the lack of specific personal
jurisdiction over the Bank on the facts alleged.
19