BLANKS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

TIM CAESAR BLANKS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:24CV588

)

SGT. CAPEL, OFC. JASMINE )

BREWINGTON, OFC. J. RICKERS, )

and LT. ANGELA SESSOMS, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Tim Caesar Blanks alleges that, while to use hers, and failing to stop Caple

he was an inmate at Scotland from doing so; and Sessoms showed

Correctional Institution (“SCI”) in deliberate indifference to Blanks’s

February 2024, Sergeant Caple,1 on serious medical needs when she

Officer J. Ricker’s2 order, pepper instructed officers to leave him in his

sprayed him while he was handcuffed cell after the incident for ten minutes.

inside a locked cell and Lieutenant

Sessoms instructed officers to leave This matter is before the Court on the

Blanks in the cell for ten minutes after parties’ cross-motions for summary

the incident. And, according to judgment. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.,

Blanks, none of this would have Docket Entry 60; Def. Caple Mot. for

happened had Officer Brewington not Summ. J., Docket Entry 61; Sessoms,

reported his earlier agitated behavior. Brewington, and Ricker’s Mot. for

He now brings this Section 1983 Summ. J., Docket Entry 64.

action alleging violations of his Eighth

Amendment rights. Although Blanks characterizes his

motion as one for summary judgment,

Specifically, Blanks alleges that Caple in fact, he argues against granting

used excessive force when she summary judgment due to the

deployed the pepper spray; Ricker existence of genuine material

used excessive force by threatening to disputes. On the other hand, the

use her pepper spray, ordering Caple defendants argue that the undisputed

1 Capel’s name is spelled Caple. 2 Defendant Rickers’s name is spelled

Ricker.

evidence shows they are not liable for Brewington to call for assistance.

violating Blanks’s constitutional Brewington Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10; Dismissal

rights and that they are each entitled Ltr. at 5, Docket Entry 62-4. Ricker

to qualified immunity. and Caple responded to the unit.

Brewington Decl. ¶ 12. Ricker placed

For the reasons set forth below, the Blanks in handcuffs through the

Court should grant the defendants’ wicket door of his cell before she and

summary judgment on the official Caple escorted him to a holding cell in

capacity claims against them. The the Red Unit. Ricker Decl. ¶ 6.

Court should deny Blanks’s motion Brewington did not follow Caple,

and Caple’s motion. The Court should Ricker, or Blanks to the Red Unit, nor

grant summary judgment for did she see Blanks for the remainder

Brewington and Sessoms and grant in of her shift. Brewington Decl. ¶ 13.

part and deny in part summary

judgment for Ricker. The Court On the way to the Red Unit, Ricker

should grant qualified immunity for tried to calm Blanks by reminding

Brewington and Sessoms and deny him that he had never caused her any

qualified immunity for Caple and problems previously and just needed

Ricker. to cool off. Ricker Decl. ¶ 7.

I. FACTS Upon arrival at the Red Unit, Ricker

placed Blanks, still handcuffed, in a

The undisputed facts show that locked holding cell. Id. ¶ 8; Dismissal

Blanks was an inmate housed in the Ltr. at 5. Blanks was yelling.

mental health block/Blue Unit at SCI Dismissal Ltr. at 5. At 10:05 p.m.,

on February 6, 2024. See Def. Ricker’s Caple took out her pepper spray

Resps. to Pl.’s First Set of Reqs. for canister and administered a burst of

Admis., Docket Entry 62-7. That pepper spray through the holding cell

night, correction officer III door. Ricker Decl. ¶ 10; Incident R. at

Brewington was overseeing the unit. 2, Docket Entry 67-10.

Ricker, a correctional officer I, and

Caple, a correctional sergeant III, Lieutenant Sessoms, a correctional

were also on duty elsewhere at SCI lieutenant III at SCI supervising the

that night. See Sgt. Brewington Decl. Gray Unit that night, responded to a

¶¶ 4, 6 (Nov. 7, 2025), Docket Entry call that a use of force incident had

65-1; Officer Ricker Decl. ¶ 4 (Nov. 6, occurred in the Red Unit. Lt. Sessoms

2025), Docket Entry 65-2; Charlene Decl. ¶¶ 3-7 (Nov. 5, 2026), Docket

Nicole Caple Decl. ¶ 2 (Nov. 6, 2025), Entry 65-3.

Docket Entry 62-5.

Ricker remained in the corridor

At approximately 10:00 p.m., Blanks watching Blanks while Caple went to

was agitated because Brewington the sergeant’s office on the unit.

would not release him from his cell to Incident R. at 2. Caple told Sessoms

assist with janitorial work, prompting she had used OC pepper spray on

Blanks. Sessoms Decl. ¶ 7. One statement detailing what direct

minute later, Caple returned to the order was given twice and

cell, followed by Sessoms who kept a refused to provide a detailed

visual on Blanks. Incident R. at 2. statement. Upper management

Sessoms did not authorize any use of has been notified.

force against Blanks that day and did

not know or have reason to know that Incident R. at 4.

Caple would administer pepper spray

However, M. Parsons, the Facility

on Blanks. Sessoms Decl. ¶ 13.

Approver of the Incident Report,

At 10:09 p.m., correctional sergeant reviewed the report and concluded

III Jarred Gholston, correctional that “staff followed all policies and

sergeant III David Graham, and procedures we have in place for this

correctional sergeant III Lenwood type of incident. Only the amount of

Graham escorted Blanks from the cell force was used to get the situation

to the showers for decontamination. under control.” Id. at 5.

Witness Statements at 2, 9, 10, Docket

The North Carolina Department of

Entry 67-6. They gave him a fresh set

Adult Correction terminated Caple’s

of clothes and took him out of the Red

employment, effective July 4, 2024.

Unit at 10:25 p.m. Id. at 2, 9, 10;

Dismissal Ltr. Her dismissal was

Incident R. at 3.

related to two use-of-force incidents,

At 10:51 p.m., correctional sergeant one on November 5, 2023 and the

III Antonio Tolbert and correctional February 6, 2024 incident involving

officer III T. Nguyen escorted Blanks Blanks “while he was restrained in

from his cell to the medical exam handcuffs in a locked holding cell.”

room for assessment and back to his See id. (detailing witness statements

holding cell three minutes later. Id. at made as a part of the investigation

3; Witness Statements at 4, 12. into the February 6 incident).

As required, Sessoms investigated the The dismissal letter explained that

use of force incident, obtained witness she “administered a burst of pepper

statements, and prepared an incident spray at the offender when he was

report. Sessoms Decl. ¶ 9. She restrained in a holding cell, and he did

concluded that not otherwise pose a threat to himself

or others. Force is not allowed to be

[a]ll policies and procedures used against a properly restrained

were not followed for this type offender and the use of pepper spray

of incident due to Sergeant on Blanks was not reasonably

Caple not providing a reason necessary to carry out a proper

for administering OC Pepper

Spray, not providing the direct

order that was given. Sergeant

Caple was asked to provide a

correctional objective.” Id. at 8.3 cleared Blanks); Ricker Decl.

(describing Blanks’s erratic and

The dismissal letter also reported aggressive behavior and threatening

other correctional officers who statements to Ricker and Caple once

witnessed the February 6 incident and in the Red Unit holding cell); Incident

stated that they would not have R. (noting Blanks’s refusal to obey

sprayed Blanks because he was in Ricker’s orders); Def. Caple’s Resps.

handcuffs in a locked cell and not to Pl.’s Interrogs., Docket Entry 67-18

posing a threat to himself or staff. See (responding that Blanks refused

generally id. at 4-6. orders and verbally threatened staff).

But the parties dispute Blanks’s II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

conduct that led Brewington to call for

assistance that night, his refusal to A court “shall grant summary

obey orders once inside the cell in the judgment if the movant shows that

Red Unit, the extent of his injuries, there is no genuine dispute as to any

and Sessoms’ directions upon material fact and the movant is

learning of the incident. See entitled to judgment as a matter of

generally Brewington’s Decl. law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

(describing Blanks’s kicking, yelling, dispute of material fact exists “if the

and threat to her precipitating her call evidence is such that a reasonable jury

for assistance); Pl.’s [Verified] Br. in could return a verdict for the

Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

(“Verified Br. in Supp.”), Docket Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

Entry 70 (claiming Blanks did not (1986). In analyzing a summary

pose a threat to staff, himself, judgment motion, courts

property, or other inmates at the time “must construe all facts and

Caple administered pepper spray; reasonable inferences in the light

describing treatment for injuries he most favorable to the nonmoving

sustained, nightmares, and party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59

aggravation of PTSD; and claiming F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023). The

that Sessoms instructed Ricker to moving party bears the burden of

leave him in the cell for ten minutes); establishing the absence of a genuine

Dismissal Letter (stating that Blanks dispute of material fact by

did not pose a threat to himself or “identifying those portions of ‘the

others); Def. Ricker’s Resps. to Pl.’s pleadings, depositions, answers to

First Set of Reqs. for Admis. (denying interrogatories, and admissions on

that Blanks was not acting violently or file, together with the affidavits, if any’

disruptively when Caple used force which it believes demonstrates the

against him and stating that “medical” absence of a genuine issue of material

3 “Not every violation of prison policy is a

violation of the constitution.” King v.

Riley, 76 F.4th 259, 267 (4th Cir. 2023).

fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 personal knowledge”). Cf. Jones v.

U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule Harrell, No. 7:21-cv-541, 2025 WL

56). 2712429, at *2 n.3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 23,

2025) (not permitting pro se plaintiff

“An affidavit or declaration used to to rely on his brief to oppose summary

support [summary judgment] must judgment because it was not verified);

be made on personal knowledge, set McAllister v. Johnson, No. 1:10-CV-

out facts that would be admissible in 13, 2023 WL 8604205, at *1

evidence, and show that the affiant or (M.D.N.C. Apr. 4, 2023) (“To the

declarant is competent to testify on extent his brief contains factual

the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. assertions, those assertions are not

56(c)(4); see also Evans v. Techs. verified and have no evidentiary

Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, value.”).

962 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Williams v.

Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. “‘When faced with cross-motions for

1991)). summary judgment, the court must

review each motion separately on its

A party generally cannot rely on own merits to determine whether

statements in a brief to support a either of the parties deserves

motion for summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law.’” TC

because they are not evidence. City of Heartland LLC v. Schiffman, No.

Greensboro v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of 1:23-CV-665, 2026 WL 1785093, at *1

Elections, No. 15-CV-559, 2017 WL (M.D.N.C. June 22, 2026) (quoting

11488724, at *1 n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516,

2017) (collecting cases); see also Hill 523 (4th Cir. 2003)), appeal

v. Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022 docketed, No. 26-1912 (4th Cir. July

WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23, 16, 2026). “‘When considering each

2022). individual motion, the court must

take care to resolve all factual disputes

However, persuasive authority

and any competing, rational

supports consideration of a pro se

inferences in the light most favorable

party’s verified submissions to the

to the party opposing that motion.’”

court, including briefs, at the

Id. (quoting Rossignol, 316 F.3d at

summary judgment stage. See, e.g.,

523).

Jones v. Perry, No. 9:21CV1822, 2022

WL 16952240, at *5 n.4 (D.S.C. Oct. III. GOVERNING LAW

27, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL

16951990 (Nov. 15, 2022) (stating Title 42, United States Code, Section

that “a pro se litigant’s . . . verified 1983 “is a federal statutory remedy

submission must be considered as an available to those deprived of rights

affidavit and may, standing alone, secured to them by the Constitution

defeat a motion for summary and, in a more sharply limited way,

judgment when the allegations the statutory laws of the United

contained therein are based on States” by persons acting under color

of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l “The more demanding . . . subjective

Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. component . . . asks a single question:

2009). A plaintiff bringing suit whether the officers acted with a

pursuant to § 1983 must show that a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’”

person acting under color of state law Dean, 984 F.3d at 302 (quoting

violated a Constitutional or other Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756,

federal legal right. West v. Atkins, 487 761 (4th Cir. 1996)), that is,

U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “wantonness in the infliction of pain,”

id. “In contrast to the objective

A. Excessive Force component, this is a demanding

standard.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112-13.

Here, as against Caple, Rickers, and

The plaintiff must establish that the

Brewington, the constitutional right

officer applied force “maliciously and

at issue is the right to be free from an

sadistically for the very purpose of

officer’s use of excessive force, derived

causing harm” rather than “in a good-

from the Eighth Amendment. Whitley

faith effort to maintain or restore

v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986);

discipline.” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302.

see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

For example, an officer acts in good

386, 395 n.10 (1989) (“The Eighth

faith when confronting “immediate

Amendment . . . serves as the primary

risks to physical safety” and

source of substantive protection to

“compelling compliance with prison

convicted prisoners in cases . . . where

rules and procedures” to “preserve

the deliberate use of force [by prison

internal order.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at

officials] is challenged as excessive

113 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503

and unjustified.”).

U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Bailey v. Turner,

736 F.2d 963, 970 (4th Cir. 1984)

A claim for the use of excessive force

(“rejecting rule that use of mace

“involves both an objective and a

against recalcitrant inmate may be

subjective component.” Dean v.

justified only by threat to physical

Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir.

safety”)).

2021).

“The objective component measures The United States Supreme Court

the nature of the force employed, recognized long ago that “corrections

asking whether that force ‘was officials must make their decisions ‘in

sufficiently serious to establish a haste, under pressure, and frequently

cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Brooks without the luxury of a second

v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir. chance.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6

2019)). “This is not a high bar; de (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).

minimis or trivial force is not enough, They “must balance the need ‘to

but anything more will suffice.” Id. maintain or restore discipline’

(citing Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112). through force against the risk of

injury to inmates.” Id. Accordingly,

“‘[p]rison administrators . . . should

be accorded wide-ranging deference Williams, 77 F.3d at 763 and stating

in the adoption and execution of that the phrase “or other chemical

policies and practices that in their agents” “plainly reaches the use of

judgment are needed to preserve pepper spray”) (emphasis in original).

internal order and discipline and to

maintain institutional security.’” Id. “[T]he extent of injury suffered by an

(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22). inmate is one factor that may suggest

See also N.C. Dep’t of Adult ‘whether the use of force could

Correction, Use of Force Policy (Aug. plausibly have been thought

30, 2018) (authorizing the use of necessary’ in a particular situation.”

pepper spray as a “first level of Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37

response” “[t]o control or deter (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at

violent, threatening or aggressive 7). However, “[a]n inmate who is

acting offenders . . .”), Docket Entry gratuitously beaten by guards does

65-5. not lose his ability to pursue an

excessive force claim merely because

But an officer crosses the line and acts he has the good fortune to escape

maliciously and sadistically, for without serious injury.” Id. at 38.

example, “when [she] inflict[s] pain

. . . to punish an inmate for To determine the nature of the force,

intransigence or to retaliate for courts assess “[1] the need for

insubordination,” Brooks, 924 F.3d application of force, [2] the

at 113-14, n.4 (citing cases finding a relationship between that need and

reasonable jury could infer the officer the amount of force used, [3] the

used excessive force in response to the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the

inmate’s use of profanity and threats responsible officials,’ and [4] ‘any

of violence and other similar efforts made to temper the severity of

statements directed at officers), or “to a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503

punish or retaliate against an inmate U.S. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at

for his prior conduct,” Dean, 984 F.3d 321).

at 302, and possibly when the officer

“If a reasonable jury could find, based

“use[s] force on an inmate who is

on the inferences drawn under the

restrained and compliant and posing

Whitley factors or other evidence,

no physical threat,” id. (noting this

that correctional officers used force

conduct “raises the specter of such an

maliciously to punish or retaliate

impermissible motive”). “[I]t is a

against an inmate, then summary

violation of the Eighth Amendment

judgment [in favor of the officers] is

for prison officials to use mace, tear

not appropriate.” Dean, 984 F.3d at

gas or other chemical agents in

303-02.

quantities greater than necessary or

for the sole purpose of infliction of

pain.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225,

240 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting

B. Deliberate Indifference of Prison officials may act with

Serious Medical Needs deliberate indifference by

“intentionally denying or delaying

Here, as against Sessoms, the access to medical care . . . .” Estelle,

constitutional right at issue once 429 U.S. at 105. But “[m]ere delay is

again derives from the Eighth not enough.” Moskos v. Hardee, 24

Amendment, but it involves alleged F.4th 289, 298 (4th Cir. 2022). “A

deliberate indifference to Blanks’s commonplace medical delay such as

serious medical needs. that experienced in everyday life will

only rarely suffice to constitute an

“Claims that prison officials failed to Eighth Amendment violation, absent

provide adequate medical care to an unusual circumstances where the

inmate, like excessive force claims, delay itself places the prisoner at

sound in the Eighth Amendment.” ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ such

Iko, 535 F.3d at 241. A plaintiff must as where the prisoner’s condition

show that the officer “acted with deteriorates markedly or the ailment

‘deliberate indifference’ (subjective) is of an urgent nature.” Id.

to the inmate’s ‘serious medical needs’

(objective).” Id. (quoting Estelle v. IV. DISCUSSION

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).

A. The Court should grant

A serious medical need is “‘one that summary judgment to the

has been diagnosed by a physician as defendants in their official

mandating treatment or one that is so capacity on the basis of

obvious that even a lay person would sovereign immunity.

easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting At the time of the incident, each of the

Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, defendants was an employee of the

846 (7th Cir. 1999)). North Carolina Department of Adult

Corrections (“the Department”). See

An officer acts with deliberate Caple Decl. ¶ 2; Ricker’s Resps. to Pl.’s

indifference when she has “actual Interrogs. ¶ 2 (responding to question

knowledge of the risk of harm to the about “DPS” employment), Docket

inmate” and also “‘recognize[s] that Entry 67-17; Brewington’s Resps. to

[her] actions were insufficient’ to Pl.’s 1st Set of Interrogs. ¶ 2 (same),

mitigate the risk of harm to the Docket Entry 67-15; Sessoms’s Resps.

inmate arising from his medical to Pl.’s Interrogs. ¶ 2 (same), Docket

needs.” Id. (quoting Parrish ex rel. Entry 67-20.

Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303

(4th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in The Department “is a North Carolina

original). agency.” Biggs v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety, 953 F..3d 236, 241 (4th Cir.

2020); see also Dade v. FNU

Carlineo, No. 1:22-cv-00125-MR, Congress has not abrogated a state’s

2023 WL 2386777, at *2 n.3 immunity from suits arising under

(W.D.N.C. Mar. 6, 2023) (“The § 1983. Biggs, 953 F.3d at 241. And

NCDPS is now known as the North “North Carolina has not consented to

Carolina Department of Adult being sued under § 1983 and therefore

Corrections (NCDAC).”). has not waived sovereign immunity in

that context.” Singh v. Univ. of N.C. at

“[A] suit against a state official in his Chapel Hill, 659 F. Supp. 3d 659, 669

or her official capacity is not a suit (M.D.N.C. 2023). Therefore, Blanks

against the official but rather is a suit cannot seek damages against the

against the official’s office,” and, thus, defendants in their official capacities.

“is no different from a suit against the And Blanks only requests money

State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of damages against the defendants. See

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Compl. § VI. For these reasons, the

Cf. id. at 71 n.10 (recognizing, though, Court should grant summary

that “‘official-capacity actions for judgment for the defendants on the

prospective relief are not treated as official capacity claims.

actions against the State’”) (quoting

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, B. The Court should deny Blanks’s

167 n.14 (1985)). motion for summary judgment.

Generally, the Eleventh Amendment As the moving party seeking summary

bars actions against a state unless the judgment, Blanks bears the initial

state consents or Congress properly burden of demonstrating the absence

abrogates immunity. Va. Office for of a genuine issue of material fact. See

Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. Celotex, 477 at 325. But he has, by his

247, 254 (2011). Cf. Alden v. Maine, own admission, failed to do so.

527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999) (“We have

sometimes referred to the States’ In his verified brief in support of his

immunity from suit as ‘Eleventh motion, Blanks describes the

Amendment immunity[,] . . . [a] defendants’ responses to

convenient shorthand but something interrogatories and requests for

of a misnomer, for the sovereign admissions as “squarely

immunity of the States neither derives contradictory” to his declaration and

from, nor is limited by, the terms of affirmatively states that “[t]here is

the Eleventh Amendment. . . . [T]he clearly a genuine issue of fact” and

States’ immunity from suit is a this “factual dispute is also material.”

fundamental aspect of the sovereignty See Verified Br. in Supp. at 5-6.

which the States enjoyed before the

ratification of the Constitution, and Indeed, the evidence does not permit

which they retain today . . . .”). the Court to determine as a matter of

law that any of the defendants has

violated Blanks’s constitutional

rights. Therefore, Court should deny “permitted to take measures,

Blanks’s motion. including the use of appropriate force,

intended to secure his cooperation.”

C. The Court should deny Id. at 118.

summary judgment to Caple in

her individual capacity. Caple further contends that the

photographs of Blanks taken shortly

Caple does “not contest that the use of after the incident, as well as his

pepper spray was non-trivial,” Def. medical assessments, “blatantly

Caple Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. contradict[]” Blanks’s alleged injuries

for Summ. J. (“Caple’s Mem. in from the pepper spray. Id. at 18-19

Supp.”), Docket Entry 62 at 15, and, (citing Ex. 2).

instead, argues that Blanks has not

put forth evidence that she used force There is evidence to support Caple’s

maliciously and sadistically. position that the force was not

malicious and sadistic, that is, it was

To meet her burden as the moving “needed to preserve internal order

party, Caple points out that multiple and discipline,” see Hudson, 503 U.S.

witnesses observed that Blanks had at 6: Blanks himself admitted that he

been “kicking his cell door, was openly was agitated and yelling for

hostile to staff, [and] was Brewington to open his cell door when

communicating threats to staff.” Id. at she would not let him out of his cell in

16 (citing Ex. 1, Offender Disciplinary the Blue Unit to help her clean. See,

Infraction; Ex. 2, Incident R.). And e.g., Dismissal Letter at 5 (Blanks’s

once in the holding cell in the Red witness statement). And, according to

Unit, he refused orders. Id. at 16-17 Ricker, once in the Red Unit holding

(citing Ex. 2; Ex. 4, Dismissal Letter; cell, Blanks refused to follow her

Ex. 5, Caple Decl.). In response to his orders to turn around to allow her to

refusal, she administered “a single remove his handcuffs and told her,

short blast of OC peppery spray.” Id. “Fuck you, I’m not giving you shit.”

at 17-18 (citing Ex. 2; Ex. 4). See, e.g., Ricker Decl. ¶¶ 8-9;

Dismissal Letter at 4.

Thus, Caple argues that her tempered

use of force was necessary because

Likewise, there is evidence that the

Blanks “was not docile and was

extent of injury Blanks suffered

refusing multiple lawful orders,” a

suggests Caple plausibly thought the

situation in which “corrections

force exerted was necessary, see

officers could reasonably perceive a

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. Ricker

danger . . . .” Id. at 22-23. The law

reported as part of the incident

recognizes that “inmates cannot be

investigation that, in response to

permitted to decide which orders they

Blanks’s refusal, Caple administered

will obey, and when they will obey

one burst of pepper spray through the

them.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 117. When

wicket door at waist level. See, e.g.,

an inmate resists, the officer is

Dismissal Letter at 5. Blanks even although Blanks was angry and

states that it is undisputed that Caple yelling, he was secure and did not

sprayed him at waist level. Pl.’s pose a threat to anyone. See, e.g.,

Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 6, Dismissal Letter at 5. Gholston, who

Docket Entry 71. The color was standing fifteen feet away from

photographs of Blanks taken shortly the holding cell at the time of the

after the incident show discoloration incident, reported that Blanks was

of the back of Blanks’ shirt and his mad but did not kick the holding cell

arms which were in handcuffs behind door and was not a security risk at the

his back. Incident R. at 15-18. time of the incident. Id. Similarly,

Gholston and David Graham reported David Graham, who was standing six

that the spray hit Blanks in the back, feet away from the cell at the time of

which Blanks also acknowledged. See, the incident, reported that Blanks

e.g., Dismissal Letter at 5. “did not kick the cell,” was in

handcuffs in a locked cell, and “was

The nurse who completed the medical not posing a threat to himself or staff.”

assessment saw no injuries. See, e.g., Id.

id. at 6. Blanks also admitted during

the incident investigation that he As for where Blanks was hit with the

suffered no injuries as a result of the spray, as part of the Unit Response

incident. See, e.g., id. at 5. investigation, Caple said she sprayed

Blanks in “his facial area.” Grievance

However, despite her argument Resp. at 1, Docket Entry 67-5. In his

otherwise, other evidence suggests verified brief, Blanks claims that he

there are genuine issues of material was “summarily maced starting below

fact regarding the “malicious and his waist to his back and upper body,”

sadistic” component. For example, despite “offer[ing] no resistance” to

after the incident, according to officers immediately preceding the

Correctional Captain Revels, Caple deployment of pepper spray. Blanks’s

initially told her that she did not know Verified Br. in Supp. at 2.

why she sprayed Blanks. See

Dismissal Letter at 4. Revels reported On February 6, during a clinic

that Caple then told her that she encounter after the incident, Blanks

sprayed Blanks because he refused to reported that his hands burned a little

“give the handcuffs back.” Id. bit and he had pain in his right hand.

Lenwood Graham reported that Caple See Med. Recs. at 21, Docket Entry 68.

also told him that she sprayed Blanks Blanks contends he told the nurse that

“because he would not give [her] the “his body felt like it was fire,” he

handcuffs.” Id. at 5. “couldn’t move, see,” and he “had

trouble breathing.” Verified Br. in

Furthermore, Ricker reported as part Opp’n at ¶ 22, Docket Entry 72.

of the incident investigation that she

did not use her pepper spray because,

On February 9, Blanks wrote his

therapist at SCI and explained that Cason had become “belligerent and

Caple deployed the pepper spray argumentative” when an officer told

“start[ing] at my male body parts and him he was not on the recreation list

worked her way up to my eyes and and had to return to his cell. Id. Once

head,” although he closed his eyes at in his cell, he refused to allow the

the time. Med. Recs. at 13. The next officers to remove his handcuffs. Id.

day, he submitted a request to see his This is where the similarities end.

therapist, noting that his PTSD

“kicked in” during the incident and he Three officers arrived at Cason’s cell

“suffered a panic attack” and could to assist in removing his handcuffs.

not breathe. Id. at 14. During a Id. They attached an extension tether

February 28 mental health to the handcuffs and pulled Cason

appointment, Blanks reported having towards the door which he initially

about three flashbacks and prevented from closing. Id. After the

nightmares about the incident. Id. at door closed, officers removed the

9. handcuffs from Cason. Id. Once his

hands were free, Cason reached out of

In March, Blanks twice requested a the slot in his cell door and grabbed

medical appointment because he was the officer’s duty belt and refused to

having “problems out of left ear, due let go of the officer. Id. Another

to where I got sprayed by Officer SGT officer then administered the burst of

Caple Scotland CI never had problems pepper spray through the cell door. Id.

with my left ear until that incident

happened” and “problems out of left Unsurprisingly, the court found that

ear where O/C pepper spray got down the evidence “did not support an

inside it.” Id. at 7, 11. He reported the inference that the defendants acted

same during his associated clinical maliciously and sadistically with the

encounter. See Med. Recs. at 23, intent to cause harm to Cason.” Id. at

Docket Entry 62-6. *7. For obvious reasons, the facts of

Cason differ from the facts here, most

Caple contends that Cason v. notably Cason’s grabbing the officer’s

Lodgson, No. ELH-11-3089, 2012 WL duty belt and refusing to let the officer

3144633 (D. Md. July 27, 2012), go. No such evidence has been

where the Court granted summary proffered here.

judgment in favor of the pepper

spraying officer, is “[a] factually After a thorough review of the

similar” case. Caple’s Mem. in Supp. evidence, Blanks’s story is not

at 21-22. Cason was an inmate in a “blatantly contradicted by the

Maryland prison when an officer record.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 230 (“When

administered one burst of pepper opposing parties tell two different

spray through the slot in his cell door. stories, one of which is blatantly

2012 WL 3144633, at *2. contradicted by the record, so that no

reasonably jury could believe it, a irresponsibly, and the need to shield

court should not adopt that version of officials who perform their duties

the facts for purposes of ruling on a responsibly from ‘harassment,

motion for summary judgment.”). distraction, and liability.’” Byers v.

Painter, 173 F.4th 155, 160 (4th Cir.

There is evidence from which a 2026) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan,

reasonable jury could find that Caple 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).

did not deploy the pepper spray to

restore order or the like but, instead, Qualified immunity shields

did so in response to intransigence or government officials from civil

in retaliation for Blanks’s earlier liability unless a plaintiff shows both

behavior towards Brewington, use of (1) that the official violated a

vulgarity, and insolence. There is also constitutional right and (2) that the

evidence from which a reasonable right was clearly established at the

jury could find that Blanks did not time of the violation. Pearson, 55 U.S.

pose a threat to the corrections at 232.

officers or himself, and, thus, there

was no need for this use of force. “In resolving whether to award

There is also evidence from which a qualified immunity at summary

reasonable jury could determine that judgment, courts are to engage in a

Blanks suffered injuries from the ‘two-pronged inquiry.’” Nazario v.

pepper spray. Gutierrez, 103 F.4th 213, 230 (4th Cir.

2024) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572

In sum, construing the facts and U.S. 650, 655 (2014)). First, the court

inferences therefrom in Blanks’s determines whether “in a light most

favor, a reasonable jury could return a favorable to the injured party – ‘the

verdict in his favor on his § 1983 claim officer’s conduct violated a

against Caple. Genuine disputes of constitutional right.’” Id. (quoting

material fact exist regarding Caple’s Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

state of mind when she administered (2001)). Next, the court asks

the pepper spray that preclude “whether the right at issue in the first

summary judgment. prong was ‘clearly established at the

time’ of the contested action.” Id.

The Court should deny Caple’s motion (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 227).

for summary judgment. “Accordingly, a court may award

qualified immunity to an official if

D. The Court should deny Caple either (1) there is no violation of a

qualified immunity. constitutional right, or (2) the

constitutional right was not clearly

“The doctrine of qualified immunity established.” Id. (citing Pearson, 555

‘balances two important interests,’ U.S. at 227).

namely, the need to hold accountable

public officials who exercise power

The court is required to define the right of an inmate particularly one

constitutional right at a “‘high level of who is restrained in handcuffs in a

particularity’” because “[t]he way in locked cell to be free from the use of

which an alleged right is described excessive force. See id. (explaining

matters.” Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 that “the clearly established right

F.4th 498, 505 (4th Cir. 2024) must be viewed with reference to the

(quoting Ewards v. City of particular facts of the case”).

Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250-51 (4th

Cir. 1999)). “Although a case directly Where, as here, genuine disputes of

on point is not required, existing material fact “preclude summary

precedent ‘must have placed the judgment on [the plaintiff’s] claim of

statutory or constitutional question [the use of excessive force], [t]hese

beyond debate.’” Id. at 505-06 disputes necessarily also preclude

(quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. summary judgment on the first step of

100, 104 (2018)). the qualified immunity inquiry.”

Bolick v. Anderson, 169 F.4th 528,

In the context of a violation of the 540 (4th Cir. 2026); see also

Eighth Amendment, the Fourth Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347,

Circuit Court of Appeals requires less 359-360 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations

specificity in defining the right than in omitted) (“If a plaintiff has alleged a

cases involving the Fourth clearly established right, summary

Amendment, but “the unlawfulness judgment on qualified immunity

must still be ‘apparent’ based on pre- grounds is improper as long as there

existing law.” See King v. Riley, 76 F. remains any material factual dispute

4th 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing regarding the actual conduct.”);

Pfaller v. Amonette, 55 F. 4th 436, Vathekan v. Prince George’s Cnty.,

453 (4th Cir. 2022) and quoting Hope 154 F.3d 173, 179 (4th Cir. 1998)

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). (“When resolution of a case depends

“In the end, the key inquiry is whether on determining what actually

‘the law provided “fair warning” that happened, ‘the issue is inappropriate

[the officer’s] conduct was for resolution by summary

unconstitutional.’” Atkinson, 100 judgment.’” (quoting Rainey v.

F.4th at 506. (quoting Booker v. S.C. Conerly, 973 F.2d 321, 324 (4th Cir.

Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 (4th 1992))).

Cir. 2017) (alteration in Booker)). To

answer that question, courts look to As previously discussed, there exist

precedent of the United States genuine disputes of material facts

Supreme Court and, in this district, regarding whether Caple violated

the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Blanks’s Eighth Amendment right

Id. when she administered pepper spray.

Therefore, the Court “proceed[s] to

In relation to Caple’s conduct, the the second step: whether the right was

constitutional right at issue is the

clearly established.” Bolick, 169 F.4th CV-166-M, 2025 WL 77897, at *9

at 540. (E.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 2025) (quoting

Martin v. Short, No. 23-1588, 2024

At the time of the incident, “it was WL 3200715, at *4 (4th Cir. June 27,

clearly established that a corrections 2024)).

officer’s use of force in bad faith – not

to preserve order or induce Further, though not dispositive, the

compliance, but to punish through the NCDAC Policies and Procedures

‘wanton infliction of pain’ – violates clearly state that “[a]n officer is

an inmate’s Eight Amendment right.” prohibited from using force solely as a

Brooks, 924 F.3d at 119. “That result of verbal provocation. An

principle applies with particular officer shall not use force against an

clarity to cases . . . where the victim is offender . . . who is effectively

restrained, compliant, and incapable restrained.” Use of Force Policy,

of resisting or protecting himself, and Docket Entry 65-5 at 3.

otherwise presents no physical threat

in any way.” Thompson v. Commonw. Because genuine disputes of material

of Va., 878 F.3d 89, 105 (4th Cir. facts exist about Caple’s use of force

2017). and the right of an inmate handcuffed

inside a locked cell to be free from the

More than three decades ago, the

use of excessive force was clearly

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

established at the time of the incident,

recognized “‘that it is a violation of the

summary judgment on Caple’s

Eighth Amendment for prison

defense of qualified immunity is not

officials to use mace, tear gas or other

appropriate. The Court should not

chemical agents in quantities greater

grant it at this stage.

than necessary or for the sole purpose

of infliction of pain.” Iko, 535 F.3d at

E. The Court should grant in part

240 (emphasis in original) (quoting

and deny in part Ricker’s

Williams, 77 F.3d at 763 and stating

motion for summary judgment.

that the phrase “or other chemical

agents” “plainly reaches the use of

Next, Blanks asserts that Ricker

pepper spray”).

threatened to spray him by pulling out

her pepper spray and then ordering

A “‘reasonable officer would have

Caple to deploy her own spray. See

understood that’” “(without warning)

Compl. § IV.D.; Verified Br. in Supp.

pepper spray[ing] a prisoner who was

at 15.

fully restrained inside of a locked cell

because that prisoner was kicking the

As to the first allegation, Ricker

door seeking the help of an officer”

herself reported that she “pulled [her]

“‘was unlawful, whether by then-

spray but then saw 3 sergeants

existing precedent or by the otherwise

standing behind [her].” Witness

obvious illegality of that outrageous

Statements at 6. See also Caple Resps.

conduct.’” Ransom v. Page, No. 7:23-

to Admis. ¶ 11 (stating the same). But “In a § 1983 suit . . . the term

appellate courts have agreed that ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer.”

threats alone cannot provide a basis Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677

for a § 1983 suit. See Henslee v. Lewis, (2009). A supervisor can only be

153 F. App’x 178, 180 (4th Cir. 2005) liable under § 1983 for “their personal

(unpublished) (“Mere threats or wrongdoing or supervisory actions

verbal abuse by prison officials, that violated constitutional norms.”

without more, do not state a Timpson v. Anderson Cnty.

cognizable claim under § 1983.”) Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31

(citing Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022)

825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979)); Fischl v. (emphasis added). The supervisor’s

Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. “‘indifference or tacit authorization’”

1997) (“[M]ere allegations of verbal of “a constitutional violation

abuse, threats or defamations by a committed by a subordinate state or

correctional officer to a prisoner are local government official” must be “‘a

not cognizable in a Section 1983 causative factor’ in enabling the

action . . . .”); King v. Olmsted County, violation.” Bolick, 169 F.4th at 541

117 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791,

(“[A] threat constitutes an actionable 798-99 (4th Cir. 1994)). To determine

constitutional violation only when the if a supervisor is liable, courts “must

threat is so brutal or wantonly cruel as consider whether the supervisor’s

to shock the conscience . . . or if the own ‘deliberate indifference

threat exerts coercive pressure on the permitted the constitutional abuses to

plaintiff and the plaintiff suffers the continue unchecked.’” Id. (quoting

deprivation of a constitutional Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373

right.”); Robertson v. City of Plano, (4th Cir. 1984)).

70 F.3d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[M]ere

threatening language or gestures of a A plaintiff must show

custodial office[r] do not, even if true,

amount to constitutional violations.”) (1) that the supervisor had

(citation omitted). actual or constructive

knowledge that [her]

This case is lacking the “something subordinate was engaged in

more.” Ricker’s threat to pepper conduct that posed a

spray Blanks was just that: she pervasive and unreasonable

stopped short of carrying out that risk of constitutional [or

threat. other legal] injury to citizens

like the plaintiff;

As for Ricker’s order for Caple to

deploy her pepper spray, the (2) that the supervisor’s

undisputed facts foreclose the claim, response to that knowledge

which sounds in supervisory liability. was so inadequate as to

show deliberate indifference

to or tacit authorization of George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 203

the alleged offensive (4th Cir. 2002)).

practices; and

An officer can be liable under this

(3) that there was an affirmative theory when she “(1) knows that a

causal link between the fellow officer is violating an

supervisor’s inaction and individual’s constitutional rights; (2)

the particular constitutional has a reasonable opportunity to

[or other legal] injury prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not

suffered by the plaintiff. to act.” Randall, 302 F.3d at 204.

“The ‘bystanding officer must know of

Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. [her] fellow officer’s misconduct . . . .

If the bystander lacks such

This claim of supervisor liability knowledge, [she] cannot be a

against Ricker fails from the start. participant in the unlawful acts, and

The undisputed evidence shows that the imposition of personal liability is

Ricker was not Caple’s supervisor. impermissible.’” Johnson, 105 F.4th

Caple was also a higher rank than at 124 (quoting Randall, 302 F.3d at

Ricker and Ricker’s superior. See 204 n.24).

Ricker Decl. ¶ 13; Ricker’s Resps. to

Despite Ricker’s argument otherwise,

Pl.’s Interrogs. ¶¶ 12, 20. Blanks

there are genuine disputes of material

presents no evidence otherwise.

facts about her knowledge of a

constitutional violation, opportunity

In addition to sounding in supervisory

to stop Caple, and choice not to act.

liability, this claim could be one based

For example, Ricker reported that she

on the theory of bystander liability

would not have administered pepper

against Ricker. See Verified Br. in

spray under these circumstances

Opp’n at 2 (stating “[t]he officers who

because Blanks “was secured at the

were present failed to protect Plaintiff

time, and even though he was angry

Blanks from certain doom”); id. at 16

and yelling, he did not pose a threat to

(“Ricker . . . stood there and watched

anyone,” Dismissal Letter at 4,

Caple [administer] pepper to Plaintiff

implying she knew doing so would be

Blanks.”); see generally also Tim

excessive force. On the other hand, as

Caesar Blanks’ Decl. in Opp’n, Docket

described above, there are genuine

Entry 73 (stating the same).

disputes of material fact about

whether Caple violated Blanks’s

Such a claim is “premised on an

constitutional rights as a threshold

officer’s ‘affirmative duty to intervene

matter. In addition, as part of the

to protect the constitutional rights of

incident investigation, Ricker stated

citizens from infringement by other

that she told Caple, Gholston, and

law enforcement officers.’” Johnson v.

Graham, “I’m not sure if I can spray

Robinette, 105 F.4th 90, 123-24 (4th

him but you’re three sergeants, you

Cir. 2024) (quoting Randall v. Prince

decide,” id. at 4-5, implying Ricker did

not know if the administration of Brewington, and Ricker’s Mot. for

pepper spray would be excessive Summ. J. at 11, Docket Entry 65. But

under those circumstances. the cases she cites for support,

Hamilton v. Roederer Corr. Complex,

Similarly, there is evidence from No. 3:20-CV-P160-DJH, 2020 WL

which a jury could find that Ricker did 4587524 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 10, 2020)

not have a reasonable opportunity to and Jennings v. Mitchell, 93 F. App’x

stop Caple. Ricker averred that 723 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished),

“Caple took out her pepper spray are distinguishable. The Hamilton

canister and administered a burst of court dismissed the complaint on 28

pepper spray” “[w]ithout warning.” U.S.C. § 1915A review because the

Ricker Decl. ¶ 10. Further, she stated plaintiff alleged no injury, and the

that “[a]t no time before or during the Jennings court affirmed summary

use of force incident did [she] know or judgment for the correction officer

even suspect that Sergeant Caple because the undisputed evidence

would use pepper spray against” showed lawful use of pepper spray

Blanks, the “incident happened and no respiratory distress. Here,

quickly and surprised [her]” such that genuine issues of material fact remain

she “did not have time to react before regarding Caple’s actions’ legality.

Sergeant Caple had already finished

Accordingly, the Court should grant in

administering pepper spray.” Id. ¶ 14.

part Ricker’s motion for summary

Gholston similarly described Caple’s

judgment as to the § 1983 claims

administration of the pepper spray as

based on threats and supervisory

“immediate[].” Dismissal Letter at 5.

liability and deny in part Ricker’s

Under these circumstances, Ricker

motion for summary judgment as to

would not have had a reasonable

the § 1983 claim of bystander liability.

opportunity to stop Caple or make the

choice not to act. On the other hand,

F. The Court should deny Ricker

her telling Caple, Graham, and

qualified immunity.

Gholston to decide what to do implies

she had time to stop the

The constitutional right of an inmate

administration of pepper spray and

in handcuffs inside a locked cell to be

chose not to do so.

free from excessive force was clearly

established on February 6, 2024, as

Considering all inferences in Blanks’s

previously explained. The material

favor, a reasonable jury could find

disputes surrounding Caple’s

Ricker liable for bystander liability.

conduct, as well as Ricker’s, foreclose

the award of qualified immunity to

Ricker disputes liability, albeit for

Ricker at this stage. See Bolick, 169

general use of excessive force, because

F.4th at 541.

there is evidence that Blanks did not

suffer injuries from the pepper spray.

The Court should deny Ricker

See Mem. in Supp. of Sessoms,

qualified immunity.

the witness statements from the

G. The Court should grant incident, including Blanks’s

Brewington’s motion for statement, place Brewington there.

summary judgment. See, e.g. Dismissal Letter at 4-6. The

summary of the video footage of the

Blanks’s primary claim against incident does not mention

Brewington is that she instigated the Brewington at all. See, e.g., id. at 6.

excessive force by reporting his

disruptive behavior. Compl. § IV.D. Although Blanks did not place

(“Brewington started the whole Brewington at the incident when he

situation by saying I made threats and gave his witness statement, he does

was kicking door, she lied”); Verified state in his verified brief in opposition

Br. in Supp. at 15 (“Brewington gave to the defendants’ motions that

false information, that the Plaintiff Brewington “stood there” when

was kicking his assigned cell door, Ricker and then Caple pulled out their

shouting threats, which started the pepper spray. See Verified Br. in

whole incident.”).4 Opp’n at 16. But the record evidence

blatantly contradicts this statement

In § 1983 suits, liability will only lie such that no reasonable jury would

where the official charged acted believe Brewington was present for

personally in the deprivation of the the use of force incident; therefore,

plaintiff’s rights. Wilcox v. Brown, the Court will “not adopt that version

877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) of the facts for purposes of ruling on

(emphasis added) (quotations [the] motion for summary judgment.”

omitted). See Iko, 535 F.3d at 230.

To meet her burden as the moving Because it is undisputed that

party, Brewington avers: she told Brewington did not act personally in

Blanks he would not be released from the alleged deprivation of Blanks’s

his cell to help her clean the unit; she rights, the Court should grant

told him to stop kicking his cell door; Brewington summary judgment.

and she called for assistance.

Brewington Decl. ¶¶ 6-12. That was H. The Court should grant

the extent of her interaction with Brewington qualified

Blanks on February 6. After Caple and immunity.

Ricker removed him from the holding

cell on her unit, she did not see Blanks Because the undisputed evidence

again that shift. Id. ¶ 13. Therefore, shows that Brewington did not violate

she was not present during the Blanks’s rights, she is entitled to

incident. Id. Furthermore, none of qualified immunity. See Bolick, 169

4 Likely out of an abundance of caution, supervisory liability. The Court does not

Brewington argues that she cannot be read Blanks’ complaint to allege such

liable under the theories of bystander or theories against Brewington.

F.4th at 540 (“Answering either Sessoms did not remember Ricker

question [of the two-step qualified asking her what to do with Blanks or

immunity inquiry] in the negative what she told Ricker in response. See

warrants granting qualified Sessoms’s Resps. to Pl.’s Interrogs.

immunity.”). ¶ 24. “After reviewing his control

actions and the incident report, I

I. The Court should grant probably told her to place him in the

Sessoms’ motion for summary holding cell.” Id. She did “not

judgment. remember saying to leave [Blanks]

inside the holding cell for any period

Finally, Blanks alleges that Sessoms of time.” Id. ¶ 23. Sessoms also did

violated his constitutional rights by not remember “the scene after SGT.

telling officers to leave him in the David D. Graham stat[ed], ‘I’ve had

holding cell for ten minutes after enough of this crap!,’ before freeing

Caple deployed her pepper spray. Plaintiff Blanks from the locked

Verified Br. at 2, 15. Essentially, holding cell . . . .” Id. ¶ 25.

Blanks claims she was deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical Policy required the officers to give

needs.5 Blanks “an immediate opportunity to

flush his or her eyes with water once

More specifically, Blanks contends control has been restored.” See

that “when Ricker asked Sessoms, NCDAC Use of Force Policy at 5. And

what do you want us to do with him? Gholston, David Graham, and

Sessoms replied, ‘leave him in there Lenwood Graham escorted Blanks to

for 10 minutes!’” Id. at 2. “[T]hats the showers to be decontaminated

when SGT David D Graham finally minutes after Caple sprayed him.

spoke up and said, ‘Alright, I’ve had Statements of Witnesses at 2, 9, 10.

enough of this crap!’ SGT David

Graham made his way through to Afterwards, at approximately 10:50

unlock the holding cell and begged p.m., Toni Nguyen and Antonio

Plaintiff Blanks to take a cold Tolbert took Blanks from his cell in

shower.” Id. According to the the Blue Unit for a medical

undisputed summary of the video assessment. Id. at 4, 11, 23. Blanks

footage of the incident, David Graham complained of his “hands burning a

removed Blanks from the cell little bit” and his eyes burning. Med.

approximately four minutes after Recs. at 21-22, Docket Entry 68. The

Sessoms arrived in the holding cell nurse assessed him, reported “no

area. See Dismissal Letter at 6. visible sign of OC spray” on his face

and “no skin swelling, redness, or

blistering anywhere” on his body, and

5 Likely out of an abundance of caution, or supervisory liability. The Court does

Sessoms argues that she cannot be liable not read Blanks’ complaint to allege

under the theories of bystander liability either of these theories against Sessoms.

saw no other injuries. Dismissal of law on the inmate’s deliberate

Letter at 6. Officers also “kept a indifference to serious medical needs

visual” on Blanks for one hour. E.g., claim:

Statements of Witnesses at 4.

Moskos experienced the usual

Days following the incident, Blanks transitory effects of pepper

wrote to his therapist requesting a spray for a period of, at most,

mental health visit and explaining 90 to 120 minutes. He did not

that as a result of the incident, his testify to a serious medical

PTSD “kicked in,” he “suffered a panic reaction or to any pain beyond

attack,” “couldn’t breathe,” and was the normal discomfort of

“having flash backs.” Med. Recs. at 14. pepper spray: even by his own

In addition, he sought medical account, he simply expressed

treatment to address “problems with that his eyes were burning, not

[his] left ear” that developed after that he was experiencing more

“that incident happened.” Id. at 7, 11. serious medical issues. In

circumstances such as these,

The undisputed evidence shows that, involving a short delay in

no matter what Sessoms said to do decontamination, without any

with Blanks after Caple sprayed him, aggravating factors such as a

David Graham removed him from the serious medical reaction, courts

cell approximately three minutes after have consistently found that

Sessoms was seen outside of the cell the objective prong is not

and approximately five minutes after satisfied.

Caple sprayed him. David Graham

and other officers then escorted Id. at 298.

Blanks to the showers to

decontaminate. Approximately forty- Here, as in Moskos, there is no

five minutes after Caple sprayed him, evidence that any delay in

officers took Blanks for a medical decontamination or medical

assessment. This delay, without treatment stemming from Sessoms’

more, is not enough to show a orders “put him at a ‘substantial risk’

constitutional violation. See Moskos, of ‘serious harm,’” as is required for a

24 F.4th at 298. deliberate indifference claim. Id. The

mental health harm Blanks reported

In Moskos, the inmate claimed that arose from the incident itself, not any

prison officials were deliberately delay in treatment for the pepper

indifferent to his serious medical spray.

needs “because they delayed

decontaminating him after he was Accordingly, the Court should grant

sprayed with pepper spray.” Id. at Sessoms summary judgment on the

297. As the Moskos court recognized deliberate indifference claim.

when it affirmed judgment as a matter

J. The Court should — grant Sessoms’ Motion for Summary

Sessoms qualified immunity. Judgment as follows:

Because the undisputed evidence i. GRANT IN PART as to

shows that Sessoms did not violate the official capacity claim

Blanks’s rights, she is entitled to and the portions of the

qualified immunity. See Bolick, 169 §1983 claim based on

F.4th at 540 (“Answering either threats and supervisory

question [of the two-step qualified liability against Jessica

immunity inquiry] in the negative Ricker, and DENY IN

warrants granting qualified PART the remainder of

immunity.”). her motion,

ii. GRANT Jasmine

V. CONCLUSION Brewington’s motion, and

IT IS HEREY ORDERED that the iiii GRANT Angela Sessoms’

Clerk redact Tim Caesar Blanks’s date motion.

of birth from pages 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 21,

and 22 of Docket Entry 68 and refile

those pages as publicly available; SALMLL

J fy na Gibso#) McFadden

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that United States Magistrate Judge

the Clerk seal Docket Entry 62-6,

redact Tim Caesar Blanks’s date of July 24, 2026

birth from page 23 of Docket Entry

62-6, and refile that page as publicly

available;

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the Court:

1. DENY Tim Caesar _Blanks’s

Motion for Summary Judgment,

2. GRANT IN PART Charlene

Nicole Caple’s Motion for

Summary Judgment as to the

official capacity claim against her,

and DENY IN PART the

remainder of her motion,

3. GRANT IN PART AND DENY

IN PART Jessica’ Ricker’s,

Jasmine Brewington’s, and Angela

22