The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
RICK BARRY, SR., et al., * .
Plaintiffs, *
* CIVIL NO. JKB-25-2393
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC *
SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL
_ SERVICES, et al., *
_ Defendants. *
* & * * * # * * * * * *
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
In October 2022, Javarick Gantt was strangled to death by his cellmate, Gordon Staron,
while in the custody of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services’s
(“DPSCS”) Central Booking facility in Baltimore. Plaintiffs—Mr. Gantt’s surviving family
members—brought suit against DPSCS and a number of individuals in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City in June 2025, and Defendants removed to this Court in July 2025. (ECF No. 1.)
Now pending are motions to dismiss filed by all Defendants. (ECF Nos. 16, 22.) The motions
have been fully briefed (see ECF Nos. 25, 31, 32) and no hearing is required. See Local Rule
105.6 (D. Ma. 2025).
The motions will be granted in part and denied in part, All claims against the unnamed □
Custody Doe Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice, and Count X, for Indemnification,
will be dismissed. All other claims will survive as described below.
II. Background
A. Factual Allegations!
In July 2022, Mr. Gantt was a pretrial detainee committed without bail to Central Booking
in Baltimore for failing to appear in court and failing to report to his probation agent, in relation to
underlying charges of second-degree assault and third-degree burglary. Cd. Jf 36-39.)
. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Gantt’s intake screening at Central Booking was improper. □□□□
40-55.) Mr. Gantt was deaf and relied on sign language to communicate. (Jd. 933.) Mr. Gantt
filled out a form called an Inmate Auxiliary Aids or Services Designations Form and explained
_ he was hearing impaired and needed an interpreter. (/d. 41.) His disability was documented
within the Offender Case Management System. (/d. 45.) However, the Designations Form Mr.
Gantt was provided did not list any auxiliary aids or services that were available to him. (/d. 43.)
Instead, in the space where such services were supposed to be listed, the Form included only the
request: “Assistant Warden / Facility ADA Coordinator, please list aids and services at the
facility.” (d.) Mr. Gantt was not in fact provided with any auxiliary aids or a qualified interpreter.
(Id. J 42, 44.) While deaf pretrial detainees could be housed in special housing units at Maryland □
Correctional Institution Jessup (another DPSCS facility), Mr. Gantt was not offered such housing, .
and Central Booking did not provide any special housing for inmates with disabilities—despite a
DPSCS directive that inmates with special needs be housed separately from the general population.
Ud. J] 52-53.) Further, during the course of his detention, Mr. Gantt demonstrated a vulnerability
to violence resulting from his disability—Plaintiffs allege that the Supervisor Defendants and
Correctional Officer (“CO”) Defendants” were aware that Mr, Gantt could not call out for help in
' The facts recited here are those alleged in the Complaint (ECF No. 2). At this stage of the case, the Court must
“accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005).
? The Court identifies the specific Defendants in each of these categories below.
the event of an emergency because, less than a week before Mr. Gantt’s death, these Defendants
observed Mr. Gantt asking for help but using sign language to do so. Ud. Jf 83-84.)
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Gantt’s screening for a risk of victimization at Central Booking
was also improper. (fd. 47-51.) In addition to being deaf, Mr. Gantt was just over five feet tall
and a little over one hundred pounds as an adult. (/d. 933.) Given Mr. Gantt’s height and weight,
his age, and the nature of the charges pending against him, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Gantt qualified
for a low security level. (id. [ 48.) However, Mr, Gantt’s low security score was overridden by a
Central Booking case, manager, without justification, which resulted in Mr. Gantt being placed in
the general population, with a medium security level. (/d. 49-51.) Plaintiffs allege that that the
Supervisor Defendants knew or should have known about the improper override of Mr. Gantt’s
calculated security level, and that Mr. Gantt’s placement violated a directive to classify inmates in
the least restrictive security level consistent with their needs, public safety, and the safe and orderly
operation of the facility. (id)
Beyond being housed in the general population, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Gantt should not
have been housed with Mr. Staron in particular—Mr. Staron should not have been housed with
cellmates at all. Ud. {{ 69, 86.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were aware, at the time of his
booking on September 9, 2022, that Mr. Staron posed a substantial risk to other detainees. (/d. §]
57, 68-69.) First, Mr. Staron was detained on charges of first-degree murder after stabbing □
homeless man to death without any apparent motive and after exiting his residence with a shotgun
and a pocketknife. (/d. | 56-63.) His arrest history included charges for resisting arrest, trespass,
drug and alcohol offenses. (Id) Second, Mr. Staron was six feet tall and 200 pounds at the
time of his booking. Ud.) Third, Mr. Staron was evaluated by prison medical personnel as having
a mental disorder and opioid dependence, was prescribed various psychiatric medications, and a
psychiatric follow-up was requested. (/d.) Despite this, Mr. Staron was cleared for release into
the general population, and his medium security level score was not overridden. (/d. ff 63, 66.)
Further, Plaintiffs allege, upon his entry into the general population, Mr. Staron demonstrated the
risk he posed to his fellow detainees: he exhibited paranoid behavior, assaulted multiple inmates,
and yelled about not receiving his medication, all of which was reported to staff. (id. §] 73-76.)
Mr. Staron’s previous cellmate was also reassigned to another cell, at the cellmate’s request, based
on his fear that Mr. Staron would harm him. (/d. ¥.81.)
Mr. Gantt was assigned to Mr. Staron’s cell on September 30, 2022, eight or nine days
before his death. (/d. J] 85, 89, 102.) On the evening of October 8, 2022, at approximately
7:21pm, Mr, Gantt and Mr. Staron were secured in their cell for the night. (/d. 7 89.) Plaintiffs
allege that “according to CO Defendant Olabisi Asckere, she last verified that Mr. Gantt was alive
at approximately 11:30pm when she shook his leg.” (/d. 795.) Inmates from the dorm heard loud
noises coming from Mr. Gantt and Mr. Staron’s cell “during the evening and early morning hours,”
but no CO responded to the disturbance. (/d. [| 96-97.) On the morning of October 9, 2022, an
inmate handing out breakfast alerted COs to Mr, Gantt’s condition, and he was pronounced dead
at 6:50am. (Ud. Jf] 98, 102.) An autopsy confirmed that Mr. Gantt died of asphyxia due to
strangulation (id. J 103) and in October 2024, Mr. Staron pled guilty to the first-degree murder of
Gantt (id q 108).
Plaintiffs allege that the CO Defendants and Supervisor Defendants failed to properly
supervise Mr. Gantt’s dorm on the night of his death. Ud. J] 111-22.) CO Defendants Asekere,
Falokun, and Lewis were working in the dorm where Mr. Gantt and Mr. Staron were housed on
the night of October 8, 2022—all three worked from 3pm to 11pm, and Asekere worked alone
from 11pm to 7am, despite the fact that there should have been two COs working in light of an
ongoing lockup tier on the dorm. (id. J§ 91-94.) Supervisor Defendant Ebisike was the officer in
charge, and Supervisor Defendant Griffin was the shift commander (id. J] 100-101), and Plaintiffs
allege that all five Supervisor Defendants collectively failed to ensure that the dorm was properly
staffed during the 11pm to 7am shift. 4117.) Plaintiffs also allege that no COs were present
inside the dorm when Mr. Gantt was murdered: “[h]ad an officer been present, he or she would
have heard the disturbance and intervened.” Ud. { 112.) Further, at times between 3pm and 7am,
the officer’s desk—where an officer was required to be physically present—was abandoned. □□□□
4,113.) And between 11pm and 7am, the CO Defendants failed to make reasonable and/or required
security rounds of the relevant dorm. (/d 114.) The Supervisor Defendants were aware that
COs, including the CO Defendants, were not performing reasonable and/or required security
rounds, but did not respond with any corrective action. Ud. 7116.)
More generally, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants failed to have'a proper system in place”
to safely monitor disabled inmates like Mr. Gantt or to enable them to communicate if they needed
help so that an officer could timely respond. (Jd. 120-21.) Not only did this cause Mr. Gantt’s
death (id. 122), but it was part of a “custom, pattern, and practice of [DPSCS] failing to provide
reasonable accommodation to detainees with disabilities at its detention facilities,” especially
Central Booking (id. ff] 148-49). As part of this alleged pattern or practice, Plaintiffs describe
findings that have been made in the context of ongoing enforcement of a 2016 consent decree? that
resolved separate litigation first filed in this District in the 1970s.4 Plaintiffs allege that a medical
monitor appointed to evaluate Central Booking’s compliance with the terms of that decree “ha[s]
consistently demonstrated [since 2016] a failure of DPSCS to implement the provisions of the
Duvall agreement,” which “includes a requirement that inmates with disabilities at Central
3 See Duvall v. Moore, Civ. No. MIM-94-2541, 2024 WL 4529261 (D. Md, Oct. 18, 2024).
4 See Duvall v, O'Malley, Civ. No. ELH-94-2541, 2016 WL 3523682 at *2—5 (D. Md. June 28; 2016).
Booking be provided with appropriate housing.” Cd. J] 150-51.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege
that the medical monitor found in October 2022—just days before Mr. Gantt was killed——“that
inmates with disabilities were not appropriately monitored.” (/d. {9 151, 155.) And in October
2023, the monitor allegedly found that Central Booking’s lack of specialized housing for disabled
detainees was particularly impactful on certain categories of detainees, including deaf detainees.
Ud. § 157.) In October 2024, Judge Maddox found that “[o]ver the last eight years of
monitoring, Defendants have achieved substantial compliance with only two of the ten substantive
provisions of the [Duvall] Agreement” and that their compliance efforts “have continued to □□□□
short.” Ud. 7 153 n.13 (citing Duvall, 2024 WL 4529261, at *4).) Plaintiffs conclude that
“Defendants were aware that the health and safety of inmates with disabilities were at risk at
Central Booking during the time that Mr. Gantt was placed in the general population,” and that
their “prolonged inaction despite .the known risks . . . constitutes deliberate indifference.” □□□ ]
161.)
Plaintiffs also describe a “custom, pattern, and practice” of Defendants failing to address
incidents of violence and death at Central Booking. Ud. ff 123-47.) Plaintiffs describe “alarming
trends in inmate violence at Central Booking at the time Mr. Gantt was committed to the facility,”
which they allege Defendants were aware of. (id. § 130.) Despite this, and despite DPSCS and
the Official Defendants knowing that this dangerous situation was created (in part) by staffing
shortages, these Defendants failed to adequately staff Central Booking, dd. 4 132, 135-37.)
Similarly, Plaintiffs allege, Defendants were aware of “an alarming number of deaths at Central
Booking indicating systemic issues in the facility’s screening and supervision of its detainees,”
_ Gd 140), such as the 2019 death of a disabled man with the mental acuity of a 12 to 15 year old
who died with morphine and fentanyl in his system (id J 142). Despite knowledge of these
incidents, Plaintiffs allege that DPSCS and the Official Defendants “failed to take any corrective
action .. . to protect its detainees.” (/d. J] 140, 146.)
Plaintiffs assert that as a result of Defendants’ conduct, Mr. Gantt suffered damages in the
form of physical pain, mental suffering and anguish, fear, and death, and that Plaintiffs themselves,
as his family members, have suffered severe mental distress. (Id. J] 162-66.)
Procedural Background
Plaintiffs are Mr. Gantt’s parents and the mother of his minor child: Rick Barry Sr. is Mr.
Gantt’s father and the personal representative of Mr. Gantt’s estate, Quinette Buadu is Mr. Gantt’s
mother, and Tamia Singleton is the mother and next friend of Mr. Gantt’s minor daughter, J.G.
Ud. J 10-12.) Defendant DPSCS is a department of the Maryland state government, which is
sued in addition to ten individuals: two Official Defendants (Robert L. Green and Dionne
Randolph), sued in both their individual and official capacities; five Supervisor Defendants
(Gerald Ebisike, Carol Griffin, F rederick Abello, Curtis Henson, and Keith Dickens), sued in their
individual capacities; and three co Defendants (Olabisi Asekere, Ayodele Falokun, and
Christopher Lewis), also sued in their individual capacities. (fd. J] 13-25.) Plaintiffs also sue an
unspecified number of “Custody Does,” whose identities are unknown but who served as
supervisors, correctional officers, and/or staff at Central Booking at the time of the pertinent
events. Ud. J 24.)
Plaintiffs assert ten claims for relief. Plaintiff Barry, as the Personal Representative of Mr.
Gantt’s estate, asserts six counts: for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts
I and II), violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count III), gross
negligence (Count IV), a Longtin pattern or practice of violating the Maryland Declaration of
Rights (Count V), and survival (Count VI). In addition, each Plaintiff individually asserts a claim
for wrongful death (Counts VII-IX). Finally, all Plaintiffs assert a claim for indemnification
(Count X).
All Defendants except CO Defendant Asekere are represented by counsel for the State of
Maryland (the “Represented Defendants”) and have moved to dismiss the majority of Plaintifis’
claims against them, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. (ECF No. 16.) The exceptions
are Count VI, for survival, and Counts VIJ-IX, for wrongful death, which Defendants do not argue
be dismissed against DPSCS and the Official Defendants in their official capacity.> (id) CO
Defendant Asekere—proceeding pro se because “[t]he Attorney General’s office declined to
represent” her (ECF No. 32 4 21)—has moved to dismiss.all claims against her. (ECF No. 22.)
Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted—or, in the alternative, pursuant to Rule 56,
because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and Defendants are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
II. Legal Standards
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and view
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Venkatraman v. REI Sys, Inc., 417 F.3d
418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005). Viewed through that lens, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd at 662. A
> The Represented Defendants do, however, argue that these counts should be dismissed against all Defendants in their
individual capacities. See Section IIL.A.4. infra. .
“pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.’”” /d. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). However, a plaintiff
need not include “detailed factual allegations,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and federal pleading
rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory
supporting the claim asserted,” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014). “A court decides
whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual
allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those
allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy
sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011).
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, the movant must show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that she is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In proving the presence or absence
of a genuine dispute, either party may point to materials in the record, such as admissions,
stipulations, depositions, documents, and electronically stored information. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine dispute of material
fact. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). If the movant meets this burden,
then the nonmoving party cannot rest on mere denials but must point to specific facts showing
there is a genuine triable issue in the case. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d
314, 525 (4th Cir. 2003). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the
Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986);
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per curiam).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or
in the alternative for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Rule 12(d) applies. Fed. R: Civ. P.
12(d). Under Rule 12(d), if the Court, in ruling on the motion, considers materials outside the
pleadings, then the motion must be construed as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, and
all parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent. A
nonmoving party can show that she has of had a reasonable opportunity to present all pertinent
material—and that the Court must disregard materials outside the pleadings and construe the
motion as seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)-—by filing a Rule 56(d) affidavit showing that
“for specified reasons,” she “cannot present facts essential to justify [her] opposition.” Fed. □□
Civ. P. 56(d). However, a Rule 56(d) request for discovery may be properly denied “where the
additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a genuine issue of
material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Strag v. Bd. of Trustees, Craven Cmty. Coll,
55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir. 1995); see McClure v. Ports, 914 F.3d 866, 874-75 (4th Cir, 2019),
iI. Analysis
Plaintiffs have filed a Rule 5 6(d) affidavit attesting that “Defendants, including Defendant
[DPSCS], possess additional non-public information related to Mr. Gantt’s death that can be
obtained through discovery,” and that “discovery will provide relevant information regarding
[Plaintiffs’] claims, . . . including the staffing, roles, and responsibilities of correctional officers
who were or should have been working at the time of Mr. Gantt’s murder.” (ECF No. 25-1 99 5-
6.) As discussed further where pertinent below, the Court finds these representations sufficient to
establish that Plaintiffs cannot, without discovery, present facts essential to justify their opposition
to Defendants’ request for summary judgment. Thus, the Court will construe Defendants’ filings
10
as motions to dismiss, disregard the materials outside the pleadings, and assess whether the factual
allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint are sufficient to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6).
A. Claims Against the Individual] Defendants
1. § 1983 (Count D
Plaintiff Barry, as the Personal Representative of Mr. Gantt’s estate, pleads two counts
against the Individual Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I alleges that the Supervisor
Defendants, the CO Defendants, and the Custody Does failed to protect Mr. Gantt in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment—they exhibited deliberate indifference to a known excessive risk that
Mr. Gantt would be harmed. (ECF No. 2 at 29-30.) The Represented Defendants argue this claim
must be dismissed for several reasons. (ECF No. 16-1 at 8-19.) Count I will survive against the
CO Defendants (Asekere, Falokun, and Lewis), but will be dismissed against the Supervisor
Defendants (Ebisike, Griffin, Abello, Henson, and Dickens) and the Custody Does.
a. Deliberate Indifference
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from □
governmental action that is not “rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
purpose” or that is “excessive in relation to that purpose.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389,
398 (2015). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits a pretrial detainee to assert a Fourteenth Amendment due
process violation based on a state official’s failure to protect the detainee from attack by another
‘detainee. Prigg v. Baltimore Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No. DLB-23-48, 2024 WL 1012885, at *5
(D. Md. Mar. 8, 2024). A failure to protect claim under the Fourteenth Amendment has two
elements: that a defendant exposed a detainee to “an objectively substantial risk of serious harm,”
and that the defendant exhibited “deliberate indifference” to that risk. Hammock v. Andoh, Civ.
lt
No. DLB-21-796, 2025 WL 2402198, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2025) (quoting Younger v. Crowder,
79 F.4th 373, 382 (4th Cir. 2023)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Applying the Supreme Court’s teaching in Kings/ey, the Fourth Circuit has held that the
standard for deliberate indifference in such cases is “purely objective.” Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th
593, 611 (4th Cir, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2631 (2024). That is, “[t]o meet the [deliberate
indifference] prong, the detainee must show that ‘the defendant’s action or inaction was . . .
objectively unreasonable.’” Hammock, 2025 WL 2402198, at *4 (quoting Short, 87 F.4th at 611).
“[A]s the Supreme Court put it when describing civil recklessness, .., itis enough that the plaintiff
show that the defendant acted or failed to act ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that
1s either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” Short, 87 F.4th at 611 (quoting Farmer
v, Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). It is not enough, by contrast, “for the plaintiff to allege
that the defendant negligently or accidentally failed to do right by the detainee.” Jd. at 611-12.
“Recklessness is a lower bar than intent, but a higher bar than negligence.” Id. at 611.
The Represented Defendants argue that Count I fails to state a claim of deliberate
indifference: “Plaintiffs lump all Defendants together, without attributing any specific conduct to
any individual officer. .. . [and] do[] not describe any ‘objectively unreasonable’ or irresponsible
actions of any Defendant.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 16.) The Court considers each category of the Count
I Defendants in turn.
As to the three CO Defendants, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly pled that these
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to an objectively substantial risk that Mr. Gantt would be
“seriously harmed. Plaintiffs allege that the CO Defendants knew that Mr. Gantt was especially
vulnerable and that Mr. Staron was especially violent, but they nonetheless failed to be present in
.the dorm, abandoned the officer’s desk on the tier, and/or failed to make required security rounds,
all while Mr. Gantt and Mr. Staron were secured in their cell together. Worse than merely failing
to respond to the threat Mr. Staron posed against Mr. Gantt, the CO Defendants are alleged to have
exascerbated that risk considerably by failing to perform their basic duties in accord with required
protocols, Such conduct was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances—not merely
negligent or accidental, but enough to constitute deliberate indifference to the obvious risk. See
Makdessi vy. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 136 (4th Cir. 2015) (where an “undisputedly vulnerable
[detainee] shared a cell with an undisputedly aggressive [detainee],” it can be obvious that “this
continued arrangement constitute[s] a substantial risk of serious harm,” and “d[oing] nothing” in
response can therefore constitute deliberate indifference); Burton v. Matti, Civ. No. RDB-24-2445,
2025 WL 3562585, *5 (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2025) (finding deliberate indifference plausibly pled
where officers in charge of a murdered detainee’s housing unit failed to properly staff their posts
at the time of the attack). .
Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. For one thing, the Represented
Defendants argue that the COs were not “responsible for case management decisions, which would
include where and with whom an inmate was placed for housing, as well as when and where an
inmate could be reassigned to different housing or another cell mate,” and they cite affidavits from
CO Defendants Falokun and Lewis to this effect. (ECF No. 16 at 12-13; ECF Nos. 16-3, 16-4,
CO Defendant Aseckere echoes these assertions in her motion, claiming that she “had no role in
[Mr. Gantt’s] placement [or] classification... .” (ECF No. 22 at 3.) But Makdessi and Farmer
suggest these facts, even if true, are insufficient to shield the CO Defendants from liability, and in
any event, Plaintiffs’ Rule 56 affidavit (ECF No. 25-1) establishes Plaintiffs’ entitlement to
conduct discovery on these points.
More substantially, the Represented Defendants argue that the claims against CO
Defendants Falokun and Lewis in particular must be dismissed because—unlike CO Defendant
Asekere—neither of them “was working at the time of Mr. Gantt’s death.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 13;
see also ECF No. 31 at 1-4.) Falokun and Lewis argue that pursuant to the facts alleged in
Plaintiffs’ own complaint, Mr. Gantt must have died affer 11pm on October 8, when CO
Defendants Falokun’s and Lewis’ shifts ended. (id) After all, the complaint alleges that
“falecording to [CO] Defendant Asekere, she last verified that Mr. Gantt was alive at
approximately 11:30pm” (ECF No. 2 § 95) and that “inmates from the dorm heard loud noises
coming from Mr, Gantt’s cell during the evening and early morning hours” (id. | 96 (emphasis
added)). If CO Defendants Falokun and Lewis were not working when Mr. Gantt was attacked,
Defendants suggest, then it cannot be any failure of theirs that was responsible for Mr. Gantt’s
death. .
However, the facts alleged in the Complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the Plantiffs, do not make clear whether Mr. Gantt was killed during the 11pm to 7am shift, when
only CO Defendant Asekere was working, or the 3pm to.11pm shift, when all three CO Defendants
were on duty, (See ECF No. 25 at 17.) The complaint is internally inconsistent as to the time that
inmates heard Mr. Gantt grunting and kicking at his cell door: Plaintiffs do allege that it was heard
“during the evening and early morning hours” (ECF No. 24 96 (emphasis added)), but also that it
was “during the night of October 8 or early morning of October 9” (id {| 2 (emphasis added)).
Considering the complaint as a whole, the Court understands Plaintiffs to be asserting that the
noise was heard in the evening and/or the early morning, which is consistent with it having been
heard before the shift change at 11 pm. Similarly, the Complaint does not embrace the assertion
that Mr. Gantt was indeed alive at 11:30pm, but only that CO Defendant Asekere asserted that.he
14
was. (id. | 95.) Interpreting these allegations in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
may sensibly maintain that “the exact time that Mr. Staron murdered Mr. Gantt is unknown, and
could have been during Defendants Falokun and Lewis’ purported shifts.” (ECF No. 25 at 17.)
Defendants’ assertions to the contrary therefore do not warrant dismissal of Count I against them.
Next, as to the five Supervisor Defendants, the Court will dismiss Count I because
Plaintiffs do not allege that any of these Defendants personally participated in the underlying
constitutional violation. Rather, the conduct of these Defendants is best assessed under a theory
of supervisory liability, which Plaintiffs allege in Count II, and which the Court addresses in
Section III.A.2. infra.
Finally, as to the Custody Does, the Court will dismiss Count I without prejudice. “The
designation of a John Doe defendant is generally not favored in the federal courts.” Chidi Njoku
v. Unknown Special Unit Staff, Civ. No. 99-7644, 2000 WL 903896, at *1 (4th Cir. July 7, 2000)
(unpublished table decision). At minimum, unnamed defendants must be “real, but unidentified.”
Kennedy, 691 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1982). Here, Plaintiffs allege that the Custody Does
“are supervisors, correctional officers, and other staff employed at Central Booking at the time of
the events giving rise to this complaint.” (ECF No. 2 § 24.) But Plaintiffs have not made any
specific nonconclusory allegation against these unidentified figures. Given this, there is no basis
to conclude that defendants are, in fact, real. See Pair v. Alexander, Civ. No. GLR-16-1492, 2018
WL 1583472, at *1 n.2 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2018). Accordingly, Count I will be dismissed without
prejudice against the Custody Does, as will all other claims asserted against them. See Attkisson
v. Holder, 925 F.3d 606, 628 (4th Cir. 2019).
15
b. Qualified Immunity □□
_ The Represented Defendants also argue that Count I should be dismissed because all the
Defendants who are sued in the individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity: “Absent
from the Complaint are any plausible factual allegations that any defendant engaged in conduct
that a reasonable correctional official would have recognized as violating a ‘clearly established’
right under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 16-19.)
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to liability where a defendant “makes a
- decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the
circumstances she confronted.” Case v. Beasley, 167 F.4th 651, 662 (4th Cir. 2026) (quoting
Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020)). Typically, “[dJetermining whether qualified immunity is
appropriate is a two step inquiry.” Jones v. Chandrasuwan, 820 F.3d 685, 691 (4th Cir. 2016)
(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). “First, a court must decide whether the
facts that a plaintiff has shown make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Jd. “Second, the
court must consider whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged
misconduct.” Jd Having concluded above that Plaintiffs have alleged a violation of a
constitutional right, the second step in the inquiry is at issue here.
Whether a right was clearly established depends on whether the law “gave the officials
‘fair warning’ that their conduct was unconstitutional.” Ridpath v. Bd of Governors of Marshall
, 447 F.3d 292, 313 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). The
contours of the constitutional right “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand what he is doing violates that right.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 753 (quotation omitted). In
determining “whether a given right was clearly established,” the court must “define that right at a
high level of particularity,” Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 271 (4th Cir. 2007) (citations
16
omitted), and “refer to concrete applications of abstract concepts,” Knussman v. Maryland, 272
F.3d 625, 638 n.9 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Ifthe right is defined “too general[ly],” state
officials will lack “adequate guidance on the constitutional limits to their conduct.” Knussman,
272 F.3d 625 at 638 n.9.
The Represented Defendants argue:
Defined with the ‘high level of particularity’ required by Campbell, . . . Plaintiffs’
claims would demand the defendants recognize a constitutional requirement that Mr. _
Gantt be classified at a low security level and not assigned to general population
housing or celled with another detainee who could be “violent” or have mental health
issues. . . . There is no such constitutional right in existence, much less one that is
clearly established such that Defendants would understand its application to Mr. Gantt.
(ECF No. 16-1 at 18-19.) Plaintiffs respond that the right at issue is Mr. Gantt’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to be protected from a substantial and known risk of harm inflicted by a fellow
detainee, and that this right has long been clearly established. (ECF No. 25 at 19 (citing Wynn v.
Perry, Civ. No. 3:14-625-FDW, 2018 WL 1077321, at *25 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2018)).)
In the Court’s view, while the right in question must be defined “in light of the specific
context of the case [and] not as a broad general proposition,” “[i]t is not necessary [ ] that ‘the
exact conduct at issue’ have been previously held unlawful; ‘rather, our analysis must [also] take
into consideration ... [rights] manifestly included within more general applications of the core
constitutional principle invoked.’”” Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Odom
v. S.C. Dept. of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 773 (4th Cir. 2003)), The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in
Case v. Beasley, 167 F.4th 651 (4th Cir. 2026), is particularly instructive on the appropriate level
- of generality at which to analyze Mr. Gantt’s constitutional right.
In Case, correctional officers allegedly failed to protect an inmate from a violent fellow
prisoner by leaving open doors that should have been closed. 167 F.4th at 657-58. In analyzing
the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity, the Fourth Circuit found Cox—which involved
17
correctional officers failing to protect an inmate by relaying his complaints about other inmates to
those inmates themselves—to be “on all fours.” Jd. at 663. Despite the factual difference in the
conduct that was challenged, the Fourth Circuit held that the officers in both cases “were on notice
that their actions were likely to increase a known and substantial risk of serious harm of violence
by other incarcerated individuals . . . [y]et the officers aggravated the risk of harm.” This
aggravation was the unconstitutional conduct at issue, and because it “was clearly established” as
unconstitutional when the Case officers acted, they were not entitled to qualified immunity. □□□
So too here. By October 2022 when the events at issue took place, it was clearly
established—by Cox—that a correctional officer violates a pretrial detainees’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights when his objectively unreasonable conduct aggravates a known and substantial
risk of serious harm of violence by another detainee. Here, Mr. Gantt’s right was allegedly violated
by the CO Defendants because they knew Mr. Gantt was especially vulnerable, knew he was
housed with another detainee with a history of violence (both preceding and during his detention),
and yet aggravated the resulting obvious risks by failing to monitor them in accordance with
required policies. The CO Defendants cannot be credited with any reasonable misapprehension
that abandoning their post or failing to conduct required rounds might be lawful under the
circumstances; rather, they had fair notice of the unconstitutionality of their conduct. Dismissal
based on qualified immunity is. therefore not warranted.
2. § 1983 Supervisory Liability (Count IT)
Plaintiff Barry, as -the Personal Representative of Mr. Gantt’s estate, pleads a second §
1983 count on a theory of supervisory liability, alleging that the responses of the Supervisor
Defendants and the Official Defendants (in their personal capacities) constituted deliberate
indifference to their knowledge of their subordinates’ conduct, and to the systemic problems at
18
Central Booking. (ECF No. 2 at 31-32.) The Represented Defendants move to dismiss. (ECF
No. 16-1 at 8-19.) Count II will survive.
Supervisors are not subject to vicarious liability under § 1983. A supervisor’s “mere
knowledge” that subordinates have engaged in unconstitutional acts does not give rise to Hability;
rather, a supervisor “is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677 (2009). Supervisory liability under § 1983 “is premised on a ‘recognition that supervisory
indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the
constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d
228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting S/akan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
[T]o establish supervisory liability under § 1983; a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that
the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged
in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to
citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so
inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to, or tacit authorization of, the alleged
offensive practices [ ]; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between the
supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). “At the pleading stage,
alleging that a supervisor knew about misconduct of his or her subordinates and failed to act can
suffice to state a plausible claim for supervisory liability. See Shipley v. Disney, Civ. No. SAG-
21-3173, 2022 WL 2789076, at *9 (D. Md. July 15, 2022), .
The Represented Defendants argue that Count II fails to state a claim: “Plaintiffs do not
allege that [the Official Defendants] had any personal knowledge of the circumstances of Mr.
Gantt’s confinement, much less assigned him his security level, decided where to house him, were
in Central Booking when the assault occurred, or otherwise had any personal knowledge that Mr.
Gantt was in danger.” (/d. at 9.) Further, Defendants argue, “Plaintiffs make no specific allegations
. 19
as to any [Supervisor] Defendant or either [of the Official] Defendant[s]. Lumping all of these
defendants together, . . . Plaintiffs assert [only] a series of general allegations.” (id. at 16.)
Plaintiffs allege that all five of the Supervisor Defendants had responsibility for security at
_ Central Booking: Abello was the Warden, Henson was the Chief of Security, Dickens was the
Director of Security Operations, and, as discussed above, on the night of Mr. Gantt’s murder, □
Ebisike was a Sergeant in charge of the tier officers and Griffin was a shift commander in charge
of the COs, (ECF No. 2 at 16-20.) The Official Defendants Green and Randolph were the
Secretary and Commissioner of DPSCS, respectively, and shared responsibility for overseeing the
agency’s compliance with law and ensuring adequate staffing and training. Ud. {J 14-15.)
Plaintiffs allege that both the Supervisor Defendants and the Official Defendants “had
knowledge of the agency’s failures to comply with state and federal law in housing detainees with
detainees with disabilities at Central Booking.” (Ud. □ 159.) “‘At the time that Mr. Gantt entered
Central Booking, [the Official Defendants] knew that disabled detainees in the general population
were not appropriately monitored at the facility” (id@ § 156) given an October 2022 finding “issued
days before Mr. Gantt was murdered, [which] confirmed that inmates with disabilities were
not appropriately monitored” (id. J 155). And the Official Defendants “were aware that staffing
shortages at Central Booking were creating a dangerous environment for detainees [and that] the
agency had failed to address the unsafe staffing levels” (id. {{ 135-36). Despite this, the Official
Defendants “took no corrective action.” (id. 9 121.) □
Further, the Supervisor Defendants allegedly “knew or should have known about the
improper override of Mr. Gantt’s calculated security level” in particular (id. | 51) and “were aware
that [Mr. Staron] posed a substantial risk to other inmates [and] should have been closely _
monitored” (id. 68). The Supervisor Defendants “were aware that correctional officers, including
20
CO Defendants, were not performing reasonable and/or required security rounds during their shifts
... [and] failed to take any corrective action” (id. J 116) and the Supervisor Defendants “failed to
take any corrective action to ensure that [Mr. Gantt’s] dorm was properly staffed during the shift
. that Mr. Gantt was murdered” (id. 9 117). .
Taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, these allegations
suffice to state a claim of supervisory liability against the Supervisor Defendants and Official
Defendants alike—they make plausible that each of these Defendants showed deliberate
indifference to, or tacit authorization of, practices of their subordinates which posed a pervasive
and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to detainees like Mr. Gantt and which contributed
causally to Mr. Gantt’s death. The Court is mindful that “[a]s liability ... is personal, a complaint .
must contain specific allegations of each individual’s conduct and state of mind,” King v. Riley,
76 F.4th 259, 269 (4th Cir. 2023), and that Plaintiffs must make factual allegations in support of
their claim that a practice posing a pervasive risk existed, Shipley, 2022 WL 2789076, at *9. On
summary judgment or at trial, the Court would expect Plaintiffs to present fulsome evidence as to
each Individual Defendant’s state of mind with respect to the previous failures that are pled and
further specifics as to prior instances where those failures caused constitutional injury. But at the □
pleading stage, the Court ts persuaded that the Fourth Circuit requires no more than what Plaintiffs
have provided here: each of the Supervisor and Official Defendants are alleged to have been aware
of ongoing failures to ‘monitor disabled detainees, ongoing failures to staff Central Booking
appropriately, and/or ongoing failures of subordinates to conduct required rounds, and specific
examples of such failures: are described in the complaint, even if somewhat briefly. Each
Supervisor and Official Defendant allegedly failed to take corrective action in response to these
failures despite having job responsibilities that—drawing favorable inferences—plausibly
21
required them to do so. Plaintiffs have alleged enough to have stated a claim that these failures to
take corrective action constituted tacit authorization and/or condonation of the alleged practices,
which in turn served as a “causative factor” in Mr. Gantt’s death. See Shipley, 2022 WL 2789076,
at *12 (“[A]t the pleading stage, there is no requirement that the plaintiff plead the multiple
incidents of constitutional violations that may be necessary at later stages to establish causation.”)
(citation omitted).
The Court rejects Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs merely “cobble[ ] together bits of
hindsight and unsupported allegations” (ECF No. 31 at 6-7) to allege supervisory liability. And
the Court finds Plaintiffs’ reliance on Baynard and Shipley apt despite the factual differences
Defendants highlight in their reply. Those cases do not impose a requirement, as Defendants
suggest, that a supervisor’s knowledge of prior misconduct must include misconduct involving the
plaintiff in particular. Rather, both cases impose the standard the Court imposes here, asking
whether “supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct [was] a
causative factor in the [Plaintiff's] constitutional injuries,” Baynard, 268 F.3d at 235—a standard
that.can be plausibly pled even where the prior misconduct involved victims other than the
plaintiff. See Shipley, 2022 WL 2789076, at *12 (citing cases denying motions to dismiss Monell
claims that, as discussed below, are evaluated by reference to the same standard as individual
supervisory liability claims). ,
So too the Court rejects Defendants’ arguments that the Supervisor Defendants and Official
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, for the same reasons as those discussed above—the
constitutional rights at issue, evaluated at the appropriate level of generality, were indeed clearly
established when they were allegedly violated in October 2022. See Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799
supervisor’s continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses [ ] provides an
22
independent basis for finding he either was deliberately indifferent or acquiesced in the
constitutionally offensive conduct of his subordinates.”) (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 372-73).
Thus, Count II will survive.
3. Article 24 (Count ITD
Plaintiff Barry, as the Personal Representative of Mr. Gantt’s estate, also pleads a violation
of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against the Individual Defendants. (ECF No.
2 at 32.) The Represented Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed for the same
reasons as the § 1983 claims, explaining that “the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 are read
in pari materia.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 19.) Plaintiffs agree that “Article 24 of the Maryland
Constitution provides the same protections as the Fourteenth Amendment,” and they argue that
“Count III states claims under Article 24 for the same reasons Counts I and II state claims under §
1983.” (ECF No. 25 at 18.) The Court therefore finds, for the same reasons that are discussed
above, that Plaintiffs have stated a claim under Article 24.
The Represented Defendants also advance one argument for dismissing the Article 24
claim which would not apply to the § 1983 claims—in particular, that the Maryland Tort Claims
Act and/or Maryland common law entitle them to qualified immunity and/or public official
immunity because their conduct was not grossly negligent or malicious. (ECF No. 16-1 at 20-24.)
This argument applies equally to all of the state law claims advanced against the Individual
Defendants (Counts III, IV, and VII-IX) and is discussed further (and rejected) below. Thus,
Count III will survive.
_ 4. Gross Negligence (Count IV) and Wrongful Death (Counts VII-IX)
In Count IV, Plaintiff Barry, as the Personal Representative of Mr. Gantt’s estate, pleads
gross negligence against all of the Individual Defendants. (ECF No. 2 {| 190-95.) The
23
Represented Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs plead only a
“failure to comply with professional standards of care and DPSCS policies, which is not enough”
to constitute the “extraordinary or outrageous” conduct required for gross negligence. (ECF No.
16-1 at 20-22.) Relatedly, the Represented Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs fail to state a
claim for gross negligence (and because they similarly fail to state a claim for malice), the
Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act
(“MTCA”) and/or public official immunity under the Maryland common law—immunity which
requires the dismissal of not only the gross negligence claim itself (Count IV), but ai/ of the state
law claims that are advanced against them (also including Count IIJ, for violation of Article 24,
and Counts VII-IX, for wrongful death). (ECF No. 16-1 at 20-24.) The Court rejects both
arguments.
Under the MTCA, “state employees are protected from liability by state sovereign
immunity for tortious acts or omissions that are within the scope of their employment, unless those
actions were made with malice or gross negligence.” MedSense, LLC v. Univ. Sys. of Md., 420 F.
Supp. 3d 382, 397 (D. Md. 2019) (citing Md Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b), State Gov't
§ 12-105). Maryland common law also recognizes public official immunity, which applies when
(1) the actor is a public official (2) whose tortious conduct occurred while performing discretionary
acts in furtherance of his duty. Rodwell v. Wicomico Cnty., Civ. No. DKC 22-3014, 2024 WL
1178202, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2024). Public official immunity, like the MTCA’s qualified
immunity, does not shield acts committed with malice or gross negligence, nor does it apply to
state constitutional torts. Johnson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 452 F. Supp. 3d 283, 297 (D. Md. 2020).
Gross negligence under Maryland law consists of “an intentional failure to perform a
manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another,
and also implies a thoughtless disregard. of the consequences without the exertion of any effort to
avoid them.” Albero v. Worcester Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, Civ. No. JKB-24-1100, 2025 WL
462588, at *18 (D. Md. Feb. 11, 2025) (quoting Cooper v. Rodriguez, 118 A.3d 829, 844-46 (Md.
2015)). Gross negligence may arise either from intentional infliction of harm or utter indifference
to the rights of others. Jd As this Court has previously held, “the gross negligence standard [is]
essentially equivalent to that for civil recklessness—the same standard that, as discussed above,
governs pretrial detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” □□□ (citing federal and state
courts alike applying the gross negligence standard in this manner); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at
' §836 n.4 (calling “gross negligence” a “nebulous” term that “in practice typically mean{s] little
different from recklessness as generally understood in the civil law”) (citing W. Keeton et
al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 34, at 212 (Sth ed. 1984)).
Defendants are surely right that “the [mere] failure to adhere to protocols and policies does
not itself establish a reckless disregard for human life or amount to gross negligence.” Est. of
Green v. City of Annapolis, Civ. No, MJM-24-1351, 2025 WL 1029555, at *20 (D. Md. Apr. 7,
2025) (quoting Stracke v. Est. of Butler, 214 A.3d 561, 571 (Md. 2019) (citations omitted)). But
as discussed above, Plaintiffs allege more than just that. Rather, Plaintiffs allege conduct that is
objectively unreasonable in the sense required for civil recklessness-—Defendants’ failures to
follow protocol stood “in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so
obvious that it should be known.” Short, 87 F.4th at 611 (citation omitted). Such utter indifference
can constitute gross negligence, and accordingly, Count IV will survive.
Given that Plaintiffs have stated a claim of gross negligence, dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state
law claims (Counts III, IV, and VILIX) against the Individual Defendants is not now warranted
on grounds of state qualified and/or public official immunity. Defendants offer no basis for
25°
dismissal of these claims beyond those that are discussed above, and thus, these Counts will
survive against the Individual Defendants.
B. Claims Against DPSCS and the Official Defendants in their Official
Capacity
1. Longtin Pattern or Practice (Count V)
Plaintiff Barry, as the Personal Representative of Mr. Gantt’s estate, pleads a Longtin
pattern or practice claim against DPSCS for violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
(ECF No. 2 § 196-201.)
[T]hese patterns or practices included failing to adequately protect the safety of □
detainees, failing to train employees to properly screen detainees for risk of
victimization or risk of abusiveness, failing to train staff to properly screen and monitor
detainees with mental health concerns, failing to adequately staff its facilities, failing
to properly monitor detainees, failing to provide safe housing for vulnerable detainees,
and failing to provide appropriate accommodations to disabled inmates.
(id.) The Represented Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that “Plaintiff[s] ha[ve]} failed to
identify and provide support for ‘the specific unconstitutional pattern or practice’ that allegedly
‘resulted in’ Mr. Gantt’s death.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 24-27.) The Court disagrees, and Count V
will survive.
“[T]he Maryland Constitution recognizes a ‘pattern or practice’ claim as part of its
protections of citizens against unconstitutional actions of local government and its employees.”
Prince George’s Cnty. v. Longtin, 19 A.3d 859, 889 (Md. 2011). A Longtin pattern-or-practice
. ¢laim is an “analogue to a [federal] Moned/ claim” and “[t]his court routinely analyzes Monell and
6 The parties’ briefs both cited law that “an unconstitutional pattern or practice claim—a Longtin claim—may be
brought against the State.” (See ECF Nos. 16-1 at 24, 25 at 27 (citing State v. Young, 333 A.3d 610, 624 (App. Ct.
Md. 2025)).) Though Defendants’ brief does not explicitly preserve any argument to the contrary, and neither party
filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority, the Court recognizes that after the briefs were filed, the Supreme Court of
Maryland vacated the holding cited from Young. No. 27, Sept. Term, 2025, 2026 WL 1801178, at *16 (Md. June 23,
2026).
26
Longtin claims together.” Doe v. Anne Arundel Cnty., Civ. No. 1:23-03451-JRR, 2025 WL
675059, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 3, 2025).
To prevail on a Longtin claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the government entity
‘maintained an unconstitutional pattern or practice, and that (2) the specific unconstitutional pattern
or practice resulted in the plaintiff's injury. Young, 333 A.3d at 626. Establishing the required
pattern or practice for a Monell/Longtin claim is difficult, but can be done under any of four distinct
factual theories:
(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2)
through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an □
omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that manifest[s] deliberate
indifference to the rights of citizens; or (4) through a practice that is so persistent and
widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.
Lytle y. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “Monell claims survive the
motion to dismiss stage if the plaintiff alleges facts to support that the defendant was aware of
ongoing constitutional violations and did nothing to stop or correct those actions.” Anne Arundel
Cnty., 2025 WL 675059, at *9 (citation omitted).
A Longtin pattern-or-practice claim advanced under a failure to supervise theory is
assessed under the same standard as a personal capacity supervisory liability claim. Anne Arundel
Cnty., 2025 WL 675059, at *11 (citing Shipley, 2022 WL 2789076, at *8). In other words, a
plaintiff must allege “(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a
- subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional
injury; (2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) an affirmative
causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the plaintiff's alleged constitutional injury.” Id. □
(citations omitted). Thus, for the same reasons that the Court has concluded above that Plaintiffs
state a claim for personal capacity supervisory liability against the Supervisor and Official
Defendants (in their personal capacities) (see Section III.A.2. supra), so too the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have stated a Longtin claim against DPSCS. . ,
Similarly, to state a Monell/Longtin claim based on a condonation theory, “[a] plaintiff
must point toa persistent and widespread practice[ ] of municipal officials, the duration and
frequency of which indicate that policymakers (1) had actual or constructive knowledge of the - □
conduct, and (2) failed to correct it due to their deliberate indifference.” Owens v. Balt. City State’s
Attys. Off, 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014). The Court further finds that the same allegations □
that suffice to state Plaintiffs’ Longtin claim on a failure to supervise theory also state a claim on
a condonation theory.
The Represented Defendants rely principally on State v. Young in arguing that Plaintiffs
have not adequately identified the required pattern or practice or connected it with Mr. Gantt’s
death. In Young, the Appellate Court of Maryland found, post-trial, that an injured inmate had not
presented sufficient evidence to support a finding ofa pattern or practice. 333 A.3d 610, 628 (App.
Ct. Md. 2025), reversed in part and vacated in part, No. 27, Sept. Term, 2025, 2026 WL 1801178,
at *16 (Md. 2026). While Young introduced evidence that there had been prior incidents of a
failure to protect inmates, they resulted from a failure to intervene in an attack, or the opening of
a cell door, whereas Young showed that his own injury resulted from dangerous metal lockers and
the inadequacy of the institution’s staffing plan. fd No evidence of prior instances concerning
lockers or staffing was introduced at trial, and thus, the evidence was insufficient “to connect the
specific failure of the State . . . with the previous instances of the failures to protect.” Jd.
The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs do not specifically allege that each of the prior
instances of failure to protect detainees that they identify in the complaint shares each and every
28
feature of Mr. Gantt’s situation. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the prior instances are alleged
to have been sufficiently similar for the Lengtin claim to survive at the motion to dismiss stage.
As Plaintiffs rightly argue, “[a]t the pleading stage, there is no need to allege that DPSCS’ failures
resulted in other instances of violence against disabled detainees.” (ECF No. 25 at 30 (citing
Johnson, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 311).) “Before discovery, courts should not expect the plaintiff to
possess a rich set of facts conceming the allegedly unconstitutional policy and the responsible
policymakers.” (/d. at 28 (citing Anne Arundel Cnty., 2025 WL 675059, at *10).) Plaintiffs
describe prior instances of inmates housed together who plausibly should not have been (see ECF
No. 2 ff 138, 139); findings that inadequate staffing created a safety risk at Central Booking (id.
71 132-34); and findings that other disabled inmates had not been properly monitored (id. 7 155).
These prior incidents are plausibly connected to Plaintiffs’ allegations that Mr. Gantt should not □
have been housed with Mr. Staron, that there was only one CO on duty during the 11pm to 7am
shift (rather than the required two), and that Mr. Gantt was not properly monitored in light of the
vulnerability that resulted from his disability. As noted above, the Court will certainly expect
further detail and specificity concerning the alleged patterns and practices at later stages of the
case, but for now, the allegations pled suffice to withstand Defendants’ arguments for dismissal.
Accordingly, Count V will survive.
2. Survival (Count VI) and Wrongful Death (Counts VIJ-IX)
Plaintiff Barry, as the Personal Representative of Mr. Gantt’s estate, pleads a survival
action against DPSCS and the Official Defendants in their official capacity (Count VI). (ECF No.
2 at 34~35.) And each Plaintiff—Plaintiff Barry, individually, Plaintiff Buadu, and Plaintiff
_ Singleton, as parent and next friend of minor J.G.—pleads a claim for wrongful death against
DPSCS and the Official Defendants in their official capacity (in addition to certain Individual
29
Defendants, as discussed above) (Counts VII-IX). The Defendants do not move for dismissal of
these counts against DPSCS and the Official Defendants in their official capacity. (See ECF No.
16-1.) Thus, these claims will survive against these Defendants.
3. Indemnification (Count X)
Finally, all Plaintiffs assert a claim for indemnification against DPSCS. (ECF No. 2 at 38.)
The Represented Defendants move to dismiss it (ECF No. 16-1 at 27-28), and Plaintiffs
“acknowledge that indemnification is not a standalone claim and therefore do not contest
dismissal.” (ECF No. 25 at 18 n.6.) Thus, this count will be dismissed. See Griffin v. Salisbury
Police Dep't, Civ. No. RDB-20-2511, 2020 WL 6135148, at *7 (D. Md. Oct. 19, 2020) (“[T]here
is no such cause of action as ‘indemnification.’”).
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Represented Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16)
will be granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant Asekere’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
22) will be denied. A separate Order follows.
DATED this &_ day of July, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
Coonan rar
James K. Bredar
United States District Judge
30