CHAMBERS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DUSTIN CHAMBERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:24CV562

)

LIEUTENANT MR. COUZZI, )

CORPORAL MR. T. KLUK, )

SERGEANT MR. RODGERS, and )

NURSE MS. JO, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dustin Chambers’ cellmate at present evidence of his claims.

Rockingham County Jail had a Accordingly, the defendants are

medical emergency on May 1, 2024, entitled to judgment as a matter of

and Chambers called for help. When law. The Court should grant their

officers responded to the cell, motions for summary judgment.

Lieutenant Mr. Couzzi, Corporal Mr.

T. Kluk, and Sergeant Mr. Rodgers Peach also moved to seal portions of

allegedly used excessive force against her brief and affidavit in support of

Chambers, and “Nurse Ms. Jo” was her motion for summary judgment, as

allegedly deliberately indifferent to well as all of Exhibit 1 to her affidavit,

the injuries he sustained. Chambers which contain excerpts of Chambers’

brings this action against the medical records. Docket Entry 38.

defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Because the public’s First

§ 1983 for violating his Eighth Amendment right of access outweighs

Amendment rights. Chambers’ privacy interest, the

motion to seal is denied.

This matter is now before the Court on

Joanna Peach’s motion for summary I. FAILURE TO RESPOND

judgment, Docket Entry 35, and her

Upon the defendants’ filing of their

co-defendants’ (“the Officers’”)

respective motions for summary

motion for summary judgment,

judgment, on October 9, 2025, the

Docket Entry 39. Chambers did not

Clerk of Court mailed Chambers the

respond to either motion, failing to

standard Roseboro letter informing although Chambers’ failure to

him of the motions and his right to respond may leave the defendants’

respond. The letter warned Chambers facts uncontroverted, they “must still

that if he failed to respond to the show that the uncontroverted facts

motions, the Court may “conclude entitle [them] to ‘a judgment as a

that the defendant(s)’ contentions are matter of law.’” Id. See also Campbell

undisputed and/or that you no longer v. Hewitt, Coleman & Assocs., Inc., 21

wish to pursue the matter” and grant F.3d 52, 55-56 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting

judgment in favor of the defendants. that, even in the absence of a

Docket Entry 41. See also M.D.N.C. response, “the court should look at the

Civ. L.R. 7.3(k) (“If no response brief movant’s own papers . . . [and]

is filed within the time required by determine if the record of filed

this rule, the motion will be depositions, answers to

considered and decided as an interrogatories, admissions, and

uncontested motion, and ordinarily affidavits[] demonstrates that a

will be granted without further genuine issue exists as to any material

notice.”). Despite the Court’s fact”).

warning, Chambers has not

responded to either motion,1 nor did The uncontroverted facts do show just

he verify the factual allegations in his that, as set forth in further detail

Complaint, see Docket Entry 2, such below.

that they could be considered as more

II. FACTS

than mere allegations, see Gowen v.

Winfield, 130 F.4th 162, 175-76 (4th

On May 1, 2024, Chambers was an

Cir. 2025).

inmate at the Rockingham County

Detention Center (“Jail”) when, at

Nevertheless, the Court cannot

approximately 7:20 a.m., his cellmate

summarily grant the defendants’

suffered a medical emergency.

motions because Chambers’ failure to

Windell Brown Aff. ¶¶ 2, 3, Docket

respond “does not fulfill the burdens

Entry 32-1. Someone in Chambers’

imposed on moving parties by Rule 56

cell pressed the intercom, and Officers

[of the Federal Rules of Civil

Couzzi, Rodgers, and Kluk, among

Procedure].” Custer v. Pan Am. Life

others, others responded. Id. ¶ 4.

Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir.

1993). When officers arrived, “Chambers

exited his cell in an aggressive manner

“Rule 56 requires that the moving

and confronted the responding

party establish, in addition to the

officers.” Id. ¶ 5. They told him to

absence of a dispute over any material

move aside so his cellmate could

fact, that it is ‘entitled to a judgment

receive medical attention. Id. But

as a matter of law.’” Id. Thus,

Chambers began arguing “so he was

1 There is also no entry on the docket of undeliverable. Therefore, it is presumed

the Roseboro letter being returned as that Chambers received it.

placed on the floor and restrained and injury and no limited rotation of

handcuffed.” Id. Officers then moved movement. Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 16).

him from the area to booking where

he stayed for the remainder of the As a result of the Sick Call visit, Peach

medical emergency response. Id. ¶ 6. placed Chambers on the list for the

Chambers had no obvious injuries doctor to see next time he was at the

and did not complain of any neck or Jail. Id. ¶ 17 (citing Ex. 1 at 16). The

back pain at the time. Id. ¶ 8. None of one doctor contracted to provide

the detention officers took him to the services at the Jail generally went

medical unit to be evaluated after the there once a week to review charts and

incident. Joanna Peach Aff. ¶ 10 evaluate patients, although he was

(Sept. 10, 2025), Docket Entry 37-1. available 24 hours a day for

consultation and to make verbal

At the time of the incident, Joanna orders for patients. Id. ¶ 5.

Peach (Nurse Jo) was a licensed

practical nurse employed with Nursing staff, including Peach, could

Southern Health Partners, Inc. which not independently make medical

contracted with the Jail to provide decisions for inmates, nor could they

nursing care to inmates. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. unilaterally order prescriptions for

There was one nurse on-site at the Jail any inmate. Id. ¶ 7.

14 hours a day, seven days a week. Id.

¶ 4. An off-site on-call registered On May 9, Chambers submitted a Sick

nurse was available 24 hours a day, Call request following up on the May 1

seven days a week. Id. incident. Id. ¶ 19 (citing Ex. 1 at 21).

In it, he complained that he could not

On May 2, Peach saw Chambers in turn his neck and could not bend over.

response to an April 30 Sick Call Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 21). He asked why

request. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Ex. 1 at 12, 14, it was taking so long for a doctor to see

19). During the examination, “someone in pain” for “something

Chambers did not mention the May 1 that[’]s an emergency.” Id. (citing Ex.

altercation, and Peach did not 1 at 21). Peach responded to the Sick

otherwise know of Chambers’ Sick Call request and let Chambers know

Call request related to the May 1 that he was on the list for the doctor to

altercation. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Ex. 1 at 16). see and he was already receiving pain

medication. Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 21).

On May 3, Peach saw Chambers for

the May 1 Sick Call request. Id. ¶ 16 Due to a personal emergency, the

(citing Ex. 1 at 15-16). She recorded doctor could not go to the Jail until

his vital signs, his complaint that he May 11. Id. ¶ 22 (citing Ex. 1 at 12).

could not move his neck in either That day, he examined Chambers who

direction, and his pain rating of a 7 complained of stiffness, pain, and a

out of 10. Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 15-16). decreased rotation of movement in

She also noted no bruising or visible his neck. Id. ¶ 23 (citing Ex. 1 at 12).

The doctor prescribed Chambers with III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

another pain medication, muscle

reliever, and a hot pack. Id. (citing Ex. A court “shall grant summary

1 at 3, 12). judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any

Approximately one month later, on material fact and the movant is

June 13, Chambers submitted his next entitled to judgment as a matter of

Sick Call request, this time reporting law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

slight pains shooting down from his dispute of material fact exists “if the

neck to his spine. Id. ¶ 25 (citing Ex. 1 evidence is such that a reasonable jury

at 22). Peach placed him on the sick could return a verdict for the

call list for the doctor to see. Id. nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

In the meantime, Peach saw (1986). In analyzing a summary

Chambers on June 18. Id. ¶ 27. He judgment motion, courts

complained that his pain had “must construe all facts and

continued since May 1 and was reasonable inferences in the light

currently at a 6 out of 10. Id. (citing most favorable to the nonmoving

Ex. 1 at 17-18). The doctor prescribed party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59

him additional pain medicine. Id. F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023).

(citing Ex. 1 at 4, 7, 18).

The moving party bears the burden of

establishing the absence of a genuine

When the doctor saw Chambers on

dispute of material fact by

June 30, he noted that Chambers’

“identifying those portions of ‘the

cervical pain had improved but he still

pleadings, depositions, answers to

had neck pain radiating to his back.

interrogatories, and admissions on

Id. ¶ 28 (citing Ex. 1 at 12). The doctor

file, together with the affidavits, if any’

discontinued the medication and

which it believes demonstrates the

ordered a corticosteroid sequence and

absence of a genuine issue of material

an x-ray of Chambers’ cervical spine.

fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 4, 9, 28).

U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule

56).

On July 2, Chambers received the x-

ray which revealed that his cervical

“Where, as here, the nonmoving party

spine was normal. Id. ¶ 29 (citing Ex.

bears the ultimate burden of proof at

1 at 10-11). The doctor did not order

trial, the moving party may discharge

any further treatment. Id. ¶ 30 (citing

its initial burden at summary

Ex. 1 at 4, 9).

judgment by ‘showing – that is,

pointing out to the . . . court – that

Chambers was transferred out of the

there is an absence of evidence to

Jail on or about October 23, 2024. Id.

support the nonmoving party’s case.’”

¶ 36.

Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp.,

LLC, 117 F.4th 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at other federal legal right. West v.

325). “If the moving party carries this Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

initial burden, the burden then shifts

to the nonmoving party, who must ‘go A. The Court should grant the

beyond the pleadings and by [his] Officers’ motion for

own affidavits, or by the depositions, summary judgment.

answers to interrogatories, and

Chambers alleges that Couzzi, Kluk,

admissions on file, designate specific

and Rodgers used excessive force

facts showing that there is a genuine

when he was exiting his cell to allow

issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex

access to his cellmate who needed

Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).

medical assistance. Specifically, he

A party cannot rely on statements in a contends that Couzzi and Kluk

brief to support a motion for slammed him to the ground for no

summary judgment, because they are reason and Rodgers placed his knee

not evidence. City of Greensboro v. and weight on Chambers’ neck. As a

Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. result, he sustained neck and back

15-CV-559, 2017 WL 11488724, at *1 injuries.

n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2017)

An inmate’s right to be free from the

(collecting cases); see also Hill v.

use of excessive force derives from the

Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022

Eighth Amendment. Whitley v.

WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23,

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); see

2022).

also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

IV. ANALYSIS 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (“The Eighth

Amendment . . . serves as the primary

Title 42, United States Code, Section source of substantive protection to

1983 “is a federal statutory remedy convicted prisoners in cases . . . where

available to those deprived of rights the deliberate use of force [by prison

secured to them by the Constitution officials] is challenged as excessive

and, in a more sharply limited way, and unjustified.”).

the statutory laws of the United

States” by persons acting under color A claim for the use of excessive force

of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. “involves both an objective and a

Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th subjective component.” Dean v.

Cir. 2009). A plaintiff bringing suit Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir.

pursuant to Section 1983 must show 2021). “The objective component

that a person acting under color of measures the nature of the force

state law violated a Constitutional or employed, asking whether that force

‘was sufficiently serious to establish a

cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Brooks

v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir.

2019)). “This is not a high bar; de

minimis or trivial force is not enough,

but anything more will suffice.” Id. maintain institutional security.’” Id.

(citing Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112). (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22).

“The more demanding . . . subjective

But an officer crosses the line and acts

component . . . asks a single question:

maliciously and sadistically, for

whether the officers acted with a

example, “when [he] inflict[s] pain . . .

‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’”

to punish an inmate for intransigence

id. (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77

or to retaliate for insubordination,”

F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)), that is,

Brooks, 924 F.3d at 113-14, n.4 (citing

“wantonness in the infliction of pain,”

cases finding a reasonable jury could

id. The plaintiff must establish that

infer the officer used excessive force

the officer applied force “maliciously

in response to the inmate’s use of

and sadistically for the very purpose

profanity and threats of violence and

of causing harm” rather than “in a

other similar statements directed at

good-faith effort to maintain or

officers), or “to punish or retaliate

restore discipline.” Dean, 984 F.3d at

against an inmate for his prior

302.

conduct,” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302, and

possibly when the officer “use[s] force

For example, an officer acts in good

on an inmate who is restrained and

faith when confronting “immediate

compliant and posing no physical

risks to physical safety” and

threat,” id. (noting this conduct

“compelling compliance with prison

“raises the specter of such an

rules and procedures” to “preserve

impermissible motive”).

internal order.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at

113 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503

“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an

U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992)).

inmate is one factor that may suggest

‘whether the use of force could

The United States Supreme Court

plausibly have been thought

recognized long ago that “corrections

necessary’ in a particular situation.”

officials must make their decisions ‘in

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37

haste, under pressure, and frequently

(2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at

without the luxury of a second

7).

chance.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6

(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). To determine the nature of the force,

They “must balance the need ‘to courts assess “[1] the need for

maintain or restore discipline’ application of force, [2] the

through force against the risk of relationship between that need and

injury to inmates.” Id. Accordingly, the amount of force used, [3] the

“‘[p]rison administrators . . . should threat ‘reasonably perceived by the

be accorded wide-ranging deference responsible officials,’ and [4] ‘any

in the adoption and execution of efforts made to temper the severity of

policies and practices that in their a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503

judgment are needed to preserve

internal order and discipline and to

U.S. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at doctor did not order any further

321). treatment.

“If a reasonable jury could find, based The law permits officers to use means

on the inferences drawn under the to maintain order and discipline. The

Whitley factors or other evidence, force used here – placing Chambers

that correctional officers used force on the floor to handcuff him – was in

maliciously to punish or retaliate response to Chambers’ aggressive,

against an inmate, then summary confrontational, and argumentative

judgment [in favor of the officers] is behavior when officers and medical

not appropriate.” Dean, 984 F.3d at personnel needed to access his cell.

303-02. Balancing the Whitley factors, the

nature of this force was not excessive.

Here, the only evidence before the And the evidence does not show that

Court shows that Chambers was any of the officers acted maliciously or

aggressive and confrontational sadistically.

towards the officers who responded to

assist his cellmate. When officers told Chambers, who has the burden at trial

him to move aside, he began to argue, of proving these officers used

at which time “he was placed on the excessive force, did not respond or

floor and restrained and handcuffed.” otherwise provide evidence to the

There is no evidence that anyone contrary. In sum, he has failed to

placed a knee or any weight on proffer evidence of the essential

Chambers’ neck. elements of his excessive force claim.

Once handcuffed, Chambers then Because there is no evidence that any

waited in booking until the emergency of the officers violated Chambers’

ended. At the time, he did not constitutional right to be free from the

complain of any neck or back pain and use of excessive force, they are

had no obvious injuries. entitled to qualified immunity. See,

e.g., Nazario v. Gutierrez, 103 F.4th

Two days later, Peach assessed 213, 230 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[A] court

Chambers for reported pain in his may award qualified immunity to an

neck and back and administered official if either (1) there is no

medications as the doctor ordered. violation of a constitutional right, or

Ultimately, an x-ray of his cervical (2) the constitutional right was not

spine showed normal results, and the clearly established.”).

Therefore, the Court should grant the

Officers’ motion for summary

judgment.2

2 In their brief, the Officers conclude that to Officers Brown, Stultz, Couzzi, Kluk,

“summary judgment should be granted and Rodgers.” Defs. Couzzi, Kluk and

B. The Court should grant knowledge of the risk of harm to the

Peach’s motion for inmate” and also “‘recognize[s] that

summary judgment. his actions were insufficient’ to

mitigate the risk of harm to the

Chambers alleges that Peach was inmate arising from his medical

deliberately indifferent to his serious needs.” Id. (quoting Parrish ex rel.

medical needs. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303

(4th Cir. 2004)).

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

has long held that an inmate is due

Prison officials may act with

“reasonable medical treatment.” See

deliberate indifference by

Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47

“intentionally denying or delaying

(4th Cir. 1977). “Claims that prison

access to medical care . . . .” Estelle,

officials failed to provide adequate

429 U.S. at 105. But “[m]ere delay is

medical care to an inmate, like

not enough.” Moskos v. Hardee, 24

excessive force claims, sound in the

F.4th 289, 298 (4th Cir. 2022). “A

Eighth Amendment.” Iko v. Shreve,

commonplace medical delay such as

535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). A

that experienced in everyday life will

plaintiff must show that the officer

only rarely suffice to constitute an

“acted with ‘deliberate indifference’

Eighth Amendment violation, absent

(subjective) to the inmate’s ‘serious

unusual circumstances where the

medical needs’ (objective).” Id.

delay itself places the prisoner at

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ such

97, 104 (1976)).

as where the prisoner’s condition

deteriorates markedly or the ailment

A serious medical need is “‘one that

is of an urgent nature.” Id.

has been diagnosed by a physician as

mandating treatment or one that is so

An inmate’s disagreement with

obvious that even a lay person would

medical staff about his treatment is

easily recognize the necessity for a

insufficient absent exceptional

doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting

circumstances. See Hixson v. Moran,

Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839,

1 F.4th 297, 302-03 (4th Cir. 2021)

846 (7th Cir. 1999)).

(citing Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d

841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing

An officer acts with deliberate

Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6

indifference when he has “actual

Rodgers’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for indifference and conditions of

Summ. J. at 8, Docket Entry 40 confinement. See Officers’ Mem. at 11-15.

(“Officers’ Mem.”). But the Court In its August 9, 2024 Order, the Court

dismissed all claims against Brown and only permitted the excessive force claim

Stultz in its August 9, 2024 Order, to proceed against the Officers, while the

Docket Entry 5. Similarly, the Officers deliberate indifference to serious medical

argue that they are entitled to summary needs claim could proceed against Nurse

judgment on claims of deliberate Jo.

(3rd Cir. 1970) (noting that Chambers access to treatment. The

exceptional circumstances are those delay was due to unforeseen personal

in which medical care is “so grossly circumstances of the doctor who was

incompetent, inadequate or excessive on-site on May 11 and evaluated

as to shock the general conscience or Chambers. When Chambers later

to be intolerable to fundamental returned to see Peach with continued

fairness”))); see also Bowring, 551 complaints of pain, she once again

F.2d at 47-48 (“The right to treatment placed him on the list to see the doctor

is, of course, limited to that which who ordered a cervical x-ray, the

may be provided upon a reasonable results of which were normal. Thus,

cost and time basis and the essential there is no evidence that any delay,

test is one of medical necessity and assuming Peach were somehow

not simply that which may be responsible for it, placed Chambers at

considered merely desirable.”); substantial risk of harm or caused his

Moorehead v. Stover, No. 5:13-CT- condition to deteriorate noticeably.

3144-F, 2016 WL 8667807, at *3

(E.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2016), aff’d, 671 F. As above, Chambers did not respond

App’x 221 (granting summary or otherwise provide evidence to the

judgment where the “claims contrary. He has failed to proffer

essentially amount to a disagreement evidence of the essential elements of

in the course of treatment prescribed his deliberate indifference claim

by Defendant”). against Peach.

Here, the undisputed evidence shows Because there is no evidence that

that Peach provided Chambers with Peach violated Chambers’

adequate medical treatment for his constitutional right to receive

alleged injuries. When she assessed adequate medical treatment, she is

him on May 2 for an unrelated earlier entitled to qualified immunity. See,

Sick Call request, he did not mention e.g., Nazario, 103 F.4th at 230 (“[A]

the May 1 incident, and she did not court may award qualified immunity

otherwise know about it. After to an official if either (1) there is no

learning of his related Sick Call violation of a constitutional right, or

request, she saw him on May 3, noted (2) the constitutional right was not

his complaints of neck and back pain, clearly established.”).

and placed him on the list to see the

doctor. Although Chambers Therefore, the Court should grant

complained of the delay in seeing the Peach’s motion for summary

doctor, there is no evidence that judgment.3

Peach intentionally delayed

3 Although Peach includes in her brief an dismissed the official capacity claim

argument that the Court should also against her in its August 9, 2024 Order,

grant summary judgment in her favor on Docket Entry 5.

the official capacity claim, the Court

V. SEALING STANDARD involving claims of inadequate

medical treatment) (citing Press-

Peach also moves to seal portions of Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S.

her summary judgment brief and 501, 510 (1984); Rushford v. New

supporting affidavit, and the entirety Yorker Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253

of the accompanying exhibit, which (4th Cir. 1988)).

contain excerpts from Chambers’

medical records. In support of her As did the defendants in Musgrove,

motion, she merely relies on the Peach refers to state and federal

Court’s express authority to seal statutes and regulations governing

materials pursuant to Local Rule 5.4 confidentiality, but “[t]he Court does

and requests that they be sealed “so not understand [Peach] to say that

that the parties may present them to these statutes and regulations

the Court without violating applicable prohibit courts from making such

North Carolina or federal statutes records available on the court docket.

concerning the confidentiality of Rather, reading between the lines, it

medical records, such as the Health appears [she is] saying that [she is]

Insurance Portability and required to keep such records

Accountability Act Privacy Rule, 45 confidential pursuant to state and

CFR Part 160 and 164.” Mot. to Seal federal laws and regulations. But that

¶¶ 4, 5. does not establish that any law

prohibits or restricts disclosure of

This argument does not address the such records by courts when the

legal standards that govern the records are filed and used in pending

public’s right of access to documents, cases.” Id. at *2.

especially those upon which the Court

relies when ruling on a motion for Nevertheless, “the Court will still

summary judgment. weigh the public’s right of access

against the defendants’ interest in

The public has a First Amendment of sealing.” Id. Like the Musgrove

access to these judicial records. See, defendants, Peach has “not addressed

e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d the public’s interest in access at all,

246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014). Therefore, much less explained why it is

Peach “must show a compelling outweighed by a governmental

governmental interest or other higher interest in secrecy.” Id.

value to justify sealing, and the

limitation on public access must be “While the Court recognizes that

narrowly tailored to serve that medical records are ordinarily kept

interest.” Musgrove v. Moore, No. confidential, that is not always the

1:19-CV-164, 2022 WL 19977408, at case when those records are

*1 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2022) (denying important to a lawsuit the patient

the defendants’ motion to seal himself has brought.” Id.

medical records in a § 1983 case

Although Peach filed her motion to VI. CONCLUSION

seal on October 8, 2025, Chambers

has not joined the motion. See IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

generally Docket. Furthermore, in Joanna Peach’s motion to seal is

his complaint, Chambers described DENIED;

his alleged injuries, statements about

his medical condition that he made to IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that

Peach, and care he received from the Joanna Peach refile Docket Entries

doctor. See Statement of Claim, 37, 37-1, and 37-2 as_ publicly

Compl. The Court discerns no accessible documents that also

interest here that outweighs the comply with Federal Rule of Civil

public’s right of access to these Procedure 5.2;

materials.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

Accordingly, Peach’s motion to seal is that the Court GRANT Defendants

denied. Couzzi, Kluk, and Rodgers’ motion for

summary judgment and dismiss the

claim against them with prejudice;

and

IT IS FURTHER

RECOMMENDED that the Court

GRANT Defendant Joanna Peach’s

motion for summary judgment and

dismiss the claim against her with

prejudice.

Gibson McFadden

United States Magistrate Judge

July 23, 2026

11