The opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-2827
THE ESTATE OF JASON THOMSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THOMAS BEHN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 23-C-84 — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED MAY 12, 2026 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and KIRSCH and LEE, Circuit
Judges.
KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Jason Thomson was arrested at St.
Vincent Hospital by officers from the Green Bay Police De-
partment after behaving erratically and aggressively towards
hospital staff. During his arrest and restraint, Thomson strug-
gled against the officers. He also repeatedly stated that he
couldn’t breathe. Officers monitored Thomson’s breathing
and transported him to the Brown County Jail, where he ex-
2 No. 25-2827
perienced a cardiac arrhythmia and died. Thomson’s Estate
filed suit against the police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, al-
leging excessive use of force and failure to provide medical
care in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as a Monell
failure-to-train claim against the City of Green Bay and Brown
County. The district court granted summary judgment to the
police officers, Green Bay, and Brown County. On appeal, the
Estate challenges the dismissal of its claims against the police
officers and Green Bay. Because no reasonable jury could find
in the Estate’s favor on the alleged constitutional violations
and, in any event, the officers are entitled to qualified immun-
ity, we affirm.
I
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to the Es-
tate of Jason Thomson, the nonmoving party. Argyropoulos v.
City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2008). On the even-
ing of February 9, 2020, Thomson suffered a seizure while at
St. John’s Homeless Shelter in Green Bay, Wisconsin. Emer-
gency medical services transported Thomson to St. Vincent
Hospital, where he received treatment. In the early morning
hours of February 10, Thomson became agitated after accus-
ing one of the nurses of rolling her eyes at him. Because Thom-
son was yelling and uncooperative, hospital staff called the
Green Bay Police Department.
Video from the hospital, the squad car used to transport
Thomson, and the Brown County Jail captured much of what
happened next. Officer Michael O’Donnell was the first to re-
spond. When he arrived at the hospital, Thomson was stand-
ing shirtless in a hallway, confronting hospital nurses and se-
curity officers. Thomson was flailing his arms and yelling in-
coherently. Officer O’Donnell approached Thomson from be-
No. 25-2827 3
hind and briefly followed Thomson down the hallway, plac-
ing himself between Thomson and hospital staff. Thomson
turned to face Officer O’Donnell, who then grabbed Thom-
son’s wrist and pushed Thomson against a wall. Thomson
buckled backwards onto the floor, where Officer O’Donnell
and hospital security officers struggled to restrain him. Of-
ficer Christopher Vaubel then arrived and began to assist, and
the hospital security officers stepped away. At this point,
Thomson was lying on his stomach and officers were on their
knees attempting to restrain him as he continued to wriggle
and flail. Officer Alex Wanish joined and eventually the three
officers were able to handcuff Thomson. During this encoun-
ter, Thomson stated that he could not breathe and that he was
going to die. In response, Officer O’Donnell placed his hand
on Thomson’s back to confirm that he was breathing, and Of-
ficers Vaubel and Wanish ensured that no one was impeding
Thomson’s breathing by putting pressure on his upper torso.
Within several minutes, Sergeant Thomas Behn and Offic-
ers Scott Delsart, Ben Harvarth, and Karen Pineda also arrived
on the scene. Sergeant Behn assisted Officers O’Donnell,
Vaubel, and Wanish in restraining Thomson, who continued
to struggle, including kicking his legs. The officers therefore
decided to place Thomson in a WRAP device, which immobi-
lizes an individual’s lower body in a fabric case, to prevent
him from injuring himself or others. As Officers Vaubel,
Delsart, Wanish, and Sergeant Behn applied the WRAP,
Thomson continued to say that he couldn’t breathe. Sergeant
Behn monitored Thomson and observed that he was breath-
ing and that none of the officers was applying pressure that
might restrict his breathing. The officers placed a loosely se-
cured foam helmet onto Thomson’s head and then carried
4 No. 25-2827
him, restrained in the WRAP, out of the hospital and into a
squad car for transport to the Brown County Jail.
Throughout Thomson’s arrest and restraint, the officers
observed his physical symptoms, including his labored
breathing, sweating, foaming at the mouth, gibberish, and ab-
normal strength. The police department’s policy manual
identifies some of these symptoms as potential signs of “in-
creased risk of sudden death” and states that “[c]alls involv-
ing these persons should be considered medical emergen-
cies.” Department policy also states that if a subject restrained
in the WRAP “complains of or shows signs of breathing dis-
tress,” “medical attention should be provided immediately,”
and that arrestees that claim injury should be medically
cleared prior to booking.
Before Thomson’s departure from the hospital, Sergeant
Behn filled out a medical clearance form and submitted it to
hospital staff for completion. That form stated that Thomson
had been treated for a seizure and had fought with the offic-
ers. The bottom portion, labeled “Provider Medical Stability
Exam” and completed by hospital staff, had a checkmark next
to the box stating: “Patient Uncooperative. To the best of my
knowledge a medical emergency does not exist.” That portion
was signed by the attending physician in the hospital’s emer-
gency room.
Officers Harvath and Pineda drove Thomson to the jail,
with Officer Vaubel accompanying them in a separate vehicle.
When Thomson was placed in the car, Officer Wanish turned
the foam helmet around so that its back side covered Thom-
son’s face. It’s not clear from the footage whether this was in-
tentional. During the roughly ten-minute drive to the jail,
Thomson maneuvered the foam helmet to uncover his nose
No. 25-2827 5
and mouth. He eventually removed the helmet completely.
Thomson also repeated his complaints that he couldn’t
breathe. In response, Officer Harvath asked Thomson what
was wrong with his breathing. Thomson responded that he
would explain once the officers removed the WRAP. The of-
ficers continued to the jail without removing the WRAP or
seeking medical attention.
Thomson arrived at the jail around 3:10 am. By that time,
he was pale, largely unresponsive, and had to be carried from
the car. Officers Harvath, Pineda, and Vaubel met jail officers,
who asked the jail’s Health Service Unit to assess Thomson.
Nurse Rebecca Warren arrived around 3:15 am and saw that
Thomson was pale, drooling, and unable to communicate co-
herently. She took Thomson’s pulse and respirations but
couldn’t take his blood pressure. Based on her observations,
Nurse Warren concluded that Thomson could not be admit-
ted to the jail and instead needed to go to a hospital for reeval-
uation.
Jail officers carried Thomson—still confined in the
WRAP—back to the squad car, where Thomson’s condition
deteriorated. Approximately five minutes later, Officers Har-
vath and Pineda moved him to the floor of the jail’s sally port,
removed the WRAP, and began CPR. Paramedics then ar-
rived on the scene, attempted to resuscitate Thomson, and
eventually transported him to a hospital, where he was pro-
nounced dead. The medical examiner determined that the
cause of death was “[c]ardiac arrhythmia of undetermined
etiology following police restraint” and ruled the manner of
death a homicide.
Thomson’s Estate sued the Green Bay Police Department
and Brown County officers involved and Nurse Warren under
6 No. 25-2827
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force
and that all defendants failed to provide adequate medical
care in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Estate also
asserted a Monell failure-to-train claim against the City of
Green Bay and Brown County. The defendants moved for
summary judgment.
The district court granted the defendants’ motions except
as to Nurse Warren. The court found that the officers did not
use excessive force when they arrested Thomson or when
they placed him in the WRAP. Similarly, the court found that
the officers did not violate Thomson’s right to adequate med-
ical care at any point during the evening in question. And
even if the Estate could establish a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion based on a failure to provide adequate medical care, the
court determined that the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity. Finally, because the Estate couldn’t establish an
underlying constitutional violation, the district court dis-
missed the Monell failure-to-train claim against Green Bay
and Brown County.
Following the district court’s summary judgment deci-
sion, Nurse Warren was dismissed from the case pursuant to
a stipulation by the parties. Similarly, the parties resolved all
claims against Brown County and the County officers. The
only remaining claims are therefore against Green Bay and
the officers from the Green Bay Police Department.
II
On appeal, the Estate challenges the dismissal of its medi-
cal care and excessive use of force claims against Officers
O’Donnell, Wanish, Delsart, Vaubel, Harvath, Pineda, and
Sergeant Behn and its Monell failure-to-train claim against
No. 25-2827 7
Green Bay. We review the district court’s ruling de novo, con-
struing all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 732. Summary judg-
ment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A
1
We begin with the Estate’s assertion that the Green Bay
police officers violated Thomson’s constitutional right to ade-
quate medical care at three junctures: at the hospital, in the
squad car, and at the jail. In evaluating each of these claims,
we ask whether the officers’ conduct was objectively unrea-
sonable under the circumstances, based on what they knew at
the time. Braun v. Village of Palatine, 56 F.4th 542, 551 (7th Cir.
2022) (citation modified). That inquiry considers: (i) whether
the officers had notice of the detainee’s medical needs; (ii) the
seriousness of the medical need; (iii) the scope of the re-
quested treatment; and (iv) police interests, including admin-
istrative, penological, or investigative concerns. Id. (citation
modified). Because we conclude that no reasonable jury could
find that the officers violated Thomson’s right to adequate
medical care, summary judgment in the officers’ favor was
appropriate.
The Estate first argues that Officers O’Donnell, Vaubel,
Delsart, Wanish, and Sergeant Behn’s failure to seek medical
care at the hospital was unreasonable. Officers can be placed
on notice of a medical need by word or through observation
of physical symptoms. Id. The officers who participated in
Thomson’s arrest observed his physical state, including his
8 No. 25-2827
heavy breathing and sweating. Like the district court, we also
presume that they had verbal notice of his medical need, be-
cause Thomson told the officers that he could not breathe and
that he was going to die. And it’s undisputed that an inability
to breathe is a serious medical condition. See Garvin v. Arm-
strong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that
asthma, depending on degree, can be a serious medical con-
dition). Finally, the officers don’t contend that seeking medi-
cal care for Thomson at the hospital would have been oner-
ous, nor do they assert a police interest beyond expeditiously
removing him.
The Estate therefore argues that the officers’ failure to seek
medical attention violated Thomson’s right to adequate med-
ical care. But our “ultimate inquiry” is the reasonableness of
their conduct. Est. of Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 453–54 (7th
Cir. 2017). Based on what the officers knew at the time and
under the circumstances, no reasonable jury could find their
conduct objectively unreasonable. When Officer O’Donnell
first encountered Thomson in the hospital hallway, Thomson
was combative and did not show signs of a serious physical
health condition. Officer O’Donnell proceeded to try to hand-
cuff Thomson, at which point Thomson began to struggle
and, eventually, to say that he couldn’t breathe. In response
to Thomson’s complaints, Officer O’Donnell placed his hand
on Thomson’s back to confirm that he was breathing. And
when the other officers joined to assist Officer O’Donnell, they
jointly ensured that nobody was kneeling on Thomson or re-
stricting his airflow. Though the officers stopped short of
seeking medical care, that was not objectively unreasonable
because—although Thomson stated that he couldn’t
breathe—they monitored him, confirmed that he was breath-
No. 25-2827 9
ing, and took steps to ensure that they weren’t inhibiting his
breathing.
The officers’ precautionary measures distinguish this case
from Perry, 872 F.3d 439, on which the Estate relies. In Perry,
the defendants didn’t obtain medical care “or take any other
actions” even though they knew that the arrestee had suffered
seizures, had defecated and urinated on himself, and had be-
gun to spit or drool on his lap. Id. at 455. Under the circum-
stances, we found their decision to ignore the arrestee’s com-
plaints and do nothing unreasonable. Id. Here, conversely, the
officers addressed Thomson’s complaints and actively moni-
tored his condition.
The Estate’s other arguments, including its attempt to
raise disputes of material fact, are unpersuasive. The Estate’s
primary contention is that Thomson’s heavy breathing,
sweating, and other physical symptoms were signs that he
was experiencing a medical emergency. But such symptoms
were also consistent with Thomson’s prolonged physical
struggle against the officers, which is how they interpreted
them. Though a similar factual dispute—whether a detainee
was experiencing a medical emergency or being combative—
precluded summary judgment in Perry, see id., that’s not the
case here. Thomson’s physical symptoms may have been am-
biguous, but once he stated that he couldn’t breathe, the offic-
ers took concrete steps to address that concern. Their conduct
was therefore objectively reasonable, even if they misinter-
preted Thomson’s physical symptoms. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judg-
ment.”).
10 No. 25-2827
The other factual disputes and inferences that the Estate
raises are similarly uncompelling. Even when we construe
these facts and inferences in the Estate’s favor (i.e., that hos-
pital staff didn’t evaluate Thomson during his arrest and that
the medical clearance form didn’t address Thomson’s breath-
ing issues), our analysis remains the same. Finally, the Estate
makes much of the officers’ failure to follow departmental
policy, which directs them to seek medical attention if an ar-
restee claims injury or breathing distress. But an officer’s com-
pliance with departmental policy “is neither sufficient nor
necessary to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement.” United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 537 (7th
Cir. 2017). Though those policies can be relevant, our analysis
is “governed by constitutional principles,” which we find sat-
isfied here. Id. at 536–37.
The Estate next challenges Officers Harvath and Pineda’s
failure to seek medical attention for Thomson while trans-
porting him from the hospital to the jail. That claim fails, too.
Because Thomson continued to say that he couldn’t breathe,
Officer Harvath asked Thomson what was wrong with his
breathing. Thomson responded that he would explain after
the WRAP was removed, not that he was in distress. Further-
more, Officer Harvath continued to monitor Thomson’s
breathing and believed that any known medical issue would
have been addressed as a part of Thomson’s medical clear-
ance before leaving the hospital. Though the Estate argues
that the clearance form didn’t cover Thomson’s breathing is-
sues, it does not identify any facts making it unreasonable for
Officer Harvath to have relied on the form during transport.
And both officers knew that—if necessary—Thomson could
get medical treatment at the jail, which was less than ten
minutes away. Based on these facts, no reasonable jury could
No. 25-2827 11
find that the officers’ failure to seek medical care during
transport was objectively unreasonable.
Finally, we reject the Estate’s contention that Officers Har-
vath, Pineda, and Vaubel, who were present at the jail, vio-
lated Thomson’s right to adequate medical care. It’s undis-
puted that the officers and jail staff were on notice that some-
thing was seriously wrong with Thomson once he arrived; he
was unresponsive, pale, and had to be carried from the squad
car. The jail staff therefore sought medical attention from the
Health Services Unit, and Nurse Warren arrived shortly
thereafter. It’s well-established that non-medical officers may
rely on the professional judgment of medical professionals
without exposing themselves to liability under § 1983. Perry,
872 F.3d at 458. So once Nurse Warren was present, the offic-
ers were entitled to defer to her professional medical judg-
ment. McGee v. Parsano, 55 F.4th 563, 569, 573 (7th Cir. 2022).
An exception to that deference exists when non-medical
officers have reason to know that the medical professionals
are “failing to treat or inadequately treating” an individual.
Id. at 569. But that exception doesn’t apply here. The Estate
points to the obviousness of Thomson’s deteriorating health,
but that “has minimal relevance under our caselaw.” Id. at
574. Rather, the question is whether the officers had reason to
believe that Nurse Warren mistreated or failed to treat Thom-
son, and the Estate doesn’t identify any evidence suggesting
that’s the case. See id. To the extent that deterioration in con-
dition is relevant, we’ve found officers entitled to defer to
medical staff in circumstances far more obvious than this one,
such as when an individual experienced “severe shaking and
foaming at the mouth.” Id. (comparing those symptoms to the
12 No. 25-2827
“more subtle” symptoms of “lethargy, incoherence, and la-
bored breathing”).
The Estate also suggests that the officers weren’t entitled
to rely on Nurse Warren’s medical judgment because they
failed to inform her about Thomson’s breathing complaints.
But the Estate cites no cases suggesting that this failure to re-
lay information affects the officers’ ability to rely on Nurse
Warren’s professional judgment. And, in any event, it was
clear—even without such reports—that Thomson had a seri-
ous medical need once he was at the jail. To the extent that the
Estate tries to repackage its argument into a claim of deliber-
ate indifference, that too fails. Once Thomson arrived at the
jail, the officers knew that he was in poor condition and—
within five minutes—a medical professional was present to
assess him. The Estate therefore can’t show that the officers
“failed to act despite [their] knowledge of a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir.
2003) (citation modified).
2
Even if the Estate could establish that the officers violated
Thomson’s right to adequate medical care, dismissal of those
claims was appropriate because the officers are entitled to
qualified immunity. We review an officer’s entitlement to
qualified immunity de novo, asking whether the right at issue
was clearly established at the time and under the circum-
stances presented. Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 508 (7th
Cir. 2015). The Estate can show that a right was clearly estab-
lished by identifying “a clearly analogous case establishing
the right to be free from the conduct at issue” or by showing
that the officers’ conduct “was so egregious that no reasona-
ble person could have believed that it would not violate es-
No. 25-2827 13
tablished rights.” Id. at 508–09 (citation modified). The Estate
bears the burden of defeating the officers’ immunity defense.
Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2012). It cannot
carry that burden.
The right at issue is not, as the Estate asserts, an arrestee’s
general right to adequate medical care. Rather, it is the right
to medical care “in light of the specific context of the case.”
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (emphasizing that
clearly established law must not be defined at a high level of
generality, especially in the Fourth Amendment context). The
Estate fails to identify any case establishing that officers vio-
late the Fourth Amendment by failing to seek medical treat-
ment when the arrestee’s potential medical condition (here,
trouble breathing) could be consistent with mere physical ex-
ertion, the officers observe that the arrestee is breathing, and
they take steps to ensure that they aren’t inhibiting his breath-
ing. As already discussed, the Estate’s reliance on Perry is mis-
placed; unlike in that case, the officers took cautionary
measures in response to Thomson’s complaints. See Perry, 872
F.3d at 460 (finding “the failure to take any action in light of a
serious medical need” clearly established as objectively un-
reasonable). And the Estate doesn’t point to any case showing
that the officers’ conduct at the hospital was so egregious that
any reasonable person would find it a constitutional violation.
See Beaman, 776 F.3d at 508.
We similarly conclude that Officers Harvath and Pineda,
who transported Thomson, and the officers present at the jail
are entitled to qualified immunity. The Estate doesn’t identify
any cases clearly establishing that failure to seek medical
treatment during transport is objectively unreasonable when
the arrestee has been medically cleared by a doctor, the offic-
14 No. 25-2827
ers ask about his condition, and treatment is available within
ten minutes. Nor do they identify cases clearly establishing
that it was objectively unreasonable for the officers at the jail
to not seek more or better treatment for Thomson than what
was provided by Nurse Warren. Therefore, because the Estate
cannot prove a violation and because—in any event—the of-
ficers are entitled to qualified immunity, the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in their favor was appropriate.
B
1
Next, we consider the Estate’s claims that the officers used
excessive force in arresting Thomson and by placing him in
the WRAP. We analyze these claims under the Fourth
Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard, consider-
ing “the specific circumstances of the arrest, including the se-
verity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an im-
mediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.” Avina v. Bohlen, 882 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir.
2018) (citation modified). And we adopt “the perspective of a
reasonable officer under the circumstances, rather than exam-
ining the officer’s actions in hindsight.” Id. (citation modi-
fied).
The Estate contends that Officer O’Donnell used excessive
force in arresting Thomson and that material factual disputes
preclude summary judgment. Not so. When Officer O’Don-
nell arrived at the hospital, staff members were trying to cor-
ral Thomson, who was yelling and uncooperative. Officer
O’Donnell states that he grabbed Thomson’s wrist because
Thomson approached him in an aggressive manner, which
No. 25-2827 15
the Estate disputes. Even if that’s not what happened, it
wasn’t objectively unreasonable for Officer O’Donnell to grab
Thomson’s wrist in light of Thomson’s volatile behavior and
confrontation with hospital staff.
As Thomson struggled, Officer O’Donnell then pinned
him to the wall, took him to the ground, and held him down
while trying to handcuff him. That wasn’t unreasonable, ei-
ther. See Cibulka v. City of Madison, 992 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir.
2021) (finding the practice of taking a resisting subject to the
ground a “routine police activity”). Because Thomson wasn’t
complying, Officer O’Donnell (and later, the officers assisting
him) were entitled to use more force to subdue Thomson. See
Est. of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir.
1997) (“Authorities must be allowed to graduate their re-
sponse to the demands of any particular situation.”).
We also find that Officers Vaubel, Wanish, Delsart, Har-
vath, Pineda, and Sergeant Behn didn’t use excessive force
when they decided to further restrain Thomson with the
WRAP. Even after being handcuffed, Thomson continued to
kick and flail, creating a safety risk to himself and to the offic-
ers. It therefore wasn’t excessive force for them to use the
WRAP, which is designed for the restraint and transportation
of violent or combative subjects.
The Estate disputes that Thomson resisted as Officer
O’Donnell initially attempted to arrest him. But it’s not
enough for the Estate to merely deny that Thomson resisted;
it must point to admissible evidence in the record. Marvin v.
Holcomb, 72 F.4th 828, 833 (7th Cir. 2023). Here, the testimony
of Officer O’Donnell and those on the scene—including hos-
pital staff who intervened to help Officer O’Donnell until
other officers arrived—confirms that (at least at the beginning
16 No. 25-2827
of the encounter) Thomson was physically resisting. Video
from the hospital doesn’t show otherwise.
The Estate also insists that Thomson’s struggle against the
officers after being handcuffed was an attempt to breathe, not
resistance. It’s true that, from the video alone, it’s not possible
to tell why Thomson is struggling. But, as with the Estate’s
medical care claims, this factual dispute isn’t material because
it doesn’t affect the outcome of the reasonableness analysis.
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It’s undisputed that Thomson
was unruly and uncooperative when Officer O’Donnell first
encountered him in the hallway. Even if Thomson’s struggle
against the officers transitioned at some point from resistance
to an attempt to breathe, we allow for the fact that officers face
“tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances when
determining reasonableness. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
396–97 (1989). Moreover, Officer O’Donnell and the other of-
ficers took measures to ensure that Thomson was getting
enough oxygen, even as they used force to subdue and re-
strain him. Their use of force during the arrest and in apply-
ing the WRAP, in light of these circumstances, wasn’t objec-
tively unreasonable. See Phillips, 123 F.3d at 593.
Finally, the Estate argues that Officer Wanish used exces-
sive force when he twisted the WRAP helmet over Thomson’s
face, covering his nose and mouth, while Thomson was in the
back of the squad car. Because the Estate makes this argument
for the first time on appeal, it is waived and we do not con-
sider it. See Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1168 (7th
Cir. 1997) (finding it axiomatic that arguments not raised be-
low are waived); United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906, 914
(7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he waiver doctrine is designed for our
No. 25-2827 17
own protection as much as that of an opposing party, and
therefore need not be asserted by a party for us to invoke it.”).
2
Even if the Estate could establish that the officers used ob-
jectively unreasonable force, the officers would be entitled to
qualified immunity. To overcome qualified immunity for an
excessive force claim, the Estate must: (i) identify a closely
analogous case establishing a right to be free from the type of
force used or (ii) show that the force “was so plainly excessive
that, as an objective matter, the police officers would have
been on notice that they were violating the Fourth Amend-
ment.” Cibulka, 992 F.3d at 639 (citation modified).
The Estate can’t do either. The cases it points to state only
that officers may not use excessive force and that minimal
force should be used when an arrestee is passively resisting.
See Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 687 (7th
Cir. 2007) (finding it clearly established that a police officer
may not use excessive force); Becker v. Elfreich, 821 F.3d 920,
928–29 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding it clearly established that “only
minimal force is warranted where the accused is passively re-
sisting”). Neither applies here. Thomson’s behavior wasn’t
passive and, in any event, the officers’ force wasn’t excessive.
The Estate does not attempt to identify a more factually anal-
ogous case, nor does it raise any factual disputes impacting
the qualified immunity analysis. Though the district court
didn’t address qualified immunity for the excessive force
claims, we also affirm on this ground. See de Lima Silva v. Dep’t
of Corr., 917 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We may affirm the
grant of summary judgment on any ground supported by the
record, as long as the parties adequately presented the issue
18 No. 25-2827
before the district court and the nonmoving party had an op-
portunity to contest it.”).
C
Finally, we consider the district court’s dismissal of the Es-
tate’s Monell failure-to-train claim against Green Bay. Because
the Estate fails to establish an underlying constitutional vio-
lation, Green Bay cannot be held liable under Monell. Sallenger
v. City of Springfield, 630 F.3d 499, 505 (7th Cir. 2010).
AFFIRMED