The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CRAIG VERLINE and SONJA )
VERLINDE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-842-R
)
STATE FARM FIRE AND )
CASUALTY COMPANY and )
BRONSON SCHUBERT AGENCY, )
INC., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [Doc. No. 12] and State Farm’s
Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery [Doc. No. 15]. Both motions are fully briefed and at
issue [Doc. Nos. 13, 14, 16, 17].
Background
This case arises from State Farm’s adjustment of Plaintiffs’ claim for storm damage
to their home. Plaintiffs allege that their home was damaged by a wind and hail storm on
September 24, 2024, they submitted a claim to State Farm under their homeowner’s
insurance policy, and State Farm wrongfully underpaid the claim by attributing the damage
to cosmetic issues, wear and tear, or deterioration. Am. Pet. ¶¶ 39-45. Plaintiffs allege the
partial denial was part of a systemic and pervasive scheme by State Farm to deny storm
claims based on an undisclosed and narrow definition of hail damage and a variety of bad
faith claims handling tactics. Id. ¶¶ 27-38. Plaintiffs assert claims against State Farm for
breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and constructive
fraud/negligent misrepresentation.
Plaintiffs purchased the State Farm policy under which they sue from the Bronson
Schubert Agency, Inc. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. They allege that, during the procurement of the policy,
they specifically requested a policy that would provide coverage for any weather-related
damage to the roof. Id. ¶¶ 9, 10, 15, 22, 77, 82. They further allege that the Agency made
affirmative, oral representations about the scope of the coverage and the condition of their
roof, including that the policy would fully replace their roof for any weather related
damage, including cosmetic damage. Id. Plaintiffs assert claims against the Agency for
negligent procurement of insurance based on its alleged failure to obtain the comprehensive
replacement cost coverage they requested and constructive fraud/negligent
misrepresentation based on its alleged misrepresentation or concealment of material facts
regarding the scope of coverage and State Farm’s alleged scheme.
State Farm removed the case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction contending that
the Agency, an admittedly non-diverse defendant, is fraudulently joined in the action.
Plaintiffs seek remand, arguing that State Farm has not met its heavy burden of showing
that the Agency is a fraudulently joined defendant. State Farm moves separately for
jurisdictional discovery, arguing that Plaintiffs have “manufactured” facts for the purpose
of defeating federal jurisdiction.
Standard
“The defendant seeking removal bears a heavy burden of proving fraudulent joinder,
and all factual and legal issues must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” Dutcher v.
Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “To establish fraudulent
joinder, the removing party must demonstrate either: (1) actual fraud in the pleading of
jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the
non-diverse party in state court.” Id. (brackets and quotation omitted). The first prong
“basically requires a showing that plaintiff lied in the pleadings.” Sanelli v. Farmers Ins.
Co., Inc., No. CIV-23-263-SLP, 2023 WL 3775177, at *2 (W.D. Okla. June 2, 2023)
(quotation omitted). Under the second prong, the removing party must show “that there is
no possibility that plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the joined
party in state court.” Montano v. Allstate Indem., 211 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished) (quotation and brackets omitted). “This standard is more exacting than that
for dismissing a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Id. Further, “remand is required if
any one of the claims against the non-diverse defendant…is possibly viable.” Id.
Although removability is typically determined on the face of the pleadings, “upon
specific allegations of fraudulent joinder the court may pierce the pleadings, consider the
entire record, and determine the basis of joinder by any means available.” Smoot v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir. 1967) (internal citation omitted).
“This does not mean that the federal court will pre-try, as a matter of course, doubtful issues
of fact to determine removability; the issue must be capable of summary determination and
be proven with complete certainty.” Id.
Discussion
State Farm contends that Plaintiffs’ allegations and the other evidence in the record
show that Plaintiffs are unable to establish a cause of action for negligent procurement of
insurance or negligent misrepresentation/constructive fraud against the Agency. Oklahoma
law defines constructive fraud as “any breach of duty which, without an actually fraudulent
intent, gains an advantage to the person in fault, … by misleading another to his prejudice,
….” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 59(1). Such a duty “may arise if a party selectively discloses
facts that create a false impression.” Specialty Beverages, L.L.C. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 537
F.3d 1165, 1181 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying Oklahoma law). Put another way,
“[c]onstructive fraud is the concealment of material facts which one is bound under the
circumstances to disclose.” Bankers Tr. Co. v. Brown, 107 P.3d 609, 613 (Okla. Civ. App.
2005). See also Sullivan v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 21-7003, 2021 WL
5822690, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 8, 2021) (explaining that negligent misrepresentation
requires a material misrepresentation, a breach of a duty in making the misrepresentation,
and reasonable reliance to the plaintiff’s detriment).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that they made specific requests regarding the scope of
coverage for their roof, the Agency made express reassurances about the coverage,1 and
1 These allegations distinguish this case from previous cases where the Court concluded that the insurance
agent was a fraudulently joined defendant. In those cases, Plaintiffs were primarily relying on inherent or
implied representations that insurance agents purportedly make every time they procure a policy and did
not allege an affirmative misstatement or partial disclosure by the agent that might be sufficient to support
a constructive fraud claim. See, e.g., Barlow v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIV-25-44-R, 2025 WL
1139489 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 17, 2025). See also Weakley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CV 25-00091-
JD, 2025 WL 2971468, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 21, 2025) (recognizing “notable differences” in cases where
“the plaintiffs alleged that the insurance agent made an affirmative misrepresentation regarding their
those statements were either false or misleading. Given these allegations and the heavy
burden of proving fraudulent joinder, the Court is unable to conclude that Plaintiff has no
possibly viable cause of action against the Agency for constructive fraud/negligent
misrepresentation.2 See Montejo v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co., No. CIV-23-738-G,
2025 WL 2755873, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2025) (concluding that plaintiff could
possibly recover against insurance agent for constructive fraud where the agent made
specific representations about home’s eligibility for a more selective coverage rider).
State Farm additionally contends that there is actual fraud in the pleading of
jurisdictional facts. State Farm points out that this is but one of many cases brought by
Plaintiffs’ counsel against State Farm, counsel utilizes a form pleading that is substantially
similar in each case, some of the allegations in the pleading are contradicted by undisputed
facts in the record,3 counsel has previously been cautioned by another court in this district
for including inaccurate allegations,4 and it is implausible to think that all State Farm agents
are making the same inaccurate statements to customers. While these arguments cast doubt
insurance coverage” as opposed to cases alleging “an inherent or implied representation attendant to the
issuance of an insurance policy”).
2 Given this determination, there is no need to address the claim for negligent procurement. See Nerad v.
AstraZeneca Pharms., Inc., 203 F. App'x 911, 913 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (explaining that a
fraudulent joinder analysis turns on “whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the plaintiff might
succeed in at least one claim against the non-diverse defendant.”).
3 For example, Plaintiffs make allegations about policy renewal even though the policy never renewed and
allege that Defendant failed to disclose that the property was ineligible for replacement cost coverage even
though they received a replacement cost policy. See Am. Pet. ¶¶ 21, 68. Counsel’s practice of recycling
allegations without regard to their applicability to a particular defendant suggests a level of carelessness but
is not sufficient to establish fraudulent joinder, particularly given the other case-specific allegations
included in the pleading.
4 See Marino v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIV-22-885-HE, 2023 WL 11915691, at *1, *3 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 7, 2023); Goebel v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIV-22-882-HE, 2023 WL 11883977, at
*1-3 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 7, 2023); Baltasar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIV-22-928-HE, 2023 WL
11883978, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 8, 2023).
on the veracity of Plaintiffs’ allegations, the Court is not persuaded that they are sufficient
to establish actual fraud in this case.
The evidentiary findings of other cases, no matter how facially similar, do
not properly establish what occurred and what did not between the parties in
this matter. Neither the use of form pleadings nor the similarity of pleadings
in separate matters, without an additional showing such as in Marino,
Goebel, or Baltasar, is sufficient to show that Plaintiffs lied in their
jurisdictional pleadings. Although not dispositive in and of itself, the effect
of overlap in pleadings is muted when the pleadings describe a ‘company-
wide scheme and pervasive practice,’ which makes it plausible that similar
events repeatedly transpired.
Montejo v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co., No. CIV-23-738-G, 2025 WL 2755873, at
*6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2025). Although State Farm disputes the Agency made the
statements or representations alleged by Plaintiffs, that dispute goes “beyond matters
suitable for ‘summary determination’ and into the realm of improperly pre-trying ‘doubtful
issues of fact’ and considering the credibility of the parties.” Id. (quoting Smoot, 378 F.2d
at 882).
Last, State Farm seeks to conduct jurisdictional discovery to establish that the
alleged representations did not actually occur, an insurance agent has no duty to inspect,
and the claim was denied due to an absence of accidental direct physical loss. The Court is
unpersuaded that jurisdictional discovery is warranted in these circumstances. State Farm’s
proposed discovery goes towards merits-based and credibility issues that are not
appropriate at this stage in the proceeding. See Champion v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
No. CIV-22-00922-PRW, 2023 WL 11944492, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 29, 2023).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [Doc. No. 12] is GRANTED and State
Farm’s Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery [Doc. No. 15] is DENIED. This action is
remanded to the District Court of Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 8" day of July, 2026.
DAVID L. RUSSELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE