The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ALLEN J. MOORE, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-03220-SEM
)
STEPHANIE HOWARD et al., )
Defendants. )
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 filed by Plaintiff Allen Moore, a Paris, Illinois, resident.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint states an
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.
I. SCREENING STANDARD
The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any
legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the Court
accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing
them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649
(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are
insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721
F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
II. ALLEGED FACTS
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges constitutional violations against
the following Graham Correctional Center (“Graham”) officials and
entities: Assistant Warden Denissa Armstrong, Nurse Practitioner
Lucas Emerich, Healthcare Administrator Stephanie Howard,
Corrections Officer Rhodes, Registered Nurse Holly Shanle, the
Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and Wexford Health
Sources, Incorporated (“Wexford”).
On April 5, 2025, Plaintiff fell from the top bunk, causing
further injury to his Sciatic condition, which Plaintiff claims was
known throughout Graham. Plaintiff’s cellmate notified Defendant
Rhodes, who refused to call for medical assistance and left Plaintiff
lying on the floor in his own urine. The next day, Defendant Shanle
saw Plaintiff for a “torn shoulder injury” but did not refer Plaintiff
for X-rays. Plaintiff claims he was never adequately treated for his
medical complaint.
C. Analysis
“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct
demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on
a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a
plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an objective and
subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir.
1996). Under the objective element, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that his medical condition is sufficiently severe. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective component, the
prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of
mind.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by
showing that a defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the
inmate and disregarded the risk.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645,
653 (7th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state a plausible deliberate
indifference to medical need claim under the Eighth Amendment
against Defendants Rhodes and Shanle. However, Plaintiff does not
state plausible claims against the remaining defendants.
Plaintiff names Defendant Howard, claiming that she is
responsible for the everyday care of the inmate population. (Doc. 1
at 8.) However, “[w]ithout a showing of direct responsibility for the
improper action, liability will not lie against a supervisory official.”
Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983); see also
Streckenbach v. Vandensen, 868 F.3d 594, 598 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that a supervisor may not be personally liable even
where it is “foreseeable that subordinates [will] make operational
errors” because this would be vicarious liability, which is not
allowed under § 1983).
Furthermore, despite identifying Defendants Armstrong and
Emerich, Plaintiff does not provide any facts that establish or
permit the inference that they deprived Plaintiff of a constitutional
right. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A
plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by including the
defendant’s name in the caption.”).
Defendant Wexford can be held liable under § 1983 if an
unconstitutional act is caused by: “(1) an official policy adopted and
promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom
that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and well
settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas
v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010); see
also Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927-
28 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the standard for municipal liability
in Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978),
applies to corporations as well). “The ‘official policy’ requirement
was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of
employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that
municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is
actually responsible.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
479 (1986) (emphases in original).
Plaintiff does not allege facts that establish or permit the Court
to infer an official policy or custom under any of the three
conditions mentioned above. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a Monell
claim against Wexford.
Plaintiff also does not state a plausible claim against IDOC. A
building, such as a jail or correctional facility, cannot be sued
under § 1983. Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th
Cir. 2012); see also White v. Knight, 710 F. App’x 260, 262 (7th Cir.
2018) (“[T]he fact that a building is owned by a corporate entity or a
government agency does not make the building a suable person
under § 1983.”).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) According to the Court’s merit review of Plaintiff’s
complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has
alleged enough facts to proceed with an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs claim against Defendants Rhodes and Shanle. Any
additional claims shall not be included in the case, except
at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good
cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate Denissa
Armstrong, Lucas Emerich, Stephanie Howard, IDOC, and
Wexford as parties.
3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court
advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for
Defendants before filing any motions to give Defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.
Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an
appearance will be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not
submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless
otherwise directed by the Court.
4) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a
waiver of service. Defendants have sixty days from service
to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or
appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry
of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the
status of service. After Defendants have been served, the
Court will enter an order setting discovery and dispositive
motion deadlines.
5) If a Defendant no longer works at the address provided by
Plaintiff, the entity where that Defendant worked while at
that address shall submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s
current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s
forwarding address. This information shall be used only for
effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding
addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not
be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the
Clerk.
6) Defendants shall file their respective Answers within sixty
days of the date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to
dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all
defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer
and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims
stated in this order. In general, an answer sets forth
Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the
merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file
a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is
necessary or will be considered.
7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after
Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance, Defendants’
counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any
motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.
Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other
documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to
Defendants’ counsel. However, this does not apply to
discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and
responses are not filed with the Clerk of the Court.
Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses
directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or
responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless
they are attached to and the subject of a motion to
compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’
counsel files an appearance and the Court enters a
scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process
in more detail.
8) The Court grants Defendants’ counsel leave to depose
Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Defendants’ counsel
shall arrange the time for the deposition.
9) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of
any change in his mailing address and telephone number.
Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in
mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal
of this lawsuit with prejudice.
10) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service
to the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the
Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service
through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and
will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal
service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
11) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified
protective order under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act.
12) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on
Defendant under the standard procedures.
ENTERED July 8, 2026.
s/Sue E. Myerscough
_______________________________________
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE