Chestnut

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 PAULO ANDRES FLOREZ CARVAJAL Case No. 1:26-cv-3075-TLN-JDP

(A-Number: 215-618-550),

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Petitioner,

13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

v.

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CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al.,

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Respondents.

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17 Petitioner Paulo Andres Florez Carvajal entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2017

18 and was detained by ICE in 2026. Petitioner, proceeding with counsel, seeks a writ of habeas

19 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondents move to dismiss on the basis that petitioner has not

20 exhausted his administrative remedies. For the reasons stated below, I recommend that

21 respondents’ motion be granted and that the petition be dismissed without prejudice.

22 Background

23 Petitioner entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2017. ECF No. 10-1 at 2. After

24 petitioner’s visa expired in 2018, he remained in the country. Id. In 2021, an immigration judge

25 ordered petitioner removed to Colombia. Id. However, because petitioner has timely appealed,

26 the removal order is not administratively final. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i). There is no

27 allegation or evidence that, prior to his present detention, petitioner has been detained.

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1 In January 2026, petitioner was arrested in Florida for battery. ECF No. 10-1 at 3. That

2 criminal case was closed after prosecutors filed a “no information.” ECF No. 1-4. Petitioner was

3 detained by ICE upon his release from local custody. ECF No. 10-1 at 2.

4 On April 3, 2026, petitioner was afforded a bond hearing, at which the immigration judge

5 granted petitioner release from custody under bond of $50,000. ECF No. 1-7 at 4. Petitioner

6 waived his right to appeal that order. Id. at 5. Petitioner has not posted bond and remains in

7 custody. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17, 46.

8 Legal Standard

9 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates

10 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75

11 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of

12 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”

13 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a

14 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.

15 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of

16 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have

17 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction

18 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

19 Analysis

20 Petitioner alleges that his detention is unlawful and that the immigration judge’s order

21 setting bond at $50,000 is unconstitutional. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 56-91. Respondents move to dismiss

22 the petition on the basis that, by not appealing the immigration judge’s bond order, petitioner has

23 not exhausted his administrative remedies.1 ECF No. 10 at 4.

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25 1 Respondents argue in the first instance that the court does not have jurisdiction over this

matter because “[t]he gravamen of Petitioner’s habeas petition appears to be a challenge to the

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$50,000 bond amount as excessive” and “challenges to bond amounts under § 1226 are not

27 cognizable for judicial review.” ECF No. 10 at 3. Because petitioner alleges that his detention

otherwise violates the Fifth Amendment, I find that the court has jurisdiction. See ECF No. 1

28 ¶¶ 56-91; 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

1 “The exhaustion requirement is prudential, rather than jurisdictional, for habeas claims.”

2 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). To decide whether exhaustion is

3 required, courts consider the Puga factors to determine if:

(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to

4 generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation

of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the

5 administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to

allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the

6 need for judicial review.

7 Id. (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)).

8 Where a court finds that the petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative

9 remedies, it “ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the

10 proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies.” Id. (quoting Leonardo v. Crawford, 646

11 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)). However, even if a consideration of the Puga factors favors

12 prudential exhaustion, a court may nonetheless waive exhaustion if “administrative remedies are

13 inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture,

14 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Id. (quoting

15 Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). I begin by considering the Puga factors.

16 First, I do not find that “agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to

17 generate a proper record and reach a proper decision.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. The

18 immigration judge (“IJ”) provided a written decision, there presumably is a transcript and/or

19 audio recording of the hearing, and neither party argues that consideration by the Board of

20 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is necessary to generate a proper record. See ECF No. 11-1 at 4.

21 Where, as here, the petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under section 1226, courts have found

22 that the first Puga factor weighs against prudential exhaustion. See Okoth v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-

23 1936-KES-SAB, 2026 WL 45199, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026); Hernandez Burruel v. Murray,

24 No. 1:25-cv-1569-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3240356, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025).

25 Second, I find that “relaxation of the [exhaustion] requirement would encourage the

26 deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. Indeed,

27 “[g]ranting petitioner’s requested relief would ‘bypass’ the administrative scheme under

28 § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations.” See Okoth, 2026 WL 45199, at *3 (finding that the

1 second Puga factor weighs in favor of prudential exhaustion). Notably, the Court of Appeals has

2 held that section 1226’s procedures facially satisfy due process. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53

3 F.4th 1189, 1213 (9th Cir. 2022). While the Court of Appeals did not foreclose as-applied

4 challenges, petitioner does not argue that section 1226’s procedures violate his due process rights.

5 See id. I find that “relaxing the exhaustion requirements in this case would encourage others to

6 immediately seek habeas review if they deem the federal courts to be a more sympathetic forum.”

7 See Martinez v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-1538-TSZ-GJL, 2025 WL 2689844, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug.

8 27, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2689066 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 19, 2025).

9 Third, I find that “administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own

10 mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. The

11 BIA “has the authority to correct . . . erroneous factual determinations and evidentiary errors.”

12 See Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *5 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii)).

13 Accordingly, while the first factor weighs against prudential exhaustion, the second and

14 third factors support the finding that petitioner has failed to exhaust prudentially required

15 administrative remedies.

16 As noted, a court may waive exhaustion if “administrative remedies are inadequate or not

17 efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will

18 result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. Petitioner

19 argues that exhaustion should be excused because he “was actually the de jure winner of the bond

20 hearing.” ECF No. 11 at 6 (emphasis in original). However, if a noncitizen “disagrees with the

21 IJ’s bond determination or wishes to challenge the amount of bond set by the IJ, he may also

22 appeal the IJ’s bond decision to the BIA.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 983 (cleaned up). Petitioner

23 presents no authority to support his assertion that “[t]here for was nothing for the Petitioner, the

24 winner of the bond hearing, to appeal to the BIA.” See ECF No. 11 at 6.

25 Next, petitioner argues that there is no “real administrative remedy that the Petitioner

26 could really have used.” ECF No. 11 at 7. Petitioner asserts that his counsel for the bond hearing

27 “attempted to file a bond redetermination due to the Petitioner’s financial inability to pay the set

28 bond amount” and that this filing was rejected. ECF No. 1 ¶ 19. The rejection notice, however,

1 states that, at the time petitioner submitted his filing, there was “no pending case” and therefore

2 the filing was rejected. ECF No. 1-9 at 2. The rejection notice instructed petitioner to file a new

3 bond redetermination request along with a copy of the notice, and thus petitioner has an

4 administrative remedy. Id. Moreover, because the immigration court has directed petitioner to

5 file a bond redetermination request, petitioner’s argument—that such a request is ordinarily

6 granted “only upon a showing that the alien’s circumstances have changed materially since the

7 prior bond redetermination”—is without merit. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e).

8 Lastly, petitioner appears to argue that exhaustion should be excused since “BIA review

9 of [his] claims would be futile because the BIA’s position on whether consideration of ability to

10 post bond is required is already set.” See ECF No. 11 at 7-8 (quoting Hernandez, 872 F.3d at

11 986). In Hernandez, the plaintiff contested “the government’s policy of refusing to require ICE

12 and IJS to consider financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release in bond

13 determinations.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 989. The Court of Appeals found that “in several

14 unpublished cases the BIA has concluded that an alien’s ability to pay the bond amount is not a

15 relevant bond determination factor.” Id. Accordingly, the court held that “the BIA’s position is

16 set and that exhaustion would be futile.” Id.

17 This action is readily distinguishable because petitioner does not bring a claim for the IJ’s

18 failure to consider petitioner’s ability to pay. Rather, petitioner claims that his bond amount “is

19 so excessively high that it acts as a de facto denial of release with the appearance of adequate

20 process.”2 ECF No. 1 ¶ 73. As noted, to the extent that petitioner “wishes to challenge the

21 amount of bond set by the IJ, he may . . . appeal the IJ’s bond decision to the BIA.” Hernandez,

22 872 F.3d at 983 (cleaned up). Consequently, it does not appear that exhaustion would be futile.3

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2 While petitioner argues in his opposition to the motion to dismiss that the IJ failed to

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“make an independent determination as to [his] ability to pay,” petitioner brings no such claim in

the petition, and thus a claim regarding the IJ’s failure to consider ability to pay is not properly

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before the court. See ECF No. 11 at 5.

27 3 It also bears mention that federal courts do not have the authority “to review the

reasonableness of the amount of bond, even if [the petitioner] cannot afford to post it.” Prieto-

28 Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)).

] Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed without prejudice.

2 | See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (holding that a petition may be dismissed without prejudice

3 | where the petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies); Okoth, 2026 WL 45199, at *4

4 | (dismissing the petition because the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies);

5 | Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *7 (same).

6 Conclusion

7 Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

8 1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 10, be GRANTED.

9 2. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be dismissed without

10 | prejudice.

11 3. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.

12 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

13 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of

14 || service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the

15 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to

16 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed

17 | within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

18 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

19 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

20 | 1991).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ June 24, 2026 QH———

24 JEREMY D. PETERSON

95 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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