The opinion
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
NORFOLK DIVISION
__________________________________________
)
In re: )
)
ALICIA ANN MAHAR, ) Case No. 25-72454-SCS
)
Debtor. )
__________________________________________)
)
ALICIA ANN MAHAR, )
) APN 25-07035-SCS
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
NEW REZ LLC D/B/A SHELLPOINT )
MORTGAGE SERVICING, )
US NATIONAL BANK NATIONAL )
ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR )
CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON )
MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP., CSAP )
MORTGAGE-BACKED PASS-THROUGH )
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-3 )
(AS IDENTIFIED IN ANNEX 3 TO THE )
CREDIT SUISSE DOJ SETTLEMENT), )
) Chapter 7
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The above-captioned adversary proceeding came before the Court on March 26, 2026, for
hearings upon the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) filed November 26, 2025 (ECF No. 32),1 and the Plaintiff’s Opposition thereto filed
November 28, 2025 (ECF No. 34); the Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Opinion
1 All citations to “ECF No.” relate to documents filed in the above-captioned adversary proceeding
unless otherwise noted.
and Order Denying Preliminary Injunction filed February 13, 2026 (ECF No. 46), and the
Defendants’ Response in Opposition filed March 19, 2026 (ECF No. 56); and the Court’s Order
for Plaintiff to Show Cause Why Pending Complaint Should Not Be Dismissed for Lack of
Jurisdiction or, in the Alternative, Why Court Should Not Permissively Abstain from Adjudication
of Complaint entered March 2, 2026 (ECF No. 52), the Plaintiff’s Brief in Response filed March
5, 2026 (ECF No. 55), and the Defendants’ Brief in Support of Dismissal filed March 20, 2026
(ECF No. 57). At the conclusion of the hearings, the Court took the aforementioned matters under
advisement. This Memorandum Opinion constitutes the Court’s findings and conclusions of law.
I. Procedural History
The Court has previously written two opinions concerning the efforts by the Plaintiff,
Alicia Ann Mahar (the debtor in the underlying bankruptcy case), by counsel, to have this Court
intervene regarding the postpetition, unstayed foreclosure sale of real property located at 4345
Charity Neck Road, Virginia Beach, Virginia (the “Property”). See generally In re Mahar, Case
No. 25-72454-SCS, 2025 WL 3465616 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2025) (hereinafter, “Mahar I”)
(denying Ms. Mahar’s motion in the bankruptcy case to set aside postpetition, unstayed foreclosure
sale due to lack of standing and failure to satisfy procedural requirements for injunctive relief as
required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(g)); Mahar v. NewRez, LLC, Adv. Proc.
No. 25-07035-SCS, 2026 WL 173351 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Jan. 21, 2026) (hereinafter, “Mahar II”)
(concluding that Ms. Mahar did not have standing to pursue motion for injunction).2 While
repetitive of the procedural history set forth in the two prior opinions, the Court nonetheless deems
it necessary to recite the record of this adversary proceeding in support of the findings and
conclusions herein.
2 Both Mahar I and Mahar II are final orders of this Court.
Ms. Mahar, by counsel, filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code on October 20, 2025, her eleventh bankruptcy case since 2012. See Case No.
25-72454-SCS, ECF No. 1; see Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351, at *1 n.1. The following day, Ms.
Mahar, by counsel, filed her Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Damages, and Injunctive Relief
(the “Complaint”) against Defendants NewRez, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing
(“Shellpoint”) and U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp., CSAP Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-33
(“U.S. Bank,” and, collectively with Shellpoint, the “Defendants”), which initiated this adversary
proceeding. ECF No. 1 (hereinafter, “Complaint”); see Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351, at *1. Ms.
Mahar describes Defendant Shellpoint as servicer of the loan on the Property and Defendant U.S.
Bank as “claim[ing] ownership or enforcement rights of the loan that was securitized within one
of the Credit Suisse RMBS listed in Annex 3 of the DOJ Settlement.”4 Complaint, at 2.
As factual predicate for her contentions, Ms. Mahar acknowledges that the automatic stay
did not take effect upon the filing of the underlying bankruptcy case because she had two pending
bankruptcy cases that were dismissed within one year preceding the filing of the underlying
3 The Complaint lists Defendant U.S. Bank in the caption as “U.S. National Bank National
Association as Trustee for Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSAP Mortgage-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-3 (as identified in Annex 3 to the Credit Suisse
DOJ Settlement).” Complaint, at 1 (emphasis added). As with Mahar II, the caption of this
Memorandum Opinion and the contemporaneously entered order retains the name for U.S. Bank
as reflected on the Complaint. Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351, at *1 n.2.
4 The term “Credit Suisse RMBS” is referenced within the Complaint only in relation to an
apparent settlement in 2017, purportedly between Credit Suisse and the United States Department
of Justice, but is not otherwise defined therein. See Complaint, at 2. Ms. Mahar asserts that the
settlement “required $2.8 billion in consumer relief through loan modifications, principal
forgiveness, and housing support.” Id. An unauthenticated excerpt of the settlement is attached
to Ms. Mahar’s Complaint. See id. (exhibit). The Court further notes that during a prior hearing,
Ms. Mahar’s counsel referred to the year of the settlement as 2019. Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351,
at *3 (citing ECF No. 30, Transcript of Nov. 20, 2025 hearing, at 21).
bankruptcy case. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)).5 She further asserts that Shellpoint and its
foreclosure trustee conducted a foreclosure sale of the Property on October 21, 2025, despite notice
that she filed her bankruptcy case the previous day and “prior to any court determination on a
motion to impose stay or injunctive relief.”6 Id. Ms. Mahar additionally recounts her submission
of “multiple [loan] modification requests to the Defendants,” including the most recent such
request submitted prior to the foreclosure sale of the Property, which Ms. Mahar alleges
“Shellpoint ignored within 30 days of the sale[.]” Id. at 3.
Ms. Mahar asserts that “Shellpoint has refused to engage in modification discussions” and
that such “actions violate [Shellpoint’s] obligations under federal mortgage servicing laws and
constitute bad-faith [sic] conduct designed to circumvent the consumer-relief [sic] provisions
applicable to loans in the Credit Suisse RMBS.” Id. The Complaint contains three counts based
upon the scant allegations therein: an alleged violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(g); a request for
declaratory and equitable relief under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); and alleged breaches of the duties of
good faith and fair dealing. Id.; see also Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351, at *1. Ms. Mahar requests
this Court “[d]eclare the foreclosure sale void or voidable; [e]njoin Shellpoint from recording or
enforcing the trustee’s deed; [o]rder Shellpoint to rescind the sale and restore title to [her]; [and]
[o]rder Shellpoint to engage in modification review consistent with Regulation X and the DOJ
Settlement[.]” Complaint, at 3-4; Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351, at *1.
5 In Mahar I, the Court further noted Ms. Mahar’s admission “that 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4) indicates
no stay arose as to the Chapter 7 Trustee upon the filing of the petition in this case.” Mahar I,
2025 WL 3465616, at *3 n.10 (citing Case No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF No. 27, Memorandum of Law
in Support of Debtor’s Standing and Analysis of Automatic Stay Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4), at
2).
6 Neither Ms. Mahar, the Chapter 7 Trustee, nor any other party in interest filed a motion to impose
the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4) in the underlying bankruptcy case at any time.
On October 31, 2025, counsel for Ms. Mahar filed a Motion for Injunction to Void and
Restrain Enforcement of Foreclosure Sale (the “Motion for Injunction”). ECF No. 6. The
Defendants opposed the Motion for Injunction. See ECF No. 26; Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351, at
*2. The Court conducted a hearing on the Motion for Injunction on an expedited basis on
November 20, 2025. Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351, at *2. The Court took the matter under
advisement, and for the reasons stated in Mahar II, entered January 21, 2026, the Court concluded
that Ms. Mahar did not have standing to pursue the Motion for Injunction. See generally id.; see
also ECF No. 40, Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunction to Void and Restrain
Enforcement of Foreclosure Sale for Lack of Standing.7
While the Motion for Injunction was under advisement, the Defendants, by counsel, filed
a motion seeking dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
(hereinafter, the “Motion to Dismiss”). ECF No. 32, filed Nov. 26, 2025. Ms. Mahar, by counsel,
filed her opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on November 28, 2025. ECF No. 34. The Court
conducted a pretrial conference on the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7016 on January 8, 2026, which counsel for the parties attended. ECF No. 38. At the
pretrial conference, the Court established a hearing date on the Motion to Dismiss.8 Id.
Subsequent to the pretrial conference and the issuance of Mahar II, Ms. Mahar, by counsel,
filed her Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Preliminary Injunction
(hereinafter, the “Motion to Reconsider”). ECF No. 46, filed Feb. 13, 2026. The Court scheduled
a hearing on the Motion to Reconsider for the same date and time as the hearing on the Motion to
7 While the decision in Mahar II was pending, the Court issued the Memorandum Opinion and
contemporaneous order in Mahar I, 2025 WL 3465616, on December 2, 2025.
8 Counsel for the Defendants failed to timely file the requisite notice of hearing for the initial
hearing date supplied by the Court for the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 43. Upon receipt of the
Defendants’ written request, the Court issued a new hearing date. ECF No. 48.
Dismiss. ECF No. 50. The Defendants, by counsel, filed a response in opposition to the Motion
to Reconsider on March 19, 2026. ECF No. 56.
As recited in the Court’s Order for Plaintiff to Show Cause Why Pending Complaint
Should Not Be Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction or, in the Alternative, Why Court Should Not
Permissively Abstain from Adjudication of Complaint (hereinafter, the “Order to Show Cause”),
entered March 2, 2026, several events occurred in the underlying bankruptcy case after the
Complaint was filed:
The Chapter 7 Trustee filed a Request for Asset Notice on November 11, 2025, and
requested the Clerk send notice to all creditors and parties in interest that there may
be assets available for distribution in the case. Case No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF No.
30. On January 21, 2026, the Plaintiff (who is the Debtor in the underlying
bankruptcy case) received her Chapter 7 discharge. Case No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF
No. 46. One week later, on January 28, 2026, the Chapter 7 Trustee filed his Notice
of Intent to Abandon regarding real property located at 4345 Charity Neck Road,
Virginia Beach, Virginia, and “[c]ontingent and unliquidated causes of action”
against the above-captioned Defendants “arising from wrongful foreclosure,
mortgage servicing violations, and related federal and state law claims[.]” Case
No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF No. 48. The Chapter 7 Trustee represented that these
assets were abandoned “on the grounds that there are liens against said property of
greater value than the property itself and/or that the Trustee believes that any
attempt at liquidation by the Trustee would fail.” Id. No objections were filed to
the Notice of Intent to Abandon within the requisite response period, and
accordingly, pursuant to the notice, the enumerated assets are now abandoned to
the Plaintiff/Debtor.
ECF No. 52, at 3.9 Based upon the aforementioned events in Ms. Mahar’s bankruptcy case and
mindful that this Court’s jurisdiction “is grounded in, and limited by, statute,” the Court issued the
Order to Show Cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) to require Ms. Mahar, through her counsel,
to appear and explain why jurisdiction exists such that this Court may adjudicate the Complaint.
9 The entry of Ms. Mahar’s discharge in this case extinguished her personal liability, if any, that
remained as to the Property following entry of the Chapter 7 discharge she received in Case No.
14-73422-FJS on January 12, 2015. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 (1991) (quoting
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1)); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(d)(2), 522(c)(2), 524(a)(1); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502
U.S. 410, 418 (1992).
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307 (1995) (“The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts,
like that of other federal courts, is grounded in, and limited by, statute.”); ECF No. 52, at 4.10 The
Court additionally directed Ms. Mahar, by her counsel, to show cause why, “if this Court has
jurisdiction over the underlying Complaint, . . . the Court should not exercise its discretion and
permissively abstain from adjudication of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) so as
to allow [Ms. Mahar] to pursue her claims in another forum.” ECF No. 52, at 4-5. Finally, the
Order to Show Cause established a schedule for the submission of responsive briefs by each party,
as well as the Chapter 7 Trustee.11 Id. at 5. Counsel for Ms. Mahar filed a Brief in Response to
the Order to Show Cause on March 5, 2026. ECF No. 55. Counsel for the Defendants filed a Brief
in Support of Dismissal on March 20, 2026. ECF No. 57.
II. The Pleadings
A. The Motion to Dismiss and Opposition Thereto
The Defendants assert that the Complaint must be dismissed because the relief sought
therein cannot be granted for several reasons. As to Ms. Mahar’s request that the Court declare
the foreclosure sale either void or voidable, the Defendants argue that the automatic stay did not
take effect as to either Ms. Mahar (as she admits) or the Chapter 7 Trustee when the underlying
bankruptcy case was filed. See ECF No. 32, at 2-5 (citing numerous cases). As such, nothing
precluded the postpetition conduction of the foreclosure sale. Id. The Defendants further represent
that, following the foreclosure sale, a deed conveying the Property to U.S. Bank was executed on
November 4, 2025, which deed was recorded on November 6, 2025. Id. at 5-6. Accordingly, the
10 The Court further notes that neither party raised nor addressed the issue of this Court’s
jurisdiction in any of their pleadings prior to the issuance of the Order to Show Cause.
11 The Chapter 7 Trustee declined to file a responsive brief.
Defendants assert that the Property is no longer property of the estate, and there remains no action
for the Court to enjoin. Id. at 6.
The Defendants also argue that Ms. Mahar did not timely submit her most recent
modification application pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41. Id. at 2. Therefore, Shellpoint was not
obligated to review such application under the aforementioned regulation. Id. Moreover, the
Defendants contend that Ms. Mahar’s reliance on the 2017 settlement between Credit Suisse and
the United States Department of Justice is misplaced because she was not a party to the settlement,
thus precluding her standing to enforce it. Id. Even if Ms. Mahar had standing to enforce the
agreement, the Defendants contend that the settlement required certain “Consumer Relief . . . ‘to
be completed no later than December 31, 2021’” and therefore, “any claim which Ms. Mahar may
have standing to bring related to the [a]greement[] would have been barred by the 3-year statute
of limitations . . . and would have expired, at the latest, on January 2, 2025, many months before
the initiation of the current action.” Id. Finally, the Defendants argue that principles of equity do
not support the relief requested because the balance of the loan on the Property ($1,353,261.30)
exceeds the Property’s value ($1,195,700.00) based upon Ms. Mahar’s bankruptcy schedules. Id.
at 6 (citing Case No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF No. 1, Voluntary Petition, Schedules, and Statements,
at 10, 23). Therefore, the Chapter 7 Trustee would not have administered the Property for the
benefit of Ms. Mahar’s creditors. Id.
Ms. Mahar opposes the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the “broad scope” of 11 U.S.C. §
105(a) allows the Court to review, on an equitable basis, “a wrongful foreclosure conducted in
violation of federal law[] and . . . the post-petition transfer of the Property, which may be avoided
or declared voidable by the Court[]” despite the non-existence of the automatic stay. ECF No. 34,
at 4-5.12 In support of this assertion, but without citation to specific authority, Ms. Mahar offers
that “[b]ankruptcy courts routinely use § 105 to undo or enjoin wrongful creditor conduct that
threatens the integrity of the estate—even when no automatic stay applies.” Id. at 5. Next, relying
on state law, Ms. Mahar argues that every contract in Virginia carries implied covenants of good
faith and fair dealing, which include a prohibition on depriving the other party of their contractual
benefits. Id. Ms. Mahar argues that her Complaint states a plausible claim under this premise
pursuant to the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), because she has alleged that the Defendants “engaged in misleading
loss-mitigation practices, obstructed [her] efforts to cure [the] default, and engineered a foreclosure
rather than deal fairly.” ECF No. 34, at 5. Claims such as these, she asserts, have been upheld in
the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. (citing Stoney Glen, LLC v. S. Bank & Tr. Co., 944 F. Supp.
2d 460, 465-66 (E.D. Va. 2013); Bourdelais v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Civil Action No.
3:10CV670, 2012 WL 5404084 (E.D. Va. Nov. 5, 2012)).13
12 At the March 26, 2026 hearing, the Court advised Ms. Mahar’s counsel that one of the cases he
cited in support of this proposition does not exist. ECF No. 61, Transcript of Mar. 26, 2026
hearing, at 9-10. Despite extensive efforts, the Court was unable to locate any case by the alleged
name, and its case citation within the response returned a completely unrelated case that is criminal
in nature. See ECF No. 34, at 4 (citing the non-existent case titled In re Coastal Carolina Fruit
Company).
13 While the noted case law does stand for the proposition that a cause of action sounding in
contract for a breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing is recognized in
Virginia, the cited opinions do not “uphold” such claims. The Stoney Glen and Bourdelais
decisions, rather, concluded that such claim was adequately pleaded to survive a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Stoney Glen, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 462, 469;
Bourdelais, 2012 WL 5404084, at *1-2, 10. Bourdelais further highlights several opinions in this
district that have “held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not extend to the review
and processing of loan modifications, absent an express provision indicating otherwise.”
Bourdelais, 2012 WL 5404084, at *5 (citing Chance v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:12CV320-
JRS, 2012 WL 4461495 (E.D. Va. Sept. 25, 2012); De Vera v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:12cv17,
2012 WL 2400627 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2012); Bennett v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3:12CV34-HEH,
2012 WL 1354546 (E.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2012); Correll v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:11cv477, 2012
WL 348594 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 2012)).
The bulk of Ms. Mahar’s opposition addresses the Defendants’ arguments regarding her
loan modification attempt. See id. at 2-4. First, Ms. Mahar argues that she has stated a valid claim
pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(g) because she alleged that she “submitted a complete loan
modification application[.]” Id. at 2. She has also pleaded that, despite acknowledging its receipt,
Shellpoint “failed to evaluate the application” and instead “proceeded to foreclosure while the
complete application remained pending[,]” a purported, improper “dual-tracking” circumstance.14
Id. Ms. Mahar maintains that any dispute regarding the timeliness of her loan modification
application is factual in nature, which cannot be resolved by the adjudication of the Motion to
Dismiss. Id. Further, she asserts that any issue concerning the timing of the application’s
submission “does not negate [her] Regulation X claim nor defeat the broader federal servicing-
violation allegations pled in the Complaint.” Id. Ms. Mahar contends that, taking the allegations
in the Complaint as true, her Complaint states a plausible claim that the Defendants violated
multiple provisions of 12 C.F.R. Part 1024 as well as certain statutory duties. Id. at 3. Specifically,
she asserts the Defendants “failed to identify any missing documents; represented or implied that
review was ongoing; and foreclosed without ever issuing a decision, denial, or appeal notice[]” on
her loan modification application. Id. Finally, Ms. Mahar declares that, contrary to the
Defendants’ claims, she is not “bring[ing] a cause of action ‘under’” the 2017 settlement between
Credit Suisse and the United States Department of Justice. Id. at 4. Instead, she offers the
settlement in support of the “factual context” that the loan on the Property was “subject to
14 In support of this argument, Ms. Mahar’s counsel cites three cases for which the United States
District Court and Westlaw case numbers, as well as the decision dates, are incorrect. See ECF
No. 34, at 2 (cases of Jennings v. RoundPoint Mortgage Servicing Corporation; Mastin v. Ditech
Financial, LLC; and Heflin v. PHH Mortgage Corporation). The Court advised Ms. Mahar’s
counsel of the discovery of the incorrect case information at the March 26, 2026 hearings. ECF
No. 61, at 9-10. The Court further advised counsel of a fourth case name contained in the pleading
that was nonexistent (the citation for which related to a criminal case). Id. at 10; see n.12, supra.
heightened modification and consumer-relief [sic] protocols, and that Defendants’ servicing
behavior departed from those standards[,]” regardless of any concerns about the timely submission
of her loan modification application. Id.
B. The Motion to Reconsider and Opposition Thereto
As iterated above, the Court concluded that Ms. Mahar did not have standing to pursue her
Motion for Injunction in the above-captioned adversary proceeding. See generally Mahar II, 2026
WL 173351. The Court reasoned that, in addition to “lack[ing] a pecuniary interest in the
distribution of assets of the bankruptcy estate,” Ms. Mahar could not pursue the requested relief
because the Property and any related causes of action were property of the bankruptcy estate and
“under the exclusive control of the Chapter 7 Trustee.” Id. at *4-5, 8, 10. In her Motion to
Reconsider, Ms. Mahar requests the Court “[r]eevaluate [her] request for injunctive relief”
pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 9023 and 9024 because the factual basis upon
which the Court based its ruling no longer exists. ECF No. 46, at 1-2. Specifically, Ms. Mahar
argues that she now has standing to pursue injunctive relief because the causes of action set forth
in her Complaint revested in her upon their abandonment by the Chapter 7 Trustee. Id. (citing
Case No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF No. 48, Notice of Intent to Abandon).
The Defendants oppose Ms. Mahar’s reconsideration request, asserting that the Trustee’s
abandonment of the Property and the issuance of the Chapter 7 discharge “clearly demonstrate that
the real property at issue is not necessary for administration of the Chapter 7 Estate[.]” ECF No.
56, at 6-7. In support, the Defendants proffer substantially the same arguments contained in their
Motion to Dismiss: that the automatic stay did not take effect as to either Ms. Mahar or the Chapter
7 Trustee when the underlying bankruptcy case was filed; that the Property has been transferred,
and there is nothing to enjoin; and equitable principles do not support the relief requested.
Compare generally ECF No. 56 (Response in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider), with ECF No.
32 (Motion to Dismiss). Accordingly, the Court incorporates here the above recitation of these
arguments by the Defendants from their Motion to Dismiss.
C. Responsive Pleadings to Court’s Order to Show Cause
Ms. Mahar maintains that “related to” jurisdiction is assessed upon commencement of a
proceeding by determining whether the outcome of a proceeding “could conceivably have any
effect on the estate being administered.” ECF No. 55, at 1-2 (citing Bestwall LLC v. Off. Comm.
of Asbestos Claimants (In re Bestwall LLC), 71 F.4th 168 (4th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.
2519 (2024); Valley Hist. Ltd. P’ship v. Bank of New York, 486 F.3d 831, 836 (4th Cir. 2007);
Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)). Ms. Mahar contends that “related to”
jurisdiction existed when the above-captioned adversary proceeding was filed for three reasons.
First, this Court has ruled that the causes of action constituted property of the bankruptcy estate.
Id. at 2 (referencing Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351, at *8). Second, the “alleged wrongful conduct,”
i.e., the foreclosure sale and deed recordation, occurred “while the estate was under this Court’s
jurisdiction.” Id. Taken together with her third reason—the Chapter 7 Trustee’s declaration that
the underlying bankruptcy case constituted an asset case such that creditors would possibly receive
a distribution—Ms. Mahar argues that the “related to” jurisdictional requirements were met when
the adversary proceeding was filed. Id. To that end, Ms. Mahar asserts that “[s]hould litigation
end favorably[,] the [Chapter 7] Trustee may very well determine that proceeds or the asset could
be property of the estate.” Id.
Ms. Mahar distinguishes the instant matter from four particular cases on the basis that the
latter involve either adversary proceedings that were initiated post-abandonment or post-
confirmation when the bankruptcy estate no longer existed; or a finding that the result would not
affect creditor distributions or administration of the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 3 (citing Brooks v.
U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. Dev. (In re Brooks), Adv. Proc. No. 17-07031, 2017 WL 6016297
(Bankr. W.D. Va. Dec. 4, 2017); Harlan v. Rosenberg & Assocs., LLC (In re Harlan), 402 B.R.
703 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009); Suntrust Bank v. Roberson (In re Baseline Sports, Inc.), 393 B.R.
105 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008); Huennekens v. Walker (In re S. Int’l Co.), 165 B.R. 815 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1994)). By contrast, Ms. Mahar contends that the causes of action asserted here were property
of the bankruptcy estate when this proceeding was filed and while the estate was being
administered by the Chapter 7 Trustee. Id. Further, she argues that the requisite “nexus . . . existed
at filing and was actively litigated in the Court,” the case has not been “fully consummated,” and
“bankruptcy interests remain.” Id.
Ms. Mahar maintains that the Chapter 7 Trustee’s abandonment of assets affects standing
but “does not retroactively eliminate the jurisdictional nexus” or automatically divest the Court of
jurisdiction when pending litigation “could still affect creditor distributions.” Id. at 2 (citing Sharif
v. IndyMac Bank (In re Sharif), 411 B.R. 276 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008)). To this end, Ms. Mahar
cites the Sharif decision as “confirm[ing] that abandonment does not automatically eliminate
jurisdiction where the proceeding remains intertwined with bankruptcy administration.” Id. at 3.
Ms. Mahar urges this Court to refrain from permissive abstention if it concludes that it
maintains “related to” jurisdiction and relies on five factors in support of this argument. Id. at 4.
First, this Court has conducted hearings and issued an opinion analyzing standing and matters
regarding property of the bankruptcy estate. Id. Moreover, the Complaint is predominantly
centered on federal law, no jury demand has been made, and there is no parallel state court
proceeding. Id. Finally, this matter is inextricably intertwined with the procedural history of the
underlying bankruptcy case. Id. Ms. Mahar requests, if the Court determines that abstention is
appropriate, a ruling “that any dismissal [is] without prejudice; [is] expressly limited to
jurisdictional grounds; . . . that no merits determination [be] made; [and] [p]reserve [her] ability
to pursue her federal claims in a court of competent jurisdiction.” Id. at 4-5.
The Defendants agree with Ms. Mahar that jurisdiction is determined at the time an action
is filed and that neither the abandonment of estate property nor entry of a discharge obviate any
such jurisdiction. ECF No. 57, at 1-2. Nonetheless, the Defendants contend that jurisdiction did
not exist when the instant Complaint was filed because the Property, being valued at less than the
unchallenged security interest thereon, provided no potential value for the Chapter 7 Trustee to
administer as part of the bankruptcy estate, as demonstrated by the trustee’s eventual abandonment
of the Property. Id. at 2-3. The instant case, Defendants reason, is distinguishable from the facts
in both In re Sharif and In re Painter, where the validity of claims against real property were
challenged, and the invalidation of the security interests would have affected forthcoming
distributions to other creditors. Id. at 2 (citing generally In re Sharif, 411 B.R. 276; Painter v.
First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n of South Carolina (In re Painter), 84 B.R. 59 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1988)). Considering the facts in the present case, however, the Defendants maintain that “related
to” jurisdiction should not be construed so broadly as to find jurisdiction here simply because Ms.
Mahar is a debtor. Id. at 2-3.
Regarding abstention, the Defendants assert this Court should decline to exercise “related
to” jurisdiction even if it does exist because this Court cannot enter a final judgment in a non-core
proceeding without the parties’ consent; therefore, judicial economy would be aided by abstention.
Id. at 3-4 (citing In re Sharif, 411 B.R. at 281 n.3). Further, there is an “absent necessary party”—
Professional Foreclosure Corporation of Virginia—that would need to be joined to this litigation
to ultimately rescind the foreclosure sale. Id. at 4. Finally, the administration of the bankruptcy
case will be unaffected by abstention because “the claims are remote and unrelated to the
bankruptcy case.” Id.
III. The Hearings on the Motions and Order to Show Cause
A. The Motion to Dismiss
Beginning with the Motion to Dismiss, counsel for the Defendants reiterated Ms. Mahar’s
failure to allege that she submitted her loan modification request more than thirty-seven (37) days
prior to the foreclosure sale to successfully establish a violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41. ECF No.
61, Transcript of Mar. 26, 2026 hearing, at 4 (hereinafter, “Tr.”). Rather, the Complaint alleges
Ms. Mahar made her request within the thirty-day period prior to the foreclosure, which timing
absolved the loan servicer from considering the application. Id. at 5-6 (citing Complaint ¶ 15).
Further, despite Ms. Mahar’s assertion in her response to the Motion to Dismiss that other federal
regulations were violated, the Complaint neglects to specifically set forth those alleged
requirements. Id. at 7. Thus, because the Complaint fails to “raise more than the mere suspicion
that there could be a cause of action[,]” as required by Iqbal and Twombly, Count I of the
Complaint should be dismissed. Id. at 6-7 (referencing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009);
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
Counsel for the Defendants argued that the requests for declaratory and equitable relief in
Count II should likewise be dismissed because the deed memorializing the Property’s transfer
resulting from the foreclosure sale has been recorded, and therefore nothing remains to be enjoined.
Id. at 9. In addition, because the parties agree that the automatic stay did not take effect when Ms.
Mahar filed the instant bankruptcy case, the stay could not have been violated so as to serve as a
basis to void the sale or otherwise find it voidable. Id. at 8-9. Finally, counsel for the Defendants
asserted that Ms. Mahar’s failure to name Professional Foreclosure Corporation of Virginia as a
party is a fatal flaw pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because that entity
undertook the action sought to be undone—the foreclosure sale. Id. at 8. Therefore, because Ms.
Mahar failed to name a necessary party, full relief could not be afforded by the Court, although
the Defendants acknowledged that this flaw could be cured via a motion to either amend the
Complaint or add the foreclosing entity. Id.
Counsel for Ms. Mahar conceded that the loan modification request was not submitted
thirty-seven (37) days prior to the foreclosure sale, but rather, was submitted within thirty (30)
days of the sale. Id. at 20-21 (citing Complaint ¶ 15). Regardless of such timing issue, however,
counsel asserted that the basis for the relief sought should encompass the history of Ms. Mahar’s
interactions with the Defendants and the latter’s failure to modify the loan on the Property despite
Ms. Mahar’s twenty (20) requests to do so. Id. at 17, 19-20. Based on this premise, counsel for
Ms. Mahar urged the Court to “infer[] in Count I” that the Defendants engaged in abusive practices
and violated several duties under 12 C.F.R. Part 1024 by making misrepresentations or providing
contradictory information, failing to acknowledge loan modification applications, and evading the
protections of the aforementioned federal regulation. Id. at 16-17. Counsel buttressed this
argument by asserting that the Defendants engaged in behavior vis-à-vis Ms. Mahar similar to that
which resulted in the 2017 settlement between Credit Suisse and the United States Department of
Justice. See id. at 17-19. Even though admittedly not a party to that settlement, Ms. Mahar’s
counsel contended that the Defendants should have bestowed treatment upon her equivalent to the
settlement benefits received by homeowners under the settlement, which purportedly included a
loan modification. Id. Counsel for Ms. Mahar made scant mention of Counts II and III of the
Complaint other than to restate the relief sought therein pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105 and alleged
violations of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 21. Lastly, Ms. Mahar’s
counsel disagreed that Professional Foreclosure Corporation of Virginia is a necessary party,
asserting instead that only U.S. Bank (the Property’s current owner) can unwind the conveyance.
Id. at 22.
On rebuttal, counsel for the Defendants countered that neither the United States Code, 12
C.F.R. Part 1024, nor the settlement involving Credit Suisse entitled a borrower to a loan
modification. Id. at 23. Rather, Count I of Ms. Mahar’s Complaint should be dismissed for failure
to allege the appropriate timing element concerning the submission of the loan modification
request. Id. at 23, 25-26. Moreover, the Defendants asserted that Court permission to sell the
Property was not required because the automatic stay did not exist, which must result in the
dismissal of Count II. Id. at 23-24. As to Count III, the Defendants argued that because Ms. Mahar
did not timely submit her modification request, they could not have violated 12 C.F.R. Part 1024
and, as a result, did not breach any duty of good faith or fair dealing. Id. at 25-26. Finally, the
Defendants reemphasized that Professional Foreclosure Corporation of Virginia is a necessary
party to the instant litigation because it conveyed the Property to U.S. Bank, the ultimate purchaser
at the foreclosure sale. Id. at 24.
B. The Motion to Reconsider
The parties offered little argument, and no legal basis, beyond the contents of their written
pleadings regarding reconsideration of the earlier decision determining Ms. Mahar did not have
standing to pursue her Motion for Injunction. See id. at 26-30. Counsel for the Defendants
contended that nothing remains to be enjoined, and there was no basis to enjoin U.S. Bank from
evicting Ms. Mahar as there was no allegation that U.S. Bank was pursuing such relief. Id. at 29.
In response, Ms. Mahar’s counsel clarified that maintaining the status quo and ensuring U.S. Bank
did not transfer the Property while these matters were being adjudicated would be appropriate. Id.
at 29-30.
C. The Court’s Order to Show Cause
Ms. Mahar’s counsel reemphasized the arguments made in her response to the Order to
Show Cause. Counsel maintained that jurisdiction must be assessed at the time the Complaint was
filed (versus the date of the instant hearing). Id. at 32. At both the time the Complaint was filed
and when the wrongful actions occurred, counsel argued that the Property was property of the
bankruptcy estate. Id.; see also id. at 33. In turn, the estate will be affected if Ms. Mahar either
receives a monetary judgment or secures avoidance of the sale, as either scenario would yield
assets for administration by the Chapter 7 Trustee. Id. at 32. Counsel for Ms. Mahar admitted,
however, that the Complaint did not request a monetary judgment because “we didn’t know. But
the [P]roperty was worth more than 1 million dollars, and the bank bought it for 950,000 dollars.
And so there’s equity in in [sic] what would be a short sale opportunity” that the Chapter 7 Trustee
could pursue if Ms. Mahar recovers the Property. Id. Therefore, Ms. Mahar asserted that the
“conceivable effect” test mandated by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is satisfied. Id. Counsel
further argued that the Chapter 7 Trustee’s abandonment of the Property does not, without more,
dispossess this Court of jurisdiction, a principle he asserts is best illustrated in Sharif v. IndyMac
Bank (In re Sharif), 411 B.R. 276 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008). Tr. at 33. Finally, counsel for Ms.
Mahar implored the Court not to abstain if jurisdiction exists, in part because the matter has been
pending before it for several months. Id. at 31, 34. However, if the Court determines that this case
should be dismissed, Ms. Mahar requested such dismissal be without prejudice. Id. at 38.
Counsel for the Defendants likewise reiterated their written arguments concerning
jurisdiction. See id. at 34-36. Counsel further asserted that Ms. Mahar’s speculation that equity
exists presupposed a position the lender has not espoused (the willingness to accept an amount less
than that which is owed in full satisfaction of the debt), and such presumption cannot support a
finding of jurisdiction. Id. at 34. Additionally, the Defendants contended that Ms. Mahar has
argued inconsistent bases for her grievances, asserting both that the wrongful acts occurred during
the pendency of this case and that the numerous unsuccessful loan modification attempts prior to
this case resulted in violations of the applicable regulations. Id. at 36. As such, the Defendants
argued jurisdiction does not exist, and the case should be dismissed. Id. Finally, if jurisdiction
exists, counsel for the Defendants advocated for the Court to permissively abstain in the interest
of judicial economy since an answer has not yet been filed, no discovery has occurred, and other
than the passage of time, any resulting delay would be insignificant. Id. at 36-37.
IV. Conclusions of Law
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court
The United States District and Bankruptcy Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307 (1995); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Kirkland (In re
Kirkland), 600 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Canal Corp. v. Finnman (In re Johnson),
960 F.2d 396, 399 (4th Cir. 1992)). The United States District Court has “original and exclusive
jurisdiction of all cases under title 11” as well as “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. §§
1334(a), (b). The United States Bankruptcy Court derives its jurisdiction from the United States
District Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), (b)(1); Valley Hist. Ltd. P’ship v. Bank of New York, 486 F.3d
831, 835 (4th Cir. 2007). In the Eastern District of Virginia, the United States District Court has
referred all cases under Title 11, as well as all proceedings “arising under” or “arising in or related
to cases under” Title 11 to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157 and the General Order of
Reference dated August 15, 1984.
As set forth in this Court’s Order to Show Cause, Judge Novak has well-described the
distinctions among the three aforementioned types of proceedings.
“A claim ‘aris[es] under Title 11’ if it is a cause of action created by the
Bankruptcy Code, and which lacks existence outside the context of bankruptcy.”
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Kirkland (In re Kirkland), 600 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir.
2010) (citing Aheong v. Mellon Mortg. Co. (In re Aheong), 276 B.R. 233, 242-46
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)). By comparison, “[a] proceeding or claim ‘arising in’ Title
11 is one that is ‘not based on any right expressly created by Title 11, but
nevertheless, would have no existence outside of the bankruptcy.’” Valley Historic
Ltd. P’ship v. Bank of New York, 486 F.3d 831, 835 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Grausz
v. Englander, 321 F.3d 467, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted)). In
other words, a claim “arises in” Title 11 when “‘it would have no practical existence
but for the bankruptcy.’” Id. (quoting Grausz, 321 F.3d at 471 (emphasis supplied)
(internal quotations omitted)).
Finally, a bankruptcy court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over
any claim “related to” a case under Title 11. To determine whether a claim relates
to a case under Title 11, the Fourth Circuit “has adopted the test articulated by the
Third Circuit in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).” Id. at
836. Pursuant to that test, a bankruptcy court may exercise “related to” jurisdiction
over proceedings, the outcome of which “could conceivably have any effect on the
estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Pacor, Inc., 743 F.2d at 994 (emphasis
supplied). “Thus, the proceeding need not necessarily be against the debtor or
against the debtor’s property. An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome
could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either
positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and
administration of the bankrupt estate.” Id.
Allied Title Lending, LLC v. Taylor, 420 F. Supp. 3d 436, 459 (E.D. Va. 2019); see also Bestwall
LLC v. Off. Comm. of Asbestos Claimants (In re Bestwall LLC), 71 F.4th 168, 178 (4th Cir. 2023)
(reaffirming application of the Pacor standard), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2519 (2024).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3), “[t]he bankruptcy judge shall determine, on the judge’s
own motion or on timely motion of a party, whether a proceeding . . . is a proceeding that is
otherwise related to a case under title 11.” Accordingly, “[t]his Court has the inherent power to
question its own jurisdiction in any given case” and may raise the issue of jurisdiction at any time.
First Nat’l Bank of Maryland v. U.S. Wall Corp. (In re Incor, Inc.), 100 B.R. 790, 793 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1989), aff’d, 113 B.R. 212 (D. Md. 1990); accord New Horizon of NY LLC v. Jacobs, 231
F.3d 143, 150 (4th Cir. 2000); McCorkle v. First Pa. Banking & Tr. Co., 459 F.2d 243, 244 n.1
(4th Cir. 1972); see Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 377 (1940).
The party asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proof to establish same. Demetres
v. E. W. Constr., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015); Toll Rd. Invs. P’ship II, L.P. v. Virginia,
Civil No. 3:25cv135 (DJN), 2026 WL 1846965, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 26, 2026) (citing Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. U.S., 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)). Jurisdiction is
determined as of the commencement of the action. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P.,
541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824));
Freeport-McMoran, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
Rapid Am. Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.), 124 F.3d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 1997). Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), as incorporated into the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
by Rule 7012(b), the Court must dismiss an adversary proceeding if it determines that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction.
B. The Causes of Action Do Not “Arise Under” or “Arise in a Case Under”
the Bankruptcy Code
As set forth in the Order to Show Cause, it is inarguable that the causes of action pursued
in the Complaint do not constitute proceedings “arising under” Title 11, as the asserted claims are
neither created by the Bankruptcy Code nor do they “lack[] existence outside the context of
bankruptcy.” In re Kirkland, 600 F.3d at 316 (citing Aheong v. Mellon Mortg. Co. (In re Aheong),
276 B.R. 233, 242-46 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)); see also Suntrust Bank v. Roberson (In re Baseline
Sports, Inc.), 393 B.R. 105, 121-22 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008) (“Jurisdiction for cases ‘arising under
title 11’ refers to those cases in which the Bankruptcy Code itself creates the plaintiff’s cause of
action or ‘if the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question
of federal bankruptcy law.’” (quoting Gates v. Didonato (In re Gates), Adv. Proc. No. 04-1240,
2004 WL 3237345, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 20, 2004))). The sole reference to potential redress
under the Bankruptcy Code in the Complaint is 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Such provision alone,
however, is not the source for any specific relief under the Bankruptcy Code. Rather, Section
105(a) provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the
raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court
from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or
appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of
process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a). As this Court and countless others have opined, “Section 105(a) may be
invoked only in furtherance of the Bankruptcy Code[.]” James River Petroleum, Inc. v. Dickson
(In re Dickson), APN 19-07013-SCS, 2020 WL 6877150, at *27 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2020);
see, e.g., Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014) (“We have long held that ‘whatever equitable
powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of’ the
Bankruptcy Code.” (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)));
David v. King, 109 F.4th 653, 666 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing In re Fesco Plastics Corp., 996 F.2d 152,
154 (7th Cir. 1993)). In other words, Section 105 “does not create a private cause of action unless
it is invoked in connection with another section of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, or
an order of this Court.” Dabney v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Dabney), 613 B.R. 225, 250 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2019) (citing Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 423 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000);
French v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. (In re French), 401 B.R. 295, 313-14 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009)),
aff’d, Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-322-BHH, 2021 WL 1105040 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2021), aff’d, No.
21-1468 (4th Cir. Dec. 27, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished decision). Accordingly, the Court
cannot employ Section 105 to take any action the Court is not otherwise capable of asserting under
the provisions of Title 11, and Ms. Mahar’s reference to such code section within the Complaint
cannot cause the relief sought in the Complaint to “arise under” Title 11 without invocation in
connection with the Bankruptcy Code, Rules or an order of this Court, which she has not pleaded.
Likewise, the Complaint does not embody claims “arising in” a case under Title 11, as such
relief exists and could be pursued outside the confines of the underlying bankruptcy case. It is of
no moment that the foreclosure on the Property occurred after Ms. Mahar filed her Chapter 7
petition. As the Fourth Circuit pronounced in the Valley Historic case, it is not “sufficient to
establish ‘arising in’ jurisdiction that a claim . . . arises during the pendency of the [case]. . . . [The
claims] would have existed whether or not the Debtor filed bankruptcy.” Valley Hist., 486 F.3d at
836. Notably, additional support in the record for these conclusions comes from representations
made by Ms. Mahar’s counsel at the November 20, 2025 hearing on her Motion for Injunction,
when he confirmed that “the cause of action in this adversary proceeding is a violation of the CFR
regulations. So this alternative proceeding is not a bankruptcy proceeding per se. It is a proceeding
to say the foreclosure under federal law—not bankruptcy law—federal law was illegal to begin
with . . . .” ECF No. 30, Transcript of Nov. 20, 2025 hearing, at 7. This statement provides staunch
support as well for the Court’s conclusion that the causes of action in the Complaint do not “arise
under” Title 11, despite counsel’s assertions that Section 105(a) provides a basis for jurisdiction.
Id. at 8 (“[Y]ou have the authority to adjudicate it under [Section] 105, so [sic] but this is
completely a federal claim, a district court claim that’s before the bankruptcy court under [Section]
105.”). Thus, by her counsel’s own statements, Ms. Mahar’s claims neither “arise under” the
Bankruptcy Code nor “arise in” the underlying bankruptcy case but, rather, exist and could be
pursued outside the context of her bankruptcy.
C. The Causes of Action Are Not “Related to” a Case Under Title 11
The Court now turns to the third type of proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), those which
are “related to cases under title 11.” “Related to jurisdiction . . . has a special meaning in the law,”
and “does not mean that the case is related in the ordinary sense of the word ‘related.’” New
Horizon, 231 F.3d at 150 & n.16 (citing Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 992
(1988)). Rather, the analysis for “related to” jurisdiction is more nuanced. To reiterate the test
employed in this Circuit, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over proceedings “related to” a
bankruptcy case only if “the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the
estate being administered in bankruptcy. . . . An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome
could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or
negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt
estate.” Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (second emphasis added)
(citations omitted); accord In re Bestwall, 71 F.4th at 178; New Horizon, 231 F.3d at 151 (quoting
Spartan Mills v. Bank of Am. Ill., 112 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (4th Cir. 1997); citing Celotex Corp. v.
Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1995)). “This ‘test does not require certain or likely alteration of
the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options or freedom of action, nor does it require certain or likely
impact upon the handling and administration of the bankruptcy estate.’ Instead, ‘[t]he possibility
of such alteration or impact is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.’” In re Bestwall, 71 F.4th at 178
(quoting In re Celotex, 124 F.3d at 626).
Despite the acknowledged breadth of Pacor’s “related to” test, however, it does not provide
this Court unbounded jurisdiction. Celotex, 514 U.S. at 308 (citing Bd. of Governors v. MCorp
Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 40 (1991); Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994); see In re Bestwall, 71 F.4th at 178.
Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
qualified the expanse of “related to” jurisdiction by emphasizing that “the mere fact that there may
be common issues of fact between a civil proceeding and a controversy involving the bankruptcy
estate does not bring the matter within the scope of section 1471(b).” Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994
(referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1471, the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)); accord New Horizon, 231
F.3d at 151 (quoting Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994). Thus, this Court has previously found that “the
‘related to’ category is not so broad as to encompass litigation of claims arising under state law or
non-bankruptcy Federal law that will not have an effect on the bankruptcy estate, simply because
one of the litigants filed a petition in bankruptcy.” In re Gates, 2004 WL 3237345, at *2 (citing
New Horizon, 231 F.3d at 155). It is under these strictures that the Court must determine whether
Ms. Mahar’s causes of action are “related to” the underlying bankruptcy case so as to confer
subject matter jurisdiction upon this Court to adjudicate them.
1. Application of the Pacor Test
Regarding the first of the two Pacor-required inquiries—whether the outcome could alter
her rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action—Ms. Mahar cites the possibility that the
transfer of the Property could be invalidated if the foreclosure sale is voided. Additionally, Ms.
Mahar has prayed in her Complaint that Shellpoint be ordered to review her loan modification
application consistent with applicable federal law. Both outcomes could possibly alter her rights
and options regarding the Property. Likewise, the unsuccessful prosecution of her Complaint
could also modify her rights and options. Thus, the Court finds that Ms. Mahar has satisfied the
first part of the Pacor inquiry.
The Pacor test also requires that the litigation’s outcome could, in any way, impact the
handling and administration of the bankruptcy estate. In this regard, Ms. Mahar argues that the
foreclosure sale on the Property and related deed recordation occurred while this Court had
jurisdiction over the Property. She further maintains that the Chapter 7 Trustee’s declaration that
there may be assets for distribution to creditors,15 combined with the Court’s earlier determination
that the causes of action embodied in the Complaint were property of the bankruptcy estate,16
provides the necessary bases for “related to” jurisdiction. Ms. Mahar asserts her argument is
unaffected by the Chapter 7 Trustee’s subsequent abandonment17 of both the Property and the
causes of action in the Complaint because the events in question occurred while the trustee was
administering the bankruptcy estate and, if she is successful, the trustee could “determine that
proceeds or the [Property] could be property of the estate.” ECF No. 55, at 2.
Ms. Mahar’s asserted bases for “related to” jurisdiction would require the Court to make
an incongruous leap in the Pacor analysis. Pacor requires a showing of the possibility that the
action could “in any way impact[] upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.”
Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994. Such impacts are generally found to exist if an action affects “the amount
of property available for distribution or the allocation of property among creditors.” Elscint, Inc.
v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Uranga v.
Geib (In re Paso Del Norte Oil Co.), 755 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1985); Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994-
96); see also Vieira v. AGM, II, LLC, 363 B.R. 746, 750 (D.S.C. 2007) (citing Bergstrom v. Dalkon
Shield Claimants Tr. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 86 F.3d 364, 372 (4th Cir. 1996); Premium of Am.,
15 See Case No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF No. 30, Request for Asset Notice, filed Nov. 11, 2025.
16 See Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351, at *8 (determining that causes of action were part of the
bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)).
17 See Case No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF No. 48, Notice of Intent to Abandon, filed Jan. 28, 2026.
LLC v. Sanchez (In re Premium Escrow Servs.), 342 B.R. 390, 396 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006)); Matson
v. Rescue Rangers, LLC (In re Rescue Rangers, LLC), 582 B.R. 669, 673 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2018);
Grimes v. First-Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Grimes), 388 B.R. 195, 201 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va.
2008) (citing In re Xonics, 813 F.2d at 131); Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. White (In re Eaton Ferry
Sales & Serv., Inc.), Adv. No. 06-9027, 2006 WL 3762002, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Dec. 19,
2006). Thus, Pacor necessitates far more than establishing either an asset’s existence as property
of the bankruptcy estate (as this Court earlier concluded), that events took place post-petition,18 or
that the Chapter 7 Trustee is administering the estate. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994 (referencing the
predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)).
Ms. Mahar has failed to demonstrate, and the Court is unconvinced, that the causes of
action asserted here could possibly impact the handling and administration of the bankruptcy estate
in any way in satisfaction of the conjunctive Pacor test. Most prominently, even if Ms. Mahar
litigates the Complaint to a successful conclusion, she has failed to show, and the Court cannot
conceive, how any of the remedies sought in the Complaint would possibly alter either creditor
distributions, the value of any assets that remain part of the bankruptcy estate to be administered
by the Chapter 7 Trustee, or any other aspect of the handling or administration of the underlying
bankruptcy case. First, and most obvious from the face of the Complaint, Ms. Mahar has not
prayed for any monetary damages, a point conceded by her counsel.19 Tr. at 32. Thus, setting
aside that the Chapter 7 Trustee has abandoned any interest the estate may have in both these
18 While it is true that the foreclosure sale and deed recordation occurred post-petition, it is also
true that no automatic stay was in place, a fact that Ms. Mahar acknowledges. Complaint, at 2.
As referenced in n.5, supra, Ms. Mahar admitted during the Mahar I proceeding that the automatic
stay did not arise as to the Chapter 7 Trustee.
19 Paragraph 17 of the Complaint indicates that Ms. Mahar “has suffered actual damages including
loss of home, emotional distress, and legal costs” but makes no specific request for a monetary
award. See id. ¶¶ 17, prayer.
causes of action and the Property (which the Court further addresses below), there would be no
funds awarded that could possibly augment the bankruptcy estate. Likewise, none of the pleadings
or Ms. Mahar’s arguments in response to the Order to Show Cause indicates any potential change
in the value of the remaining estate property; that any money would flow out of, or new claims
would arise against, the estate; or that any currently lodged claims would increase or decrease in
amount as a consequence of litigating the Complaint.20
Second, Ms. Mahar has not requested avoidance of the lien on the Property21 if title is
restored to her, and there was no apparent equity in the Property at the commencement of this
adversary proceeding that would have caused the Chapter 7 Trustee to liquidate it for the benefit
of creditors. 22 As recited in Mahar II, based upon Ms. Mahar’s bankruptcy schedules, the balance
of the loan on the Property was $1,353,261.30,23 which exceeds the Property’s scheduled value of
$1,195,700.00. Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351, at *2 n.8 (citing Case No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF No.
1, Voluntary Petition, Schedules, and Statements, at 10, 23).24 Despite the representations in her
20 As set forth above, if any personal liability as to the Property remained following Ms. Mahar’s
receipt of her Chapter 7 discharge in Case No. 14-73422-FJS on January 12, 2015, such was
extinguished by her discharge in the underlying bankruptcy case here. See supra n.9.
21 The Court further noted in Mahar II that “Ms. Mahar does not indicate the debt owed on the
Property is contingent, unliquidated, or disputed.” Mahar II, 2026 WL 173351, at *2 n.8 (citing
Case No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF No. 1, Voluntary Petition, Schedules, and Statements, at 23).
22 The Court notes Ms. Mahar’s representation that the Chapter 7 Trustee’s declaration of potential
assets available for distribution in this case was triggered not by the Property or the instant
proceeding, but rather, by her non-exempt shares of stock. ECF. No. 55, at 2 n.1.
23 The actual claim amount may exceed the loan balance asserted by Ms. Mahar in her schedules.
In Mahar I, the Court noted that counsel for Shellpoint indicated the loan balance exceeds $2
million per the proof of claim filed in Ms. Mahar’s most recent previous case, Case No. 25-70412-
FJS. Mahar I, 2025 WL 6455616, at *2 n.5 (citing Case No. 25-70412-FJS, Claim No. 8-1, filed
May 9, 2025 (asserting total claim of $2,050,466.75 as of the Feb. 28, 2025 petition date of that
case)).
24 The Chapter 7 Trustee confirmed the non-existent equity in his abandonment notice, where he
indicated that “there are liens against said property of greater value than the property itself[.]” See
Case No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF No. 48, Notice of Intent to Abandon, at 1.
schedules, though, Ms. Mahar’s counsel insisted at the March 26, 2026 hearings that if she
succeeds on her Complaint and recovers the Property, the Chapter 7 Trustee could pursue a sale
of the Property at a price lower than the amount of the debt it secures (commonly known as a
“short sale”). Ms. Mahar’s reasoning is grounded upon the apparent successful bid amount at the
foreclosure sale of $950,000.00. Tr. at 32.25 As the Defendants correctly point out, however, this
assertion presumes the lender’s agreement to such transaction, and there has been no evidence or
argument that such consent by the lender would materialize. See Hackman v. Nationstar Mortg.,
LLC (In re Hackman), 563 B.R. 812, 817-18 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017) (finding that proposed short
sale was “inconsistent with the express terms of the Note and Deed of Trust” and that the lender
“was entitled to refuse to release its lien on the Property absent payment in full”). This proffered
series of hypotheticals is highly speculative as to any possible future action of the lender and
unknown potential purchasers and thus is much too tenuous to satisfy the second part of the Pacor
test. Accordingly, the lack of potential pecuniary recovery; the uncontested status, and the lender’s
retention of, the lien on the Property through at least the date of foreclosure; as well as the lack of
equity in the Property demonstrates the absence of possible effect on the estate in the event Ms.
Mahar is successful on her claims.
Ms. Mahar also urges the Court to distinguish the instant matter from four specific cases
originating in both this Court and the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia, where
the respective courts declined to find that estate administration would be impacted. ECF No. 55,
at 3 (citing generally Brooks v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. Dev. (In re Brooks), A.P. No. 17-
07031, 2017 WL 6016297 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Dec. 4, 2017); Harlan v. Rosenberg & Assocs., LLC
25 Counsel for Ms. Mahar earlier referenced the foreclosure sales price as $977,000.00. See Case
No. 25-72454-SCS, ECF No. 27, Memorandum of Law in Support of Debtor’s Standing and
Analysis of Automatic Stay Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4), filed Oct. 31, 2025, at 1.
(In re Harlan), 402 B.R. 703 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009); Suntrust Bank v. Roberson (In re Baseline
Sports, Inc.), 393 B.R. 105 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008); Huennekens v. Walker (In re S. Int’l Co.), 165
B.R. 815 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994)). Ms. Mahar proffers that the four noted cases were filed either
post-abandonment or post-confirmation, and/or involved proceedings that could not affect estate
administration or distributions to creditors. Id. In contrast, Ms. Mahar asserts that the
jurisdictional test was met here when the Complaint was filed, including because this action was
initiated while the causes of action were property of the bankruptcy estate. Id. These arguments
fall short of sufficient reasoning to satisfy Pacor’s second requirement for the reasons stated above.
While the adversary proceedings in the four noted cases originated at various points in the lifespan
of the underlying bankruptcy cases as compared to the instant matter, the requisite analysis is not
purely temporal, but rather, requires the fact- and case-specific analysis that the Court has
undertaken here. Ms. Mahar also offers that the prior litigation of this proceeding before this Court
supports finding that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id. That the Court has previously opined
in this case incorrectly focuses the analysis on procedural history, which has no bearing on the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction. The prior opinion in this adversary proceeding (as well as
the one issued in the underlying bankruptcy case) addressed the much more discrete and
nonmeritorious issue of standing. It is unquestionable that the Court is obligated to dispose of
jurisdictional and procedural matters before reaching the merits of a case or controversy, and the
Court, as is its duty, adjudicated these matters accordingly. The Court’s fulfillment of its duties
cannot serve to provide jurisdiction.
2. The Trustee’s Abandonment of Property and Causes of Action Does Not Affect the Analysis
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Ms. Mahar also argues that this case has not been “fully consummated,” “bankruptcy
interests remain,” and the Chapter 7 Trustee’s abandonment of the estate’s interests in the Property
and the causes of action neither retroactively affects, nor automatically divests, this Court of
jurisdiction. Id. at 2-3. Ms. Mahar relies on the holding in Sharif v. IndyMac Bank (In re Sharif),
411 B.R. 276 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008), to exemplify the latter proposition. While Ms. Mahar’s
statement of the law is correct,26 the Court has concluded that Ms. Mahar has failed to establish
that “related to” jurisdiction existed at the time the Complaint was filed for reasons unrelated to
the Chapter 7 Trustee’s abandonment of the Property and these causes of action. Nonetheless,
because Ms. Mahar has made these additional arguments regarding the potential administration of
the Property if recovered via successful prosecution of her causes of action, a discussion regarding
abandonment is necessary.
Section 554 provides that a “trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is
burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 554(a). Abandonment of assets protects the bankruptcy estate by avoiding the use of scarce
resources to administer property that will provide no benefit to unsecured creditors. In re Wilton
Armetale, Inc., 618 B.R. 424, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2020) (citing In re Paolella, 79 B.R. 607, 609
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)). “Property abandoned under [Section 554] ceases to be part of the estate.
It reverts to the debtor and stands as if no bankruptcy petition was filed. . . . Abandoned property
is not property administered by the estate.” Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 590
(10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), aff’d, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
Even if an asset has been abandoned, though, litigation involving such asset may remain
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. In In re Sharif, the discharged debtor sought to invalidate the
defendant’s lien on property the chapter 7 trustee abandoned while the litigation was pending. In
26 See In re Celotex, 124 F.3d at 626 (citing Freeport-McMoran, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S.
426, 428 (1991)) (finding that subsequent events do not divest a court of subject matter jurisdiction
that existed when the action commenced).
re Sharif, 411 B.R. at 279. Judge Mitchell found that the litigation neither arose under the
Bankruptcy Code nor did it arise in a bankruptcy case. Id. at 281. Employing the Pacor test,
Judge Mitchell concluded that, despite the debtor’s discharge and the trustee’s abandonment of the
property, whether the defendant was a secured creditor could affect the distribution it and other
creditors were entitled to receive as the trustee continued his administration of the bankruptcy
estate. Id. Accordingly, Judge Mitchell found that the proceeding was sufficiently “related to”
the bankruptcy case, and subject matter jurisdiction existed.27 Id.
The instant factual circumstances stand in contrast to those addressed by Judge Mitchell in
In re Sharif. As stated above, Ms. Mahar has neither sought to avoid the lien in the event title to
the Property is restored to her nor, more importantly, has she satisfied her burden to show how this
proceeding could possibly impact the handling and administration of the bankruptcy estate. While
it is correct that the trustee has not yet concluded his administration of the remaining estate
property, he has determined that the Property and the causes of action are of no consequential
value to the estate. No objections were filed to the Notice of Intent to Abandon within the requisite
response period,28 and accordingly, pursuant to the notice, the enumerated assets are now
abandoned to Ms. Mahar. See In re Ryan-Jones, 561 B.R. 380, 381 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016)
(deeming property abandoned since no objection was filed to the trustee’s notice of abandonment);
In re Preston, 82 B.R. 28, 30 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987) (finding property is considered abandoned,
without entry of order, if no objection is filed to notice of abandonment). Whether abandoned or
not, unlike Sharif, Ms. Mahar’s litigation cannot affect the distributions to creditors in her case or
27 Judge Mitchell expressly ruled that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction in that matter only
if the debtor’s non-filing spouse was added as a plaintiff to the action. In re Sharif, 411 B.R. at
278, 282.
28 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6007(a) requires a hearing only where an objection to a
notice of abandonment is filed.
otherwise impact the handling or administration of the estate in any discernible way for the reasons
stated above and thus provides no basis for “related to” jurisdiction.
Further, even if the sale is vacated or Ms. Mahar is otherwise successful with one of more
of her causes of action, the possibility that the Property or any resulting benefits from the causes
of action will reenter the bankruptcy estate post-abandonment is extremely suppositional at best.
Ms. Mahar’s speculation to the contrary ignores the business judgment already exercised by the
Chapter 7 Trustee, as he has represented that the enumerated assets were abandoned “on the
grounds that there are liens against said property of greater value than the property itself and/or
that the Trustee believes that any attempt at liquidation by the Trustee would fail.” Case No. 25-
72454-SCS, ECF No. 48 (referencing the Property and causes of action comprising the instant
Complaint). Moreover, Ms. Mahar’s conjecture overlooks long-standing precedent in this Court
and countless others that, with very limited exceptions that do not appear applicable here based
upon the record currently before the Court,29 “abandonment of an asset by a trustee is irrevocable,”
even if the trustee later discovers that the value of the abandoned property was greater than
29 As Judge Bostetter recognized,
There are but two principal exceptions to the above-referenced rule of
irrevocability of abandonment under applicable law. Property will not be deemed
to have been abandoned by the trustee where it was actually concealed from him or
where his knowledge of the existence of the property was one of mere suspicion,
which engendered only a cursory investigation. The rule also is not applicable in
those situations where the property is unscheduled by the debtor, thus preventing
the trustee from having “knowledge, or sufficient means of knowledge, of its
existence.”
In re Sutton, 10 B.R. 737, 740 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981) (quoting Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513,
518 (1896)). While the trustee in Sutton asserted a purported third exception of “unintentional
abandonment,” (id.), as this Court concluded in In re Parson, “[e]ven if this is a valid exception to
the irrevocability of abandonment, there is nothing in this case to suggest that the abandonment
here by the Chapter 7 Trustee was other than fully intentional[.]” In re Parson, 2007 WL 3306678,
at *9 n.5.
anticipated. In re Parson, No. 01-73786-SCS, 2007 WL 3306678, at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 6,
2007) (citing In re Sutton, 10 B.R. 737, 739-40 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981), and collecting cases from
numerous circuits reaching conclusions in accord with In re Sutton); see also, e.g., In re Clary,
440 B.R. 122, 124 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (“The judgment as to whether property should be
administered or abandoned is made by the trustee during the course of the case and is final except
in extraordinary circumstances.”); In re Locklair, No. 03-50924, 2006 WL 1491440, at *2 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. May 18, 2006) (citing generally In re Sutton, 10 B.R. 737 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981))
(denying Chapter 7 trustee’s motion to reopen case filed two years after case closure and finding
that “discovery that an abandoned asset has a value which is greater than what the trustee initially
believed, after a reasonable opportunity to investigate such asset, is not grounds to revoke an
abandonment”).30 Therefore, to the extent intended as support for her position under the
conjunctive Pacor test, Ms. Mahar’s argument that the Property or the fruits of her causes of action
may reenter the bankruptcy estate upon successful prosecution of the instant matter is unavailing.
D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Does Not Arise Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)
While not explicitly argued, Ms. Mahar seems to suggest that this Court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate the Complaint because the causes of action were property of the bankruptcy estate at
the time the Complaint was filed, perhaps in an attempt to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e). That
section provides:
(e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending
shall have exclusive jurisdiction—
(1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the
commencement of such case, and of property of the estate; and
30 The Court includes the discussion regarding the general irrevocability of abandonment not as an
advisory opinion, but rather, to underscore the ineffectual nature of Ms. Mahar’s jurisdictional
theory.
(2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construction of
section 327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules relating to
disclosure requirements under section 327.
Jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) is “conceptually distinct” from that of 28
U.S.C. § 1334(b). Valley Hist. Ltd. P’ship v. Bank of New York, 486 F.3d 831, 837 (4th Cir. 2007).
The latter “invests district courts with original but not exclusive jurisdiction over ‘civil
proceedings.’” Id. The former, however, provides the United States District Court (and in turn,
this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)), “a broad grant of exclusive jurisdiction over a debtor’s
property; it does not invest district courts with jurisdiction to conduct civil proceedings. Instead,
. . . it creates exclusive jurisdiction over ‘property’ for a limited period of time[.]” Id. Thus,
because “§ 1334(e) does not by itself create jurisdiction to conduct civil proceedings[,]”
jurisdiction must be established under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Id. at 838.
Judge Teel applied the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning and rationale concerning Section 1334(e)
in Ostroff v. American Home Mortgage (In re Ostroff), 433 B.R. 442 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2010). In
Ostroff, the debtors sought the determination of the validity of a deed of trust for property that was
part of the bankruptcy estate when the Chapter 7 case was filed but was later adjudicated exempt.
Id. at 443-44, 448, 452. Judge Teel explained that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) is to “divest[]
any other court of the authority to take jurisdiction over the res being administered by the trustee
for the benefit of unsecured creditors.” Id. at 452: accord Porretto v. City of Galveston Park Bd.
of Trs., 113 F.4th 469, 484 (5th Cir. 2024) (discussing In re Ostroff); Smith v. McLeskey (In re Bay
Vista of Va., Inc.), 394 B.R. 820, 829-30 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008) (citing Williams v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co. (In re Williams), 244 B.R. 858, 866 (S.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d, 34 F. App’x 967 (11th Cir.
2002); AG Indus., Inc. v. AK Steel Corp. (In re AG Indus., Inc.), 279 B.R. 534, 539 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2002)). Relying upon the Valley Historic decision, Judge Teel concluded that even if the
Court had jurisdiction over the debtors’ property pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (which it
specifically determined it did not, given the earlier exemption decision), such jurisdiction “[did]
not equate to jurisdiction under § 1334(b) over a proceeding that relates to such property.” In re
Ostroff, 433 B.R. at 453; accord Toledo Dávila v. Luna Residential II, LLC (In re Toledo Dávila),
671 B.R. 335, 342 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2025) (“[W]e are unwilling to construe § 1334(e) as providing
an independent basis for bankruptcy jurisdiction when subject matter jurisdiction is lacking under
§ 1334(a) and (b).”).
Accordingly, guided by the Valley Historic decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
and finding the reasoning in In re Ostroff to be sound, the Court concludes that 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)
does not provide a substitute basis for subject matter jurisdiction in place of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
Thus, any argument by Ms. Mahar that subject matter jurisdiction here is supported by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(e) fails.
E. Summary
The Court finds that Ms. Mahar has failed to satisfy her burden to show cause why subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) existed at the time the Complaint was filed.
The Court concludes that the causes of action do not “arise under” the Bankruptcy Code, in part
because 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) does not create an independent source of relief. Further, the Court
finds that the causes of action neither “arise in” nor are they “related to” a case under the
Bankruptcy Code for the reasons stated herein. Such analysis is unaffected by the Chapter 7
Trustee’s subsequent abandonment of the Property and causes of action. Finally, 28 U.S.C. §
1334(e) cannot supply subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint
must be dismissed as provided for by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), as incorporated
into the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure by Rule 7012(b).31 The Court finds dismissal
without prejudice is required because “a court that lacks jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate
and dispose of a claim on the merits.” S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v.
OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b);
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998); Interstate Petroleum Corp. v. Morgan, 249 F.3d 215, 222
(4th Cir. 2001)). The Order entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion will so
provide. The Court expresses no opinion concerning the merits of the claims in the underlying
Complaint.
V. Remaining Matters
Based upon the Court’s determination that Ms. Mahar’s Complaint must be dismissed
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Order to Show Cause, the
Court finds that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be deemed moot. The Court further
finds that Ms. Mahar’s Motion to Reconsider should also be deemed moot.
VI. Conclusion
Ms. Mahar has failed to demonstrate how the successful prosecution of her Complaint
could possibly impact the handling and administration of the bankruptcy estate. Further, Ms.
Mahar attempts to create the illusion of “related to” jurisdiction by urging the Court to adopt
hypothetical scenarios for which she provides no support. Mindful that Pacor does not require
certain or likely impact upon the administration or handling of a case, even the “conceivable effect”
31 As the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, the Court cannot consider the issue of
permissive abstention noted in the Order to Show Cause. In re Brown, Adv. No. 12-2059, 2013
WL 1010359, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2013) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)) (“[T]he
doctrines of permissive and mandatory abstention come into play only when a bankruptcy court
has subject-matter jurisdiction in the first instance.”).
test has its limits. Those limits are exceeded when a plaintiff fails to sustain their burden to
establish subject matter jurisdiction and instead presents only unsupported hypotheticals that fail
to embrace the realities present in the underlying bankruptcy case when the complaint was filed.
At its base, the instant proceeding is purely a two-party dispute for which this Court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction, as its outcome will not affect the administration of the bankruptcy
estate.
A separate Order will be contemporaneously issued consistent with this Memorandum
Opinion.
The Clerk shall deliver copies of this Memorandum Opinion to counsel for the Plaintiff;
counsel for the Defendants; and the Chapter 7 Trustee in the underlying bankruptcy case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Entered this 31st day of July, 2026, at Norfolk, in the Eastern District of Virginia.
/s/ Stephen C St-John
STEPHEN C. ST. JOHN
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Entered On Docket: July 31, 2026