Anderson

IN THEF OURN ITTHEED DSITSATTREICST B OAFN KCROULPOTRCAYD OCO URT

The Honorable Michael E. Romero

In re:

Case No. 25-14514 MER

Mark Anthony Anderson

Chapter 7

Debtor.

Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. Adversary No. 25-01301 MER

Plaintiff,

v.

Mark Anthony Anderson

Defendant.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment

(“Motion”) filed by Plaintiff Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. (“Sunbelt”). There were no responses

to the Motion.1

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed. Sunbelt commenced the instant adversary

proceeding against Debtor/Defendant Mark Anderson (“Anderson”) on October 21,

2025. Anderson is the owner and operator of A and L Construction (“A&L”)

(collectively, the “Anderson Parties”). Pre-petition, A&L entered into an agreement

with Sunbelt, under which Sunbelt agreed to extend commercial credit to A&L for the

purpose of renting construction equipment (“Credit Agreement”). In return, A&L

agreed to make timely payments to Sunbelt, and to pay Sunbelt for any lost, stolen, or

damaged equipment. Anderson personally guaranteed the Credit Agreement.

A&L rented equipment from Sunbelt from December 2023 to February 2024.

The Anderson Parties did not make any payments towards the rentals. Additionally, the

Anderson Parties intentionally misused the equipment, which caused damages. The

Anderson Parties refused to pay for the equipment repairs. As a result of the Anderson

Parties’ failure to make payments towards the rentals or the repairs, Sunbelt initiated a

lawsuit against the Anderson Parties in the Jefferson County District Court (“State

Court”), asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of guaranty, and fraud (the

1 ECF No. 21.

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Parties in the total principal amount of $234,612.86 (“Default Judgment”).3 Anderson

then filed the underlying bankruptcy case on July 21, 2026. Sunbelt asserts the Default

Judgment is excepted from Anderson’s discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

ANALYSIS

A. Applicable Standard

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056), a

court may award summary judgment only when there are no disputes as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4 In applying this

standard, the Court examines the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party.5 The movant bears the burden of

demonstrating there is no genuine issue of material fact.6 If the moving party makes a

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts

demonstrated by evidence, “from which a rational trier of fact” could find in its favor.7

“Great circumspection is required where summary judgment is sought on an issue

involving state of mind.”8 If the nonmoving party fails to timely respond to the summary

judgment motion, they waive the right to respond or to controvert the facts asserted.9

“The court should accept as true all material facts asserted and properly supported in

the summary judgment motion. But only if those facts entitle the moving party to

judgment as a matter of law should the court grant summary judgment.”10

2 Case No. 2024CV031884, ECF No. 21, Ex. E, December 30, 2024, Complaint for Damages. The

breach of contract claim was alleged only against A&L, while the breach of guaranty claim was alleged

against Anderson. The fraud claim was alleged against both Anderson Parties.

3 ECF No. 21, Ex. H, April 15, 2025, Order Re: Motion for Default Judgment. This amount includes

$189,321.41 in damages, $40,138.15 in interest through April 11, 2025, $4,685.50 in attorney’s fees, and

$467.80 in costs.

4 Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

5 Schwartz v. Bd. Of Maint. of Way Emp., 264 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 2001).

6 Sports Unlimited Inc. v. Lankford Enter., Inc., 275 F.3d 996, 999 (10th Cir. 2002).

7 Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 866 (10th Cir. 2000).

8In re Tilly, 286 B.R. 782, 792 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2002); Gelb v. Board of Elections of City of New York, 224

F.3d 149, 157 (2nd Cir. 2000) (summary judgment is generally inappropriate where there are issues of

intent).

9 Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002).

10 Id. (citing Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir. 2001); Anchorage Assoc. v. Virgin Islands Board

of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1990); Livernois v. Medical Disposables, Inc., 837 F.2d

1018, 1022 (11th Cir. 1988)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

B . Collateral Estoppel

First, the Court will briefly discuss the application of collateral estoppel to the

Default Judgment. While Sunbelt obtained a judgment against Anderson for fraud,

among other things, the Default Judgment does not have a preclusive effect on

dischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) because those issues were not “actually litigated”

in the State Court Case.11 “[C]ollateral estoppel attaches only when an issue of fact or

law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the

determination is essential to the judgment.”12 Further, “collateral estoppel applies in

bankruptcy courts only if the state court has made specific, subordinate, factual findings

on the identical dischargeability issue in question.”13 Collateral estoppel generally does

not apply where a default judgment was entered against the defendant because they

failed to participate from the outset of the case.14

None of the issues regarding the dischargeability of the Default Judgment were

“actually litigated” in the State Court Case. The Default Judgment was entered after

Anderson failed to respond to Sunbelt’s state court complaint.15 As such, it appears

Anderson did not participate in the State Court Case at all prior to entry of the Default

Judgment. Furthermore, the Default Judgment does not contain any factual findings, let

alone specific factual findings that are identical to those necessary to find a debt

nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).16 Therefore, the Default Judgment does not

have a preclusive effect on any issues in this proceeding other than to prove the

existence of a debt owed to Sunbelt.

C. Sunbelt is not Entitled to Summary Judgment

Sunbelt asserts one claim for relief under § 523(a)(2)(A), which excepts debts

obtained by “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud” from a debtor’s

discharge. To establish a non-dischargeable claim under § 523(a)(2)(A), a creditor

must prove: (1) the debtor made a false representation; (2) with intent to deceive the

creditor; (3) the creditor relied on the false representation; (4) the creditor’s reliance was

11 See In re Crespin, 551 B.R. 886, 898 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2016) (“Giving the Default Judgment preclusive

effect as to the claim on the debt but not as to its dischargeability is consistent with Tenth Circuit

precedent and Brown v. Felson, and is mandated by the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738).

12 In re Sukut, 357 B.R. 840, 844 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006) (quoting Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414,

120 S.Ct. 2304, 147 L.Ed.2d 374 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, at 250 (1982)).

13 In re Jensen, 395 B.R. 472, 490 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008).

14 Id. (“Collateral estoppel does not apply to this case. The Plaintiff’s judgment was entered by default and

thus was not ‘actually litigated . . .’ In this case, it appears that Ms. Jensen merely defaulted by not

participating in the state court proceeding . . . As a result, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not

applicable.”).

15 ECF No. 21, ¶ 21; ECF No. 21, Ex. A, Affidavit of Plaintiff, ¶ 22.

16 Any use of the term “Section” or “§” hereafter means Title 11 of the United States Code.

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of intent is rarely available, scienter may be established through circumstantial

evidence.”19 Intent may be inferred where a debtor knowingly or recklessly makes false

representations that he knows, or should know, will induce another to act.20 “A

representation of the maker’s own intent to do a particular thing is fraudulent if he does

not have that intention at the time he makes the representation.”21 In contrast, if at the

time a debtor makes a promise he honestly intends to keep but later changes his mind

or fails to carry out his expressed intention, there has been no misrepresentation.22

“This is true even if there is no excuse for the subsequent breach. A debtor’s statement

of future intention is not necessarily a misrepresentation if intervening events cause the

debtor’s future actions to deviate from previously expressed intentions.”23

In support of its claim, Sunbelt asserts that Anderson represented that he and

A&L would pay for the equipment rented, for any damages thereto, and that Sunbelt

relied on these representations.24 Sunbelt also asserts that Anderson knew these

representations were false.25 However, Sunbelt does not allege facts nor provide

evidence showing Anderson knew the representations were false at the time they were

made. For example, Sunbelt didn’t provide bank statements showing that Anderson

was incapable of paying for the equipment and repairs, despite his representations to

the contrary. The fact that Anderson was later unable to pay for the equipment and

repairs does not prove he knowingly made false statements about his ability to pay at

the time he signed the Credit Agreement. Therefore, the Court concludes that Sunbelt

has not met its burden to show it is entitled to summary judgment on its § 523(a)(2)(A)

claim.

17 In re Bolling, 600 B.R. 838, 848 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019); Fowler v. Young (In re Young), 91 F.3d 1367,

1373 (10th Cir. 1996).

18 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).

19 Santiago v. Hernandez (In re Hernandez), 452 B.R. 709, 720-21 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting Rezin

v. Barr (In re Barr), 194 B.R. 1009, 1020 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996)).

20 Id. at 721.

21 Palmacci v. Umpierrez, 121 F.3d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 530(1)) (quotations omitted).

22 Id. at 787.

23 Id. (quoting 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.08 [1][d], at 523-43) (quotations omitted).

24 ECF No. 21, ¶¶ 10-11, 16; ECF No. 21, Ex. A, ¶¶ 11-12, 25.

25 ECF No. 21, Ex. A, ¶ 26.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court

ORDERS the Motion is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: July 31, 2026.

Michael E, Romero, Judge

United States Bankruptcy Court