The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MICHAEL JASON LEE TOBY, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:26-cv-1748-K-BN
§
RYAN JESSE GARDNER, §
ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Without paying the filing fee, Plaintiff Michael Jason Lee Toby filed a pro se
complaint. See Dkt. No. 3. And United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade referred
the complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial
management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation that the Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice as
frivolous.
Discussion
A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed IFP (that is, without
payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint (or any portion
of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam).
And “[i]t is well-established that a district court may dismiss a complaint on
its own motion under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
granted.” Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171 (5th
Cir. 2006)), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff’d, 763 F.
App’x 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142 (2019).
A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint
on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll,
470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted).
“[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to
dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano
v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v.
Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court
may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’
More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention
and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.”
(citations omitted)).
And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while
the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett,
2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted).
A district court’s authority to dismiss an action that “fails to ‘state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face’” extends to dismissal of “claims that are ‘clearly
baseless,’ including ‘claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.’” Starrett, 763
F. App’x at 383-84 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, then Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)
(concluding that dismissal “is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of
the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable
facts available to contradict them”)).
A review of Toby’s filing reflects that the complaint presents claims and
allegations that qualify as clearly baseless, irrational, or wholly incredible, requiring
dismissal with prejudice. His complaint was submitted on the standard civil case
form, and his claims are entirely within the space provided for identifying defendants.
See Dkt. No. 3 at 2. Although largely undecipherable, the complaint appears to assert
conclusory claims such as “stalking, harassment, obstruction of mail,” and “social
security fraud” against a list of individuals as well as general assertions against
groups like the Masons and the Mexican/Latino Community and claims that appear
to be brought against locations of the Dallas Public Library and the Fairmont Hotel.
See id.
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint
before dismissal, but leave is not required when he has already pled his “best case.”
Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Toby has failed to state or
suggest a cognizable claim or any facts from which a cognizable claim can be inferred.
Based on the most deferential review of his complaint, it is highly unlikely that, given
the opportunity, Toby could allege cogent and viable legal claims. Thus, the
undersigned concludes that granting leave to amend under these circumstances
would be futile and cause needless delay.
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice as frivolous.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: June 11, 2026
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
-5-