The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ANDREW EVAN HOWLAND, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:22-cv-02359-JPH-MKK
)
JACKSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S )
DEPARTMENT, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DIRECTING ENTRY
OF FINAL JUDGMENT
Federal inmate Andrew Evan Howland filed this civil rights action
alleging violations of his rights by individuals involved in his arrest and
prosecution. Dkt. 1. He proceeds on claims under the Fourth Amendment and
Federal Wiretap Act. Dkt. 82 at 7.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. Dkt. [108]. For the reasons
that follow, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
I.
Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions
As an initial matter, Mr. Howland has moved for sanctions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37, addressing many of the same discovery issues he
previously made in his motion to compel, dkt. 119, and his motion to reopen
discovery, dkt. 121. Dkt. 122. The Court denied those motions. Dkt. 125.
Mr. Howland argues that (1) "Defendants did not serve their Initial
Disclosures on the Plaintiff until 12/23/24, three months after they were
initially due," and (2) that Defendants did not timely respond to his January
2025 discovery requests. Dkt. 122 at 2. The Court has already addressed these
arguments, explaining that "[m]otions to compel must be filed within 60 days of
receipt of the inadequate discovery response or deadline to respond if no
response was provided." Dkt. 125; dkt. 88 at 8. Mr. Howland's request for
sanctions based on Defendants' initial disclosures and late discovery responses
is denied because he waited too long to file a motion to compel regarding these
issues. Mr. Howland's motion to compel, dkt. 119, and his motion to reopen
discovery, dkt. 121, as they related to the initial disclosures or discovery
responses, were denied on the same grounds. Dkt. 125.
Mr. Howland next argues that Defendants should be sanctioned because
they filed affidavits in support of their summary judgment motion that were not
disclosed during the discovery period. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(1)(A)(i) requires a party to provide to another party "the name and, if
known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have
discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support its
claims or defenses . . . identifying the subjects of the information." The purpose
of this rule is to require a party to provide the other side with the identities of
witnesses who may have relevant information. Flowers v. Kia Motors Fin., 105
F.4th 939, 947 (7th Cir. 2024). Here, Mr. Howland already knew Defendants'
identities, as they are the parties he chose to sue. He has not shown that
Defendants failed to comply with their disclosure obligations or otherwise
engaged in misconduct. See Langley v. Union Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 510, 514 (7th
Cir. 1997). Nor has he shown that he was prejudiced in any way by
Defendants' submission of declarations in support of their motion for summary
judgment. See Neita v. City of Chicago, 148 F.4th 916, 929 (7th Cir. 2025)
("Rule 37 . . . provides recourse for parties actually harmed by a litigant's
noncompliance with disclosure obligations. It does not safeguard a party's
decision to sense an error, seize on it, and then, when it is resolved, claim
incurable harm in the face of apparent remedies.").
Mr. Howland's motion for sanctions is therefore denied. Dkt. [122].
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is
unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and,
instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,
572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility
determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-
finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has
to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it
need not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of
Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the
basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed,
the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the
record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual
assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and
potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
III.
Factual Background
Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule
56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to
Mr. Howland and draws all reasonable inferences his favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d
at 572–73.
A. The Parties
Plaintiff Andrew Howland is a federal inmate serving a 30-to-105-year
sentence for multiple crimes related to child pornography and to the
kidnapping and sexual abuse of a 13-year-old child, MJC. Commonwealth v.
Howland, 289 A.3d 58, 2022 WL 16832489 at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2022).
Mr. Howland was 38 years old when he began communicating with MJC via
Snapchat regarding sexual matters in fall of 2020. Id. On December 2, 2020,
Mr. Howland traveled from Lancaster County, Pennsylvania to the state of
Indiana, picked up MJC without the knowledge or permission of MJC's
parents, and brought him to Lancaster. Id.
Defendant J.L. McElfresh is and was employed by the Jackson County,
Indiana, Sheriff's Department as a detective. Dkt. 111-3 at 1 (Affidavit of J.L.
McElfresh). He was one of the detectives assigned to investigate MJC's
disappearance. Id. at 2.
Defendant William Dishman is and was employed by the Jackson County
Sheriff's Department as a deputy sheriff. Dkt. 111-4 at 1 (Affidavit of William
Dishman). He was assigned to assist in locating MJC. Id.
Defendant Bethany McElfresh is and was employed by the Jackson
County Sheriff's Department as a dispatcher. Dkt. 111-5 at 1 (Affidavit of
Bethany McElfresh). She received the report of a missing 13-year-old named
MJC.
B. Jackson County Sheriff's Department Investigation
In the early morning hours of December 1, 2020, MJC's mother
discovered that he was missing from his bedroom. Dkt. 111-3 at 1; dkt. 111-4
at 1. MJC's mother called the Jackson County Sheriff's Department and
officers were dispatched to the child's home to assist in locating MJC. Dkt.
111-3 at 2; dkt. 111-4 at 2. MJC's mother was frantic, explaining that MJC
was missing, he was suicidal and battling depression, and that she feared that
MJC committed suicide. Dkt. 111-3 at 2; dkt. 111-4 at 2. MJC's mother
explained that he did not really go anywhere or talk to anyone. Dkt. 111-3 at 2;
dkt. 111-4 at 2.
The Jackson County Sheriff's Department began checking with friends
and neighbors and assessing local river access points and the high school. Dkt.
111-3 at 2; dkt. 111-4 at 3-4. After the police left the residence, MJC's mother
called the Jackson County Sheriff's Office and spoke with Deputy Dishman and
conveyed that MJC had been communicating online with an older man named
Andrew. Dkt. 111-3 at 2; dkt. 111-4 at 2. MJC's mother told Deputy Dishman
that she was able to gain access to MJC's Snapchat to obtain this information.
Dkt. 111-4 at 2. MJC's mother also told Deputy Dishman that there were
"snaps" from Andrew, username "official_roo82," stating things like "I'm
counting down the day until I get to see you" and "I can't wait to hold you in
my arms." Id.
Knowing that MJC had experienced suicidal ideation and had been
communicating with an unknown adult on Snapchat, Deputy Dishman sent a
law enforcement request for information via email to Snapchat requesting
information about the username "official_roo82." Id. at 3. That same evening,
Deputy Dishman received an email response from Snapchat stating that they
could not verify Deputy Dishman's email address as being associated with a
government entity that they recognized. Id. Snapchat gave Deputy Dishman a
different email to send his request to, and he again requested information
associated with the Snapchat username "official_roo82." Id. In the email,
Deputy Dishman explained that he "was working a runaway/possible abducted
juvenile case, and that her well-being was unknown, and that she was believed
to be in danger." Id.
The next day, Detective McElfresh spoke with MJC's father. Dkt. 111-3
at 2. MJC's father stated the family found a voice message on MJC's snapchat
and Detective McElfresh listened to it. Id. at 2-3. Detective McElfresh then
spoke with MJC's sister, who, by accessing MJC's Facebook account, was able
to identify an individual named Andrew Howland from Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. Id. at 3. MJC's sister sent a screenshot of Mr. Howland's
Facebook page to Detective McElfresh. Id. Detective McElfresh then sent an
email request to Snapchat for information associated with the username
"official_roo82" and stated that it was an emergency due to the age difference
between MJC and Mr. Howland. Id.
While waiting for the response from Snapchat, Detective McElfresh ran a
national database search on Andrew Howland in Lancaster, Pennsylvania for
identifying information including phone numbers and email addresses. Id. at 4.
Around 2:00 p.m. Detective McElfresh received a response from Snapchat with
a phone number and email address that matched the results of his web search.
Id. Detective McElfresh then contacted Bethany McElfresh in dispatch with a
request to contact Verizon Wireless, Mr. Howland's phone carrier, to obtain
"location pings" on Mr. Howland's location. Id. at 5. Detective McElfresh told
Dispatcher McElfresh that the case involved a juvenile runaway who had
suicidal ideations, had made previous suicide attempts, and that there was a
large age gap between the suspect and the juvenile. Dkt. 111-5 at 2.
Dispatcher McElfresh submitted to Verizon Wireless an "Emergency
Situation Disclosure Form . . . limiting the real-time information requested to
48-hours" to obtain Mr. Howland's real-time location coordinates. Dkt. 111-5
at 2. Verizon provided her with the coordinates for Mr. Howland's real-time
cellular location, which Dispatcher McElfresh communicated to law
enforcement in Pennsylvania. Dkt. 111-3 at 5. She received real-time
coordinates from Verizon from 2:46 p.m. until 7:58 p.m. Dkt. 111-5 at 2.
While dispatch was communicating the ping locations to local law
enforcement agencies in Pennsylvania, Detective McElfresh submitted a
preservation request to Facebook for MJC's Facebook account and Andrew
Howland's account for the time period of October 1, 2020, to December 2,
2020. Dkt. 111-3 at 5. A search of the Facebook Messenger Conversation
between MJC and Mr. Howland revealed numerous sexual photos with Mr.
Howland and further confirmed MJC's severe emotional distress and suicidal
ideation. Id. at 6.
At approximately 8:20 p.m., Detective McElfresh received a call from
dispatch at Columbia Burrow Police Department in Pennsylvania, confirming
that MJC and Mr. Howland were located together at a Comfort Inn, and that
Mr. Howland was in custody. Id.
IV.
Discussion
Mr. Howland proceeds on claims under the Fourth Amendment and
Federal Wiretap Act. Dkt. 82 at 7.
A. Fourth Amendment claim
1. Individual Defendants
Mr. Howland alleges that Defendants' warrantless acquisition of his real-
time cell-site location information ("CSLI")1 violated the Fourth Amendment.
Dkt. 49 at 7-8.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this
claim because their acquisition of real-time CSLI in this situation was not a
search under the Fourth Amendment, or, to the extent it was a search, it was
justified by exigent circumstances. Dkt. 110 at 10−15. Mr. Howland responds
that Defendants might not have been collecting real-time CSLI, but historical
CSLI that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. Dkt. 115 at 37–40.2
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The "ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,'" Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398, 403 (2006), which "'generally requires law enforcement to obtain a
1 "CSLI is location information generated by cellular phone providers that indicates
which cell tower a particular phone was communicating with when a communication
was made. Any cell phone with a functioning battery regularly communicates with cell
towers. The phone leaves behind a trail of this data." United States v. Hammond, 996
F.3d 374, 383 n.2 (7th Cir. 2021).
2 The majority of the assertions and arguments in Mr. Howland's response are blanket
denials of the facts that underlie his criminal conviction, along with assertions that
contradict the amended complaint and his deposition testimony. Mr. Howland's story
is inconsistent across his amended complaint, deposition testimony, response in
opposition to summary judgment, and other filings he submitted before this Court.
Mr. Howland may not contradict himself to create a dispute of fact to survive summary
judgment. See Gills v. Hamilton, 164 F4th 640, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2026) (approving
district court's decision to ignore affidavits that contradicted plaintiff's previous
testimony under sham affidavit rule).
warrant before executing a search." United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374,
384 (7th Cir. 2021).
The Court will assume without deciding that Mr. Howland was subjected
to a "search" when Defendants obtained real-time CSLI. See United States v.
Karmo, 109 F.4th 991, 994–95 (7th Cir. 2024); Carpenter v. United States, 585
U.S. 296, 310 (2018) (holding that individuals have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in historical CSLI and specifically declining to decide if its ruling applied
to "real-time CSLI").3
Even if Carpenter were extended to cover real-time CSLI data, law
enforcement's actions here would be justified by exigent circumstances. A
warrantless search is justified when "the exigencies of the situation make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively
reasonable." Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011). "[W]arrantless
searches are permissible if law enforcement has probable cause to believe that
illegal activity is occurring and that exigent circumstances are present." United
3 It is far from clear that Defendant's actions constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment. See Hammond, 996 F.3d at 392 (analyzing Carpenter and holding that
the collection of real-time CSLI over several hours for the purpose of locating a suspect
did not constitute a search). While the Supreme Court's decision last month in Chatrie
v. United States held that some short-term location data is protected, it did not extend
Carpenter to real-time CSLI. 2026 WL 1855568, 609 U.S. --- (June 29, 2026). Instead,
Chatrie recognized that obtaining the detailed "Location History" at issue was intrusive
in large part because the "tracking capacity . . . travels back in time" and can "easily
and cheaply . . . reconstruct any person's movements 'retrospectively.'" Id. at 10.
Moreover, the location history at issue in Chatrie was "more fine-tuned" and more
frequent than CSLI, and allowed law enforcement "to chart the movements of many
individuals" who were in the area, rather than only one person. Id. at 11 ("Far less
could [law enforcement officials of an earlier age] ever perform the tireless and
absolute surveillance of any number of people in any number of places, public and
private, that Location History can accomplish.").
States v. Karmo, 109 F.4th 991, 994–95 (7th Cir. 2024) (assuming without
deciding that a search occurred and holding that exigent circumstances
applied to collection of CSLI). One established exigent circumstance is to
"protect individuals who are threatened with imminent harm," including in the
context of "child abductions." Carpenter, 585 U.S. 320.
Here, Defendants were operating with the understanding that MJC was
battling depression and suicidal ideation at the time of his disappearance. Dkt.
111-3 at 2; dkt. 111-4 at 2. They soon learned that MJC had been
communicating via social media with an older man, who they had reason to
believe was Mr. Howland. The Snapchat messages indicated that Mr. Howland
planned to see MJC in person and wanted to "hold [MJC] in his arms." Dkt.
114- at 2. Under the totality of the circumstances, Defendants had probable
cause to believe that illegal activity was occurring, and that there were exigent
circumstances—MJC's personal safety—that justified the warrantless search.
See Karmo, 109 F.4th at 995 ("Exigent circumstances are present if law
enforcement reasonably believes that the safety of the public is threatened.");
Gaetjens v. City of Loves Park, 4 F.4th 487, 493–95 (7th Cir. 2021).
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the
Fourth Amendment claim against them.4
4 The Court declines to address Defendants' qualified immunity and statute of
limitations arguments because the Court resolves the Fourth Amendment claim on the
merits. For the same reason, the Court does not address whether Mr. Howland waived
any Fourth Amendment claim against Deputy Dishman in his deposition.
2. Monell claim against Jackson County Sheriff's Department
Mr. Howland proceeds on a Monell claim against the Jackson County
Sheriff's Department based on the allegations that it violated the Fourth
Amendment through a policy of using an Emergency Situation Disclosure Form
in place of a search warrant. Dkt. 49 at 3-8; dkt. 82 at 7.
In order to maintain a § 1983 claim against the Sheriff's Department, Mr.
Howland must show that his constitutional rights were violated by a policy or
custom of Jackson County Sheriff's Department. Monell v. Dep't. of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694−95 (1978). "The critical question under Monell is
whether a policy or custom of a municipal entity caused a constitutional
deprivation." Gonzalez v. McHenry Co., Ill., 40 F.4th 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2022).
For Monell liability to attach, Mr. Howland must first show that he was
deprived of a federal right, and then that the deprivation was caused by a
Jackson County Sheriff's Department custom or policy or failure to implement
a needed policy. Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th
Cir. 2021). Mr. Howland fails on the first prong. As explained above,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of his Fourth
Amendment claim. Accordingly, he cannot show a violation caused by a policy
of Jackson County Sheriff's Department, and the Department is entitled to
summary judgment. Doxtator v. O'Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 864 (7th Cir. 2022) ("[A]
municipality cannot be liable under Monell when there is no underlying
constitutional violation by a municipal employee.").
B. Federal Wiretap Act
Mr. Howland alleges that Detective McElfresh and Dispatcher McElfresh
illegally obtained his location data in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act. Dkt.
49 at 5-6. Defendants argue that Mr. Howland's Federal Wiretap Act claim fails
because the data that was intercepted was not "content" for purposes of the
statute. Dkt. 110 at 21. Alternatively, they argue that they are entitled to
qualified immunity. Id. at 22–25.
"[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their
conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.
7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). "Once the
defense of qualified immunity is raised, a defendant is entitled to dismissal
unless a plaintiff comes forward with facts showing a constitutional violation
and law showing his right was 'clearly established' at the time of the alleged
violation." Thomas v. Carmichael, 164 F.4th 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2026). To be
"clearly established," a right "must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-
existing precedent." District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018).
Given this emphasis on notice, clearly established law cannot be framed at a
"high level of generality." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). "A rule
is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct 'does not follow
immediately from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.'"
Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). "The plaintiff bears
the burden of demonstrating that a right was clearly established at the time the
alleged violation occurred." Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir.
2017).
"To overcome the defendant's invocation of qualified immunity, [a
plaintiff] must show both (1) that the facts" make out a violation of the right,
and (2) that the right "was 'clearly established' at the time of the official's
alleged misconduct." Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 713 (7th Cir.
2013). The court may analyze the qualified immunity prongs in any order it
chooses. Koh v. Ustich, 933 F.3d 836, 844 (7th Cir. 2019). "If either inquiry is
answered in the negative, the defendant official is protected by qualified
immunity." Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2018).
The Wiretap Act provides that "any person who . . . intentionally
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or
endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral or electronic communication" shall be
found in violation of the statute and subject to civil or criminal penalties. 18
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). It defines "intercept" as the acquisition of the contents of
any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device. 18 U.S.C. § 2510. A plaintiff therefore may only
bring a claim under the Federal Wiretap Act for the interception of content. 18
U.S.C. § 2510(4). "Content" under the Wiretap Act is defined as including the
"substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
Defendants argue that CSLI does not qualify as content because it
reveals where a phone is, not what was said or transmitted. Dkt. 110 at 21
(citing Hammond, 996 F.3d at 384–85 (analyzing CSLI as "non-content
information" under Section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act)). In these
circumstances, Hammond's description of CSLI as "non-content information"
for purposes of the Stored Communications Act would likely apply equally to
the definition of "content" under the Federal Wiretap Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
Similarly, in Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., the court discussed several
different types of "non-content" information for purposes of the Federal Wiretap
Act, including geolocation data collected by Apple that was "generated
automatically, rather through the intent of the user. No. 11-CV-03113 JSW,
2013 WL 1282980 at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (citing In re iPhone
Application Litigation, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 1062, (N.D. Cal. 2012)). In his
response, Mr. Howland discusses Hammond and Yunker, but does not provide
any case or argument showing that he had a clearly established right under the
Wiretap Act to not have his CSLI obtained and reviewed by investigators as
they searched for MJC, who they had good reason to believe was in danger. See
dkt. 115 at 88-90.
Moreover, while neither the Seventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court have
defined "content" for purposes of asserting a Wiretap Act claim, Hammond
indicates that the real-time CSLI at issue here is unlikely to qualify as "content"
under the statutory definition. 996 F.3d at 384–85. In Zynga Privacy Litigation,
the Ninth Circuit interpreted "contents" to mean "the intended message
conveyed by the communication." 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014). Zynga
distinguished the contents of a communication from the "record information,"
which is "information regarding the characteristics of the message that is
generated in the course of the communication." Id. (e.g., for a phone call, a
call's "origination, length, and time" are not the call's content, but instead
record information, because those items contain "no 'information concerning
the substance, purport, or meaning of [the] communication.'").
Considering these cases and the lack of controlling precedent addressing
the issue, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the Wiretap Act
claim. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63 (To be "clearly established," a right "must
have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent."). Indeed, Mr.
Howland has not identified a Seventh Circuit or Supreme Court case showing
that it was clearly established that the real-time CSLI data was "content" for
purposes of the statute. It was Mr. Howland's burden to do so, which "is a 'do
or die' requirement" for his claim. Villalobos v. Picicco, 168 F.4th 1057, 1063
(7th Cir. 2026) ("If a plaintiff fails to identify analogous precedent clearly
establishing the law, the district court must grant summary judgment for the
defendant."); accord Thomas v. Carmichael, 164 F.4th 1058, 1067 (7th Cir.
2026).
Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment based on
qualified immunity on the Federal Wiretap Act claim against them.
V.
Conclusion
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. [108]. Mr.
Howland's motion for sanctions against Defendants and Defense Counsel, dkt.
[122], is DENIED.
Final judgment shall issue by separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 7/15/2026 S) ans Patruck banter
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
ANDREW EVAN HOWLAND QN6721
SCI BENNER TOWNSHIP
301 Institution Drive
Bellefonte, PA 16823
All Electronically Registered Counsel
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