Rockenbaugh

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

CALEB-ROBERT:ROCKENBAUGH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:26-cv-00351-RK

)

BRAD D. EDISON,1 PARKE J. STEVENS, )

and J.R. STEVENS, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff “Caleb-Robert:Rockenbaugh’s” pro se motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis and Financial Affidavit. (Doc. 2.) After careful consideration and for

the reasons explained below, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s pro se motion to proceed in forma

pauperis, (Doc. 2), is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s complaint, (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED pursuant

to the Younger abstention doctrine and the Court’s initial in forma pauperis screening review under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), as set out below.

Discussion

In the complaint, Plaintiff, a citizen of Ohio, (see Doc. 1 at 1), asserts claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, false arrest, and false

imprisonment. (See generally Doc. 1.) These claims arise from events occurring during a traffic

stop and subsequent court proceedings in Texas County, Missouri.2 (Id.) In his complaint Plaintiff

seeks both injunctive relief regarding the pending state court proceedings as well as damages.

Specifically, Plaintiff is requesting that the charges in the state matter be dropped, all records

related to the state matter be removed from his records, and for the Court to lift any restrictions on

his driver’s license. (Doc. 1 at 5.) He seeks a total of $800,000 in damages. (Id. at 6.)

I. In Forma Pauperis Status

As an initial matter, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) authorizes the Court to allow indigent persons

to commence a civil action without the prepayment of costs, that is the Court may allow a case to

1 The Court presumes that Plaintiff is referring to the Honorable Brad. D. Eidson, Associate Circuit

Judge for the Circuit Court of Texas County, Missouri.

2 See State v. Rockenbaugh, No. 22TE-CR00734 (Cir. Ct. Tex. Cnty., Mo.).

proceed in forma pauperis. However, “[t]he opportunity to proceed in forma pauperis is a

privilege, not a right.” Weaver v. Pung, 925 F.2d 1097, 1099 n.4 (8th Cir. 1991). When considering

a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court first determines whether the plaintiff satisfies the

economic eligibility requirements. Local Rule 83.7(c) provides that the standard for determining

in forma pauperis status is whether the requirement to pay the costs of the lawsuit would cause the

applicant to be forced “to give up the basic necessities of life.” It appears based on his affidavit

that Plaintiff is financially unable to pay the filing fee. (Doc. 2 at 2-4.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.

II. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and § 1915(e)(2)(B) Screening Review

Although the Court will not require Plaintiff to pay the required filing fee, the Court must

consider whether Plaintiff has properly invoked the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and whether

Plaintiff’s complaint is otherwise subject to dismissal because it is frivolous or malicious, fails to

state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the

court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the

action.”).

A. Younger Abstention as to Plaintiff’s Claims for Injunctive Relief

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes a civil action for the violation of a person’s constitutional

rights under color of state law. While federal courts generally have subject-matter jurisdiction in

a case asserting claims under § 1983 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction),

there are certain cases in which the Court should decline to exercise its subject-matter jurisdiction.

For example, under the Younger3 abstention doctrine, “federal courts should abstain from

exercising their jurisdiction if (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding, (2) that implicates important

state interests, and (3) that provides an adequate opportunity to raise any relevant federal

questions.” Tony Alamo Christian Ministries v. Selig, 664 F.3d 1245, 1249 (8th Cir. 2012); see

also Minn. Living Assistance, Inc. v. Peterson, 899 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Younger

abstention is applicable only where the state proceeding qualifies as (1) a criminal prosecution,

(2) a civil enforcement proceeding that is akin to a criminal prosecution, or (3) a proceeding

implicating a state’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts”). The Younger

3 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

abstention doctrine recognizes that “principles of comity and federalism preclude federal actions

seeking injunctive or declaratory relief” when the factors above are present in a given case. Tony

Alamo Christian Ministries, 664 F.3d at 1249 (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 41 & n.2 (1971)).

Based on Plaintiff’s complaint, there is little question that the three Younger elements for

abstention are present here. First, Plaintiff’s constitutional claims arise in the context of an

ongoing state criminal proceeding involving the traffic stop and subsequent charge for driving

while intoxicated. See id. (“For purposes of applying Younger abstention, the relevant time for

determining if there are ongoing state proceedings is when the federal complaint is filed.”). This

proceeding was pending when the federal complaint was filed on March 4, 2026, and appears to

remain pending as of the date of this Order.4

Second, the underlying state proceeding is a criminal matter that the State of Missouri has

brought against Plaintiff Rockenbaugh. See Minn. Living Assistance, 899 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir.

2018) (“Younger abstention is applicable . . . where the state proceeding qualifies as (1) a criminal

prosecution . . . .”). “There are important state law interests in enforcing the state’s criminal laws

and in allowing state courts to administer their own cases.” Egziabher v. Evans, No. 5:20-cv-

05003, 2020 WL 2067433, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 29, 2020) (finding Younger abstention applied

where Egziabher had an ongoing state criminal proceeding for driving while intoxicated); see also

Aiona v. Judiciary of Hawaii, 17 F.3d 1244, 1249 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he state does have an

important interest in keeping drunk drivers off the road.”).

And finally, third, there is no indication that Plaintiff will be unable to raise any

constitutional concerns through the state courts as this criminal matter proceeds. See Haugen v.

Missouri, No. 17-cv-00794-ODS, 2017 WL 4819110, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2017) (finding that

Younger abstention doctrine applied, in part, to the extent “an adequate opportunity exists for

Plaintiff to raise these [constitutional] issues in the state court proceeding”). Because the Younger

abstention doctrine applies here, the Court declines to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction in this

case as to Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief. See Hudson v. Campbell, No. 09-cv-4271-NKL,

2010 WL 1657989, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2010).

4 It appears that following Plaintiff’s September 2022 arrest, a misdemeanor information charging

Plaintiff with DUI was filed in the Circuit Court of Texas County on December 30, 2022, along with the

issuance of an arrest warrant (which may remain unexecuted).

B. Initial Screening Review as to Plaintiff’s Claims for Monetary Damages

As to Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages, when the Younger abstention doctrine

applies, damages claims should generally be stayed, rather than dismissed. Night Clubs, Inc. v.

City of Fort Smith, 163 F.3d 475, 481 (8th Cir. 1998). Independent of the Younger abstention

doctrine, however, the Court must also ensure that a complaint survives an initial in forma pauperis

screening review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Upon review, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s complaint is otherwise subject to

dismissal because it “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief”

and otherwise fails to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). First, Plaintiff asserts claims

against Judge Brad D. Eidson, a Texas County Circuit Court Judge, for his judicial conduct in the

state criminal proceedings. “Judges performing judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity from

§ 1983 liability.” Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, Judge Eidson

is entitled to absolute immunity from suit for performing judicial functions in Plaintiff’s underlying

state criminal proceedings.

Plaintiff also asserts claims against Parke J. Stevens who is the Texas County Prosecuting

Attorney in the underlying state criminal proceeding. Like judges carrying out judicial functions,

prosecutors are “entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for claims arising out of [their]

conduct” during the prosecution of a criminal proceeding. See Fisher v. Casey, No. 23-cv-00733-

FJG, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237672, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 13, 2023) (collecting cases). Therefore,

Prosecutor Stevens is also entitled to absolute immunity from suit for performing prosecutorial

functions in Plaintiff’s underlying state criminal proceedings.

In addition to Judge Eidson and Prosecutor Stevens, Plaintiff brings suit against Missouri

State Trooper J.R. Stevens. Trooper Stevens may be entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claims where “[t]here are no non-conclusory allegations that show that [he] violated a

clearly established federal right.” Spencer v. Koster, No. 4:16-cv-00648 JAR, 2016 WL 3348412,

at *2 (E.D. Mo. June 16, 2026). Given the lack of factual detail in Plaintiff’s complaint, and the

conclusory nature of the allegations included, Trooper Stevens is entitled to qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

Moreover, even if Trooper Stevens were not entitled to qualified immunity, a plaintiff—

even when proceeding pro se—must allege “sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted”; that is a complaint must include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Church of Jesus Christ Christian v. Newton County,

No. 3:13-cv-05020-SRB, 2015 WL 13357901, at *1 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2015) (quoting Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). As best as the Court can discern, Plaintiff asserts a § 1983

claim against Trooper Stevens for arresting Plaintiff after he refused a blood or breathalyzer test

during a traffic stop. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff pleads that the arrest “represented excessive force,”

without any further detail on how Trooper Stevens used excessive force in making the arrest.

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are not sufficient to “show at least an inference that [his]

constitutional rights were violated,” however. Church of Jesus Christ Christian, 2015 WL

13357901, at *3. Thus, he has failed to state a claim pursuant to § 1983 against Trooper Stevens.

Finally, Plaintiff appears to assert a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment against

Trooper Stevens. Under Missouri law, false arrest and false imprisonment are interchangeable and

the elements of both are “the confinement, without legal justification, by the wrongdoers of the

person wronged.” See Highfill v. Hale, 186 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Mo. 2006). Trooper Stevens pulled

Plaintiff over after observing he was not staying in his lane of traffic. (Doc. 1 at 4.) After

conducting field sobriety tests, Trooper Stevens requested that Plaintiff submit to a breathalyzer

test, which he refused. (Id.) The results of a breathalyzer test “can be used by the officer to

establish probable cause.” See Findley v. Dir. of Revenue, 204 S.W.3d 722, 727-28 (Mo. Ct. App.

2006). Thus, when a driver refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test, “[t]he refusal to submit to the

[portable breathalyzer test] is evidence supporting a reasonable belief . . . that [the individual] was

intoxicated.” Findley, 204 S.W.3d at 727-28. Moreover, Plaintiff admitted to Trooper Stevens

that he had a beer about an hour before getting pulled over. (Doc. 1 at 4.) These facts indicate that

probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for driving while intoxicated. Where there is probable

cause for an arrest, a claim of false arrest or false imprisonment must fail because it requires the

arrest or confinement to be “without legal justification.” See Highfill, 186 S.W.3d at 280; see also

Brown v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:18-cv-00389-MTS, 2021 WL 2413364, at *6 (E.D. Mo. June 14,

2021) (“Given the Court’s conclusion that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff, his restraint

was lawful, and his claim for false arrest under Missouri law necessarily fails.”). Thus, Plaintiff

has failed to state a claim against Tropper Stevens for false arrest or false imprisonment.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s pro se motion to proceed in forma

pauperis, (Doc. 2), is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s complaint, (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED pursuant

to the Younger abstention doctrine and the Court’s initial in forma pauperis screening review under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark

ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATED: July 22, 2026