Guidry

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MICHELLE GUIDRY CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 26-456-SDD-RLB

REBECCA DONALDSON, ET AL.

NOTICE

Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the

Clerk of the United States District Court.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served

with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of

law, and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings of

fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations within fourteen (14) days after being served will

bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed

factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the

District Court.

ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE

WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 25, 2026.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.

U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MICHELLE GUIDRY CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 26-456-SDD-RLB

REBECCA DONALDSON, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Plaintif’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction (“Motion for TRO”) filed on May 29, 2026. (R. Doc. 6). The motion was

referred to the undersigned on June 2, 2026.1

On April 29, 2026, Michelle Guidry (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, commenced this Section 1983 action, alleging that Rebecca Donaldson (“Donaldson”),

her former attorney Kathryn Jakuback Burke (“Burke”), Assistant District Attorney Quoc Huu

Nguyen, and Baton Rouge Police Department (“BRPD”) officers Willie Williams, Kama

Rousell, and Johnathan Lamotte (collectively, “Defendants”) violated her constitutional

rights. (R. Doc. 1).

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that after having an affair with a man married to

Donaldson, various litigation ensued in which Burke represented Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that

after the issuance of certain protective orders, Burke secretly filed and lost an appeal, resulting in

1 Because this is a motion for injunctive relief, the undersigned has issued a Report and Recommendation for the

district judge’s consideration. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Ritter v. Cook, 45 F. App’x 325 (5th Cir. 2002)

(“Because the magistrate judge had not obtained consent from all parties to rule on Ritter's motion for a preliminary

injunction, the magistrate judge was without jurisdiction to issue a dispositive order on that motion.”); Beaird v.

Lappin, No. 06-967, 2006 WL 2051034, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2006) (vacating magistrate judge’s order on

motion for temporary restraining order, noting that magistrate judge should have submitted proposed findings of

fact and recommendations for disposition as required under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)); see also Hanson v.

Drummond, No. 25-102, 2025 WL 636319, at *2 (W.D. La. Feb. 27, 2025) (concluding that magistrate judge had

the authority to issue a report and recommendation to the district judge regarding a motion for temporary restraining

order).

the garnishment of Plaintiff’s bank account and, ultimately, multiple arrests in 2024 and 2026.

While it is not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff’s arrests and criminal proceedings pertain to

charges of cyberstalking and improper telephone communications with respect to Donaldson.

Plaintiff further appears to have entered a guilty plea on February 5, 2026, and a hearing was set

for June 17, 2026 with respect to the withdrawal of the guilty plea.

Plaintiff seeks relief for the following claims: deprivation of liberty without due process

of law; malicious prosecution; First Amendment retaliation; abuse of process; conspiracy to

interfere with civil rights; unlawful seizure/wrongful arrest; conditions of confinement/deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs; coerced and involuntary guilty plea; and state law claims

for legal malpractice, fraud, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In the instant motion, Plaintiff seeks preliminary injunctive relief, including: a stay of

state-court criminal proceedings against her; an injunction precluding the defendants from being

any new arrests, criminal complaints, or professional-license actions against her; an injunction

precluding Burke from communicating with the Baton Rouge Police Department, the EBR

Parish District Attorney’s Office, or the Louisiana State Board of Social Work Examiners; and

the preservation of all state-court records, BRPD case files, and prosecutorial files pertaining to

Plaintiff. (R. Doc. 6).

Rule 65(b)(1) provides the following with respect to the issuance of a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) without notice to the defendants:

(1) Issuing Without Notice. The court may issue a temporary restraining order

without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that

immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant

before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and

(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give

notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).

Having considered Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to

satisfy the requirements of Rule 65(b)(1). Foremost, while Plaintiff states that she submitted a

Verified Complaint under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, her verification is not

executed. (See R. Doc. 1 at 26). Plaintiff does not otherwise submit an affidavit pursuant to Rule

65(b)(1)(A). Second, the allegations in the Complaint do not “clearly show that immediate and

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard

in opposition.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the ongoing risk

of arrests and prosecutions are vague, conclusory, and speculative at best.

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 65(b)(1)’s verification requirements, standing

alone, is a sufficient basis to deny her request for a TRO. See Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC v.

Truehill, No. 25-00255-BAJ-RLB, 2025 WL 980064, at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 1, 2025) (citing

Stevenson v. Benjamin, No. 19-00637-BAJ-SDJ, 2021 WL 11592389, at *1 (M.D. La. Feb. 17,

2021) (denying pro se plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order due to failure to comply

with Rule 65’s notice requirements); Hampton v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., No. 16-632,

2016 WL 5796886, at *1 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2016) (same); Spears v. Scales, No. 15-11-SDD-

RLB, 2016 WL 3774069, at *1 (M.D. La. July 13, 2016) (same)).

Furthermore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements for

preliminary injunctive relief at this time. A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must

demonstrate: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood the movant

will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities

tips in the movant's favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See Texas

Midstream Gas Servs., LLC v. City of Grand Prairie, 608 F.3d 200, 206 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008)). “A preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary and drastic remedy; it is never awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674,

689-90 (2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The moving party must satisfy all four

factors. See Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989)

(preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted only if the

movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion with respect to all four factors”); Clark v.

Prichard, 812. F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The party seeking [injunctive] relief must satisfy

a cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated before a temporary

restraining order or preliminary injunction can be granted.”). “The decision whether to grant or

deny a request for a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of the Court.” See

Allied Mktg. Grp., 878 F.2d at 809.

For the purposes of the instant Motion for TRO, Plaintiff has not established substantial

likelihood of success on the merits. Foremost, at least two of the defendants – Donaldson and

Burke – are not facially state actors for the purposes of Section 1983. See Spoon v. Bayou Bridge

Pipeline, LLC, No. 19-516, 2020 WL 5803453, at *3 (M.D. La. Sept. 29, 2020) (“It is well

settled that private parties do not become state actors merely by calling upon law enforcement

for assistance. Likewise, private citizens who give information to law enforcement do not

become state actors under Section 1983 when the information is used to effect an arrest, even if

the citizen knew that the information was false.”). Accordingly, there is not a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits with respect to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims raised against

Donaldson and Burke, and the Court finds no basis to issue any injunctive relief at this time

regarding those individual defendants.

The Court also finds that Plaintiff has not established a substantial likelihood of success

on the merits with respect to the remaining relief, which includes injunctive relief with respect to

unidentified ongoing criminal prosecution, future arrests, criminal complaints, or professional-

license actions against Plaintiff. The Ant-Injunction Act provides that “[a] court of the United

States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly

authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or

effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. “Where an injunction against a criminal proceeding

is sought under [Section] 1983, ‘the principles of equity, comity, and federalism’ must

nonetheless restrain a federal court.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976) (quoting

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972)). “[E]ven where the prayer for injunctive relief

does not seek to enjoin the state criminal proceedings themselves, we have held that the

principles of equity nonetheless militate heavily against the grant of an injunction except in the

most extraordinary circumstances. “ Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 379.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts should not interfere with ongoing

state criminal prosecutions. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971); see also DeSpain v.

Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1984) (“The Younger doctrine establishes a presumption

that the federal courts should abstain in cases in which a state criminal proceeding is pending.”).

Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts should generally decline to exercise

jurisdiction when: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ‘ongoing state judicial

proceeding’; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim;

and (3) the plaintiff has ‘an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional

challenges.’” Bice v. Louisiana Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). “If the three

prerequisites are satisfied, then a federal court can assert jurisdiction only if ‘certain narrowly

delimited exceptions to the abstention doctrine apply.’” Bice, 677 F.3d at 716 (quoting Tex. Ass'n

of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 2004)).

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s claims, it appears that most, if not all, injunctive relief sought

will be precluded by the Younger abstention doctrine. “Only in cases of proven harassment or

prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid

conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be

shown is federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions appropriate.” See Perez v.

Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff raises conclusory arguments

regarding bad faith and harassment, irreparable harm, and serial arrests in support of a finding

that the extraordinary injunctive relief sought is appropriate.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated to the Court, for the purposes of the instant Motion for

TRO that any preliminary injunctive relief is merited at this time. The Court has provided

Plaintiff with the opportunity to serve the defendants. The Court will determine whether and to

what extent Plaintiff is entitled to any injunctive relief in this action after the defendants have

appeared and had the opportunity to file responsive pleadings.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintif’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order and Preliminary Injunction (R. Doc. 6) be DENIED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 25, 2026.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE