Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 KEISHA BROWN, Case No. 2:25-cv-1422-JDP (SS)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of

Social Security,

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Defendant.

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18 Plaintiff challenges the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

19 (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability and disability insurance

20 benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act. Both parties have moved for summary

21 judgment. ECF Nos. 11 & 13. For the reasons discussed below, I will grant plaintiff’s motion,

22 deny the Commissioner’s, and remand for further proceedings.

23 Standard of Review

24 An Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision denying an application for disability

25 benefits will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record and if the correct

26 legal standards have been applied. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th

27 Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a

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1 preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to

2 support a conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007).

3 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical

4 testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001)

5 (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,

6 one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.

7 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court will not affirm on grounds upon

8 which the ALJ did not rely. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We are

9 constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”).

10 A five-step sequential evaluation process is used in assessing eligibility for Social Security

11 disability benefits. Under this process, the ALJ is required to determine: (1) whether the claimant

12 is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a medical impairment (or

13 combination of impairments) that qualifies as severe; (3) whether any of the claimant’s

14 impairments meet or medically equal the severity of one of the impairments in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404,

15 Subpt. P, App. 1; (4) whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the

16 claimant can perform other specified types of work. See Barnes v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 702, 704

17 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018). The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps of the inquiry,

18 while the Commissioner bears the burden at the final step. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d

19 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001).

20 Background

21 On April 28, 2022, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB, alleging

22 disability beginning March 1, 2021. Administrative Record (“AR”) 371-77. She also filed an

23 application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) on May 10, 2022. Id. at 379-84. Her

24 applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. Id. at 209-10, 251-52. Plaintiff

25 requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Id. at 40-77. On

26 May 28, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiff’s disability claims. Id. at 18-33.

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1 Specifically, the ALJ found:

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1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social

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Security Act through September 30, 2023.

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2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

6 March 1, 2021, the alleged onset date.

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3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative

9 disc disease of the lumbar spine and thoracic spine, obesity,

depression, and anxiety.

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4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of

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impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of

13 the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

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5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned

16 finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and

17 416.967(b) except she can only occasionally climb ramps and

stairs; can never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; can frequently

18 balance; can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; must

avoid all exposure to hazards such as dangerous machinery and

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unprotected heights; and must have a sit/stand option for five

20 minutes for every hour of work while remaining on task. The

claimant can understand, remember, and carry out simple

21 instructions; and cannot perform work requiring a specific

production rate such as assembly line work or work requiring an

22 hourly quota.

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6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.

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7. The claimant was born on [redacted], which is defined as a

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younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability date. The

28 claimant subsequently changed age category to closely

1 approaching advanced age.

2 8. The claimant has at least a high school education.

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9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of

disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a

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framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,”

5 whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills.

6 10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and

residual functional capacity, there are jobs in significant numbers

7 in the national economy that the claimant can perform

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11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined by the

10 Social Security Act, from March 1, 2021, through the date of this

decision.

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12 AR 21-32 (citations to the code of regulations omitted).

13 Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, which denied the request. AR 1-3. She

14 now seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g).

15 Analysis

16 Plaintiff raises five arguments. She claims that: (1) the ALJ failed to provide sufficient

17 reasoning to discount her allegations of pain and physical dysfunction; (2) the ALJ failed to

18 provide sufficient reasoning to discount her allegations of mental dysfunction; (3) the ALJ failed

19 to properly evaluate the examining medical source opinion of the psychological consultative

20 examiner, Wendy McCray, Ph.D.; (4) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the treating medical

21 source opinion of plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Anne Wiltse, M.D.; and (5) the ALJ failed to

22 carry his burden to show plaintiff was able to perform a significant number of jobs in the national

23 economy. ECF No. 11 at 2, 9-28. I find plaintiff’s first argument persuasive and need not

24 consider the others. I will, for the reasons stated below, remand this matter for additional

25 proceedings.

26 Plaintiff suffers from pain in her back and lower extremities. At the hearing before the

27 ALJ she testified that she suffered from constant pain in her knees, feet, and back. AR at 51-53.

28 She stated that it was hard for her to walk or stand for long periods of time. Id. at 51. Plaintiff

1 also testified that she was limited in her ability to do household chores, like laundry, vacuuming,

2 or dishes. Id. at 54-55.

3 Medical records from May 9, 2022, reflect that plaintiff rated her lower back pain at an “8”

4 and informed her provider that the problem was “persistent.” Id. at 631. In January 2023, she told

5 providers that the issue was worsening. Id. at 758. Imaging confirmed degenerative disc disease.

6 Id. at 564-65, 752. Plaintiff also took medication for the associated pain. Id. at 633.

7 To evaluate a claimant’s subjective testimony, an ALJ must engage in a two-step process.

8 First, an ALJ must “determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of

9 an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

10 symptoms alleged . . . [plaintiff] need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree

11 of the symptom.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations

12 omitted). Second, absent evidence of malingering, an ALJ must offer “specific, clear and

13 convincing reasons” for rejecting a claimant’s testimony. Id. at 1014-15.

14 Here, the ALJ found that her impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the pain

15 in her back and legs, but that her statements regarding the “intensity, persistence, and limiting

16 effects” of these issues were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and her daily

17 activities.

18 In so finding, the ALJ emphasized imaging from 2019 on plaintiff’s knees that “showed no

19 acute osseous abnormality.” Id. at 26, 566. This imaging did show moderate medial compartment

20 joint space narrowing in both knees, however. Id. at 566. And back imaging taken in 2020, also

21 acknowledged in the ALJ’s decision, showed degenerative facet joints and degenerative disc

22 disease. Id. at 26, 564. Imaging from 2023, also cited by the ALJ, showed “stable, mild

23 degenerative changes” and was otherwise unchanged from the 2020 back imaging. Id. at 941.

24 The ALJ has acknowledged all this imaging, but he has failed to adequately explain how it

25 contradicts plaintiff’s testimony regarding the intensity, persistence, and limitations associated

26 with her symptoms. Taken together, the imaging presents a somewhat nebulous picture, neither so

27 catastrophic as to obviously confirm plaintiff’s testimony, nor so mild as to plainly contradict it. It

28 is the ALJ’s prerogative to interpret the evidence, but he “must identify the specific testimony that

1 lacks credibility, provide clear and convincing reasons why the testimony is not credible, and

2 identify the specific evidence in the record which supports [his] determination.” Talbot v. Colvin,

3 No. SACV 14-1935 JC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134489, at *10 a (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2015). The

4 ALJ failed to do so here.

5 Similarly, the ALJ noted that, beginning in December 2021, plaintiff enrolled as a patient

6 at a pain management clinic. AR at 27. He notes that she presented as obese, with moderate pain,

7 and was referred to physical therapy. Id. It is not obvious, and the ALJ does not explain, why this

8 evidence contradicts plaintiff’s subjective testimony. He does note that she returned to the pain

9 management clinic in September 2023, and, from that time through December 7, 2023 (the most

10 recent file), her findings were without abnormality. Id. But many of these records persist in

11 showing significant pain and limitations. See, e.g., id. at 956 (noting that back pain is persistent

12 and aggravated by bending, changing positions, and daily activities). And the pain clinic persisted

13 in prescribing medication for plaintiff’s pain, including the opiate hydrocodone. Id. at 953.

14 The ALJ also discounted plaintiff’s symptom testimony because her daily activities were

15 inconsistent with her testimony that she did not perform chores. Specifically, the ALJ noted that

16 in September 2023 she reported caring for family members, namely her granddaughter, mother,

17 and grandmother. Id. at 29. The opinion does not, however, elaborate on what this care entailed

18 or how often plaintiff performed it. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The

19 ALJ must make specific findings relating to [the daily] activities and their transferability to

20 conclude that a claimant's daily activities warrant an adverse credibility determination.”)

21 (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original); see also Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676

22 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Though the ALJ repeatedly pointed to Trevizo’s responsibilities caring for her

23 young adoptive children as a reason for rejecting her disability claim, the record provides no

24 details as to what Trevizo’s regular childcare activities involved . . . . Absent specific details about

25 Trevizo’s childcare responsibilities, those tasks cannot constitute ‘substantial evidence’ . . . .”).

26 I note that some of the cited evidence, like the August 31, 2022 internal medical evaluation

27 conducted by Dr. Shahid Ali, does weigh in favor of the ALJ’s finding insofar as it noted normal

28 gait, ability to perform a squat, and assessed minimal limitations. AR at 710-12. But the rejection

1 | ofaplaintiff’s subjective testimony “must be supported by clear and convincing reasons why the

2 | claimant’s testimony of excess pain was not credible, and must be supported by substantial

3 | evidence in the record as a whole.” Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995). Here

4 | the analysis of most of the record used to discount plaintiff's testimony is flawed or incomplete. I

5 | find that remand is appropriate so that the ALJ may reassess plaintiffs subjective allegations. See

6 | Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court may reverse the

7 | decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for a

8 | rehearing, but the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for

9 | additional investigation or explanation.”’) (internal quotes and citations omitted); Treichler, 775

10 | F.3d at 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (‘Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain

11 || and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”).

12 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

13 1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 11, is GRANTED.

14 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 13, is DENIED.

15 3. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.

16 4. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor and close this case.

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18 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ July 6, 2026 _————

20 JEREMY D. PETERSON

51 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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