Wertzberger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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UNION MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against- 23-CV-07792 (OEM) (PK)

JOEL WERTZBERGER, 1022 EAST 226TH JOYLAND,

LLC, and JOYLAND MANAGEMENT LLC,

Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs.

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ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge:

Before the Court in this declaratory judgment action is Defendants and counter-claim

plaintiffs Joel Wertzberger’s, 1022 East 226th Joyland, LLC’s, and Joyland Management LLC’s

(collectively, “Defendants”) motion for approval of attorneys’ fees.1

On October 18, 2023, Plaintiff and counterclaim-defendant Union Mutual Fire Insurance

Company (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against Defendants seeking a declaratory judgment that

Defendants’ insurance policies with Plaintiff were void ab initio and that Plaintiff did not owe

Defendants a duty to defend or indemnify for the underlying state-court litigation based on

Defendants’ alleged material misrepresentations in their insurance policy applications. See

generally Complaint, Dkt. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”). Defendants asserted twelve affirmative

defenses and two counterclaims seeking declaratory judgment that Plaintiff owed Defendants a

duty to defend and indemnify for the state-court litigation and requesting that Plaintiff pay

Defendants’ legal fees incurred in the instant litigation. See generally Answer and Counterclaim,

1 Notice of Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, Dkt. 47 (“Motion” or “Mot”); Memorandum of Law in Support

of Joel Wertzberger, 1022 East 226th Joyland, LLC and Joyland Management, LLC’s Motion for Approval of

Attorneys’ Fees, Dkt. 47-1 (“Memorandum” or “Mem.”); Memorandum of Law In Opposit[o]in to Defendants[’]

Motion For Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, Dkt. 49 (“Opposition” or “Opp’n”); Reply Memorandum of Law in Further

Support of Joel Wertzberger, 1022 East 226th Joyland, LLC and Joyland Management, LLC’s Motion for Approval

of Attorneys’ Fees, Dkt. 50 (“Reply”).

Dkt. 11. The parties engaged in discovery, including third-party discovery, through September

2024. See Letter from Plaintiff to the Court (Sep. 10, 2024), Dkt. 24. On March 7, 2025, the

parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment,

Dkt. 36; Notice of Motion, Dkt. 40.

On January 5, 2026, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment seeking

dismissal of Plaintiff’s recission claims on the basis of misrepresentation, denied the parties’ claims

seeking indemnification without prejudice, and granted Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees

expended in the defense of the present litigation. See Memorandum and Order at 26, Dkt. 45

(“Order”). On January 8, 2026, the Court entered judgment consistent with the Court’s Order,

Judgment, Dkt. 46, and that same day, Defendants filed their motion for attorney’s fees, see Mot.

On January 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed its opposition to Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees, see

Opp’n, and on February 5, 2026, Defendants filed their reply in support of their motion for

attorney’s fees, see Reply. The Court otherwise assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts of

this case.

For the following reasons Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in part.

DISCUSSION

Defendants seek $139,047.42 in attorneys’ fees for work performed by attorneys David

BenHaim (“BenHaim”) and Yisroel Steinberg (“Steinberg”) and legal professional Beti Cohen

(“Cohen”), arguing that the hours expended and rates charged were reasonable. Mem. at 1.

Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that both the hours expended and rates charged were

unreasonable. See Opp’n at 1.

“The burden is on the party moving for attorney’s fees to justify the hourly rate sought.”

Ehrlich v. Royal Oak Fin. Servs., Inc., CV-12-3551 (BMC), 2012 WL 5438942, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

Nov. 7, 2012); see also Gunawan v. Sake Sushi Rest., 897 F. Supp. 2d 76, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)

(“District courts have broad discretion, using ‘their experience with the case, as well as their

experience with the practice of law, to assess the reasonableness’ of each component of a fee

award.” (quoting Fox Indus., Inc. v. Gurovich, CV 03-5166 TCP WDW, 2005 WL 2305002, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2005))). The Second Circuit has instructed district courts considering awards

of attorneys’ fees that:

[T]he better course—and the one most consistent with attorney’s fees

jurisprudence—is for the district court, in exercising its considerable discretion, to

bear in mind all of the case-specific variables that we and other courts have

identified as relevant to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees in setting a reasonable

hourly rate. The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing

to pay. In determining what rate a paying client would be willing to pay, the district

court should consider, among others, the Johnson factors; it should also bear in

mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to

litigate the case effectively. The district court should also consider that such an

individual might be able to negotiate with his or her attorneys, using their desire to

obtain the reputational benefits that might accrue from being associated with the

case. The district court should then use that reasonable hourly rate to calculate what

can properly be termed the “presumptively reasonable fee.”

Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d

Cir. 2008) (internal citations and emphasis omitted).2 “The product of a reasonable hourly rate

and the reasonable number of hours” is the “lodestar” figure which “creates a ‘presumptively

reasonable fee.’” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Arbor

Hill, 522 F.3d at 183).

2 The Johnson factors include “(1) [t]he time and labor required”; “(2) [t]he novelty and difficulty of the questions”;

“(3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly”; “(4) [t]he preclusion of employment by the

attorney due to acceptance of the case”; “(5) [t]he attorney’s customary hourly rate”; “(6) [w]hether the fee is fixed or

contingent”; “(7) [t]he time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances”; “(8) [t]he amount involved in the

case and the results obtained”; “(9) [t]he experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys”; “(10) [t]he

‘undesirability’ of the case”; “(11) [t]he nature and length of the professional relationship with the client”; and

“(12) [a]wards in similar cases.” Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).

A. Reasonable Number of Hours

Defendants seek reimbursement for 313 hours of work. See Declaration of David BenHaim

in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees (“BenHaim Decl.”), Exhibit A

at 11, Dkt. 47-3 (“Billing Records”)3; Reply at 8. Defendants assert that the hours of legal services

that they expended in connection with defending themselves in the instant action are reasonable.

Mem. at 2-3. Plaintiff argues that defense counsel’s hours are excessive, block-billed, vague, and

redundant, and thereby contends that the Court should reduce the hours by 48% because Plaintiff’s

counsel only spent 161.1 hours on the prosecution of this action. Opp’n at 4-8.

To determine the reasonableness of the number of hours billed by Defendants’ counsel, the

Court must “‘examine[] the particular hours expended . . . with a view to the value of the work

product and the specific expenditures of the client’s case[,] and if it ‘concludes that any expenditure

of time was unreasonable, it should exclude these hours’ from the fee calculation.” Hines v. City

of Albany, 613 F. App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 116

(2d Cir. 1997)). In determining the reasonable number of hours of work for a fee award, “courts

are . . . expected to take into account their own familiarity and experience both ‘generally’ and

with the particular case at hand . . . .” Melo v. Milagro Grocery Corp., 750 F. Supp. 3d 38, 62

(E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Concrete Flotation Sys., Inc. v. Tadco Constr. Corp., 07-CV-319 (ARR)

(VVP), 2010 WL 2539771, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010)). “[T]he district court should exclude

excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours.” Quarantino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422,

425 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). “[D]istrict courts have

the legal authority and discretion to . . . apply an across-the-board reduction to the hours billed or

total fee award to account for time spent on clerical tasks (or block-billed time entries reflecting a

3 When referencing the Billing Records, the Court refers to the page numbers contained in the automatically generated

ECF headers.

mix of clerical and legal work).” Lilly v. City of New York, 934 F.3d 222, 234 (2d Cir. 2019);

Marion S. Mishkin L. Off. v. Lopalo, 767 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining “the district

court is not obligated to undertake a line-by-line review” of a fee application and “may, instead,

‘exercise its discretion and use a percentage deduction as a practical means of trimming fat.’”

(quoting McDonald ex rel. Prendergast v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Tr. Fund, 450

F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2006))).

1. Vague Entries

“Applications for fee awards should generally be documented by contemporaneously

created time records that specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature

of the work done.” Dotson v. City of Syracuse, 5:04–CV–1388 (NAM/ATB), 2012 WL 4491095,

at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2012) (quoting Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir.

1998)). “Where descriptions of work done are vague and ambiguous, the Court cannot assess the

reasonableness of the entries.” Id. (quoting Baim v. Notto, 316 F. Supp. 2d 113, 122 (N.D.N.Y.

2003)); accord F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 810 F.2d 1250, 1265 (2d Cir. 1987);

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12 (“[C]ounsel, of course, is not required to record in great detail how

each minute of his time was expended. But at least counsel should identify the general subject

matter of his time expenditures.”).

Here, most of the Billing Records entries adequately detail the tasks performed and the

time spent on each task. However, some of the entries lack specificity and detail and cannot be

clarified by the context of other entries. Such entries include: “work on file,” “legal research,” and

“new federal case.” Billing Records at 1-3, 8. Several other entries state, “confer with DBH,”

“confer with YS,” “call with J Minster,” and “[w]ork with BC” without any description of the

nature of the call, conference, or meeting. Id. at 2-9. These entries do not permit the Court to

determine what “the attorneys were researching, much less whether the expended time was

reasonable for the work performed.” Mawere v. Citco Fund Servs, (USA) Inc., 09 Civ.

1342(BSJ)(DF), 2011 WL 6779319, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 16, 2011) (collecting cases), report and

recommendation adopted, 09 Civ. 1342 BSJ DF, 2011 WL 6780909 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2011);

see also LV v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 700 F. Supp. 2d 510, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (collecting cases

and finding that entries “‘meeting w/co-counsel,’ ‘conference w/ c-counsel,’” were unreasonably

vague). Accordingly, the Court concludes that a reduction in hours for vagueness is warranted.

2. Excessive and Redundant Entries

An applicant “should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; accord Seitzman v.

Sun Life Assur. of Canada, Inc., 311 F.3d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 2002).

Several of defense counsel’s Billing Record entries are redundant. For instance, BenHaim

and Steinberg both billed for the deposition of Jim Lambert, and A. Portnoy, and BenHaim billed

to “prepare and take” the deposition and Steinberg billed to “join” him. See Billing Records at 5-

6. Similarly, both Steinberg and BenHaim billed to prepare for and appear for a court appearance,

which Steinberg notes that he “joined” BenHaim for. See id. at 3. Given that Steinberg only joined

BenHaim for the depositions and the proceeding, such matters are duplicative and unnecessary.

See Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cnty., Inc. v. Borough of Litchfield, Conn., 3:09-CV-1419

(JCH), 2018 WL 2332075, at *10 (D. Conn. May 23, 2018) (reducing hours by 10% for duplicative

work by two partners who both billed for significant time preparing for and attending the same

depositions); LV, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (reducing hours across the board by 5% for overstaffing

and duplicative work where three or more attorneys often attended depositions, team meetings,

and conferences).

In addition to redundant billing, Plaintiff argues that defense counsel engaged in excessive

billing based on the fact that Plaintiff’s counsel billed less time for the same task. First, Plaintiff

points to three tasks where Plaintiff’s counsel billed less hours than BenHaim for the same event.

• On February 8, 2024, BenHaim billed 5.5 hours for appearing in court for the

initial conference, Steinberg billed 1.6 hours, Billing Records at 3, and

Plaintiff’s counsel billed 2 hours for the same appearance, Attorney Declaration

in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees (“Pl.’s

Decl.”), Exhibit 1 at 3, Dkt. 49-2.

• On June 25, 2024, BenHaim billed 3.15 hours for conducting Jim Lambert’s

deposition, Steinberg billed 3 hours, Billing Records at 5, and Plaintiff’s

counsel billed 2.4 hours for the same deposition, Pl.’s Decl., Exhibit 1 at 6, Dkt.

49-2. The deposition transcript reflects a start time of 11:05 a.m. and an end

time of 1:15 p.m. Pl.’s Decl., Exhibit 3, Dkt. 49-4.

• On June 27, 2024, Benhaim billed 2.2 hours for conducting the deposition of

Andrew Portnoy, Steinberg billed 1.5 hours, and Plaintiff’s counsel billed 1.6

hours for the same deposition, Pl.’s Decl., Exhibit 1 at 7, Dkt. 49-2. The

deposition transcript reflects a start time of 11:05 a.m. and an end time of 12:40

p.m. Pl.’s Decl., Exhibit 4, Dkt. 49-5.

The discrepancy with the contemporaneous deposition times and defense counsel’s billed hours

indicates the possibility that defense counsel was block-billing for activities other than

participating in the deposition or initial conference, which presents a compounded problem of a

failure to attribute a task to those additional hours. Thus, from the Billing Records alone, the Court

is unable to determine how much time defense counsel spent participating in the depositions and

initial conference versus conducting related tasks that should have been billed separately. See

Mawere, 2011 WL 6779319, at *8 (“[T]he Court has reduced or even disallowed requested

attorneys’ fees where the supporting time records were not broken out with sufficient detail to

enable it to determine the reasonableness of the time spent on particular tasks.” (citing Green v.

City of New York, 403 F. App’x 626, 630 (2d Cir. 2010))). These entries are excessive and warrant

a reduction.

Next, Plaintiff argues that two entries warrant reduction because they are unnecessarily

excessive given BenHaim’s experience. See Opp’n at 4-5. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that

BenHaim billing 1.7 hours to draft a motion to extend the time to answer, see Billing Records at

2, is excessive because it is a “pro forma” document and Steinberg billing 0.7 hours to research

whether this case can be tried by a jury, see id., is excessive because it is a question that BenHaim

undoubtedly knew the answer to, given his experience, Opp’n at 4-5. Even if excessive for the

individual entries, defense counsel has not made excessive entries for ostensibly pro forma work

that are pervasive throughout the Billing Records. Thus, these two entries do not rise to the level

of unreasonableness. See Sanchez Juarez v. 156-40 Grill LLC, 15-cv-5081 (CBA)(LGD), 2025

WL 3709064, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2025) (collecting cases and reasoning that “[o]n balance,

these undesirable billing slip-ups are not pervasive enough, in relation to the whole of the billing

record, to warrant a blanket reduction in hours.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2:15-cv-

05081 (CBA) (LGD), 2025 WL 3707830 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2025). Accordingly, they do not

warrant a reduction in hours.

Lastly, Plaintiff urges the Court to reduce defense counsel’s hours because Plaintiff’s

counsel billed less hours for the same activities, thereby implying that defense counsel’s hours are

excessive. See Opp’n at 1, 7. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that its counsel only billed 161.6 total

hours to defense counsel’s 313 total hours and, within that total, Plaintiff’s counsel only billed 50

hours to brief its summary judgment motions to defense counsel’s 80 hours. Id. Defendants

respond that Plaintiff has had significantly more experience in similarly-postured actions and was

therefore able to rely on prior work product, which resulted in less hours billed. Reply at 2-3. As

an initial matter, in determining whether bills are excessive, they are not reasoned against opposing

counsel’s time spent preparing the opposing motions, rather the Court must “use its experience

with the case, as well as its experience with the practice of law.” Fox Indus., Inc. v. Gurovich, 03-

CV-5166 (TCP)(WDW), 2005 WL 2305002, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2005). The records reflect

that defense counsel spent approximately 80 hours on briefing the motion for summary judgment.

See Billing Records at 9-10. The Defendants drafted approximately 60 pages in support of and

opposition to the cross-motions for summary judgment. See Reply at 8. This is reasonable and

not excessive given that the parties cross-moved for summary judgment and counsel had to draft

a motion, opposition, and reply. Further, there were at least 1,500 pages of discovery to

incorporate. See id.; contra Fleetwood Servs, LLC v. Ram Cap. Funding, LLC, 20-cv-5120 (LJL),

2023 WL 112429, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2023) (concluding that 126 hours preparing the motion

for summary judgment and 70 hours for the reply brief was excessive despite the complex nature

of the issues).

Given the foregoing, the Court applies an across-the-board reduction of 10% in defense

counsel’s hours. See Jaramillo v. Latino Regal Corp., 19 CV 3104 (HG) (CLP), 2024 WL

4648135, at *23 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 4, 2024) (collecting cases and reducing hours by 10% for

duplicative, redundant, and vague billing entries).4

B. Reasonable Hourly Rate

Defendants seek $600 per hour for the time of BenHaim and $350 per hour for the time of

Steinberg. Mem. at 4. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ Motion should be denied because defense

counsel seeks excessive rates and urges the Court to reduce BenHaim’s rates to $450 per hour and

Steinberg’s rates to $150 per hour.5 Opp’n at 9-10. Defendants respond that this reduction is

4 The Court notes an entry on June 3, 2024, for 0.3 hours billed by Ira Lipsius without any description of the work

completed. See Billing Records at 5. Given the vague nature of the bill and no information as to who Ira Lipsius is

or what work was performed, the Court further reduces the hours by 0.3.

5 Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ Motion should be denied for failure to attach the retainer agreement and proof

of payment. Opp’n at 9. Defendants respond by attaching both a retainer agreement and proof of payment in their

unsupported by the record, defense counsel’s experience, and what is reasonable in this District.

Reply at 3-5.

The reasonable hourly rate should be what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to

pay to litigate the case effectively. See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190. The Second Circuit has stated

that fee awards must account for the current market rate in the district. Reiter v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit

Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 232-33 (2d Cir. 2006). In determining what that figure is, the Second Circuit

follows the “forum rule” to calculate a reasonable hourly fee. See Bergerson v. N.Y. State Off. of

Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 652 F.3d 277, 289-90 (2d Cir. 2011). The forum rule

advises courts to “use ‘the hourly rates employed in the district in which the reviewing court sits’

in calculating the presumptively reasonable fee.” Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 192 (quoting In re “Agent

Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Bergerson, 652 F.3d at

290. Furthermore, courts consider the factors set forth in Johnson. See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at

190.

Defendants’ payment of the attorneys’ fees supports a finding that defense counsel’s rates

are reasonable. The Court may consider “as ‘solid evidence’ of reasonableness” the fact that the

client paid the rates at which the firm billed. See Match Grp., LLC v. Beazley Underwriting Ltd.,

Reply. See Reply at 6. To determine a reasonable fee, the Second Circuit has relied on the factors set forth by the

Fifth Circuit in Johnson. See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190. In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit instructed that “[i]n no

event . . . should the litigant be awarded a fee greater than he is contractual bound to pay, if indeed the attorneys have

contracted to an amount.” 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974). However, failure to attach a retainer agreement is not a

basis alone to deny a motion for attorney’s fees provided there is sufficient documentation to substantiate the requested

attorneys’ fees. See Zhang v. Zhang, 16 Civ. 4013 (LGS), 2021 WL 1154084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021) (citing

Marion S. Mishkin, 767 F.3d at 148) (overruling objection to report and recommendation that argued that the prevailing

party failed to provide a retainer agreement).

Here, Defendants submitted contemporaneous billing records with their Motion. See Billing Records. In their Reply,

they attached the retainer agreement between defense counsel and Wertzberger, agreeing to a fee schedule that bills,

inter alia, partners for $600 per hour and associates for $350-475 per hour. See Declaration of David BenHaim in

Further Support of Defendants’ Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees (“BenHaim Decl. in Further Support”),

Exhibit B at 2, Dkt. 50-3. Furthermore, Defendants attach a copy of the check received from Wertzberger and a deposit

slip indicating his payment of $100,000 towards the retainer. Id., Exhibit C, Dkt. 52 (“Proof of Payment”). Thus,

Defendants have provided sufficient documentation to substantiate their attorneys’ fees request.

22 Civ. 4629 (LGS) (SLC), 2023 WL 9603886, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2023) (quoting Bleecker

Charles Co. v. 350 Bleecker St. Apt. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)), report

and recommendation adopted, 22 Civ. 4629 (LGS), 2024 WL 863468 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2024);

see also Kimba Indus. Inc. v. Fortegra Specialty Ins., 24-cv-01334 (JMW), 2026 WL 618037, at

*5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2026). Here, Wertzberger has paid $100,000 of the $139,047.47, see

Declaration of David BenHaim in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion for Approval of

Attorneys’ Fees (“BenHaim Decl. in Further Support”), Exhibit C, Dkt. 52, which favors a finding

of reasonableness at the requested rates.

Defendants’ degree of success also weighs in favor of granting the Motion. “’[T]he degree

of success obtained’ during litigation is the ‘most critical factor’ in computing an appropriate

lodestar award.” Toyota Lease Trust v. Village of Freeport, 24-488-cv, 2025 WL 1135441, at *3

(2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2025) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436). To compute the degree of success, “a

court should look to ‘the quantity and quality of relief obtained, as compared to what the plaintiff

sought to achieve as evidenced in the complaint,’ as ‘key factors.’” Id. (quoting Barfield v. N.Y.C.

Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 152 (2d Cir. 2008)). Here, Defendants were successful in

dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against them, prevailed on their counterclaims, and were awarded

attorney’s fees. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of granting their requested fees.

Next, the Court considers the forum rule in confirming the reasonableness of Defendants’

requested fees. In the Eastern District of New York, the forum rates “adjusted for inflation and

market conditions” are, in relevant part, “$450-$650 for partners,” “$150-$300 for junior

associates,” and “$100-$150 for paralegals.” Rubin v. HSBC Bank USA, NA, 763 F. Supp. 3d 233,

244 (E.D.N.Y. 2025).

With regards to the hourly rate for BenHaim, a $600 hourly rate is reasonable. BenHaim

is a founding partner at the law firm of Lipsius-BenHaim Law, LLP and has approximately 25

years of experience in insurance litigation in state and federal court. See BenHaim Decl. ¶¶ 3-5,

Dkt. 47-2. He “routinely bill[s]” his time at $600 per hour. Id. ¶ 8. $600 per hour is within the

range of partner rates in this District. See Rubin, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 244. It is also lower than or

the same as what other courts in this District have awarded partners for cases with similar factual

and procedural backgrounds. See Kimba Indus., 2026 WL 618037, at *6 (awarding partners $650

per hour based on their experience in the industry in an action where the insured sought a

determination that the insurer owed it a duty to defend); Value Wholesale Inc. v. KB Ins., 18-cv-

5887(KAM)(SMG), 2020 WL 6393016, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2020) (awarding partners $600

per hour based on the complexity of the dispute and length of the dispute in an action where the

insured sought a determination that the insurer breached its duty to defend). BenHaim has years

of experience in insurance litigation, the instant case involved three years of litigation and a motion

for summary judgment, and the requested rate is within the reasonable range for partners.

Accordingly, the Court fixes BenHaim’s hourly rate at $600 per hour.

Regarding the hourly rate for Steinberg, a $350 hourly rate is unreasonable. Steinberg has

worked at Lipsius BenHaim Law, LLP since 2022 and was admitted to practice in September 2023.

BenHaim Decl. ¶ 9. He “routinely bills his time at $350 per hour.” Id. First, $350 is above the

highest rate of $300 considered reasonable for junior associates in this district. See Rubin, 763 F.

Supp. 3d at 244. This is a fact that even defense counsel acknowledges. See Reply at 7 (“[T]here

is ample authority in the Second Circuit awarding approximately $300 for attorneys that graduated

law school in 2022 and were admitted in 2023.”).6 “[A]warding fees outside the range is reserved

6 While Defendants urge that other courts have held that rates between $275 and $325 are reasonable for junior

associates, Reply at 7, they only cite to cases from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, not

for rare occasions” that “require ‘specific evidence that the lodestar fee would not have been

“adequate to attract competent counsel.”’” Rubin, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 240 (quoting Perdue v. Kenny

A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 554, 553054 (2010)). Defendants have not provided such evidence here.

Steinberg has been practicing law for less than 3 years. BenHaim Decl. ¶ 9. Considering his

limited experience and the hourly rates in this District, the Court reduces his hourly rate as a junior

associate to $275. See Rubin, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 245 (reducing junior associate’s hourly rate to

$275 where the associate was admitted to practice in January 2023).

Plaintiff urges the Court to reduce defense counsel’s hours to the lower end of the rate

ranges in Rubin given the limited complexity of the case and the fact that Defendants undoubtedly

used the matter of 74 Orchard St. Holding Inc. v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 52416/2021, 2023

N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 36373 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 2023), as a roadmap for their case strategy and

motion for summary judgment such that “counsel’s defense of this action was by and large scripted

for them.” Opp’n at 9-10. However, in their motion for summary judgment briefing, Defendants

raised arguments beyond the purview of 74 Orchard, such as collateral estoppel, waiver, equitable

estoppel, and immateriality of misrepresentations. See generally Memorandum of Law In Support

Of Joel Wertzberger, 1022 East 226th Joyland, LLC and Joyland Management, LLC’s Motion For

Summary Judgment, Dkt. 36-1. The fact that there is one state-court case that touches upon some,

but not all, of the legal arguments raised by Defendants in their motion for summary judgment

does not warrant a reduction in rates.

Finally, Defendants include bills for 14.6 hours of legal professional work by Cohen billed

at a rate of $125 per hour for legal professional tasks and at a rate of $0.10 per hour for printing

tasks. See generally Billing Records. Plaintiff does not make any argument for or against these

the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which is the applicable standard under the forum rule,

see Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 192.

rates. See generally Opp’n. One hundred twenty five dollars per hour is within the range of forum

rates for paralegals in the Eastern District. See Rubin, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 244. Accordingly, the

Court fixes Cohen’s rate at $125 per hour for legal professional tasks and $0.10 for printing tasks.

Accordingly, the Court fixes BenHaim’s rate at $600 per hour, Steinberg’s rate at $275 per

hour, and Beti Cohen’s rate at $125 per hour.

C. Total Reasonable Fees

Based on the reasonable rates determined and the 10% reduction in hours applied above,

Defendants’ reasonable attorneys’ fees are calculated as follows:

Individual Requested Reasonable Recorded Reduction Reasonable Adjusted

Rate Rate Hours7 Hours Fees

David $600 $600 127.7 10% 114.93 $68,958

BenHaim

Yisroel $350 $275 165.375 10% 148.8375 $40,930.31

Steinberg

Beti Cohen $125 $125 14.6 10% 13.4 $1,575.058

Total 307.675 277.1675 $111,463.36

D. Costs

Defendants do not move for costs. See generally Mot. However, the Billing Records

include bills for deposition transcripts, delivery of courtesy copies, binder preparation, and printing

for a total of $2,120.77. “An award of cost ‘normally include[s] those reasonable out-of-pocket

expenses incurred by the attorney and which are normally charged fee-paying clients.’” Fisher v.

SD Protection Inc., 948 F.3d 593, 600 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati

& Mazzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1987)). However, “[t]he fee applicant must submit

adequate documentation supporting the requested attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. Defendants have

7 All recorded hours are taken from the Billing Records.

8 Based on the Billing Records, Cohen billed $0.10 per hour for printing and $125 for other all other tasks. This total

incorporates the printing entries billed at $0.10 and the remaining hourly-rate entries billed at $125.

not provided any documentation as to these costs. Accordingly, the Court declines to award them

$2,120.77 in costs. See Wentworth Grp. v. Evanston Ins., 20-CV-6711 (GBD) (JLC), 2022 WL

336456, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2022) (declining to award costs for expenses for which the

plaintiffs did not submit any supporting documentation).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in part, and

Defendants are awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $111,463.36.

SO ORDERED.

/s/

ORELIA E. MERCHANT

United States District Judge

July 8, 2026

Brooklyn, New York