The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 TREMAINE CARROLL, Case No. 1:23-cv-00974-JLT-HBK (PC)
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
PERMIT PLAINTIFF TO PROCEED ON
13 v. COGNIZABLE CLAIMS AND DISMISS
REMAINING CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS1
14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,
(Doc. 54)
15 Defendants.
FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD
16
17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §
18 1983. Plaintiff proceeds on her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. 54). As explained
19 below, the undersigned concludes the SAC states cognizable Eighth Amendment sexual-assault
20 claims against Defendants Pallares and Rodriguez but fails to state any other claim. The
21 undersigned, therefore, recommends that this action be allowed to proceed only on those claims
22 and that the remaining claims and defendants be dismissed.
23 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE PLEADING
24 Plaintiff Tremaine Carroll (“Plaintiff” or “Carroll”), who identifies as a “transwoman,”
25 initially filed this action with the assistance of counsel. The events underlying Plaintiff’s claims
26 occurred while Carroll was confined at Central California Women’s Facility (“CCWF”).
27
1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302
28 (E.D. Cal. 2026).
1 On December 12, 2025, after Plaintiff’s counsel withdrew, the Court screened the First
2 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and found it failed to state a federal claim. (Doc. 51). The FAC
3 alleged four causes of action: (1) cruel and unusual punishment/excessive force; (2) right to
4 bodily integrity; (3) failure to protect against; and (4) supervisory liability, all against various
5 defendants and Doe parties. The Court found, among other things, that the FAC improperly
6 attributed wrongful acts to all “Defendants” without specifying what each Defendant did and
7 failed to allege when the alleged acts occurred. The Court granted leave to file a second amended
8 complaint but advised Plaintiff not to add unrelated claims.
9 On January 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed the SAC. (Doc. 54). The SAC added defendants and
10 claims and named, the State of California, CDCR, CDCR Secretary/Director, Warden De La
11 Cruz, (former) Officer Greg Rodriguez, (former) Warden Mike Pallares, Correctional Sergeant
12 Dusty Brown, Governor Gavin Newsom2, (former) Sargent Ralph Contreras Jr., Lieutenant
13 Villegas, Corrections Counselor Bradford, Corrections Officer J. Haynes, Corrections Officer
14 Pineda, CCWF Chief Medical Officer, CCWF Chief Psychologist, CCWF Prison Rape
15 Elimination Act (“PREA”) Director, Secretary Kathleen Allison3, and Does 1-100. (Id. 1-4).
16 On June 8, 2026, the Court screened the SAC and found that it stated cognizable Eighth
17 Amendment sexual-assault claims against Defendants Pallares and Rodriguez, but no other
18 cognizable claim. (Doc. 57). The Court gave Plaintiff three options: (1) file a Third Amended
19 Complaint; (2) file a notice under Rules 41 and 15 voluntarily dismissing the defendants and
20 claims found non-cognizable; or (3) file a notice that she wished to stand on the SAC, subject to
21 findings and recommendations dismissing the non-cognizable claims and defendants. (Id. at 13-
22 14).
23 On June 22, 2026, Plaintiff filed a documents titled “Notice under Rule 41(a)(1) and Rule
24 15, Objections to Court’s Ruling, Appointment of Counsel, Settlement Conference.” (Doc. 58).
25 In it, Plaintiff stated that she “elects to go with” the second option and proceed against
26
2 Misspelled “Newsome” in SAC.
27
3 Misspelled “Kathelen” in SAC.
28
1 Defendants Pallares and Rodriguez but then listed objections to the dismissal of claims against
2 several defendants. (Id. at 1-2). Plaintiff does not state that she wished to file a Third Amended
3 Complaint. (See id.). In light of the obligation to construe pro se filings liberally, Ross v.
4 Williams, 950 F.3d 1160, 1173 n.19 (9th Cir. 2020), the undersigned construes Plaintiff’s filing as
5 electing to stand on the SAC, subject to the issuance of these findings and recommendations
6 dismissing the claims and defendants previously found non-cognizable.
7 APPLICABLE LAW
8 A. Screening Requirement
9 Because Plaintiff commenced this action while incarcerated, the Court must screen the
10 complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court
11 must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any portion of the Complaint that is frivolous,
12 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. Id.
13 § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim
15 showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Evidence of the claim is not
16 required under Rule 8 at the pleading stage. Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. 187, 193 (2026). To survive
17 screening, the Complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on
18 its face—i.e., facts permitting the reasonable inference that each named defendant is liable for the
19 alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service,
20 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not
21 sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard.
22 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
23 action and conclusory statements do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts likewise are not
24 required to indulge unwarranted inferences. Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681
25 (9th Cir. 2009).
26 At the screening stage, the Court accepts the Complaint’s factual allegations as true,
27 construes the pleading liberally, and resolves doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Jenkins v.
28 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.
1 2003). However, the Court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable
2 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618,
3 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A claim must have arguable basis in law and fact to proceed. See Jackson v.
4 Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989).
5 The Federal Rules permit multiple claims against a single defendant and allow joinder of
6 multiple defendants if the claims arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
7 transactions or occurrences and share common questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a),
8 20(a)(2). Claims that arise at the same institution do not make the claims properly joined.
9 Camposeco v. Bordeaux, 2020 WL 5984420, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 31, 2020). Unrelated claims
10 against unrelated defendants may not proceed in a single action and must be brought, if at all, in a
11 separate lawsuit.
12 B. Section 1983
13 Section 1983 allows a private citizen to sue for the deprivation of a right secured by
14 federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 362 (2017). To
15 state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that a defendant acting under color of state law caused
16 the deprivation of a federal right. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910,
17 921 (9th Cir. 2017). The causation requirement is satisfied by showing either the defendant’s
18 personal involvement in the deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the defendant’s
19 supervisory conduct and the deprivation. See King v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 885 F.3d 548, 559
20 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, personal participation is necessary, and the mere presence or generalized
21 involvement is insufficient. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 939 (9th Cir. 2002); Barren v.
22 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
23 ANALYSIS
24 Because Plaintiff’s allegations are disjointed and brief, and not clearly organized by cause
25 of action, the Court addresses the pertinent facts below as to each group of defendants.
26 A. Defendants Pallares, Rodriguez
27 The SAC alleges that Plaintiff was transferred to CCWF on August 26, 2021. (Doc. 54 at
28 6, ¶ 7). In or around November or December 2021, Warden Pallares allegedly summoned
1 Plaintiff to the CCWF Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) room and coerced her to perform oral sex
2 by threatening to transfer her back to a men’s prison. (Id. at 3, ¶ 1). Pallares chaired the
3 Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”) that denied Plaintiff’s transfer “per PREA.”4 (Id.).
4 In or around April or May 2022, Officer Rodriguez allegedly called Plaintiff into the same room
5 and, under the same threat of transfer to a men’s and threats to Plaintiff’s family, coerced Plaintiff
6 to perform oral sex. (Id. at 3, 5, ¶ 2).
7 These allegations are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and
8 unusual punishment in penal institutions and is violated by sexual harassment or abuse of an
9 inmate by a corrections officer. Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012); see also
10 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000). To state a cognizable sexual-assault
11 claim, a plaintiff must allege that a prison staff member, acting under color of law and without
12 legitimate penological justification, touched the plaintiff in a sexual manner or otherwise engaged
13 in sexual conduct for the staff member’s own sexual gratification, or to humiliate, degrade or
14 demean the prisoner. Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020).
15 Courts evaluate such claims under both a subjective requirement, whether an official acted
16 with “a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” Schwenk at 1196, and an objective requirement,
17 whether the act itself was “offensive to human dignity.” Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1046
18 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “a sexual assault on a prisoner by a prison
19 guard is always ‘deeply offensive to human dignity’ and is completely void of penological
20 justification.” Id. at 1051.
21 The SAC alleges that Pallares and Rodriguez used their authority and threats of transfer to
22 a men’s prison to coerce Plaintiff into performing oral sex, which plausibly alleges sexual
23 conduct without penological justification undertaken for sexual gratification or to humiliate,
24 degrade, or demeaning Plaintiff. See Bearchild, 947 F.3d at 1144. Such conduct, if true, is
25 inherently offensive to human dignity and satisfies both the subjective and objective components
26 of an Eighth Amendment claim. Wood, 692 F.3d at 1046. Accordingly, the undersigned
27
4 The Court presumes the acronym is for Prison Rape Elimination Act.
28
1 recommends that Plaintiff be allowed to proceed on her Eighth Amendment sexual-assault claims
2 against Defendants Pallares and Rodriguez.
3 B. Defendants Brown, Villegas, Contreras
4 The SAC alleges that, on or around January 2, 2023, Defendants Brown, Villegas, and
5 Contreras “attempted to intimidate” Plaintiff and other victims of the sexual-abuse scandal from
6 “naming” them, Pallares, and other “CCWF ‘rape crew.’” (Doc. 54 at 5, ¶¶ 3-5). The SAC does
7 not otherwise describe what each of these defendants did.
8 These vague and conclusory assertions that Defendants “attempted to intimidate” Plaintiff
9 do not meet Rule 8’s pleading standard or identify specific acts by each defendant. See Iqbal, 556
10 U.S. at 678; Western Mining, 643 F.2d at 624. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that
11 the claims against Defendants Brown, Villegas, Contreras, and Bradford based on these
12 allegations be dismissed.
13 C. Defendants CCWF Chief Medical Officer, Chief Psychologist, PREA Director,
14 CCDR, Bradford
15 The SAC alleges that, on or around January 2, 2023, the CCWF Chief Medical Officer
16 and Chief Psychologist denied Plaintiff medical and mental health treatment for “RTS” and
17 “CSAAS” under PREA Policy. (Doc. 54 at 5, ¶¶ 1,2). Also, on or around the same date, the
18 CCWF PREA Director allegedly failed to protect Plaintiff by not enforcing PREA Policy and by
19 not separating or transferring Plaintiff. (Id, ¶ 3). The SAC further alleges that CDCR failed to
20 protect Plaintiff and provide follow-up treatment per PREA policy. (Id., ¶ 4). The SAC similarly
21 alleges, Defendant Bradford failed to separate Plaintiff from Pallares under PREA policy. (Id. at
22 ¶ 6).
23 Allegations that defendants violated CDCR or PREA policy do not alone establish a
24 constitutional violation under § 1983, because violations of state departmental regulations do not
25 create federal constitutional liability. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009);
26 see Case v. Kitsap County Sheriff's Dep’t, 249 F.3d 921, 930 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gardner v.
27 Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997)) (“[T]here is no § 1983 liability for violating prison
28 policy. [Plaintiff] must prove that [the official] violated his constitutional right . . .”). Thus,
1 Plaintiff’s claim based on CDCR’s PREA policy are not cognizable under § 1983. Sonier v.
2 Singh, No. 2:24-CV-02511 SCR P, 2025 WL 2897237, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025).
3 Similarly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue under PREA itself, his claim fails because PREA
4 does not contain a private right of action, either directly or through § 1983. Id. (citing McPherson
5 v. Carpenter, No. 2:25-cv-0202 DC CSK P, 2025 WL 745819, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2025),
6 report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:25-cv-0202 DC CSK (PC), 2025 WL 2590355 (E.D.
7 Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); Stevens v. Smith, No. 1:22-cv-0741 SAB PC, 2022 WL 4292289, at *3 (E.D.
8 Cal. Sept. 16, 2022), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Smith v. Smith, No. 1:22-cv-
9 0741 ADA SAB PC, 2022 WL 16850368 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2022), aff’d sub nom. Stevens v.
10 Smith, No. 22-16850, 2023 WL 6140590 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 2023).
11 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the dismissal of the claims premised on
12 alleged violations of CDCR’s PREA policy or PREA itself against these defendants.
13 D. Defendants Governor Newsom, Secretary Allison, State of California
14 Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against Governor Gavin
15 Newsom, CDCR Secretary Kathleen Allison, and the State of California arising from Plaintiff’s
16 August 26, 2021 transfer to CCWF, alleging they “should have known” Pallares “had previously
17 raped various CCWF staff members,” and the that the State transferred Plaintiff despite
18 “incompetent leadership” and a pattern of staff sexually abusing incarcerated women. (Doc. 54
19 at 6, ¶¶ 7, 8).
20 These claims appear time-barred on the face of the SAC, as they are based on acts
21 occurring in 2021 and are subject to the applicable limitations period and tolling rules governing
22 claims brought by California prisoners. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004);
23 Cal. Civ. Proc. § 352.1(a).5 In addition, Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for
24 monetary damages against the State of California and its agencies and generally bars suits against
25
26 5 For claims raised for the first time in an amended complaint that are filed after the limitations period
have expired to be timely, they must “relate back” to claims properly raised in a timely complaint. See
27 Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). Claims “relate back” to the claims in an original petition if they
“are tied to a common core of operative facts.” Id. at 664.
28
1 state officials in their official capacities. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Brooks v. Sulphur Springs
2 Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,
3 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100–01
4 (1984). Governor Newsom, Secretary Allison, and the State of California are therefore entitled to
5 Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages. See Will v. Mich.
6 Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752
7 (9th Cir. 2009).
8 Although, under Ex parte Young, a plaintiff may seek prospective injunctive relief against
9 a state official in his or her official capacity, the official must have a sufficiently direct connection
10 to the alleged constitutional violation. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newsom, 2025 WL
11 1151004, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2025); Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1998).
12 Plaintiff alleges only generalized, conclusory assertions and does not plead facts establishing such
13 direct connection with respect to Newsom, Allison or the State of California. Thus, undersigned
14 therefore recommends dismissal of the claims against Governor Newsom, Secretary Allison, and
15 the State of California.
16 E. Defendants Haynes, Pineda
17 The SAC alleges, on July 2, 2022, Defendant Haynes “went off camera,” entered
18 Plaintiff’s room, and physically assaulted Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s roommate while using racial,
19 and that Defendant Pineda stood at the door during the assault. (Doc. 54 at 6, ¶¶ 9, 10).
20 These allegations, if true, could support Eighth Amendment excessive-force and failure-
21 to-protect claims, but they involve different defendants, a different incident, and different legal
22 theories than the sexual-assault claims against Pallares and Rodriguez. They are therefore
23 unrelated and may not proceed in this action under the joinder rules; Plaintiff must pursue them, if
24 at all, in a separate lawsuit. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the claims
25 against Defendants Haynes and Pineda from this action. K’napp v. California Dept. of
26 Corrections, 2013 WL 5817765, at *2 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 29, 2013), aff’d sub nom. K’napp v.
27 California Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 599 Fed. Appx. 791 (9th Cir. 2015) (alteration
28 in original) (quoting George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
1 F. Doe Defendants 1-100
2 The SAC alleges that, on unspecified dates, unidentified Jane/John Does 1–100, together
3 with the named defendants, violated Plaintiff’s civil rights in various ways, including retaliation
4 and “extreme torture,” but does not provide individualized factual allegations or information
5 indicating how any Doe defendant can be identified. (Doc. 54 at 6, ¶ 12).
6 Use of Doe defendants is disfavored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.
7 1980) (citation omitted). It is permissible only where the plaintiff otherwise pleads sufficient
8 factual detail to allow later identification of the unknown defendants and to support the inference
9 that each is liable. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
10 Here, the SAC offers only collective, speculative allegations against a group of 100
11 unnamed defendants, which is impermissible. Hernandez v. Gonzalez, 2010 WL 4917160, at *2
12 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (“Plaintiff may not sue Doe [D]efendants collectively based on
13 speculative beliefs as to whether they exist, or hypothetical allegations of what they may have
14 done that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”).
15 To the extent that Plaintiff also contends that CDCR officials are breaching a prior court
16 order, those assertions alone do not state a claim under § 1983 without allegations of a protected
17 liberty interest, state actions, and inadequate process. The undersigned therefore recommends
18 dismissal of the claims against Doe Defendants 1-100.
19 G. Defendant De La Cruz
20 The SAC alleges that Plaintiff’s grievances and appeals were denied because “CDCR and
21 specifically CCWF Warden De La Cruz said, ‘There’s not enough evidence to prove nor disprove
22 the allegations.’” (Doc. 54 at 1-2). The SAC contains no other allegations against De La Cruz.
23 Inmates do not have a constitutional right to any particular grievance procedure, nor are
24 there constitutional requirements regarding how a grievance system is operated, even if an inmate
25 believes the process to be unfair or inaccurate. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th
26 Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). A prion officials’ denial of a
27 grievance, without more, does not constitute a basis for liability under § 1983. Penton v.
28 Johnson, 2019 WL 6618051, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019) (“Moreover, a prison official’s denial
1 of a grievance does not itself violate the constitution…. ‘An allegation that a prison official
2 inappropriately denied or failed to adequately respond to a grievance, without more, does not
3 state a claim under § 1983.’”) (quoting Evans v. Skolnik, 657 F. App’x 285, 288 (9th Cir. 2015)),
4 cert dism’d, 136 S. Ct. 2390 (2016) (unpublished opinion) (other citation omitted). Accordingly,
5 the undersigned recommends dismissal of the claim against Defendant De La Cruz.
6 H. Allegations Against Former Counsel Hunt, Darden, and Virgilio
7 The SAC alleges that a friend paid $4206 in April 2024 to attorney Nelson Hunt,
8 Christopher Darden, and Virgilio7 on Plaintiff’s behalf to cover the filing fee; that these attorney
9 represented Plaintiff; and that when the Court granted Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status, the
10 firm did not return the money, legal documents, or an unpublished manuscript. (Doc. 54 at 7, ¶
11 5).
12 These allegations are unrelated to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment sexual-assault claims and
13 therefore cannot be joined in this action. See K’napp, 2013 WL 5817765, at *2. They also do not
14 state a federal cause of action under § 1983, and any such claim must be pursued, if at all, in state
15 court. The undersigned recommends dismissal of the claims against Defendants Hunt, Darden,
16 and Virgilio.
17 I. Defendant CDCR – Retaliation
18 The SAC states, in passing, that “[i]n retaliation for me reporting being victim of
19 employee sexual misconduct (in CDCR), CDCR subjected me to cruel [and] unusual punishment,
20 reckless endangerment, deliberate indifference, discrimination.” (Doc. 54 at 3).
21 Prisoners have First Amendment rights to file a grievance and civil rights actions against
22 correctional officials. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F. 3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). “Within the prison
23 context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An
24 assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that
25
26 6 The base filing fee is currently $350 dollars, with an additional administrative fee of $55 set by the
Judicial Conference that brings the total civil filing fee to $405 dollars for most new civil cases. Plaintiff
27 was granted in forma pauperis status and was assessed only the base $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914.
28 7 Misspelled “Virgillio” in SAC.
1 prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of her First
2 Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”
3 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005). A retaliatory motive may be shown
4 by the timing of the allegedly retaliatory act or other circumstantial evidence, as well as direct
5 evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288–89 (9th Cir. 2003); McCollum v. Ca. Dep’t of Corr.
6 And Rehab., 647 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011). Mere speculation that a defendant acted out of
7 retaliation is not sufficient. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing cases).
8 Plaintiff’s bare assertion of retaliation does not identify any specific adverse acts,
9 responsible individuals, dates, or facts showing a causal connection between her protected
10 activity and any alleged retaliation. These conclusory allegations do not satisfy even the low
11 pleading threshold at screening. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Western Mining, 643 F.2d at 624.
12 The undersigned therefore recommends dismissal of the retaliation claim against CDCR.
13 Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED:
14 1. This action proceed only on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment sexual-assault claims
15 against Defendants Pallares and Rodriguez.
16 2. All remaining claims and defendants be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to
17 state claims upon which relief may be granted and service be directed upon Defendants Pallares
18 and Rodriguez.
19 NOTICE TO PARTIES
20 These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
21 assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after
22 being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written
23 objections with the Court. Id.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned,
24 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed fifteen
25 (15) pages. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party
26 wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its
27 CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with
28 specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by
1 | the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. §
2 | 636(b)()(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the
3 | waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).
4 | These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to the
5 | Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of
6 | Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment.
7
| Dated: __Iuly 2.2026 Wiha Th. Doareh Zack
9 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA
10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1]
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
12