Petty

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

JENNIFER ANNIE INEZ PETTY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 7:25-cv-1908-EGL

)

FRANK BISIGNANO, )

Commissioner of )

Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Jennifer Annie Inez Petty seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits. After careful

review of the administrative record and the parties’ briefs, the Court AFFIRMS the

Commissioner’s decision.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On September 17, 2021, Petty protectively filed an application for Disability

Insurance Benefits, alleging disability beginning January 1, 2018. Doc. 13 at 4. The

Social Security Administration denied the claim on January 21, 2022, and again on

reconsideration on September 23, 2022. Id. Petty requested a hearing, which an ALJ

held by telephone on March 7, 2023. Id. The ALJ denied her claim on May 30, 2023.

Id.

The Appeals Council denied review on August 21, 2023. Id. Petty then sought

review in this Court, which remanded the case on April 24, 2024. Id.; see also Petty

v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 7:23-cv-1722, Doc. 14 (N.D. Ala. April 24, 2024).

Following remand, an ALJ held a new hearing on January 28, 2025, and again denied

Petty’s claim on March 10, 2025. Doc. 13 at 4. That decision became the

Commissioner’s final decision. Id.

B. Factual Background

Petty was born on May 5, 1981, and was 40 years old on the date last insured.

Id.; see also Doc. 14 at 2. She completed high school and has no past relevant work.

Doc. 13 at 5. She alleged disability beginning May 4, 2021, because of depression,

anxiety, adjustment disorder, degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, and bilateral

plantar fasciitis. Doc. 14 at 2.

ALJ DECISION

Disability determinations follow a five-step sequential evaluation. The ALJ

considers whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has

a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) has an impairment meeting

or equaling a listed impairment; (4) can perform any past relevant work; and, if not,

(5) can adjust to other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011).

At step one, the ALJ found that Petty had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity through the relevant period, from May 4, 2021, through December 31, 2022.

Doc. 9-18 at 19. At step two, the ALJ found the following severe impairments:

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, bilateral plantar fasciitis,

fibromyalgia, obesity, depression, and anxiety. Id. at 20.

At step three, the ALJ found that none of Petty’s impairments, alone or in

combination, met or equaled a listed impairment. Id. The ALJ then assessed Petty’s

residual functional capacity (RFC) and found she could perform a modified range of

sedentary work. Id. at 22. Specifically, Petty could occasionally climb ramps and

stairs but never ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel,

crouch, or crawl; could tolerate extreme cold or vibration; could frequently handle,

finger, or feel with both upper extremities; could not be exposed to unprotected

heights, hazardous machinery, or commercial driving; could understand and

remember simple instructions; could maintain attention and concentration to carry

out simple instructions in at least two-hour intervals over an eight-hour workday

with customary breaks; could occasionally interact with the general public; and

could adapt to occasional changes in work environment. Id.

At step four, the ALJ found Petty had no past relevant work and proceeded to

step five. Id. at 31. Based on vocational expert testimony, the ALJ found at step five

that Petty could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national

economy, including final assembler, lens inserter, and printed circuit board screener.

Id. at 31-32. The ALJ therefore concluded that Petty was not disabled from May 4,

2021, through December 31, 2022. Id. at 32-33.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review under the Social Security Act is narrow. The Court asks only

whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and rests

on the correct legal standards. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178.

Whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold here

“is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019). Substantial evidence is

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Henry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015).

The Court must affirm if that standard is met, “[e]ven if the evidence preponderates

against the Commissioner’s findings.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d

1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

Petty seeks reversal and remand on three grounds. The Court addresses each

in turn.

I. Evaluation of Medical Opinions & Findings

The ALJ found the opinions of state agency psychological consultants Drs.

Gloria Roque and Pauline Hightower “largely persuasive” but declined to adopt two

specific limitations: that Petty require non-confrontational feedback and access to an

isolated workstation. Doc. 9-18 at 30. Petty argues this rejection was arbitrary. Doc.

13 at 13-17. She contends the ALJ acknowledged no contrary medical evidence and

that the ALJ’s characterization of her social functioning as “generally intact” directly

contradicts the ALJ’s own step-three finding of moderate limitations in social

interaction. Id. She also argues the ALJ improperly substituted Petty’s lay self-

reports for credentialled medical opinion. Id.

The Commissioner responds that neither consultant had reviewed Petty’s

Adult Function Reports, and that the ALJ properly weighed the expert opinions

against the broader record, including Petty’s own accounts of her daily functioning.

Doc. 14 at 11-12.

An ALJ may rely upon a claimant’s own statements when evaluating a

disability claim. Morrissette v. Astrue, No. 1:09-cv-314, 2010 WL 2491003, at *3

(M.D. Ala. June 18, 2010) (citing Sykes v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 284, 286 (8th Cir. 1988)

& 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3)). The ALJ must, however, clearly articulate her

reasons for departing from a treating physician’s opinion. Winschel, 631 F.3d at

1179.

The ALJ did so here. She previously found that the non-confrontational

feedback limitation lacked clear vocational relevance, Doc. 9-19 at 15; Doc. 9-3 at

44, a conclusion this Court has affirmed in analogous circumstances, see, e.g., Cody

v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, No. 4:20-cv-568, 2021 WL 5232554, at *9 (N.D. Ala.

Nov. 10, 2021). As for the workstation limitation, the consultants stated only that

Petty “would benefit from her own workstation,” Doc. 9-4 at 29, which is a

recommendation rather than a functional requirement. A physician’s observation

that a patient would benefit from an accommodation does not compel the ALJ to

impose it as a vocational restriction. See Daywalt v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-277, 2021

WL 3679304, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2021) (“A recommendation that a patient

undertake certain ameliorative measures does not equate to a physical restriction or

a judgment about what Plaintiff can still do despite her impairments.”). The ALJ

further explained that neither limitation was supported by the medical evidence,

Doc. 9-18 at 30, or Petty’s own reports of generally intact social functioning, id.

(citing Doc. 9-8 at 33-40, 50-56).

Petty’s objection therefore ultimately asks this Court to weigh the evidence

differently than the ALJ did. That is not the Court’s role. See Dyer v. Barnhart, 395

F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Because the ALJ clearly articulated its reasons for

departing from the own-workstation and non-confrontational feedback

recommendations, reversal is not warranted on this issue.

II. Obesity Analysis

Petty argues that the ALJ, having found obesity a severe impairment, failed to

evaluate its functional impact or its effect on her other impairments. Doc. 13 at 19-

23.

The Commissioner responds that the ALJ addressed Petty’s obesity multiple

times in its RFC analysis and that Petty has not shown that obesity produced

limitations beyond those already addressed. Doc. 14 at 9.

The ALJ discussed Petty’s weight repeatedly throughout its RFC

determination and found that her obesity constituted a severe impairment. See, e.g.,

Doc. 9-18 at 23, 25-28. While the ALJ did not expressly state at every available point

that obesity was being considered in relation to Petty’s other impairments, such a

level of granular detail is unnecessary. See Coley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 771 F.

App’x 913, 917 (11th Cir. 2019) (The ALJ “is not required to specifically address

every aspect of an opinion or every piece of evidence in the record.”). Nor does an

ALJ need to document every aspect of its disability decision at optimal length. See

Hutchison v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986). Given the ALJ’s

recognition of Petty’s obesity, there is no reason to suspect that the ALJ failed to

consider it in relation to her other disabilities.

More fundamentally, Petty’s argument inverts the burden of proof. The

claimant bears the burden of showing that obesity produced specific functional

limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); see also Flynn v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 1273,

1274 (11th Cir. 1985). Petty has not identified any such limitation that the ALJ

overlooked or that the RFC fails to address. See, e.g., Barbara B. v. Comm’r, Soc.

Sec. Admin., No. 1:22-cv-93, 2023 WL 12147828, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2023)

(“Plaintiff has not identified any specific findings that would require the ALJ to

include more restrictive limitations in the RFC assessment.”); Maxena v. Barnhart,

No. 6:07-cv-211, 2008 WL 686907, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2008) (holding that

plaintiff failed to “identify with specificity” the limitations arising from her obesity

that the ALJ “allegedly overlooked”); Fabian v. Astrue, No. 8:08-cv-1254, 2009 WL

3334783, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2009) (“[I]n order to demonstrate reversible

error with respect to obesity, the plaintiff must show that she had functional

limitations from that condition that were not included in the law judge's

determination of the plaintiff's residual functional capacity.”).

Petty speculates that the ALJ’s RFC determination and the vocational expert’s

occupational evaluation could have been different had the ALJ considered her

obesity more fully. Doc. 13 at 21-22. But that begs the question because it assumes

that neither the vocational expert nor the ALJ considered Petty’s obesity, and it

further lacks any substantive demonstration that the ALJ’s analysis would be

different. See Wallace v. Berryhill, No. 2:17-cv-168, 2018 WL 1399255, at *6 (N.D.

Ala. Mar. 20, 2018) (holding that “Plaintiff’s speculation that further development

of the record might have produced evidence favorable to her” is not enough to justify

remand).

III. Medication Side Effects

The ALJ accounted for Petty’s allegations of medication side effects,

including expressly addressing “drowsiness, dizziness, and frequent urination.” Doc.

9-18 at 27, 29. The ALJ recounted Petty’s April 2022 report that taking her

medications at night sent her to the bathroom multiple times overnight, while taking

them during the day required her to stay at home; Petty’s May 2022 report that her

diuretic resulted in six to seven bathroom trips a day and required her to wear

Depends; and the therapy records from the summer of 2022 reflecting similar

complaints. Id. at 27. The ALJ nonetheless found “little evidence to show that the

claimant has experienced medication side effects refractory to adjustments in

medication frequency, dosage, or the underlying medication itself,” and found that

the “indications of urinary incontinence” appearing in the spring and summer of

2022 were not present “for a period of 12 months” and were “not to the extent there

would be a corresponding workplace functional limitation.” Id. at 29.

Petty raises three objections: that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard by

asking whether her side effects were theoretically improvable rather than whether

they actually limited her functioning; that the ALJ misapplied the twelve-month

durational requirement at the RFC stage; and that the ALJ ignored nausea and

stomach pain documented in VA and rheumatology records. Doc. 13 at 24-28. None

warrants remand.

The evaluation of subjective symptoms, including medication side effects, is

committed in the first instance to the ALJ. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212

(11th Cir. 2005); Walker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 404 F. App’x 362, 366 (11th Cir.

2010). A clearly articulated finding supported by substantial evidence will not be

disturbed, Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995), and the question on

review is not whether the ALJ could reasonably have credited Petty’s account, but

whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discount it, Werner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

421 F. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 2011). It is likewise Petty’s burden to establish that

her side effects produced functional limitations beyond those the RFC already

contains. Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1512(a); see Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 (11th Cir. 1990)

(affirming an ALJ’s determination that medication side effects did not present a

significant problem).

First, the “refractory to adjustments” sentence, read in the context of the

decision as a whole, did not impose a heightened or otherwise erroneous legal

standard. In weighing the intensity and persistence of symptoms, an ALJ considers

“[t]he type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication,” and the other

measures a claimant uses for relief. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v); see generally

SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017). Whether the reported

side effects followed the timing of doses, prompted (or never prompted) a change in

medication regimen, or persisted despite treatment bears directly on how severe and

persistent they were. The ALJ’s observations followed from Petty’s self-reports that

her urinary symptoms followed the timing of her medication use, and that she was

otherwise content with her medication regimen and needed no changes. Doc. 9-18

at 27. In describing Petty’s urinary symptoms as not appearing “refractory to

adjustments,” the ALJ therefore simply identified what the record did, and did not,

contain.

Nor did the ALJ neglect her duty to investigate Petty’s side effects generally.

In the cases Petty cites, Doc. 13 at 23-24, remand resulted because the ALJ simply

made no findings on the subject at all, see, e.g., Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731,

737 (11th Cir. 1981); McDevitt v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 241 F. App’x 615, 619 (11th

Cir. 2007). Here, by contrast, the ALJ elicited, recounted, and analyzed evidence of

Petty’s side effects throughout several pages of her opinion. See Doc. 9-18 at 27-29.

More important, the ALJ’s “refractory” observation was not the operative

finding. What appears to have resolved the issue was her determination that the

documented side effects did not rise “to the extent there would be a corresponding

workplace functional limitation.” Id. at 29. Substantial evidence supports that

determination. And Petty has not identified any workplace limitations that her side

effects would impose that are not already accounted for in the RFC. Her allegations

of drowsiness and dizziness are not clearly corroborated by any medical opinion in

the record. See Koepp v. Astrue, No. 10-C-1002, 2011 WL 3021466, at *8 (E.D.

Wis. July 22, 2011) (“A social security claimant cannot establish disability based

solely on his own statements about his symptoms and limitations.”). And the RFC

already appears to accommodate them, as it prohibits Petty from being exposed to

unprotected heights, hazardous machinery, and commercial driving, and limits her

to simple instructions performed in two-hour intervals with customary breaks. Id. at

22.

As for her urinary symptoms, the July 2022 therapy note on which Petty

principally relies records her reports and their effect on her self-esteem and daily

activities, Doc. 9-17 at 66, but it is not a “medical opinion” the ALJ was required to

adopt or weigh for persuasiveness, see McCurley v. Astrue, No. 6-cv-649, 2008 WL

4682260, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 22, 2008) (“No medical evidence supports

Plaintiff’s allegations of severe urinary and bowel incontinence; her testimony alone

cannot establish an impairment.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2)-(3); cf. Lopez v.

Astrue, 807 F. Supp. 2d 750, 764 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[A] doctor’s notation of a

claimed symptom or subjective complaint from the patient is not medical

evidence.”). There is, moreover, no conflict between accepting that a condition is

distressing and burdensome in daily life and finding that it requires no workplace

limitation beyond those already imposed; the mere existence of the former does not,

without more, compel the latter. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213 n.6; cf. Daywalt, 2021

WL 3679304, at *8. It remained Petty’s burden to show what accommodation her

symptoms actually required, but she offers no evidence, medical or otherwise, to do

so.

Second, the twelve-month reference in the ALJ’s opinion does not require

remand. Petty is correct that the durational requirement screens impairments at step

two and supplies no license to disregard short-lived symptoms at the RFC stage. See

Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F. App’x 949, 950-51 (11th Cir.

2014). But the ALJ did not disregard the symptom, she merely found that it imposed

no workplace functional limitation. Doc. 9-18 at 29. The sentence Petty attacks states

two grounds in the conjunctive, and the second basis stands on its own. An

adequately explained and supported ultimate finding is not undone by an additional,

unnecessary observation. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983);

Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210-11; Hutchison, 787 F.2d at 1463.

Nor was the durational observation per se inappropriate. The regulations

direct the ALJ to evaluate the “intensity and persistence” of symptoms, 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(c)(1), and duration is an aspect of persistence. The RFC, in turn, describes,

what a claimant can do on a “regular and continuing basis” during the period at issue.

SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). Petty’s complaints of

urinary urgency and incontinence cluster within a window of a few months in the

spring and summer of 2022, out of a relevant period spanning May 2021 through

December 2022, see Doc. 9-18 at 27-29, and she identifies no evidence that those

symptoms persisted at that severity through her date last insured, see generally Doc.

13. The ALJ could reasonably weigh that limited persistence in deciding whether

the restriction belonged in Petty’s RFC.

The ALJ’s discussion could have been fuller, but she need not document every

aspect of the decision at optimal length. Hutchison, 787 F.2d at 1463. Read against

the whole of her analysis, including Petty’s largely normal examinations, the

effective and conservative course of treatment she received, and the absence of any

corroborating medical opinions, Doc. 9-18 at 23-30, the ALJ’s conclusion is

reasonable.

Third, Petty’s reports of nausea and stomach pain do not alter the analysis.

They appear in two isolated notations: a January 2022 report attributing nausea to

mental-health medication, and a January 2023 rheumatology note, recorded days

after Petty’s date last insured, stating that gabapentin helped her pain to an extent

but was associated with nausea and stomach pain. Doc. 13 at 26. Neither source

suggested any functional restriction, and Petty identifies no such limitation flowing

from these complaints that the RFC omits. An ALJ need not “specifically refer to

every piece of evidence” so long as the decision reflects consideration of the

claimant’s condition as a whole. Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d

780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014); Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211; Burke v. Kijakazi, No. 5:22-cv-

389, 2023 WL 5103134, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 9, 2023). This decision does.

Finally, because the ALJ permissibly found no side-effect-related limitation,

she was not required to include one in the hypothetical posed to the vocational

expert. Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161. Petty’s contrary argument assumes restrictions

that no evidence establishes, and speculation of that kind will not support remand.

Wallace, 2018 WL 1399255, at *6. Her objections ultimately ask the Court to

reweigh the evidence of her side effects and draw a different conclusion than the

ALJ. That is not the Court’s role. Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210.

CONCLUSION

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinion

evidence, her consideration of Petty’s obesity, and her assessment of Petty’s

subjective complaints, including the alleged medication side effects, and the ALJ

applied the correct legal standards. Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS. the

Commissioner’s decision. Final judgment will be entered separately.

DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of July, 2026.

EDMUND G.LACOURJR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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