Warner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JONATHAN EVERETT WARNER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 25-CV-0019-GKF-JFJ

)

DETECTIVE AMY M. HALL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jonathan Everett Warner (“Warner”), a self-represented prisoner, brings this action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming several local officials and municipalities violated his

constitutional rights when they arrested him in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. See Doc. 57. This

matter is before the Court on defendant Detective Amy Hall’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 69). Hall

contends Warner fails to state a claim against her upon which relief may be granted, and she is

entitled to qualified immunity. See id. Warner filed a response in opposition (Doc. 75) and Hall

filed a reply (Doc. 84). For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Hall’s

motion.

BACKGROUND

Warner initiated this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma1

on December 19, 2024, and filed an amended complaint on November 12, 2025. Doc. 1; Doc. 56

at 2, n. 1;2 Doc. 57. The amended complaint advances numerous claims against the following

defendants: K9 Officer Jeff Maxey, Detective Adam Derycke, Detective Brad Sharpe, Sergeant

Eric Spradlin, Sergeant Gene Watkins, Officer Jacob Drain, Officer Jefferson Reynolds, Detective

1 The Eastern District transferred the case to this district on January 14, 2025.

2 The Court’s citations refer to the CM/ECF header pagination.

Amy M. Hall, the City of Tulsa, the City of Broken Arrow, and Lance Eberle. See Doc. 57.

Warner’s claims arise out of his arrest on December 23, 2022, in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. Id. at

8. Warner generally alleges the officers effectuating his arrest used excessive force and failed to

intervene to stop the on-going excessive force thereby violating his Fourth Amendment and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Doc. 57. Critical to Hall’s motion, Warner also alleges Hall

deprived him of his due process rights to be protected against arbitrary government action, violated

his equal protection rights and conspired with defendant Adam Derycke to deprive him of his right

to be free from an unlawful seizure. Id. at 49-56. Warner sues Hall in her individual capacity. Id.

at 5. As noted, Hall moves to dismiss the amended complaint for failing to state a claim against

her upon which relief may be granted. Doc. 69.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the facts alleged in the complaint

fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the

complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible if the facts alleged “raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the conduct necessary to establish

plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 556; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). The complaint need

not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain “more than labels and conclusions”

or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.

When considering the sufficiency of the complaint, a court must accept as true all the well-pleaded

factual allegations and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. But the court may disregard legal

conclusions or conclusory statements devoid of factual support. Id.; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Further, when a plaintiff appears without counsel, the Court must liberally construe the

complaint. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But even self-represented

litigants bear the burden to “alleg[e] sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be

based.” Id. And the rule of liberal construction neither permits nor requires a court to assume the

role of the unrepresented litigant’s advocate by “supply[ing] additional factual allegations to round

out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct[ing] a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New

Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997).

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a “well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a

savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] facts is improbable.” Straub v. BNSF Ry. Co., 909

F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Nonetheless, dismissal

is appropriate “when the allegations in [the] complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of

entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 558. The Court now turns to Warner’s amended

complaint and Hall’s motion to dismiss.

ANALYSIS

I. Due process claim

Warner alleges Hall “deprived [him] of his due process rights: to be protected against

arbitrary governmental action by state authorities and/or local officials.” Doc. 57 at 49. Hall,

working with the victim of the crime, lured Warner back to Oklahoma to arrest him. Id. at 50-55.

Hall also misinformed the arresting officers regarding Warner’s criminal history to escalate the

amount of force used to effectuate his arrest. See id.

Addressing first the purported scheme by Hall to secure Warner’s presence in Oklahoma,

the Court agrees with Hall that this claim is appropriately considered pursuant to the Fourth

Amendment, not the Fourteenth. Doc. 69 at 5-6. Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process

standards “have no applicability” to “pretrial deprivations of liberty.” Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d

1556, 1560 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Jones v. City of Sapulpa, Case No. 24-CV-392-MTS, 2025

WL 1195002, at *1, n. 1 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2025) (unpublished).3 Instead, the Fourth

Amendment controls. Id.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

The Fourth Amendment only prohibits “unreasonable” seizures. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S.

593, 599 (1989). Courts have held that the use of a ruse to execute an arrest warrant does not

violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Michaud, 268 F.3d 728, 733 (9th Cir.

2001); see also Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1959) (“There is no

constitutional mandate forbidding the use of deception in executing a valid arrest warrant.”);

Sanders v. Schulze, Case No. 15-CV-89-N, 2015 WL 5547630, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2015)

(unpublished) (“Ruses have been found to be acceptable in the Fourth Amendment context.”).

Here, Warner complains Hall used a ruse to execute the arrest warrant. However, Warner does not

challenge the validity of the arrest warrant. See Doc. 75 at 22 (“Plaintiff … never alleged that

Detective Hall lacked probable cause or a warrant for his arrest.”). Therefore, in conformity with

the cited persuasive authority, the Court concludes Warner did not allege a plausible Fourth

Amendment claim against Hall based on the purported scheme between Hall and the victim.

3 The Court cites all unpublished decisions herein as persuasive authority. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a);

10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

Next, the Court considers Warner’s claim that Hall provided the arresting officers with false

information to escalate tensions during the arrest. Doc. 57 at 52-55. Warner alleges Hall falsely

informed the fugitive warrant unit he was previously convicted of a violent charge of aggravated

assault and battery to a peace officer in Illinois and “produced a firearm” during an arrest. Doc.

57 at 52-53. Warner alleges this misinformation “rose the level of force arresting officers … would

anticipate using while effectuating his arrest.” Id. Liberally construing Warner’s claim, he is

attempting to hold Hall liable for the allegedly excessive force used by the officers in effectuating

Warner’s arrest.

What the arresting officers knew or believed may impact whether Warner can ultimately

prevail on his excessive force claims against the individual officers. However, as the claim relates

to Hall, it fails to establish any personal involvement by Hall during the arrest; Warner does not

even allege Hall was on scene. See Doc. 57 at 49-56. “Personal liability under § 1983 must be

based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.” Brown v. Montoya, 662

F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir. 2011). Therefore, to the extent Warner is attempting to hold Hall liable

for the excessive force purportedly utilized during his arrest under the guise of a due process

violation, the Court dismisses this claim.

II. Equal protection claim

Next, Warner alleges Hall’s conduct was motivated by the fact that she, the victim and the

other arresting officers are Caucasian, and he is African American. Doc. 57 at 51-52. The

Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause provides that no state shall “deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Am. XIV, § 1. “Equal

protection ‘is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’”

Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). To state a race-based equal protection

claim, “[a] plaintiff must sufficiently allege that defendants were motivated by racial animus.”

Phelps v. Wichita Eagle–Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 1989).

Here, to the extent Warner alleges his constitutional rights were violated because he is

African American, Warner fails to allege any specific facts demonstrating a racial animus. Instead,

he merely identifies his, the victim’s and the authorities’ race. Lacking from Warner’s amended

complaint is any allegation demonstrating racial animus or discriminatory treatment.

To the extent Warner presents a “class of one” claim as an African American male from

Chicago (Doc. 57 at 54), Warner must allege that “others, ‘similarly situated in every material

respect’ were treated differently.” Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty., 440 F.3d 1202, 1210 (10th Cir.

2006)). The burden on a plaintiff to show similarity in class-of-one cases is “exacting,” as it is

“exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that any difference in treatment is not attributable to a quirk

of the plaintiff or even to the fallibility of administrators whose inconsistency is as random as it is

inevitable.” Shifrin v. Toll, 483 F. App’x 446, 449 (10th Cir. 2012). Warner does not include any

allegations that an individual similarly situated in every material respect was treated differently by

Hall. Therefore, Warner’s class-of-one equal protection claim does not state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. Regardless of how it is construed, the Court dismisses Warner’s equal

protection claim.

III. Conspiracy claims

Warner also alleges § 1985(3) and § 1983 conspiracies against Hall for conspiring with

Derycke to unlawfully seize his cellphone and tablet in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Doc.

57 at 55-56.

A. § 1985(3) conspiracy

Beginning with Warner’s § 1985(3) conspiracy, Section 1985(3) “provides a right of action

‘[i]f two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire ... for the purpose of depriving, either

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws.’” Jones v.

Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 578 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). To state a plausible

claim for relief under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege facts showing “(1) the existence of a

conspiracy; (2) intended to deny him equal protection under the laws or equal privileges and

immunities of the laws; (3) resulting in an injury or deprivation of federally-protected rights; and

(4) an overt act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.” Jemaneh v. Univ. of Wyo., 82 F.

Supp. 3d 1281, 1306 (D. Colo. 2015). Further, Section 1985(3) applies “only to conspiracies

motivated by ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’”

Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.

88, 101–02 (1971)).

Once again, Warner alleges he is an African American and Hall, the arresting officers and

victim are Caucasian. However, he does not include any allegation “that suggests a race-based

animus by defendants.” Henry v. Board of Leavenworth Cnty. Comm’rs, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1042,

1059 (D. Kan. 1999). Beyond conclusory allegations, Warner does not allege Hall engaged in the

purported conspiracy “because of [Warner’s] race.” Id. Therefore, the Court dismisses Warner’s

§ 1985(3) claim against Hall.

B. § 1983 conspiracy

Allegations of conspiracy may form the basis of a § 1983 claim. Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d

1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994). To support a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege specific

facts showing an agreement and concerted action amongst the defendants. Id. at 1268. “[M]ere

conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient” to state a valid §

1983 conspiracy claim. Id. Liberally construing the amended complaint, the Court finds Warner

states a plausible § 1983 conspiracy claim against Hall. Warner alleges on or about December 16,

2022, Hall learned of inappropriate images on Warner’s cellphone. Doc. 57 at 55-56.

Subsequently, on December 21, 2022, Hall sought and obtained an arrest warrant for domestic

assault and battery offenses. Id. at 51, 55-56. However, at this time, Hall did not seek a warrant

to seize and search Warner’s cellphone and tablet. Id. at 55-56. Nevertheless, Hall instructed the

fugitive warrant unit, including Defendant Derycke, to search and seize Warner’s cellphone and

tablet when they executed the arrest warrant “without … having … a search and seizure warrant[.]”

Id. at 55. At the time of his December 23, 2022 arrest, Derycke acting pursuant to the conspiracy

with Hall, searched Warner’s truck on “private property without permission” and seized Warner’s

“cellphone and tablet without consent and permission and without a search and seizure warrant.”

Id. Derycke did not “inform [Warner] that he was going to or had done so.” Id.

“The Amended Complaint alleges that the conspiracy had a clear goal, that the defendants

took ‘specific actions’ to ‘carry out the plan’ and that each defendant ‘participated in the

conspiracy.’” Meyer v. City of Marion, Ks., 776 F. Supp. 3d 991, 1020 (D. Kan. 2025) (quoting

Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 609-10 (10th Cir. 2022)). The plausible goal of the conspiracy

was to unlawfully seize Warner’s cellphone and tablet without a warrant. Doc. 57 at 55. The

amended complaint identifies the “specific actions defendants allegedly took to carry out the

plan[:]” Hall created the plan and provided the direction to seize the electronics, and Derycke

seized Warner’s cellphone and tablet without consent, permission or a warrant. Id. This claim is

not subject to dismissal at this stage.

i. Heck bar

Hall contends the § 1983 conspiracy claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994). Doc. 69 at 3. Hall interprets Warner’s conspiracy claim as an impermissible attack on the

validity of Warner’s guilty plea and conviction in the criminal case that was the subject of his

arrest. Id. In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider

whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity

of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless

the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if

successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal

judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed[.]

Heck, 512 U.S. at 587 (emphasis in original).

Here, after his arrest, Warner was convicted, via guilty plea, of domestic assault and battery

by strangulation and domestic assault and battery against a current or former intimate partner.

Docket, State of Oklahoma v. Warner (Tulsa Cnty. Dist. Ct. Feb. 26, 2024).4 These charges

correlate to the December 21, 2022 arrest warrant Hall obtained for domestic assault and battery.

See Doc. 57 at 50, 51. Warner was arrested, and his cellphone was seized, on December 23, 2022.

Id. at 49, 55. Therefore, as pled, the basis for the charges was formed prior to Warner’s cellphone

and tablet being seized.

Warner reveals Hall received information of “inappropriate images on Plaintiff’s cellphone

and tablet from the alleged victim.” Doc. 57 at 55. But it is unclear if the images relate to the

charges of assault and battery or something else. It is also unclear if the images were the basis of

4 The Court may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if those proceedings have a

direct relation to matters at issue. St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605

F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t has been held that federal courts, in appropriate

circumstances, may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”).

the convictions. At this stage of the litigation and considering only Warner’s allegations, the Court

cannot conclude Warner’s claim of conspiracy for unlawfully seizing his cellphone and tablet

would invalidate his underlying criminal convictions. Therefore, the Court rejects Hall’s

contention that Warner’s claim, at this juncture, violates Heck.5

ii. Qualified immunity

Finally, Hall contends she is entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. 69 at 7. She offers:

Because [Warner] has not plausibly alleged a violation … the inquiry ends. Even

if he had, [Warner] can cite no precedent putting Detective Hall on notice that her

alleged conduct – encouraging a suspect to return under false pretenses, or

providing internal misinformation – violates the Constitution. Absent such

authority, the right is not “clearly established.” Therefore, Detective Hall is entitled

to qualified immunity[.]

Id.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (“Tenth Circuit”) provides the

following guidance concerning a qualified immunity defense at the motion to dismiss stage:

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). When a defendant raises the defense of

qualified immunity, “the plaintiff carries a two-part burden to show: (1) that the

defendant’s actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right, and, if so, (2)

that the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful

conduct.” T.D. v. Patton, 868 F.3d 1209, 1220 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).

Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, a plaintiff “must

allege facts sufficient to show (assuming they are true) that the defendants plausibly

violated their constitutional rights, and that those rights were clearly established at

the time.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008).

But to trigger the plaintiff’s two-part burden, a defendant must first “adequately

present” the qualified-immunity defense. Tillmon v. Douglas County, 817 F. App’x

586, 589 (10th Cir. 2020); see Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640–41 (1980)

5 Having rejected Hall’s Heck contention, the Court denies Warner’s motion for leave to file

supplemental response (Doc. 85) wherein he seeks leave to further address Hall’s Heck argument.

See Doc. 85 at 2.

(holding that “the burden of pleading” a qualified-immunity defense “rests with the

defendant”). And to adequately present the defense, the defendant must not only

explicitly raise it, see Montoya v. Vigil, 898 F.3d 1056, 1063–64 (10th Cir. 2018),

but must also plead the defense beyond a “perfunctory assertion,” Tillmon, 817 F.

App’x at 590. Accordingly, where a defendant makes only a bare assertion of

qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears no burden to satisfy the ordinary two-prong

test. See id.; A Brighter Day, Inc. v. Barnes, 860 F. App’x 569, 575 (10th Cir. 2021)

(holding that a defendant’s “qualified-immunity argument was underdeveloped”

where it “contain[ed] mostly general legal statements and empty platitudes”).

Finally, in raising a qualified-immunity defense, a defendant may not merely rely

on substantive legal arguments based on the Rule 12(b)(6) failure-to-state-a-claim

standard. Tillmon, 817 F. App’x at 590; Montoya, 898 F.3d at 1064–65 (holding

that a “failure-to-state-a-claim argument, without more, is insufficient to raise

qualified immunity” because “a claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the

merits of the plaintiff's claim” (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527–28

(1985))).

Berryman v. Niceta, 143 F.4th 1134, 1140-41 (10th Cir. 2025).

Here, Hall fails to adequately raise qualified immunity. First, she impermissibly relies, in

part, on her Rule 12(b)(6) argument. See Doc. 69 at 7. Further, Hall’s “cursory argument makes

no attempt to analyze any facts within the applicable legal framework, and so it provides no clear

factual or legal basis for asserting the defense.” Berryman, 143 F.4th at 1141.

The Court also notes Hall inverts the appropriate order of analysis. She must first

adequately raise the defense “beyond a perfunctory assertion” before Warner is required to

demonstrate the right is clearly established. However, Hall attempts to place the onus on Warner

to first cite precedent demonstrating the right is clearly established. Doc. 57 at 7. The Tenth

Circuit makes clear when a defendant, as Hall did here, “makes only a bare assertion of qualified

immunity,” the plaintiff “bears no burden to satisfy the ordinary two-prong test.” Berryman, 143

F.4th at 1140-41. For these reasons, the Court declines to grant Hall’s motion based on qualified

immunity. As outlined, Warner stated a § 1983 conspiracy claim against Hall that, at this stage, is

not barred by Heck or qualified immunity.

IV. Conclusion

As outlined above, the Court fully considered Warner’s claims against Defendant Amy

Hall. The Court dismisses Wamer’s due process, equal protection and § 1985(3) conspiracy

claims. Warner’s § 1983 conspiracy claim is not subject to dismissal at this time.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Hall’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 69) is granted in

part and denied in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Warner may proceed on his § 1983 conspiracy to

unlawfully seize Warner’s cellphone and tablet claim against Hall.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amended complaint is dismissed, in part, as to

Warner’s due process, equal protection and § 1985(3) conspiracy claims against Hall.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hall shall file her answer to Warner’s amended

complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Warner’s motion for leave to file supplemental

response (Doc. 85) is denied.

DATED this 21st day of July, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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