The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 SANTOS EDGAR CIFUENTES Case No. 1:26-cv-4193-DC-JDP
VELASQUEZ (A-Number: 213-106-047),
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Petitioner,
13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
v.-
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WARDEN OF THE MESA VERDE
15 DETENTION FACILITY,
16 Respondent.
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18 Petitioner Santos Edgar Cifuentes Velasquez entered the United States no later than 2010
19 and was re-detained by ICE in 2026. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus
20 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that his re-detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth
21 Amendment. For the following reasons, I recommend that the petition be granted and that
22 petitioner be immediately released.
23 Background
24 No later than January 2010, petitioner entered the United States, was briefly detained by
25 immigration officers, and then was released on his own recognizance.1 ECF No. 5 at 17. There is
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1 Petitioner was previously ordered removed in 1998 and re-entered the country after
27 presumably being removed. ECF No. 5 at 17. Petitioner alleges that he has lived in the United
States continuously since 2006. ECF No. 1 at 6. Additionally, petitioner’s RAP sheet includes an
28 arrest from 2006. See ECF No. 5 at 26. This evidence supports the finding that petitioner entered
1 no allegation or evidence that petitioner has violated the terms of his release. Petitioner has
2 received employment authorization and maintained employment since his release. See ECF No. 1
3 at 9, 13
4 Petitioner’s RAP sheet includes arrests from between 1999 and 2016. Id. at 24-33. Many
5 of the arrests stem from traffic violations. See id. Other incidents are as follows: a 2007 arrest
6 for battery that did not result in a conviction; a 2007 arrest for resisting an officer, in connection
7 with a traffic violation, that did not result in a conviction; and a 2008 conviction for fraud, giving
8 false name or ID. See id. at 27-29.
9 In July 2022, petitioner was ordered removed. Id. at 17. Petitioner appealed that decision,
10 and his appeal remains pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals. Id.; see also ECF No.
11 1 at 16. Accordingly, petitioner’s removal order is not final. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a).
12 On March 5, 2026, petitioner was re-detained by ICE in Miami, Florida. ECF No. 5 at 17.
13 ICE records indicate that petitioner “was encountered during a Violation—walking dog without a
14 leash.” Id. However, as noted, petitioner’s RAP sheet does not include any arrests or convictions
15 from after 2016, and there is no other evidence or allegation that petitioner violated the law
16 leading up to his re-detention. Moreover, respondent does not address the alleged underlying
17 violation that led to petitioner’s encounter with law enforcement.
18 Legal Standard
19 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates
20 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75
21 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
22 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
23 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a
24 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.
25 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of
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the United States in 2006. However, ICE records reflect that petitioner was detained and released
27 in January 2010. See id. at 17. Although this factual dispute does not have any bearing on the
merits of petitioner’s claim, for purposes of my analysis, I assume that petitioner entered the
28 United States in January 2010.
1 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have
2 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction
3 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
4 Analysis
5 Petitioner claims that his re-detention without a bond hearing violates his Fifth
6 Amendment Due Process rights. ECF No. 1 at 6. Notably, respondent offers little response to
7 petitioner’s due process claim. Instead, it advances an argument premised on the assertion that
8 petitioner is an “applicant for admission” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) and that he is
9 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). ECF No. 5 at 1-2. In asserting
10 this statutory argument, respondent ignores the cases from this District rejecting such an
11 argument. See, e.g., Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting
12 cases). Respondent does not explain what, if any, binding precedent supports its statutory
13 position. More fundamentally, respondent’s focus is misplaced because it only address
14 petitioner’s due process argument through the lens of its statutory argument.
15 Courts analyze procedural due process claims in two steps: first, we consider whether
16 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and, second, we evaluate
17 what procedures are necessary to ensure that any deprivation of that protected liberty interest
18 accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
19 (1989). I consider each in turn.
20 To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty
21 interest, courts have compared “specific conditional release in the case before them with the
22 liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey [v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971)].”
23 Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
24 citation omitted). In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole from a criminal
25 conviction “enables [the parolee] to do a wide range of things open to persons” who have never
26 been in custody or convicted of any crime, including to live at home, work, and “be with family
27 and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” 408 U.S. at 482. The
28 court observed that while “the [government] properly subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions
1 not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring and seeking authorization to work and travel,
2 the petitioner’s “condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id. “The
3 parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live
4 up to the parole conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss
5 on the parolee.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, in Morrissey, the Supreme Court found that
6 a parolee in a criminal case possessed a protected interest in “continued liberty.” Id. at 481-84.
7 Recently, confronted with questions similar to those raised by petitioner, courts in this
8 Circuit have found that noncitizens released from ICE custody acquire a liberty interest in their
9 continued release. See, e.g., Labrador-Prato v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1598-DC-SCR, 2025 WL
10 3458802, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal.
11 2025). “Even where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by statute, that person
12 may retain a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.” Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No.
13 1:25-cv-00379-SASPKJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (citing Gagnon v.
14 Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972));
15 Shoimov v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-1603-CSK, 2026 WL 35624, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2026). I
16 agree with the bulk of other courts to have considered the issues presented here and find that
17 petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his continued release.
18 Immigration officials released petitioner on his own recognizance in January 2010. ECF
19 No. 5 at 17. Since his release, petitioner has lived in the United States, subject to ICE supervision
20 but outside of custody, for over sixteen years. During that time, he has formed “enduring
21 attachments of normal life.” See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. I conclude that petitioner’s initial
22 release and time out of custody have created a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
23 continued release. See Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-5436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4
24 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (recognizing that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from
25 immigration detention] is inherent in the Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-
26 5259-JST, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding released
27 noncitizens to have strong liberty interests).
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1 Once a court has found that a noncitizen has a liberty interest in continued release, the
2 court must next determine what procedural protections the government must afford the noncitizen
3 before depriving him of that liberty interest. This requires balancing the factors laid out in
4 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993
5 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context).
6 The Mathews test requires courts to consider:
7 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
8 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
9 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
10 requirement would entail.
11 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
12 First, petitioner has a significant private interest in his continued release. “Freedom from
13 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at
14 the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
15 Petitioner acquired a private interest in continued release over the sixteen years of his supervised
16 release. See Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (S.D. Cal.
17 Oct. 1, 2025) (“Petitioner has a private interest in remaining free, which developed over the year
18 he resided in the United States.”).
19 Turning to the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation is high. Prior to
20 releasing petitioner in 2010, immigration officers necessarily determined that he presented neither
21 a danger to the community nor a risk of flight. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (explaining
22 that a petitioner’s “release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a
23 determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
24 community”). Absent a bond hearing in front of a neutral arbiter, the risk of erroneous
25 deprivation is high given the possibility that petitioner’s re-detention will not be pursuant to a
26 valid state interest. See Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01471-KES-SAB, 2025 WL 3254999,
27 at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (“Civil immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose
28 and effect[,]’ is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.”)
1 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
2 “Where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody . . . hearing,’ ‘the
3 risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high’ because neither the government nor [the
4 petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for her detention.”
5 Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00801, 2025 WL
6 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)). Respondent offers no evidence or argument indicating
7 that any procedural safeguards were employed prior to petitioner’s re-detention; more generally,
8 it gives the court no reason to believe that any efforts were made to prevent erroneous deprivation
9 of petitioner’s liberty. See id. Accordingly, “the probable value of additional procedural
10 safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.” See A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0107-KES-SKO,
11 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025
12 WL 1808676 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025).
13 “Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, and a
14 hearing is ‘low.’” Salazar v. Casey, No. 25-cv-2784-JLS, 2025 WL 3063629, at *5 (S.D. Cal.
15 Nov. 3, 2025) (citation omitted). Indeed, respondent has provided no information about the
16 additional burden that would fall on it as a result of being required to provide a bond hearing. See
17 ECF No. 5. “In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ cost.”
18 Carballo v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0978-KES-EPG, 2025 WL 2381464, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15,
19 2025) (quoting Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025)).
20 Accordingly, a consideration of the Mathews factors demonstrates that petitioner’s re-
21 detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights. Given this finding, I must
22 determine the appropriate remedy. Petitioner requests release. ECF No. 1 at 7. Respondent does
23 not address this issue. See ECF No. 5.
24 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful
25 executive detention,” and the “typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” Munaf v.
26 Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008); see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
27 103, 107 (2020) (“Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful
28 detention.”). To satisfy due process, “the Court usually has held that the Constitution requires
1 some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v.
2 Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). In some circumstances, however, the
3 Court has held that a post-deprivation hearing satisfies due process, such as where there is “the
4 necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any predeprivation
5 process.” Id. at 128 (cleaned up). Where a petitioner is entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing,
6 courts have found that “[t]he appropriate relief . . . is their immediate release from custody, and to
7 be provided with relief returning them to status quo ante, i.e., the last uncontested status which
8 preceded the pending controversy.” Cardin Alvarez v. Rivas, No. 25-cv-2943-PHX-GMS, 2025
9 WL 2898389, at *21 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2025), report and recommendation adopted in part,
10 rejected in part on other grounds, 2025 WL 2899092 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2025).
11 Here, between his release in January 2010 and his re-detention in March 2026, there is no
12 evidence or allegation that petitioner violated the terms of his release. While respondent’s RAP
13 sheet provides some criminal history from that time period, his arrests mainly stem from traffic
14 violations, and his RAP sheet does not include any criminal activity after 2016. See ECF No. 5 at
15 24-33.
16 ICE records indicate that petitioner was re-detained in March 2026 after he “was
17 encountered during a Violation—walking dog without a leash.” See id. at 17. However, as noted,
18 there is no other evidence or allegation that petitioner violated any law leading up to his re-
19 detention by ICE. Moreover, respondent does not address the underlying activity that led to
20 petitioner’s re-detention. See ECF No. 5.
21 Even if petitioner violated the law by walking a dog without a leash, there is no evidence,
22 nor has respondent presented any argument, suggesting that there was “the necessity of quick
23 action” by ICE such that petitioner could not have been provided a pre-deprivation hearing. See
24 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128. Indeed, respondent does not argue that petitioner is a danger to the
25 community or a flight risk; instead, respondent summarily states that petitioner “has a criminal
26 history.” See ECF No. 5 at 1.
27 Under these circumstances, I find that the “typical remedy” of release is appropriate
28 because the government has not provided a lawful justification for re-detaining petitioner without
1 a pre-deprivation hearing. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693. Petitioner’s due process rights have been
2 violated such that the appropriate relief is immediate release from custody, thereby returning him
3 to the “status quo ante.” See Cardin Alvarez, 2025 WL 2898389, at *21.
4 Conclusion
5 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:
6 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be GRANTED.
7 2. Respondent be ordered to immediately release petitioner (A-Number: 213-106-047)
8 from its custody. Respondent shall not impose any additional restrictions on petitioner, unless
9 that is determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. If the government
10 seeks to re-detain petitioner, it must provide no less than seven days’ notice to petitioner and must
11 hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before an immigration judge at which the government shall
12 bear the burden of justifying petitioner’s detention by clear and convincing evidence. This order
13 does not address the circumstances in which respondent may detain petitioner in the event
14 petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal.
15 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to serve Mesa Verde Detention Facility with a copy of
16 this order.
17 4. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
18 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
19 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within seven days of
20 service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the
21 court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to
22 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed
23 within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file
24 objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
25 Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.
26 1991).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ June 24, 2026 Q_————
4 JEREMY D. PETERSON
5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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