The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DUSTIN NELSON, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25-3326
)
TIONA FARRINGTON et al., )
Defendants. )
ORDER
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:
Before the Court for screening is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
by Plaintiff Dustin Nelson, a resident of Northlake, Illinois. Plaintiff has also filed a
Motion for Counsel (Doc. 4) and a Petition to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. 6).
I. Complaint
A. Screening Standard
The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient
claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if
it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In
reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally
construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).
However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be
provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States,
721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
B. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff alleges violations at Lincoln Correctional Center (“Lincoln”) against the
following Defendants: Illinois Department of Corrections Director (“IDOC”) Latoya
Hughes; Lincoln Warden Tiona Farrington; Corrections Lieutenants King and Walsh;
Corrections Officers Michael Cook, Cox, and Hinds; and the IDOC.
On September 2, 2025, Plaintiff was sitting in the tool room at Lincoln, awaiting
the departure of other inmate workers who were blocking the area where his electrician
tools and ladder were located. Defendant Cox screamed at Plaintiff, ordering him to stand
up and return the chair to Cox’s desk. Cox later issued Plaintiff disciplinary tickets for
insolence and unauthorized movement. Thereafter, Cox would not permit Plaintiff to
sign in to resume his duties as an inmate electrician. (Doc. 1 at 3.)
Plaintiff explained his situation to Defendant Farrington, who told Plaintiff she
would speak to Defendant Walsh, Plaintiff’s work supervisor. On September 8, 2025,
Plaintiff again returned to the tool room to retrieve his work gear, but Cox denied him
access. Plaintiff recalled that Walsh walked out of the tool room laughing when Cox
ordered Plaintiff to leave and never return. Walsh later issued Plaintiff disciplinary
tickets for threats and intimidation. (Id. at 4-5.)
On September 20, 2025, Plaintiff was in a group of inmates walking to the dining
hall when Defendant Cox urged physical violence against Plaintiff, falsely claiming
Plaintiff “was a toucher.” (Id. at 5-6:18.) Plaintiff was physically attacked the next day.
Plaintiff asserts that he lost the good-time credit he had earned for working as an
electrician. In this regard, Plaintiff claims Defendants Cook and King, acting as
Adjustment Committee members, did not permit Plaintiff to call witnesses, use video
evidence, or prepare his defense during his hearing on the disciplinary ticket issued by
Defendant Walsh. (Id. at 7:23, 8:24.)
C. Analysis
“Wolff v. McDonnell[, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)], sets forth the minimum due process
requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings when the prisoner has been charged
with serious misconduct which could result in loss of good time credits, punitive
segregation, or which might also be punishable in state criminal proceedings.” Chavis v.
Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1285 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981).
“Due process requires that prisoners in disciplinary proceedings be given: ‘(1)
advance (at least 24 hours before hearing) written notice of the claimed violation; (2) the
opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) the opportunity to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence (when consistent with institutional safety);
and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons
for the disciplinary action.’” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992)).
The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process claim against Defendants Cook and King for denying Plaintiff
the ability to prepare a defense before his disciplinary hearing and to call witnesses and
present evidence during his disciplinary hearing on Defendant Walsh’s disciplinary
ticket. Plaintiff also states a due process violation against Defendants Farrington and
Hughes for their presumed concurrence with the Adjustment Committee’s
recommendation to rescind Plaintiff’s earned good conduct credit.
However, Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendants Walsh and Cox for
issuing Plaintiff disciplinary tickets, as Plaintiff does not allege they were falsely issued
or issued in retaliation for exercising a constitutional right. See Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395,
1402 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that at the pleading stage, if a plaintiff alleges that he was
punished with segregation and loss of good time credits as a result of “false” and
“unjustified” disciplinary charges, then these allegations plausibly could “mean that the
tickets and resulting segregation and loss of good time were not supported by any
evidence”); see also Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[B]acktalk by prison
inmates to guards, like other speech that violates prison discipline, is not constitutionally
protected.”).
However, Plaintiff does state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Cox
for falsely insinuating that Plaintiff had inappropriate sexual relations with children. See
Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 357–58 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that a guard calling an inmate
“derisive terms” like “punk, fag, sissy, and queer,” … may be unconstitutional, such as
where it inflicts significant psychological harm, “increas[es] the likelihood of sexual
assaults” on the plaintiff, or makes “him a pariah to his fellow inmates”); see also Turner
v. Pollard, 564 F. App’x 234, 238 (7th Cir. 2014) (vacating summary judgment for prison
official who deliberately exposed prisoner to harm by insinuating to fellow inmates that
prisoner had placed “hits” on them).
To the extent Plaintiff is claiming a constitutional deprivation based on his prison
work assignment, “neither Illinois law nor the Due Process Clause itself affords prisoners
a liberty or property interest in their jobs.” DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir.
2000); see also Starry v. Oshkosh Corr. Inst., 731 F. App’x 517, 518 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The
district court held correctly that prisoners have no liberty interest in their jobs, and thus
[the plaintiff] could not state a due-process claim.”); Soule v. Potts, 676 F. App’x 585, 586
(7th Cir. 2017) (“The Constitution does not give prisoners any substantive entitlements to
prison employment.”).
Despite identifying Defendant Hinds, Plaintiff does not provide any facts that
establish or permit the inference that he deprived Plaintiff of a constitutional right. See
Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against
a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”). Additionally, IDOC is
not a person within the meaning of § 1983. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir.
2015); see also Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (“IDOC was properly
dismissed because it is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.”).
II. Counsel and IFP Petition
A. Counsel
Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court cannot require an
attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask
for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a
district court may, in its discretion, request counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in
certain circumstances). In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask
two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel
or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case,
does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654
(7th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 4) is denied because he has not satisfied his
threshold burden of demonstrating that he has attempted to hire counsel, which typically
requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received.
B. IFP Petition
Plaintiff has filed a Long Form IFP Petition as instructed, which indicates he has
no funds to make an initial partial payment of the filing fee. Thus, Plaintiff’s IFP Petition
is granted, but the initial fee is waived. See 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(b)(4) (“In no event shall
a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal
judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay
the initial partial filing fee.”).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 4) is DENIED.
2) Plaintiff’s IFP Petition (Doc. 6) is GRANTED.
3) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to proceed with Eighth Amendment
claims against Defendants Cook, Cox, Farrington, Hughes, and King, as noted in
the Court’s Merit Review Order. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants proceeds
in their individual capacity only. Any additional claims shall not be included in
the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause
shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
4) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate Hinds, Walsh, and IDOC as
parties.
5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait
until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give
Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions
filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be
denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this
time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing each Defendant a
waiver of service. Defendants have sixty days from service to file an Answer. If
Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety
days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status
of service. After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter an order
setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
7) Concerning a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by
Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall
submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said
Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for
effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained
only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed
by the Clerk.
8) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends
the waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The Answer should include all
defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent
pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an
Answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the merits
of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no
response to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.
9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel
has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive
electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.
Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other documents
that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does
not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses
are not filed with the Clerk. Instead, Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests
and responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses
sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the
subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’
counsel files an appearance and the Court enters a scheduling order, which will
explain the discovery process in more detail.
10) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of
confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.
11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his
mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of
a change in mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of this
lawsuit with prejudice.
12) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within
thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect
formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will
require that Defendant to pay the total costs of formal service under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendants under the standard
procedures.
ENTERED July 16, 2026.
s/ Colleen R. Lawless
____________________________________
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE