Melvin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KEYWUAN MELVIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-00197-SPM

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER TOLIVER,

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER NARSH,

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER GERMAK,

and

SERGEANT HINKLE,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Keywuan Melvin, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

who is currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this civil

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. The

Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or requests money

damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se

complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577

F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT1

Plaintiff alleges the following: On June 27, 2025, he was on crisis watch when

Correction Officers Narsh and Germak escorted him to the shower. (Doc. 1, p.

6). After showering, Correctional Officer Toliver came to escort Plaintiff back to his

cell. (Id.). Plaintiff requested a new smock because his was dirty. (Id.). Toliver then

left Plaintiff to retrieve a clean smock as requested. After Toliver left, Plaintiff found

a plastic garbage bag on the floor of the shower, picked it up, and folded it over once.

(Id. at p. 6-7). Correction Officer Toliver returned with the clean smock, cuffed

Plaintiff from behind, put shackles on him, and walked him back to his cell. (Id. at p.

7). Toliver did not comment on or attempt to take the plastic bag from Plaintiff, either

because he did not care or did not see the plastic bag. (Id.).

Shortly after Plaintiff returned to his cell, he put the plastic bag over his head

and tied it with a shoelace in an attempt on his life. (Doc. 1, p. 7). An inmate worker

cleaning the cell saw Plaintiff on the floor and yelled for help. (Id.). Sergeant Hinkle

arrived at the cell and pepper-sprayed Plaintiff upon discovery of him with the plastic

bag over his head, exacerbating Plaintiff’s difficulty breathing. (Id.). Hinkle yelled for

Plaintiff to “cuff to fuck up.” (Id.). Despite repeatedly falling, Plaintiff was eventually

able to stand up and submit to being handcuffed. (Id.). Plaintiff received medical care

directly after the incident, but did not receive follow-up physical or mental

healthcare, despite Plaintiff asking for such and telling officers and nurses his face

1 Because it appears that Plaintiff is relying on statements made in the Complaint and attached

exhibits in asserting his claims, the Court is construing the allegations in all of these pleadings

together. See Otis v. Demarass, 886 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2018).

hurt and that it was hard to breathe. (Id.). Plaintiff threatened to attempt suicide

again since staff “do not do their jobs” and do not conduct their scheduled “walks”

through crisis watch. (Id.). Due to seeing how easy it would be to commit suicide, and

because of the lack of mental healthcare, the incident on June 27, 2025, made Plaintiff

want to kill himself even more than previously. (Id.).

PRELIMINARY DISMISSAL

The Court dismisses any claims Plaintiff is attempting to bring for the denial

of medical care following his attempt to self-harm and the use of excessive force by

Hinkle. These claims are only associated with a nurse and unidentified staff

members, who are not listed as defendants. The Court will not treat parties not listed

in the caption as defendants, and any claims against them are dismissed without

prejudice. See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005).

DISCUSSION

Based on the allegations and Plaintiff’s articulation of his claims in the

Complaint, the Court designates the following counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Germak, Narsh, and

Toliver for deliberate indifference to and failure to protect

Plaintiff from his risk of self-harm and suicide on June 27,

2025.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Hinkle for the use of

excessive force by pepper spraying Plaintiff on June 27,

2025.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings

and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other

claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order

should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled

under the Twombly2 pleading standard.

Count 1

Plaintiff fails to sufficiently state an Eighth Amendment claim against

Germak, Narsh, and Toliver for deliberate indifference.

Deliberate indifference occurs when a prison official knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994). To constitute a Section 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment, the harm

that befell the prisoner must be objectively, sufficiently serious, and a substantial

risk to his or her health or safety. Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir.

2006). Suicide, attempted suicide, and other acts of self-harm pose a “serious” risk to

an inmate’s health and safety and may provide the foundation for deliberate

indifference to medical needs and failure to protect claims. See Collins, 462 F.3d at

761 (quoting Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2001)). Therefore,

Plaintiff satisfies the objective aspect of deliberate indifference.

Where the harm at issue is a suicide or attempted suicide, deliberate

indifference requires “a dual showing that the defendant: (1) subjectively knew the

prisoner was at substantial risk of committing suicide and (2) intentionally

disregarded that risk.” Collins, 462 F.3d at 761 (citations omitted). In order to be

liable for an inmate’s self-harm, “a prison official must be cognizant of the significant

likelihood that an inmate may imminently seek to take his own life and must fail to

2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (7th Cir. 2007).

take reasonable steps to prevent the inmate from performing this act." Sanville v.

McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 737 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226

F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000)).

Mere negligence on the part of a prison official does not equate to a

constitutional violation of deliberate indifference. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S.

344, 347 (1986); Wilson v. Ryker, 451 F. App’x 588, 589 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Tackett

v. Dauss, 132 F.4th 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 2025)). Rather, deliberate indifference

describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 835 (1994). The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw

the inference. Id. at 837. Inattentiveness to prisoner safety violates the Eighth

Amendment only if prison officials have actual knowledge of impending harm.

Stanciel v. Roszak, No. 88 C 5059, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11029, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sep.

15, 1989) (citing Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 1985)). Therefore,

a “plaintiff must show that the defendant was essentially criminally reckless, that is,

ignored a known risk.” Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2016).

Here, Plaintiff merely alleges that Germak, Narsh, and Toliver failed to notice

the plastic bag that was left in the shower. He fails to allege anything to indicate that

Germak, Narsh, or Toliver were even aware of the presence of the plastic bag, let

alone that Plaintiff had taken it into his possession. Plaintiff does not allege any

conversation or interaction that would allude to the correction officers’ actual

knowledge of an imminent risk of self-harm. Thus, the alleged conduct amounts to

negligence because nothing in the complaint suggests that Defendants had actual

knowledge of, and intentionally disregarded, a sustainable risk of suicide.

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim of deliberate indifference against

Germak, Narsh, and Toliver.

Count 2

Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim of excessive force against Hinkle.

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in

violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is.

. . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,

or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7

(1992). Plaintiff claims that Hinkle deployed pepper spray while he was experiencing

difficulty breathing and was subdued. (Doc. 1, p. 7). This could reasonably show that

Hinkle did not apply force in a good-faith effort, as Plaintiff was already subdued and

in distress when said force was applied.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Because the Complaint includes a request for injunctive relief, the current

warden of Lawrence Correctional Center, Jeremiah Brown, in his official capacity,

will be added to the docket regarding the request for injunctive relief. See Gonzalez

v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011).

DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint survives preliminary review

pursuant to Section 1915A. COUNT 1 is DISMISSED without prejudice as to

Toliver, Germak, and Narsh. COUNT 2 will proceed against Hinkle. The Clerk of

Court is DIRECTED to ADD the Warden of Lawrence Correctional Center,

Jeremiah Brown, in his official capacity, to the docket for purposes of Plaintiff’s

request for injunctive relief. Because there are no surviving claims against Toliver,

Germak, and Narsh, the Clerk shall terminate them as parties on the docket.

The Clerk of the Court shall prepare for Hinkle and Brown (official capacity

only) the following: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of

a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is directed

to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to

each Defendant’s place of employment. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the

Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the

forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on

that Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of

formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff,

the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or,

if not known, his or her last known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any

documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address

information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint in a timely manner and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(g). Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants only need to respond to

the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.

Because this suit includes allegations of mental and physical harm, the Clerk

of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep

the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address;

the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in

writing and not later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs.

Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court

documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 8, 2026

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit

and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants

will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will likely take at least 60

days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible

that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court

will enter a Scheduling Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and

procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before

filing any motions, to give the defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those

motions. Motions filed before defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be

denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless

otherwise directed by the Court.