The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
JILL BONG, Case No. 6:25-cv-01075-MTK
Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER
v.
BARRETT MERSEREAU; JOE
LAFOUNTAINE; DOUGLAS COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT 15; JENS JENSEN;
and OREGON SCHOOL BOARDS
ASSOCIATION PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY COVERAGE FOR
EDUCATION TRUST (“PACE”),
Defendants.
KASUBHAI, United States District Judge:
Self-represented Plaintiff Jill Bong brings her Amended Complaint alleging First
Amendment retaliation, Equal Protection violations, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and denial of
due process. Am. Compl., ECF No. 130. Defendants move to dismiss. ECF Nos. 131-32, 139.
For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motions are granted and this case is dismissed with
prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The Court recounted the facts of this case in its October 30, 2025 Opinion and Order, and
incorporates those facts here. ECF No. 123. In that Opinion, the Court explained the deficiencies
in Plaintiff’s allegations, dismissed her claims for failure to state a claim, and allowed her leave
to file an amended complaint. Id. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint reasserts many of the same
claims and legal theories. Compare Op. & Order, ECF No. 123, with Am. Compl. Defendants
again move to dismiss. ECF Nos. 131-32, 139.
STANDARDS
Where the plaintiff “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” the action
must be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on
a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation”). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level . . . .
Id. at 555 (citation omitted). Moreover, when assessing the sufficiency of any civil
complaint, a court must distinguish factual contentions—which allege behavior on the part of the
defendant that, if true, would satisfy one or more elements of the claim asserted—and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In short, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Id. (citation omitted).
A court must liberally construe the filings of a self-represented plaintiff and give them
the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). “Unless
it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect, . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to
notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the
action.” Garity v. APWU Nat’l Labor Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Days Creek Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The Days Creek Defendants move to dismiss all six of Plaintiff’s claims. This motion is
granted.
A. Claims 1–3
Plaintiff’s first three claims, for First Amendment retaliation, fail to state a claim for
relief. The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s retaliation claims for failure to “allege
sufficient facts to allow the Court to infer that Defendants were motivated by animus toward
[Plaintiff’s] speech.” Op. & Order 14. The same is true here.
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims take issue with Defendants’ decisions to involve attorneys in
her public records requests and the litigation that followed. Plaintiff cites no case that suggests
that directing communications through an attorney, denying discovery requests, or otherwise
employing a particular litigation strategy violates an individual’s right to be free from retaliation
under the First Amendment. Plaintiff broadly alleges “burdensome” litigation techniques but
does not provide any plausible details to substantiate her position that Defendants’ conduct was
unconstitutionally burdensome. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Whatever
injuries Plaintiff may have suffered through that litigation, her allegations do not support her
theory that Defendants’ communications and litigation decisions were made “with the intent to
retaliate against, obstruct, or chill” her First Amendment rights. Ariz. Students’ Ass’n v. Ariz. Bd.
of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2016).
B. Claim 4
Plaintiff similarly fails to state a claim for a violation of her Equal Protection rights. This
Court dismissed that claim because Plaintiff’s “allegations [were] sparse and conclusory, and no
factual assertions indicate that Defendants paid any mind to Plaintiff’s religion . . . much less that
they intended to discriminate against her.” Op. & Order 15.
Plaintiff’s amended Equal Protection claim fails for the same reasons. She alleges that
Defendants were aware of her minority religious beliefs and treated her public records requests
uniquely. But she does not allege anything to plausibly tie those allegations together to show the
requisite discriminatory animus or any injury suffered as a result. See Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City
of Yuma, Ariz., 818 F.3d 493, 504 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Under Arlington Heights, a plaintiff must
simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason
more likely than not motivated the defendant and that the defendant's actions adversely affected
the plaintiff in some way.”). These allegations remain little more than “purely conclusory
allegations of alleged discrimination, with no concrete, relevant particulars,” which are
insufficient to state a claim. Forsberg v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1419 (9th
Cir. 1988).
C. Claim 5
Plaintiff’s fifth claim, for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), fares no better. Plaintiff
again challenges Defendants’ litigation-related conduct and fails to allege anything more than
conclusory assertions that Defendants conspired to deprive her of her rights. Karim-Panahi v.
L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s failure to plausibly allege any
discriminatory or retaliatory animus is fatal to this claim. See Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara,
995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing elements of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)).
D. Claim 6
Plaintiff’s sixth claim, alleging a due process violation, is also dismissed. That claim
again takes issue with Defendants’ “burdensome and manipulative legal process . . . to litigate
disputes.” Am. Compl. 19. She claims that Defendants’ discovery tactics were employed to
prevent her from obtaining evidence and to delay proceedings. While it is true that “the Due
Process Clause grants the aggrieved party the opportunity to present [her] case and have its
merits fairly judged,” Plaintiff does not allege anything that suggests she was deprived of that
opportunity. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982).
The Court is mindful of Plaintiff’s self-represented status, but even a liberal construction
of her Amended Complaint does not save her claims from dismissal. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d
469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that “a liberal interpretation of a pro se civil rights complaint
may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled”); Johnson v. Lucent
Technologies Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Conclusory allegations and
unwarranted inferences . . . are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”). The Days Creek
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.
II. Defendant Mersereau’s Motion to Dismiss
The Court previously dismissed claims against Defendant Mersereau because Plaintiff
did not allege facts that indicated Mersereau was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Op. & Order 9-11. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not remedy this deficiency and
otherwise fails to state a claim for the reasons described above. Defendant Mersereau’s motion to
dismiss is granted. Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Dismissal of a §1983
claim following a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is proper if the complaint is devoid of factual allegations
that give rise to a plausible inference of” either a constitutional violation or a state actor.).
III. Defendant PACE and Jensen’s Motion to Dismiss
Finally, Defendants PACE and Jensen also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. These
Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not plausibly allege a state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“An individual acts under color of state law when he or she exercises power possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law.” Naffe, 789 F.3d at 1036 (quotations omitted). State action can arise from a state
actor’s “coercive power,” “significant encouragement, either overt or covert,” or activity
“controlled by an agency of the State” or “delegated a public function by the State.” Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 297 (2001) (quotations and
citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant PACE “is a self-insurance trust administered by the
Oregon School Boards Association . . . that provides coverage and claims services to school
districts including [DCSD].” Am. Compl. 3. She alleges that Defendant Jensen “is PACE’s
Claims Director” who “is sued in his individual capacity for authorizing, directing, and funding”
the conduct in her complaint. Id. Defendant PACE states that it “is a public body” that “provides
coverage for the District, much like an insurer.” Defs.’ PACE & Jensen’s Mot. Dismiss 5, ECF
No. 139; Defs.’ PACE & Jensen’s Reply 2, ECF No. 142.
The Court need not reach this question because Plaintiff otherwise fails to state a claim
for the reasons above. Even if Defendants PACE and Jensen were acting under color of state law
for purposes of § 1983, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts that allow the Court to infer those
Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights in any way. Defendant PACE and Jensen’s
motion to dismiss is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 131, 132,
139) are GRANTED.
This Court has reviewed three complaints by Plaintiff in this case and heard several
rounds of motions from various defendants as to those allegations. It is absolutely clear to the
Court that Plaintiff could not cure the defects in her Amended Complaint through additional
amendment. Allowing Plaintiff leave to amend would be futile and prejudicial to Defendants.
Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
DATED this 8th day of July 2026.
[Fee
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (he/him)
United States District Judge
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