Opinion

Adele Ruppe v. Marco Rubio

Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jul 31, 2026
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 42.0%

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 5, 2026 Decided July 31, 2026

No. 24-5199

ADELE E. RUPPE,

APPELLANT

v.

MARCO RUBIO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF

STATE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:17-cv-02823)

Kevin E. Byrnes argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant. Kiarash Rahnama Moghaddam entered an

appearance.

Sean M. Tepe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeanine Ferris Pirro,

U.S. Attorney, and Johnny H. Walker, III, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Before: WILKINS, RAO and PAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.

2

RAO, Circuit Judge: Foreign Service officer Adele Ruppe

sued the State Department, alleging multiple violations of

federal anti-discrimination law. The district court held it lacked

jurisdiction over Ruppe’s Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)

damages claim under Waters v. Rumsfeld, 320 F.3d 265 (D.C.

Cir. 2003), and sua sponte transferred that claim to the Court

of Federal Claims. The district court granted summary

judgment for the Department on Ruppe’s remaining claims.

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment

but vacate the transfer of Ruppe’s FLSA damages claim.

Waters cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s later

decision in United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6 (2012).

Overruling Waters, we conclude that the district courts and the

Court of Federal Claims have concurrent jurisdiction over

FLSA damages claims against the United States. We therefore

vacate the transfer and remand for the district court to consider

Ruppe’s FLSA claim.

I.

Ruppe joined the Foreign Service in 1993 and was

promoted to the Senior Foreign Service in 2011. In 2014, she

began working as a director in the Office of Public Diplomacy

for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Over the next

two years, she tried and failed to obtain a promotion to a deputy

chief of mission post in Europe. She also experienced difficulty

working with her direct supervisor, whom she accused of

discriminatory conduct.

After filing an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint

with the State Department’s Office of Civil Rights, Ruppe sued

the Department. Her amended complaint raised seven

discrimination claims: five under Title VII, one under the

3

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and one under the FLSA.1 Ruppe’s

FLSA claim sought more than $10,000 in damages. The district

court granted summary judgment for the State Department on

Ruppe’s Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims.

As to her FLSA claim, Ruppe and the Department both

maintained that the district court had jurisdiction because

Waters cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s

decision in Bormes. The district court held it was bound by

Waters until overruled by this court and therefore the Court of

Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over FLSA damages

claims against the United States in excess of $10,000. The

district court transferred Ruppe’s FLSA claim sua sponte to the

Court of Federal Claims. Ruppe timely appealed.

II.

Ruppe first challenges the district court’s grant of

summary judgment for the State Department on her Title VII

and Rehabilitation Act claims. Reviewing the entry of

summary judgment de novo, we affirm for substantially the

same reasons given in the district court’s careful opinion and

do not further address these claims.

Ruppe also challenges the district court’s transfer of her

FLSA damages claim to the Court of Federal Claims. Review

of this decision is de novo as well because the transfer was

based on a purported lack of jurisdiction. See Fed. L. Enf’t

Officers Ass’n v. Ahuja, 62 F.4th 551, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2023). We

first confirm our appellate jurisdiction to review the transfer

1

Ruppe’s complaint referred to this last claim as brought under the

Equal Pay Act. Because the Equal Pay Act is part of the FLSA, we

refer to it as an FLSA claim. Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d

1071, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam); see Equal Pay Act of 1963,

Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)).

4

and then explain why the district court had jurisdiction over

Ruppe’s FLSA claim.

A.

This court has appellate jurisdiction to review the district

court’s transfer order. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“[T]he first and fundamental

question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of

the court from which the record comes.”) (cleaned up).

Transfer orders are generally not appealable final orders,

nor are they generally reviewable under the collateral order

doctrine. Ukiah Adventist Hosp. v. FTC, 981 F.2d 543, 546

(D.C. Cir. 1992). This court, however, has recognized that

when a district court transfers a claim for lack of jurisdiction,

the transfer order is appealable if the transferee court has

jurisdiction over the underlying claim. Goble v. Marsh, 684

F.2d 12, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussing former 28 U.S.C.

§ 1406(c)). When there is a possibility of concurrent

jurisdiction between the D.C. District Court and the Court of

Federal Claims, an order transferring a claim from the district

court to the Court of Federal Claims would likely evade review

unless this court steps in. Ukiah Adventist Hosp., 981 F.2d at

547 (discussing Goble, 684 F.2d at 14). Absent immediate

review by this court, the plaintiff would find herself in the

Court of Federal Claims with no effective way to contest the

transfer. Because that court has jurisdiction over her claim, it

likely would proceed to the merits without entertaining any

challenge to the district court’s transfer decision. Goble, 684

F.2d at 14. Nor could the plaintiff seek effective review in the

Federal Circuit, which likely would find “any error in

transferring the action … harmless” in light of the two trial

courts’ concurrent jurisdiction. Ukiah Adventist Hosp., 981

F.2d at 547. In these circumstances, we have appellate

5

jurisdiction to review the transfer order because otherwise, the

concurrent jurisdiction of the two trial courts might “defeat[]

review” entirely. Id.

This exception to the general prohibition on reviewing

transfer orders supports our appellate jurisdiction in this case.

The district court transferred Ruppe’s FLSA claim for lack of

jurisdiction, presumably under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.2 As the Court

of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over the transferred claim,

Ruppe likely cannot secure relief against the transfer order

either in the Court of Federal Claims or in the Federal Circuit.

See Goble, 684 F.2d at 14; Ukiah Adventist Hosp., 981 F.2d at

547. Because the transfer order would be “otherwise

unreviewable,” we have appellate jurisdiction to review it.

Ukiah Adventist Hosp., 981 F.2d at 547.

The State Department maintains that this court lacks

jurisdiction to review the transfer order because the Federal

Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over a district court

“order … granting or denying, in whole or in part, a motion to

transfer an action to the United States Court of Federal Claims

under section 1631.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A). Because the

district court transferred Ruppe’s FLSA claim to the Court of

Federal Claims under section 1631, the Department contends

that appellate review may be sought only in the Federal Circuit.

We find section 1292(d)(4)(A) inapplicable in these

particular circumstances because the district court ordered a

sua sponte transfer, and this provision vests the Federal Circuit

2

The district court did not explicitly identify the source of its

authority to transfer Ruppe’s claim. We agree with the State

Department that the district court’s transfer is best understood as

made under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which authorizes a court to sua sponte

transfer a claim with jurisdictional defects to a court where it could

have been brought in the first place.

6

with exclusive appellate jurisdiction only over orders granting

or denying a transfer motion filed by a party.3

The statutory text and context demonstrate the word

“motion” in section 1292(d)(4)(A) refers to a motion filed by

one of the parties. Its neighboring provision details the

procedure for evaluating motions to transfer under section

1631. After a “motion to transfer … is filed in a district court,

no further proceedings shall be taken in the district court until

60 days after the court has ruled upon the motion.” Id.

§ 1292(d)(4)(B). Section 1292(d)(4)(B) outlines a process by

which a “motion” is “filed” with a district court, the court rules

on it, and there is a pause for appeal. In so doing, section

1292(d)(4)(B) necessarily refers to a “motion” filed by a party.

Because section 1292(d)(4)(A) covers the appeal of a ruling on

the same motion, the same understanding of “motion” applies

to that provision. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 33–34

(2005) (reasoning that identical terms in adjacent subsections

generally have the same meaning when one subsection

references the other). Since neither Ruppe nor the Department

filed a motion to transfer, the district court’s sua sponte transfer

did not grant or deny such a motion. Section 1292(d)(4)(A)

accordingly does not bar this court’s review.4

3

The Ninth Circuit reached a different conclusion about the

applicability of section 1292(d)(4)(A) to sua sponte transfers. See

Demontiney v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of Interior, 255 F.3d 801,

811 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001). We respectfully disagree with that decision,

which emphasized “challenges to judicial economy and uniformity”

but did not fully engage with the statutory text and context. Id.

4

Our holding applies only to this specific provision and does not

reach the broader question of whether a sua sponte transfer can ever

qualify as the grant of a motion to transfer. The parties appear to

dispute this question. Ruppe treats the district court’s action as sua

sponte because there was no motion filed by a party. The Department

7

B.

We hold the district court had jurisdiction over Ruppe’s

FLSA claim. The FLSA establishes a precise and self-

executing remedial scheme that enables both the district courts

and the Court of Federal Claims to adjudicate damages claims

against the United States.

1.

The FLSA provides that the district court and the Court of

Federal Claims have concurrent jurisdiction over Ruppe’s

damages claim against the United States. This court’s decision

in Waters, which held the Court of Federal Claims has

exclusive jurisdiction over such claims, cannot be reconciled

with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bormes.

Under the FLSA, employees may bring damages claims

against “any employer (including a public agency) in any

Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 216(b). “Public agency” is defined to include the United

responds that a court acts sua sponte when it acts on its own motion.

See Sua Sponte, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“Of … its

own will or motion.”). Invoking similar arguments, our sister circuits

have divided over whether a provision in the Class Action Fairness

Act (“CAFA”) provides appellate jurisdiction over sua sponte

remand orders of class actions removed from state court. See 28

U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (providing appellate review over “an order of a

district court granting or denying a motion to remand”); compare

Watkins v. Vital Pharms., Inc., 720 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013)

(per curiam) (answering yes), with Ruhlen v. Holiday Haven

Homeowners, Inc., 28 F.4th 226, 228–29 (11th Cir. 2022) (per

curiam) (answering no). Because the statutory text and context of

section 1292(d)(4)(A) differ from the CAFA provision, we need not

pick a side in this split.

8

States and federal agencies. Id. § 203(x). The FLSA therefore

waives federal sovereign immunity because it “creates a cause

of action and authorizes suit against [the] government on that

claim.” Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Centro

de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc., 143 S. Ct. 1176, 1184

(2023).

The waiver of sovereign immunity applies “in any Federal

or State court of competent jurisdiction.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

The phrase “any … court of competent jurisdiction” is not a

grant of jurisdiction, but rather a reference to a “court with the

power to adjudicate the case before it.” Lightfoot v. Cendant

Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 82, 91 (2017). The FLSA’s waiver thus

applies to all courts with “an existing source of subject-matter

jurisdiction” covering an FLSA claim. Id. at 92.

Through other statutory grants, both the district courts and

the Court of Federal Claims have jurisdiction over an FLSA

damages claim against the United States. District courts have

federal question jurisdiction because the FLSA is a federal law.

28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction

because such a claim is founded on an “Act of Congress” and

seeks damages “against the United States.”5 Id. § 1491(a)(1).

Since the FLSA’s waiver of federal sovereign immunity

applies to all courts of competent jurisdiction, and both the

district courts and the Court of Federal Claims are such courts,

they have concurrent jurisdiction over Ruppe’s FLSA damages

5

The Court of Federal Claims is a court of competent jurisdiction

only for FLSA damages claims against the United States; it is not a

court of competent jurisdiction for FLSA claims against other

defendants or for claims that request certain forms of equitable relief.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation,

563 U.S. 307, 313 (2011) (affirming the Court of Federal Claims has

“no general power to provide equitable relief against the Government

or its officers”).

9

claim against the United States. See Deaf Smith Cnty. Grain

Processors, Inc. v. Glickman, 162 F.3d 1206, 1210 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (explaining that a sovereign immunity waiver is

necessary for courts to have competent jurisdiction over claims

against the United States).

Notwithstanding the above provisions, this court held in

Waters that the Court of Federal Claims has “exclusive

jurisdiction” over FLSA claims against the United States

seeking more than $10,000 in damages. 320 F.3d at 272.

Waters relied on the general principle that, under the Tucker

Act, the Court of Federal Claims often has exclusive

jurisdiction over claims against the federal government for

more than $10,000 in damages. Id. at 270 & n.6; 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491(a)(1); cf. id. § 1346(a)(2) (providing the district courts

and the Court of Federal Claims with concurrent jurisdiction

over similar claims seeking $10,000 or less). But that court’s

jurisdiction is exclusive “only to the extent that Congress has

not granted any other court authority to hear the [relevant]

claims.” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 n.48

(1988). Waters recognized this qualification but failed to

mention the distinct waiver of sovereign immunity in the

FLSA. See 320 F.3d at 270 n.6. The analysis in Waters

implicitly proceeded on the assumption that only the Tucker

Act provided a waiver of federal sovereign immunity for FLSA

claims, and therefore jurisdiction was exclusive in the Court of

Federal Claims.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bormes compels the

conclusion that Waters was wrongly decided because it

superimposed the Tucker Act’s waiver on the FLSA, which

10

contains a precise and self-executing remedial scheme. We

now overrule Waters.6

In Bormes, the plaintiff sued the United States in district

court, seeking damages for violations of the Fair Credit

Reporting Act (“FCRA”). 568 U.S. at 8. Because the Supreme

Court had not yet decided whether the FCRA waives federal

sovereign immunity,7 the plaintiff tried to use the waiver of

sovereign immunity in the Little Tucker Act to maintain his

lawsuit. Id. at 10–11; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). The Court

unanimously rejected this attempt to “mix and match” the

FCRA’s liability provisions with the Little Tucker Act’s

sovereign immunity waiver and thereby “create an action

against the United States.” Bormes, 568 U.S. at 15. Reviewing

a line of precedents stretching back to 1869, the Court

explained that a precise and self-executing remedial scheme

“establishes the exclusive framework for the liability Congress

created under the statute.” Id. at 12–15 (collecting cases).

The FCRA establishes such a remedial scheme because it

creates a cause of action, provides certain remedies, sets a

specific limitations period, and defines the appropriate forum

for bringing suit. Id. at 15. The Court therefore held that FCRA

damages claims against the United States may rely only on a

waiver of sovereign immunity found within the FCRA. Id. The

Court also warned courts not to “leapfrog[] the threshold

6

The decision to overrule Waters has been approved by the en banc

court and thus constitutes the law of the circuit. See Oakey v. U.S.

Airways Pilots Disability Income Plan, 723 F.3d 227, 232 & n.1

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 267–68 &

n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

7

The Supreme Court later held that “[t]he FCRA effects a clear

waiver of sovereign immunity.” Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural

Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 144 S. Ct. 457, 467 (2024).

11

concern” that the Tucker Act and the Little Tucker Act “cannot

be superimposed on an existing remedial scheme.” Id. at 16.

Like the FCRA, the FLSA establishes a precise and self-

executing remedial scheme. The FLSA includes a cause of

action—employees can bring suit on behalf of themselves and

other similarly situated employees against their employer. 29

U.S.C. § 216(b). The FLSA details remedies that are tied to

specific statutory violations. Id. The FLSA specifies a statute

of limitations—three years for willful violations, two years for

all others. Id. § 255(a). And the FLSA waives sovereign

immunity in “any Federal or State court of competent

jurisdiction.” Id. §§ 216(b), 203(x).

Because the FLSA creates a precise and self-executing

remedial scheme, we cannot superimpose the Tucker Act’s

sovereign immunity waiver on the FLSA. Following Bormes,

we must assess jurisdiction by “look[ing] only” to the FLSA.

568 U.S. at 11, 15. As explained, the FLSA waives federal

sovereign immunity in courts of competent jurisdiction, which

include the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims. And

unlike the Tucker Act, the FLSA’s sovereign immunity waiver

applies regardless of the amount of damages sought. See 29

U.S.C. § 216(b). Because the district courts and the Court of

Federal Claims have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate

FLSA damages claims against the United States, Ruppe’s

claim may proceed in district court.

2.

In rejecting the parties’ jurisdictional arguments, the

district court followed Waters because this court had not

overruled it. The district court also followed other district court

decisions that had relied on the Federal Circuit’s decision in

Abbey v. United States, 745 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014). See,

e.g., Alston v. Bethea, No. 22-cv-3595, 2023 WL 4198203, at

12

*2–3 (D.D.C. June 27, 2023); Adair v. Bureau of Customs &

Border Prot., 191 F. Supp. 3d 129, 132–34 (D.D.C. 2016). In

Abbey, the Federal Circuit affirmed that, despite Bormes, the

Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over FLSA

claims against the United States for over $10,000 in damages.

745 F.3d at 1368–72. We decline to follow Abbey because it

relied on extraneous considerations and is inconsistent with

Bormes.

To begin with, the Federal Circuit emphasized the United

States’ pre-Bormes litigating position that the Court of Federal

Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over FLSA claims against the

United States seeking more than $10,000 in damages. See

Abbey, 745 F.3d at 1369 (“As the courts have held at the

government’s urging for three decades ….”); id. (referencing

the “longstanding, government-supported interpretation”); id.

at 1371 (citing a 1994 government brief). But this court must

“exercise [its] independent judgment” when interpreting

federal statutes. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct.

2244, 2273 (2024). The federal government’s past litigating

position, which it properly abandoned after Bormes, cannot

overcome the text of the FLSA.

Second, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is at odds with

Bormes. The Federal Circuit recognized that the FLSA

contains a waiver of federal sovereign immunity. Abbey, 745

F.3d at 1370. But perhaps because it did not assess whether the

FLSA establishes a precise and self-executing remedial

scheme, the Federal Circuit did not “look only” to that scheme.

See Bormes, 568 U.S. at 11. Instead, it interpreted the FLSA to

align with the Tucker Act. See Abbey, 745 F.3d at 1370 (“[I]t

is natural to read the [FLSA] as implicitly specifying a forum

(the Tucker Act forum) in order to complete the waiver of

sovereign immunity.”); see also id. (holding the FLSA “does

not specify a forum that is contrary to that specified by the

13

Tucker Act”). This approach contravenes Bormes by

effectively superimposing the Tucker Act on the FLSA.

Because the FLSA contains a precise and self-executing

remedial scheme, “only its own text” controls the jurisdictional

analysis. Bormes, 568 U.S. at 15. We must interpret the FLSA

by its terms, not with an interpretation circumscribed by the

Tucker Act. Cf. id. at 14 n.5 (“Reconcilable or not, [the] FCRA

governs.”). Looking to the FLSA’s waiver of sovereign

immunity, the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims

both have jurisdiction over FLSA damages claims against the

United States.

***

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment

for the State Department with respect to Ruppe’s Title VII and

Rehabilitation Act claims. We further hold the FLSA

establishes a precise and self-executing remedial scheme that

provides the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims

with concurrent jurisdiction over FLSA damages claims

against the United States. Because the district court had

jurisdiction over Ruppe’s FLSA claim, we vacate the transfer

of that claim to the Court of Federal Claims. We therefore

affirm the district court’s judgment in part, vacate in part, and

remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.