The opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-11875
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
HALEY COLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LAWRENCE CHRISTOPHER YOUNG,
ELLYN SHOOK,
RYAN OAKES,
in their individual and professional capacities,
ACCENTURE, LLP,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cv-01897-MHC
____________________
Before BRANCH, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
PER CURIAM:
Haley Cole appeals the district court’s order dismissing
Cole’s first amended complaint bringing employment-related
claims against Accenture, LLP (“Accenture”), former Accenture
employee Lawrence Young, and Accenture executives Ellyn Shook
and Ryan Oakes, and denying leave to file a second amended
complaint. Cole presses five arguments on appeal, contending that
the district court erred in: (1) dismissing the claims against Shook
and Oakes for lack of personal jurisdiction without allowing
jurisdictional discovery; (2) dismissing the claims under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) for failure to timely
exhaust administrative remedies; (3) dismissing the constructive
discharge claim for failure to state a claim; (4) denying leave to file
a second amended complaint adding claims under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) after finding that the proposed
amendment was futile; and (5) declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state-law claims. We address each of these
arguments in turn. After careful review, we affirm the district
court’s decision.
I. Background
A. Cole’s Allegations
Cole, a Georgia resident, was an employee at Accenture
from May 2016 until Cole resigned on December 21, 2023. 1 Cole
1 To evaluate the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss, we accept the
facts in the first amended complaint as true and construe them in the light
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25-11875 Opinion of the Court 3
primarily worked remotely from home unless there was a need to
meet colleagues in person. According to the complaint, Cole is “an
autistic, non-binary individual who was assigned female at birth.”
During Cole’s tenure at Accenture, “Cole received several
promotions, raises, and bonuses due to . . . superior work
performance.” In January 2020, Cole began reporting to Young as
Cole’s direct supervisor and career counselor. Young’s
responsibilities in this role including “guiding . . . Cole’s career
progression” and recommending “promotion[s], salary increases,
performance bonuses, and other professional development
opportunities.” The working relationship between the two meant
they were “in constant communication . . . on an almost daily
basis.” Young developed a “special and personal relationship,” with
Cole, frequently alluding to a “continued life partnership” between
the two.
Young developed and frequently used pet names for Cole
between December 2020 and January 2023, including “Doodle
Bug” and “Little Sister.” Over time, Young’s text messages to Cole
not only increased in volume but became “increasingly personal
and sexual in nature” and included sexually explicit discussion of
Young’s new romantic partner. Following a Thanksgiving
gathering at Young’s house in November 2021, Young
“inappropriately inquired whether . . . Cole was clothed or
unclothed during a sensory deprivation session for anxiety relief.”
most favorable to Cole. See Doe ex rel. Doe #6 v. Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295, 1302
(11th Cir. 2022).
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On January 1, 2022, Young sent Cole roughly 162 text
messages. After hours of messages that turned sexual in nature,
Young sent Cole “more than a dozen pornographic images of
himself ” and provided graphic descriptions of his sexual activity
and genitalia. Young asked Cole to send him images in return.
Cole initially rebuffed Young’s requests, which led Young to call
Cole a “tease” who was “rude” for making him “be patient.” Cole,
fearing potential career repercussions, eventually relented. Young’s
messages turned to descriptions of Cole’s genitalia and included
telling Cole that Young wanted to “put his seed” in Cole and
inquiring as to Cole’s preferred sexual positions. Young invited
Cole to his house to engage in sex, but Cole refused.
Young then video called Cole. When Cole answered the call,
Young exposed his penis and began masturbating to the images
Cole had sent him. During this call, Young “forced” Cole to expose
Cole’s genitals to Young while Young continued masturbating and
eventually ejaculated. At no point had Cole welcomed Young’s
sexual advances or have any desire to engage in a romantic or
sexual relationship with Young.
Following the January 1, 2022, incident, Young continued
“the same inappropriate sexual harassment” while managing
Cole’s career and day-to-day work projects, including attempts to
pressure Cole to come over to his house and forcibly hugging Cole
without permission in June 2022. From February 2022 through
“the entire summer of 2022,” Cole began experiencing suicidal
ideations, depression, panic attacks, uncontrollable periods of
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crying, fear, and anxiety, feelings of guilt, shame, and
embarrassment, and an overall decline in mental health linked to
daily interactions with Young. Doctors diagnosed Cole with
“major depression, anxiety, OCD, and ADHD” in March 2022, and
each day Cole continued to work with Young “inflicted additional
and compounding trauma.” Cole also “developed symptoms of
PTSD.”
Cole’s declining mental health led to taking time off from
work, including a Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave of
absence in April 2022 and short-term disability leave in May 2022.
In August 2022, Cole underwent a partial hospitalization program
to treat major depression, gender dysphoria, and suicidal ideations.
Cole transferred to a sober living program in November 2022. And
by December 2022, Cole’s mental and physical health deteriorated
so severely that doctors diagnosed Cole with anorexia nervosa and
began treating the eating disorder.
Even though Cole was on leave in December 2022, Young
informed Cole that Cole would receive a bonus and a raise. Cole
reported Young’s prior conduct to Accenture on December 2, 2022,
and then met with representatives from Accenture on December
5, 2022, to provide more information. Cole remained on paid leave
until after the investigation concluded. The representatives also
instructed Cole not to discuss Young’s conduct with coworkers at
Accenture. Shook was involved in the investigation as a member
of Accenture’s executive team.
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On January 10, 2023, Accenture informed Cole that
Accenture would no longer employ Young and advised that Cole
could return to work on January 18, 2023, after Young departed.
On January 19, 2023, the day after Cole returned to work, a senior
Accenture employee e-mailed Cole’s group to announce that
Young had “decided to pursue his passion outside of Accenture”
and that Accenture would “always appreciate [Young’s] personal
style and passion for public service,” which was an effort to
“protect . . . Young’s reputation and character, despite [h]is sexual
misconduct” while continuing to prevent Cole from discussing the
matter with colleagues. Cole viewed this action as “silencing
behavior.”
Cole discovered upon returning to work that Accenture had
assigned Cole to a new team with a female supervisor, and that
Oakes, a close friend of Young’s, was now Cole’s career counselor.
The new team had “little to no direct client contact” and Cole
viewed it as “an inferior team.” Cole believed that Oakes was at
least one of the decisionmakers involved in the transfer decision.
Cole struggled to transition back to work, reaching a “breaking
point” on January 31, 2023, that resulted in Cole taking several days
off. In February 2023, Cole asked Accenture whether Cole could
disclose Young’s conduct to the new supervisor but was told in
March 2023 not to do so.
By May 5, 2023, Cole’s mental health team considered
whether admission to an intensive outpatient eating disorder
program was necessary to protect Cole’s life. Cole’s last work
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assignment submission before going back on medical leave
occurred on May 16, 2023. Cole took another leave of absence on
May 31, 2023; unable to work, Cole submitted a worker’s
compensation claim on June 15, 2023. Accenture denied the claim
because its worker’s compensation did not cover harassment or
mental illness. Cole appealed a previous denial for long-term
disability on June 23, 2023, which was granted on September 18,
2023.
While still on leave, Cole e-mailed Accenture on October 31,
2023, informing Accenture of Cole’s intention to report Young to
the State of Georgia for sexual misconduct and seeking a transfer
back to Cole’s previous team. Cole also again sought permission
to discuss Young’s conduct with coworkers. Accenture
representatives responded on November 14, 2023, and explained
that Cole could tell coworkers about Young’s conduct if required
but questioned whether such conversations were necessary.
Despite approval for long-term disability through November 2024,
Cole “reached a breaking point” on December 21, 2023, and e-
mailed Shook and Oakes to “resign from Accenture under duress.”2
The resignation e-mail cited Young’s prior “grooming and
sexual harassment”—and the resulting mental effects—as the
reason for Cole’s resignation, as well as the Accenture
representative’s instructions to Cole to avoid disclosing the
2 Cole attached the e-mail to the complaint and referenced it in the complaint.
Thus, we may properly consider it at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See
Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000).
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
harassment to colleagues. The e-mail also noted that, after
Accenture told Cole not to disclose Young’s conduct, Cole had
“asked to be transferred to another team” because Cole could not
imagine being unable to tell colleagues what Young had done. But
upon returning to work in January 2023 and attempting to adjust
to the new team and new work, “it became obvious that separating
[Cole] from [Cole’s] team of 7-years was never a viable long-term
solution.” Cole expressed unhappiness with the way Accenture
had handled things and a need to resign as a result.
B. Cole’s Litigation
On December 29, 2023, Cole filed a discrimination charge
against Accenture with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) alleging violations of Title VII and the
ADA based on sex, “gender identity and sexual orientation,”
retaliation, and disability. On March 21, 2024, the EEOC issued a
Notice of Right to Sue.
Cole then sued Accenture, and Young, Shook, and Oakes in
their individual capacities, on April 30, 2024, and filed a first
amended complaint on May 2, 2024. Among the ten causes of
action were alleged violations of Title VII for gender
discrimination, sexual harassment, and hostile work environment,
as well as a constructive discharge claim for the defendants creating
an environment “so intolerable that a reasonable person would
have felt compelled to resign.” Cole further alleged that Accenture,
Oakes, and Shook violated Title VII by retaliating after Cole filed a
harassment complaint against Young. The complaint also included
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five state-law claims for battery, invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and negligent retention.
Accenture, Shook, Oakes, and Young moved to dismiss the
first amended complaint because the complaint failed to state a
claim, many of the claims were untimely, and the court lacked
personal jurisdiction over Shook and Oakes. In support of their
jurisdictional argument, Shook and Oakes attached sworn
declarations to their motion explaining that they were New York
and Connecticut residents, respectively, with limited to no
connection to Georgia. Cole responded, arguing that Shook and
Oakes directed actions toward Georgia and caused damages in
Georgia.
The magistrate judge recommended granting the motions
in part. As to Shook and Oakes, the magistrate judge
recommended dismissing them as defendants for lack of personal
jurisdiction as neither were Georgia residents, committed tortious
acts in Georgia, or could reasonably expect to be haled into court
in Georgia. As to the Title VII claims against Young, the magistrate
judge recommended their dismissal as Title VII does not allow for
individual liability. 3 The magistrate judge also recommended
3 In its final order dismissing the complaint, the district court noted that Cole
had conceded Title VII does not provide individual liability against other
employees or supervisors. Thus, even if the court did have personal
jurisdiction over Shook and Oakes, the Title VII claims against them would
fail for the same reason.
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10 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
dismissing the gender discrimination, hostile work environment,
and retaliation claims as untimely because the alleged conduct
occurred more than 180 days before the EEOC filing and Cole had
not shown a basis for equitable tolling or that the continuing
violation doctrine applied. The magistrate judge next concluded
that the Title VII constructive discharge claim, while timely, failed
to state a claim because the complaint had not pleaded
circumstances that would have compelled a reasonable person to
resign. Finally, having recommended dismissal of all the federal
claims, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal without
prejudice of the remaining state court claims.
Cole filed objections to the magistrate judge’s first report
and recommendation (“R&R”). Part of these objections included
a request for jurisdictional discovery as to Shook’s and Oakes’s
contacts with Georgia. Cole simultaneously moved for leave to file
a second amended complaint to add Accenture PLC as a party, add
claims against Accenture LLP and PLC under the ADA, and
voluntarily dismiss Cole’s Title VII claims against Young, Shook,
and Oakes.4 In the proposed second amended complaint, Cole
largely relied on the same facts but limited the Title VII claims to
Accenture only. As for the ADA claims against Accenture, the
second amended complaint alleged that Accenture, Oakes, and
Shook “repeatedly refused to accommodate [Cole’s]
4 We refer to Accenture LLP and PLC together as Accenture.
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accommodation requests” 5 and instead “subjected [Cole] to . . .
disparate treatment, retaliation, and a hostile work environment
due to [Cole’s] mental health disabilities.
The magistrate judge considered the proposed amended
complaint and issued a second R&R, recommending that the
district court deny leave to amend because amendment would be
futile. Specifically, the amendment would not cure the personal
jurisdiction problems as to Shook or Oakes, nor could Cole cure
the time-barred nature of the Title VII gender discrimination,
hostile work environment, and retaliation claims, or adequately
plead constructive discharge. The new ADA claims were (A) time-
barred as they fell outside the statutory limitations period, (B) did
not relate back to the original complaint, and (C) even setting aside
these procedural problems, they failed to state a claim.
Cole filed objections to the second R&R. The district court
entered an order overruling the objections to both the first and
second R&Rs. It found that the court did not have personal
jurisdiction over Shook and Oakes and that Cole failed to diligently
pursue the jurisdictional discovery request by raising it for the first
time in the objections to the first R&R, despite having ample
opportunities to make the request earlier. The court next
concluded that Title VII did not allow for liability against
individuals, and that the gender discrimination, hostile work
5 Cole’s accommodation requests included (1) a request to transfer back to
Cole’s old team, and (2) a request to disclose to colleagues Young’s conduct
and its effects on Cole.
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12 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
environment, and retaliation claims under Title VII were clearly
untimely and that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply.
As to constructive discharge, the court found that Cole failed to
state a claim upon which the court could grant relief because the
conditions alleged did not plausibly show a situation so intolerable
that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. As
to the motion for leave to amend the complaint, the court found
that the proposed second amended complaint would not cure the
deficiencies in the first amended complaint as to the Title VII
claims it retained. And as for the new ADA claims, the court found
they would be futile because the allegations failed to state a claim
for failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, retaliation,
hostile work environment, or constructive discharge under the
ADA. Accordingly, the court granted the motions to dismiss,
dismissed the claims against Shook and Oakes without prejudice
for lack of personal jurisdiction, dismissed the Title VII claims with
prejudice, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. It also
denied the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.
Cole moved for reconsideration, which the court denied,
and then timely appealed.
II. Discussion
Cole raises five issues on appeal: (1) the district court should
not have dismissed the claims against Shook and Oakes for lack of
personal jurisdiction without allowing jurisdictional discovery;
(2) the district court should not have dismissed the Title VII
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complaints as time barred; (3) the district court should not have
dismissed the constructive discharge claim for failure to state a
claim; (4) the district court erred in finding the proposed ADA
claims would be futile and denying leave to file the second
amended complaint; and (5) the district court should have
exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. We
address each issue in turn.6
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Cole argues that the court had personal jurisdiction over
Shook and Oakes because the two defendants directed Cole’s work
assignments in Georgia, participated in personnel decisions
affecting Cole’s employment in Georgia, and caused harm to Cole
in Georgia. Cole further argues that any factual dispute about
6 Cole also raises perfunctory challenges to the district court’s denial of post-
judgment relief, “cumulative errors” that resulted in a violation of Cole’s due
process rights, and whether the district court’s entering of final judgment on
the merits of the ADA claims “impos[ed] unwarranted res judicata
consequences.” The initial brief listed these issues in the statement of the
issues, but did not further explain the issues in the argument section of the
initial brief. Instead, Cole attempted to develop the issues for the first time in
the reply brief. An appellant who fails to raise a claim plainly and prominently
in their opening brief by, for example, devoting a discrete section of their
argument to the claim, abandons it on appeal. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). We generally will not consider an issue
raised for the first time in a reply brief. Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84
F.4th 1300, 1313 (11th Cir. 2023). Thus, we decline to address these issues.
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Shook’s and Oakes’s supervisory authority should have led the
court to allow jurisdictional discovery.
“We review de novo whether the district court had personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Louis Vuitton Malletier,
S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir. 2013). “In doing so,
we accept as true the allegations in the complaint” and review the
district court’s jurisdictional factfinding for clear error. Id. We
review a district court’s denial, grant, or limitation of a motion for
discovery for an abuse of discretion. United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer,
556 F.3d 1260, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009).
“A plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the
complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of
jurisdiction.” Id. at 1274. “Where . . . the defendant challenges
jurisdiction by submitting affidavit evidence in support of its
position, the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to
produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Analyzing “whether personal jurisdiction exists requires a
two-step inquiry.” Mut. Serv. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d
1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004). First, we consider whether the exercise
of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is consistent with
the forum state’s long-arm statute. Id. If so, “we examine whether
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would
violate the Due Process Clause . . . , which requires that the
defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state and that
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the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id.
(quotation omitted); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 474–77 (1985).
When a federal court uses a state long-arm statute, it
construes the statute as the state’s supreme court would. Diamond
Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1258
(11th Cir. 2010). Georgia’s long-arm statute explains:
A court of this state may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any nonresident . . . , as to a cause of
action arising from any of the acts, omissions,
ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this
Code section, in the same manner as if he or she were
a resident of this state, if in person or through an
agent, he or she:
(1) Transacts any business within this state;
(2) Commits a tortious act or omission within
this state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act;
[or]
(3) Commits a tortious injury in this state
caused by an act or omission outside this state
if the tort-feasor regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered in this state . . . .
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O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1)–(3). “[T]he Georgia long-arm statute does
not grant courts in Georgia personal jurisdiction that is coextensive
with procedural due process” and “must be read literally.”
Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1259.
The Georgia Supreme Court has held that for subsection (2)
of Georgia’s long-arm statute to apply to a non-resident defendant,
the defendant must commit a tortious act or omission within
Georgia rather than a tortious act or omission in another state that
merely causes an injury in Georgia.7 Innovative Clinical &
Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352, 353–
54 (Ga. 2005); see also Anderson v. Deas, 632 S.E.2d 682, 683 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2006) (“[W]here a person commits a tortious act outside this
state causing injury in the state, paragraph (3) rather than (2)
applies—thereby requiring the presence of one of the contacts set
forth in paragraph (3) before long arm jurisdiction may be exercised
if the tortious injury but not the act occurs in this state.”).
District courts “have the power to order, at their discretion,
the discovery of facts necessary to ascertain their competency to
7 Cole did not challenge the magistrate judge’s finding that personal
jurisdiction over Shook and Oakes was inconsistent with O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1)
or (3) in Cole’s objections to the first R&R. Cole has thus waived the issue,
and we decline to address it. See Smith v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc., 106 F.4th
1091, 1097 (11th Cir. 2024) (“A party who fails to object to a magistrate judge’s
findings or recommendations in [a R&R] waives the right to challenge on
appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal
conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the
consequences on appeal for failing to object.” (quotation omitted)).
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entertain the merits.” Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727,
729 (11th Cir. 1982). While “the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be given the
opportunity to discover facts that would support [the] allegations
of jurisdiction.” Majd-Pour v. Georgiana Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 724 F.2d
901, 903 (11th Cir. 1984). In other words, generally, dismissal
without affording the plaintiff an opportunity to pursue
jurisdictional discovery is an abuse of discretion. See id. But a
district court does not abuse its discretion when the plaintiff fails to
formally move for jurisdictional discovery, “burie[s] such requests
in [the] briefs,” or fails to take “reasonable steps to seek discovery”
during the time in which a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction is pending. Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1280–81.
The district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Shook
and Oakes under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2). Cole failed to plausibly
allege any tortious acts or omissions committed by Shook and
Oakes within Georgia and instead relied solely on the effects
Shook’s and Oakes’s actions had on Cole in Georgia, which is
insufficient to satisfy O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2). Innovative Clinical &
Consulting Servs., 620 S.E.2d at 353–54. The district court also did
not abuse its discretion in declining the belated request for
jurisdictional discovery filed after the magistrate judge had issued
his first R&R. See Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1280–81. Thus, the district
court properly dismissed the claims against Shook and Oakes for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
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B. Exhaustion
Cole argues that the district court should not have dismissed
most of the Title VII claims as time-barred. For the hostile work
environment claim, Cole claims the complaint “allege[d] a
continuous pattern of supervisory harassment, coercive power
imbalance, and retaliatory workplace conditions” that fell within
the limitations period. Cole raises similar arguments about the
gender discrimination and retaliation claims, arguing that Cole’s
reassignment, restricted disclosure requirements, deterioration in
workplace standing, and limited advancement opportunities from
the “inferior” team extended into the limitations period. Cole also
argues that the claims, even if not timely, should be subject to
equitable tolling based on mental health struggles which prevented
Cole from timely filing the complaint.
“We review de novo [a] district court’s ruling on a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construing them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Doe ex rel. Doe #6 v.
Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation
omitted). We also “review de novo whether undisputed facts
satisfy the legal prerequisites for equitable tolling.” Beazer v.
Richmond Cnty. Constructors, LLC, 169 F.4th 1082, 1086 (11th Cir.
2026). At the pleadings stage, a claim’s dismissal as untimely “is
appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that
the claim is time-barred.” See Karantsalis v. City of Miami Springs, 17
F.4th 1316, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).
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To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint
must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Mere legal conclusions “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth”; instead, “they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Id. at 679.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to [the individual’s] compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment . . . because of such individual’s . . .
sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Sex-based discrimination under
Title VII encompasses discrimination based on transgender status
and sexual orientation. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 661–
62 (2020). Sexual harassment can also constitute sex-based
discrimination under Title VII. Johnson v. Booker T. Washington
Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 508 (11th Cir. 2000). Title VII’s
“opposition clause” prohibits an employer from retaliating against
an employee because they have opposed any practice that is
unlawful under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Gogel v. Kia Motors
Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1134 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
“[R]elief under Title VII is available against only the employer and
not against individual employees whose actions would constitute a
violation of the Act . . . .” Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th
Cir. 2006).
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20 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
“Before a potential plaintiff may sue for discrimination
under Title VII, [the plaintiff] must first exhaust [the plaintiff’s]
administrative remedies,” and “[t]he first step down this path is
filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC.” Wilkerson
v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001). In a non-
deferral state 8 such as Georgia, a plaintiff must bring a charge with
the EEOC within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Wilkerson, 270 F.3d
at 1317. The applicable period for filing an EEOC charge begins to
run when the employee receives unequivocal notice of an adverse
employment decision. See Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232
F.3d 844, 849 (11th Cir. 2000).
“[F]iling a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is
not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a
requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver,
estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). Generally, a plaintiff seeking equitable
tolling must “prove (1) that [the plaintiff] has been pursuing [the
plaintiff’s] rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in [the plaintiff’s] way and prevented timely
filing.” Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 971 (11th
Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quotation omitted). “The plaintiff bears the
8 A “deferral state” is one that “prohibit[s] the unlawful employment practice
at issue and ha[s] established state or local authorities to grant or seek relief for
such practice.” Maynard v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp., 256 F.3d 1259, 1262–63 (11th
Cir. 2001). Georgia is a non-deferral state. Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1317.
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burden of showing that such extraordinary circumstances exist.”
Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006).
In the Title VII context, we have said that equitable tolling
is appropriate in situations where (1) an action was pending before
a state court, (2) the defendant concealed facts supporting a cause
of action, or (3) the defendant misled the plaintiff about the nature
of the plaintiff’s rights under Title VII. Manning v. Carlin, 786 F.2d
1108, 1109 (11th Cir. 1986). A plaintiff seeking equitable tolling
based on a mental impairment must establish a causal connection
between the impairment and the plaintiff’s ability to file timely. See
Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 2005).
Additionally, “[t]he continuing violation doctrine allows [a]
plaintiff to sue on otherwise time-barred claims if the defendant’s
actions violate a plaintiff’s rights on a repeated or ongoing basis.”
Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 146 F.4th 972, 992 (11th Cir. 2025)
(quotation omitted). “In determining whether a discriminatory
employment practice constitutes a continuing violation, this
Circuit distinguishes between the present consequence of a one
time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, and
the continuation of the violation into the present, which does.”
Calloway v. Partners Nat’l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir.
1993) (quotation omitted). Discrete employment actions such as
termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire
each trigger a separate clock for filing an EEOC charge, and the
“continuing violation doctrine cannot convert related discrete acts
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22 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
into a single unlawful practice for the purposes of timely filing.”
Jimenez, 146 F.4th at 992 (quotation omitted).
Hostile work environment claims, by contrast, are “different
in kind from discrete acts” because their “very nature involves
repeated conduct.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 115 (2002). Thus, the Supreme Court has “eschewed the use
of the continuing violation doctrine in hostile work environment
cases,” see Shields v. Fort James Corp., 305 F.3d 1280, 1281 (11th Cir.
2002), instead holding that a “hostile work environment claim is
composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute
one unlawful employment practice,” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117
(quotation omitted). Thus, for an EEOC charge to be timely as to
a hostile work environment claim, the employee need only file the
charge within 180 days “of any act that is part of the hostile work
environment.” Id. at 118. Similarly, for a hostile-environment
constructive discharge claim, so long as the acts alleged are part of
the same claim under consideration, the relevant filing period will
only begin running after the last relevant act occurs. Jimenez, 146
F.4th at 993.
As a preliminary matter, there is no individual liability under
Title VII, so the district court did not err in dismissing Cole’s Title
VII claims against Young. See Dearth, 441 F.3d at 933 (explaining
that relief under Title VII is available only against the employer and
not against individual employees). As for the remaining Title VII
claims against Accenture, Cole filed the EEOC charge against
Accenture on December 29, 2023. Thus, any unlawful
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25-11875 Opinion of the Court 23
employment practice must have occurred within 180 days of that
filing—on July 2, 2023, or later—for the action to proceed under
Title VII. Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1317.
Cole’s claims do not allege conduct within that 180-day
window. Young left Accenture in January 2023, well outside the
range, and any sexual harassment or gender discrimination that he
inflicted on Cole as part of his role at Accenture necessarily
terminated then as well. The harm alleged, while severe, reflects a
“present consequence” of the previous discrimination, and thus
does not transform the past conduct into a continuing violation.
See Calloway, 986 F.2d at 448. Cole’s retaliation claims meet a
similar fate. The alleged retaliatory acts, including Accenture’s
efforts to dissuade Cole from discussing Young’s conduct, the
reassignment to another team, and Accenture’s failure to provide
“accommodations” all occurred before July 2, 2023. The last time
Accenture told Cole not to discuss Young’s conduct was March
2023, and Accenture reassigned Cole to another team in January
2023. Each of these discrete acts did not represent a continuing
violation and thus did not extend the filing period. See Jimenez, 146
F.4th at 992.
While a hostile work environment claim differs from the
previously discussed discrete acts, Cole failed to allege any act that
was part of a hostile work environment that occurred after July 2,
2023. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 118. This claim depended on Young’s
actions and Cole’s perception of Accenture’s support for Young, all
of which ended by January 2023. And the last act that an observer
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24 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
could possibly view as retaliation (and creating a hostile
environment) was Accenture’s denial of the worker’s
compensation claim which happened before July 2, 2023. Cole’s
voluntary resignation in December 2023 also did not extend the
limitations period, because as we will discuss in the next
subsection, the resignation was not a constructive discharge.
Furthermore, contrary to Cole’s contentions, the timing of each
event was readily apparent from the face of the complaint; thus,
the district court did not err in determining the statute barred the
untimely claims when the court considered the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. See Karantsalis, 17 F.4th at 1319–20.
Similarly, the district court did not err in concluding that
equitable tolling did not apply to Cole’s claims. While Cole’s first
amended complaint detailed mental harms resulting from Young’s
sexual harassment and Accenture’s actions, the complaint failed to
plausibly allege that these psychological harms prevented timely
filing. Moreover, the complaint establishes that Cole pursued
other legal rights during the relevant period, including, e.g., filing a
claim for long-term disability in September 2022, submitting a
claim for worker’s compensation around June 2023, appealing the
denial of a request for long-term disability on June 23, 2023, and e-
mailing Accenture on October 31, 2023, expressing an intent to
report Young to the State of Georgia. See Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 971;
Lawrence, 421 F.3d at 1226–27. All told, these other actions indicate
that Cole could have filed the EEOC action earlier, and thus
equitable tolling does not apply.
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In sum, the district court did not err in dismissing Cole’s
gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation
claims under Title VII in the first amended complaint as time-
barred. 9 The employment actions underlying these claims
occurred more than 180 days before Cole filed the December 2023
charge with the EEOC. The continuing violation doctrine does not
save these claims. And Cole’s pursuit of other legal rights
throughout 2022 and 2023 belied the belated assertion in Cole’s
objections to the R&R that equitable tolling should apply based on
Cole’s mental health struggles. 10
C. Constructive Discharge
Cole argues that the complaint plausibly alleged the
working conditions at Accenture had become objectively
intolerable, which meant Cole’s departure was a constructive
discharge and not a resignation. In support of this conclusion, Cole
points to Accenture’s removal of Cole from core responsibilities,
reassignment to another less prestigious team, and refusal to
provide accommodations. Cole also argues that the resignation’s
reasonableness was a factual issue that the court should not have
resolved at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
9 Because we find that these claims are time barred, we need not reach nor
express any opinion on their merits.
10 The proposed second amended complaint would not have cured the
timeliness constraints on the Title VII claims because it added no facts showing
conduct that occurred during the relevant 180-day window.
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26 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
“Constructive discharge occurs when an employer
deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions intolerable
and thereby forces [the employee] to quit [the] job.” Bryant v. Jones,
575 F.3d 1281, 1298 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). “A
plaintiff must show the work environment and conditions of
employment were so unbearable that a reasonable person in that
person’s position would be compelled to resign.” Id. (quotation
omitted). The time between the objectionable acts and the
plaintiff’s resignation is relevant to assessing whether a reasonable
person would have felt compelled to resign. See Steele v. Offshore
Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1313–14, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 1989)
(affirming a district court’s finding that a corporate employer did
not constructively discharge employees where the sexual
harassment stopped almost two weeks before the employees’
resignations).
“Creation of a hostile work environment is a necessary
predicate to a hostile-environment constructive discharge case,”
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 149 (2004), though
“[e]stablishing a constructive discharge claim is a more onerous
task than establishing a hostile work environment claim,” Bryant,
575 F.3d at 1298. A plaintiff seeking to establish a hostile work
environment must establish that he suffered harassment based on
a protected characteristic that was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of his employment, and the employer was
responsible for the hostile work environment. Miller v. Kenworth of
Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002).
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Cole’s constructive discharge claims fail to state a situation
that would have forced a reasonable person to resign. Young left
Accenture in January 2023, nearly a year before Cole’s December
2023 resignation. See Steele, 867 F.2d at 1313–14, 1317–18. As for
the alleged acts of retaliation, the reassignment to another team (at
Cole’s request) was in January 2023, as was Accenture’s alleged
protection of Young’s reputation upon Young’s exit. The initial
instructions to Cole not to discuss the harassment while the
investigation was ongoing occurred in December and January
2023, with the last denial in March 2023. When Cole asked again
about discussing Young’s harassment with colleagues in October
2023, Accenture allowed Cole to do so in November 2023.
Combined, these facts undermine any plausible claim that
Accenture deliberately made Cole’s working conditions so
intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to
resign. See Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1298.
Finally, contrary to Cole’s argument, the district court did
not engage in factfinding as to constructive discharge. Instead, it
applied the correct standard for a motion to dismiss, treating the
factual allegations as true, before determining that even if true, the
facts did not show Accenture constructively discharged Cole based
on the analysis above. See Doe, 51 F.4th at 1302.
D. Leave to Amend to Add ADA Claims
Cole argues that the district court should have granted leave
to amend the complaint and add the ADA claims against
Accenture. Cole contends that the second amended complaint
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28 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
would have been the first substantive chance to amend, which Cole
should have received under our precedent. 11 In any event, Cole
argues that the court applied the wrong standard in resolving
factual disputes against Cole. Instead, the ADA claims were timely
because they share the same factual nucleus as the facts in the
complaint, meaning they related back to the date of the first
amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
Cole contends the second amended complaint plausibly stated a
claim for relief under the ADA.
“Generally, a district court’s decision to deny a motion to
amend a complaint is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”
Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2021).
“But we will review de novo an order denying leave to amend on
the grounds of futility, because it is a conclusion of law that an
amended complaint would necessarily fail.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), once the time
for amending as a matter of course has passed, “a party may amend
its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the
court’s leave,” and “[t]he court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Generally, where a
more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff
must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before
11 Cole filed the initial complaint on April 30, 2024, and the first amended
complaint on May 2, 2024. The first amended complaint removed the
defendant’s addresses at their request but was otherwise the same complaint.
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25-11875 Opinion of the Court 29
the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Garcia v.
Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 48 F.4th 1202, 1220 (11th Cir. 2022)
(quotation omitted). But a district court need not grant leave
where amendment would be futile. Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d
1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005). In other words, “[b]ecause justice does
not require district courts to waste their time on hopeless cases,
leave may be denied if a proposed amendment fails to correct the
deficiencies in the original complaint or otherwise fails to state a
claim.” Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1255 (11th Cir.
2008).
Cole’s ADA claims fell into three categories: (1) reasonable
accommodation; (2) disparate treatment; (3) hostile work
environment and constructive discharge; and (4) retaliation. For
the reasons below, we agree with the district court that the second
amended complaint failed to state an ADA claim.
The ADA prohibits covered employers from
“discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A plaintiff who
alleges that an employer has discriminated against them in
violation of the ADA must make out a prima facie case showing
that (1) the plaintiff has a disability, (2) the plaintiff is a qualified
individual, and (3) the defendant unlawfully discriminated against
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30 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s disability. Reed v. Heil Co., 206
F.3d 1055, 1061 (11th Cir. 2000). 12
An employer discriminates against a qualified individual
because of the individual’s disability when the employer fails to
“mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of [its] business.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A reasonable
accommodation is one that “enables the employee to perform the
essential functions of the job.” LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc.,
146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998). An employer’s “duty to provide
a reasonable accommodation is not triggered unless a specific
demand for an accommodation has been made,” and “[o]nly after
the employee has satisfied this burden and the employer fails to
provide that accommodation can the employee prevail on a claim
that [the] employer has discriminated against [the employee].”
Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363–64
(11th Cir. 1999).
Additionally, the ADA further provides that “[n]o person
shall discriminate against any individual because such individual
12 On appeal, the parties only dispute the third element, whether Accenture
discriminated against Cole based on disability. We accordingly limit our
review to whether the second amended complaint states a claim on that point
and, for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, assume that Cole satisfies the
first two elements.
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25-11875 Opinion of the Court 31
has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA].” 42
U.S.C. § 12203(a). “This provision creates a prohibition on
retaliation under the ADA that is similar to Title VII’s prohibition
on retaliation.” Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117
F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997). To establish retaliation under the
ADA, “a plaintiff must show (1) statutorily protected expression;
(2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the
protected expression and the adverse action.” Id.
Finally, a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment under the
ADA must “prove that [the plaintiff was] treated less favorably than
a similarly situated, non-disabled person.” Sailboat Bend Sober
Living, LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 46 F.4th 1268, 1275 (11th Cir.
2022). In the Title VII context13, we have held that a hostile work
environment claim requires the following showing:
(1) [the plaintiff] belong[ed] to a protected group;
(2) [the plaintiff] was subject[ed] to unwelcome
harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a
protected characteristic; (4) the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of [the plaintiff’s] employment; and (5) [the]
employer was responsible for the hostile work
environment.
13 We have never addressed whether a hostile work environment is a viable
claim under the ADA. But for the purposes of this motion to dismiss, we
assume that it is and that Title VII’s standard would also apply to such a claim.
Even assuming such claim could be viable, Cole’s allegations are insufficient.
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32 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
Copeland v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 97 F.4th 766, 774 (11th Cir. 2024)
(quotation omitted).
Cole’s proposed ADA claims were futile, and the district
court did not err in denying leave to bring the claims in a second
amended complaint. The failure-to-accommodate claim rested on
the October 31, 2023, e-mail requesting a transfer back to Cole’s
former team and to speak with coworkers about Young’s sexual
harassment and its effect on Cole. We assume for purposes of the
motion to dismiss stage that these are reasonable requests for
accommodations and that these requests related to Cole’s
disabilities. While Accenture initially encouraged Cole to avoid
disclosing to coworkers Young’s conduct and its effects on Cole,
Accenture explicitly permitted Cole to talk to coworkers about
Young’s sexual harassment on November 14, 2023. Thus,
Accenture granted Cole the requested accommodation, and the
second amended complaint failed to state a claim for failure to
accommodate based on this request. Gaston, 167 F.3d at 1364. As
for Cole’s request to return to the old team, the October 2023 e-
mail stated that Cole was requesting to transfer back to the old
team “when [Cole] return[ed] to work.”14 Because Cole did not
14 While Accenture attached this e-mail to its motion to dismiss, a court “may
consider exhibits attached to a motion to dismiss without converting the
motion into one for summary judgment if the exhibits are (1) central to the
plaintiff’s claim and (2) their authenticity is not disputed.” Crawford’s Auto Ctr.,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 945 F.3d 1150, 1162 (11th Cir. 2019). Cole
did not contest the district court’s consideration of the e-mail and has thus
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25-11875 Opinion of the Court 33
return to work before resigning in December 2023, Accenture’s
failure to immediately respond to the request did not plausibly
amount to a denial of it. See id. Accordingly, Cole failed to state a
plausible claim for failure-to-accommodate based on this request.
Cole’s second amended complaint also failed to state a claim
for disparate treatment or a hostile work environment under the
ADA. While the complaint described various acts of alleged
discrimination and harassment by Accenture in support of these
claims—including its instruction not to disclose Young’s sexual
harassment to Cole’s colleagues, its reassignment of Cole to a
different team upon Cole’s return to work in January 2023, and its
efforts to protect Young’s reputation,—the second amended
complaint made no allegations suggesting that Accenture took
these alleged discriminatory and harassing actions based on Cole’s
disabilities. See Reed, 206 F.3d at 1061; Copeland, 97 F.4th at 774.
Lastly, Cole’s ADA retaliation claim relied on the “close
temporal proximity” between the “constructive discharge” in
December 2023 and Cole’s requests for an accommodation. But
because the complaint failed to state a hostile work environment
claim, it also necessarily failed to allege a constructive discharge
and thus failed to allege a link between a protected activity and an
abandoned any challenge Cole may have had. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines
Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004); Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681.
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34 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
adverse employment decision. See Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1298; Stewart,
117 F.3d at 1287. 15
E. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Finally, Cole argues that the district court erred in declining
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because Cole still had viable
federal claims. Cole also contends that the district court should
have analyzed whether judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity favored retaining supplemental jurisdiction.
We review a district court’s decision to decline
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim for abuse of discretion.
Harris-Billups ex rel. Harris v. Anderson, 61 F.4th 1298, 1302 n.4 (11th
Cir. 2023); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th
Cir. 2004).
In civil actions, the district courts “have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to [those]
claims” over which the district court has original jurisdiction “that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
15 Cole also argues that the district court should not have considered the
second amended complaint’s sufficiency before deciding whether to grant
leave to amend. But “leave may be denied if a proposed amendment fails to
correct the deficiencies in the original complaint or otherwise fails to state a
claim.” See Mizzaro, 544 F.3d at 1255. The district court properly assumed the
truth of the allegations in the second amended complaint, avoided drawing
inferences against Cole, and considered Cole’s objections before deciding
whether to adopt the R&Rs. Doe, 51 F.4th at 1302; Mizzaro, 544 F.3d at 1255.
It then found that amendment would be futile, and it did not need to allow
futile claims to move forward. See Corsello, 428 F.3d at 1014.
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25-11875 Opinion of the Court 35
the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But a district
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where it
“has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Additionally, in deciding whether to dismiss claims over
which it has supplemental jurisdiction, the district court should
consult the factors articulated in United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), including “judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity.” Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium
Laby’s, Inc., 803 F.3d 518, 532 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
Where “the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs
strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of state claims.”
Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation
omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims
because it had dismissed all of the Title VII federal claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Mergens, 166 F.3d at 1119. Cole resists this
conclusion, arguing that the district court erred in declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction without explicitly discussing
each of the Gibbs factors. But Cole has identified no authority
holding that district courts must explicitly discuss the Gibbs factors
on the record before declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. In any event, the magistrate judge’s first R&R—which
the district court adopted—explicitly referenced Gibbs, comity, and
considerations impacting fairness (including, for example, Cole’s
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36 Opinion of the Court 25-11875
ability to refile the claims in state court under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a)).
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims.16
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
judgment.17
AFFIRMED.
16 Cole also argues that the district court erred in resolving the amendment
issue and the supplemental jurisdiction issue in a single order “without first
recognizing that . . . grant[ing] [the amendment] would preserve jurisdiction.”
But, as discussed above, the court properly denied leave to file the proposed
second amended complaint because amendment would have been futile.
Thus, there was no error.
17 We note with grave concern that Cole’s initial appellate brief includes
purported quoted material from five cases—Pinnacle Advert. & Mktg. Grp. Inc.
v. Pinnacle Advert. & Mktg. Grp., LLC, 7 F.4th 989 (11th Cir. 2021); Perez-Priego
v. Alachua Cnty. Clerk of Ct., 148 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1998); Akins v. Fulton
County, 420 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2005); Quality Foods de Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin
Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989 (11th Cir. 1983), and Horsley v.
Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2002)—but the asserted quoted material does
not appear anywhere in these opinions. While it may be arguable whether
the cases support the propositions counsel cited them for, we remind Cole’s
counsel that the Court relies on advocates to present their case on their client’s
behalf. Providing quotations that do not appear in the cited cases is a
disservice to that obligation to the client and an abdication of counsel’s duty
to the Court.