Warner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JONATHAN EVERETT WARNER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 25-CV-0019-GKF-JFJ

)

DETECTIVE AMY M. HALL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jonathan Everett Warner (“Warner”), a self-represented prisoner, brings this action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming several local officials and municipalities violated his

constitutional rights when they arrested him in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. See Doc. 57. This

matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by the City of Tulsa (Doc. 61) and the City

of Broken Arrow (Doc. 62) (collectively, the “Cities”). The Cities contend Warner failed to state

a claim against them upon which relief may be granted. See Docs. 61 and 62. Warner filed a

response in opposition (Doc. 75), and each City filed a Reply (see Docs. 82 and 83). For the

following reasons, the Court grants both motions to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Warner initiated this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma1

on December 19, 2024, and filed an amended complaint on November 12, 2025. Doc. 1; Doc. 56

at 2, n. 1;2 Doc. 57. The amended complaint advances numerous claims against the following

defendants: K9 Officer Jeff Maxey, Detective Adam Derycke, Detective Brad Sharpe, Sergeant

Eric Spradlin, Sergeant Gene Watkins, Officer Jacob Drain, Officer Jefferson Reynolds, Detective

1 The Eastern District transferred the action to this district on January 7, 2025.

2 The Court’s citations refer to the CM/ECF header pagination.

Amy M. Hall, the City of Tulsa, the City of Broken Arrow, and Lance Eberle. See Doc. 57.

Warner’s claims arise out of his arrest on December 23, 2022, in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. Id. at

8. Warner generally alleges the officers effectuating his arrest used excessive force and failed to

intervene to stop the on-going excessive force, thereby violating his Fourth Amendment and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Doc. 57. Critical to the instant motions before the Court,

Warner also advances negligent use of excessive force, negligent intentional infliction of emotional

distress and deliberate indifference claims against each City under a theory of municipal liability.

See Doc. 57 at 59-71. As noted, the Cities move to dismiss the amended complaint for failing to

state a claim against them upon which relief may be granted. Docs. 61 and 62.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the facts alleged in the complaint

fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the

complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible if the facts alleged “raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the conduct necessary to establish

plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 556; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). The complaint need

not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain “more than labels and conclusions”

or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.

When considering the sufficiency of the complaint, a court must accept as true all the well-pleaded

factual allegations and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. But the court may disregard legal

conclusions or conclusory statements devoid of factual support. Id.; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Further, when a plaintiff appears without counsel, the Court must liberally construe the

complaint. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But even self-represented

litigants bear the burden to “alleg[e] sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be

based.” Id. And the rule of liberal construction neither permits nor requires a court to assume the

role of the unrepresented litigant’s advocate by “supply[ing] additional factual allegations to round

out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct[ing] a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New

Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997).

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a “well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a

savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] facts is improbable.” Straub v. BNSF Ry. Co., 909

F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Nonetheless, dismissal

is appropriate “when the allegations in [the] complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of

entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 558. The Court now turns to Warner’s amended

complaint and the Cities’ motions to dismiss.

ANALYSIS

To hold a municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) the existence

of a municipal policy or custom by which the plaintiff was denied a constitutional right and (2)

that the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation. City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

436 U.S. 658 (1978); Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (citations

omitted). “Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under [Section] 1983.” City

of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. A municipal policy or custom takes one of the following forms:

(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a

widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express

municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage

with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking

authority; (4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions—and the

basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these

policymakers’ review and approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train or

supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to

the injuries that may be caused.

Thao v. Grady Cnty. Criminal Justice Auth., 159 F.4th 1214, 1227 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Waller

v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019)). “After establishing such a policy

or custom, a plaintiff must demonstrate the causation element, that is, ‘a direct causal link between

the policy or custom and the injury alleged.’” Thao, 159 F.4th at 1227 (quoting Bryson v. City of

Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010)). “A plaintiff must include ‘factual allegations

sufficient to support a plausible inference’ that a policy [or custom] caused his injuries.” Manning

v. City of Tulsa, 170 F.4th 1287, 1300 (10th Cir. 2026) (quoting Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257,

1266 (10th Cir. 2017)). And the absence of a constitutional violation by the officers of a city

precludes a finding of liability against the city itself. Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782

(10th Cir. 1993). With this legal background, the Court considers Warner’s municipal liability

claims.

I. Warner’s claims against the City of Tulsa

The Court agrees Warner fails to state plausible municipal liability claims against the City

of Tulsa. As noted, Warner advances three claims against the City of Tulsa: excessive force,

intentional infliction of emotional distress and deliberate indifference. Doc. 57 at 60-65.

A. Intentional infliction of emotional distress

The Court first dispenses with Warner’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

“[I]ntentional infliction of emotional distress, by itself, cannot amount to a constitutional

violation.” Savage v. Fallin, Case No. 15-CV-1194-HE, 2020 WL 292186, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Jan.

21, 2020) (unpublished)3 (quoting Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 678 (6th

Cir. 2005)). To the extent Warner is attempting to hold the City of Tulsa liable for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, the Court dismisses this claim because there is no underlying

constitutional violation. Hinton, 997 F.2d at 782.

B. Excessive force

Turning next to Warner’s excessive force claim, Warner alleges he is proceeding under an

“official policy” theory of municipal liability. Doc. 57 at 60. Warner alleges, “a police sergeant

has significant final decision making authority; as he/she is the first (1st) level of supervision in

the police chain of command overseeing patrol officers and other personnel.” Id.; see also id. at

31-32. Beyond this, Warner’s allegations are conclusory. See id. at 60-61. The Court understands

Warner’s claim to allege the City of Tulsa promulgated a policy making the sergeant on scene the

decisionmaker and, pursuant to this policy, the sergeants on scene “inflicted [Warner’s] injuries or

acquiesced and/or sanctioned it.” Id. at 60. Therefore, as Warner sees it, the City of Tulsa is liable.

However, Warner fails to allege Spradlin or Watkins, the sergeants on scene, took any

affirmative action pursuant to a City of Tulsa policy which resulted in the excessive force. Warner

explicitly alleges Spradlin stood by and did nothing during his arrest. Doc. 57 at 33 (“Spradlin’s

inability and/or failure to act and/or supervise was the proximate cause of all his subordinates

actions to inflict severely serious injuries upon [Warner].”). Warner further alleges Watkins

engaged in excessive force which “sent a message” to his subordinates that such conduct would

be tolerated by the City of Tulsa. Doc. 57 at 38. However, Warner does not present any factual

allegations that Watkins’s conduct was caused by the policy. See Manning v. City of Tulsa, Case

3 The Court cites all unpublished decisions herein as persuasive authority. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a);

10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

No. 17-CV-336-EFM, 2023 WL 11643939, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 9, 2023) (unpublished); see also

Manning, 170 F.4th at 1300. If anything, Watkins’s use of force was the result of his own deliberate

conduct. See Manning, 2023 WL 11643939, at *5.

Warner may also be proceeding under the theory that Spradlin and Watkins, as final

policymakers, ratified their subordinates’ decisions. See Thao, 159 F.4th at 1227. Warner alleges

Spradlin and Watkins “ratifi[ed] all of [their] subordinates unconstitutional acts of excessive force

against [Warner]” and “acquies[ced] to [their] subordinates unconstitutional acts of excessive

force[.]” Doc. 57 at 33, 39. “Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses

final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Pembaur v. City

of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). Fatally, Warner fails to allege Spradlin or Watkins

possessed final authority to establish municipal policy. See Doc. 57 at 59-71.4 Therefore, the

Court concludes Warner fails to state a claim against the City of Tulsa based upon excessive force

and dismisses the same.

C. Deliberate indifference

Warner also asserts a “deliberate indifference” claim against the City of Tulsa. Warner

points to history, reports and other statistics to support his allegation that the Tulsa police employ

excessive force disproportionately to African American individuals compared to Caucasians. See

Doc. 57 at 62-65. The Court understands this cause of action to be premised on an “informal

custom.” Thao, 159 F.4th at 1227.

4 The City of Tulsa represents, “Title 29, Section 101 of Tulsa Revised Ordinances provides that

the Tulsa Police Department ‘shall be under the control and authority of the Mayor.’ Section 104

then authorizes the Mayor to appoint the Chief of Police, who in turn (pursuant to Section 106) is

‘accountable to the Mayor for the promulgation of all orders or regulations made or given to the

Department.’” Doc. 61 at 4-5.

“[D]eliberate indifference is germane to claims premised on inadequate supervisory

practices (such as claims of inadequate hiring or training) and requires proof that the municipality

disregarded a known or obvious risk of constitutional harm.” Thao, 159 F.4th at 1228 (citing

Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124 (1992) and Waller, 932 F.3d at 1284). “The Supreme

Court established this rigorous standard of culpability for claims of inadequate hiring, training, or

other supervisory practices because a less stringent standard of fault would result in de facto

respondeat superior liability on municipalities.” Thao, 159 F.4th at 1228 (internal quotations and

citations omitted). “The deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the municipality

has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in

a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.”

Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998). “In most instances, notice can be

established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct.” Id. Deliberate indifference

“may be found absent a pattern of unconstitutional behavior” only in “a ‘narrow range of

circumstances’” where “a violation of federal rights is a ‘highly predictable’ or ‘plainly obvious’

consequence of a municipality’s action or inaction.” Id. at 1307–08 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. 397,

409 (1997)).

Warner’s amended complaint fails to state a claim against the City of Tulsa for deliberate

indifference. Warner cites several reports and studies which, he alleges, find that “rate of force”

by the Tulsa Police Department against African Americans is higher than that against Caucasians.

See, e.g., Doc. 57 at 64. However, the use of force does not necessarily equate to unconstitutional,

excessive force. Warner fails to allege the City of Tulsa had “actual or constructive notice that its

action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation[.]” Barney, 143

F.3d at 1307. Therefore, Warner fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference against the City

of Tulsa.

As explained, Warner’s claims against the City of Tulsa fail to allege the essential elements

of a municipal liability claim, and the Court dismisses the same.

II. Warner’s claims against the City of Broken Arrow

Warner’s claims against the City of Broken Arrow mirror the claims asserted against the

City of Tulsa (see Doc. 57 at 66) except Warner alleges that during his arrest the City of Broken

Arrow “was in agreement with and conceded to the Fugitive Warrant Unit [Tulsa]” to command

Warner’s arrest. See id. at 65-68. Therefore, Warner’s position is the City of Broken Arrow,

pursuant to a policy, abdicated authority concerning his arrest to the City of Tulsa’s on-scene

sergeants, and the alleged constitutional violations by the City of Tulsa officers render the City of

Broken Arrow liable. See id. at 65-69.

Warner’s excessive force and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against the

City of Broken Arrow fail to state a claim for the same reasons they did against the City of Tulsa.

First, there is no underlying constitutional violation for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Savage, 2020 WL 292186, at *4; Hinton, 997 F.2d at 782. Second, Warner fails to identify any

City of Broken Arrow policy which caused the use of excessive force. Instead, Warner only offers

conclusory statements and speculation.

Concerning his deliberate indifference claim, Warner attempts to hinge the City of Broken

Arrow’s municipal liability upon the alleged conduct of Spradlin and Watkins, Tulsa police

sergeants. See id. at 70-71. However, Warner does not allege that Spradlin and Watkins possessed

final authority to establish City of Broken Arrow policy nor that any action was ordered pursuant

to a City of Broken Arrow policy. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 48. Nor, to the extent Warner is

proceeding under a theory of informal custom, does he adequately allege the City of Broken Arrow

was on notice “that its action or failure to act [was] substantially certain to result in a constitutional

violation[.]” Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307. In all, Warner’s claims against the City of Broken Arrow

fail to allege the essential elements of a municipal liability claim, and the Court dismisses these

claims.

Ii. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Cities’ motions to dismiss shall be

granted, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City of Tulsa’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 61) is

granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the City of Broken Arrow’s motion to dismiss (Doc.

62) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amended complaint is dismissed, in part, as to

Warner’s municipal liability claims against the City of Tulsa and the City of Broken Arrow.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate the City of Tulsa

and the City of Broken Arrow as party defendants.

DATED this 21st day of July, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE