The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MARTIN ANAYA FLORES (A- Case No. 1:26-cv-0069-DAD-JDP
Number: 077-278-376),
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Petitioner,
13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
v.
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TODD LYONS, et al.,
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Respondents.
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17 Petitioner Martin Anaya Flores entered the United States at an unknown time and was
18 detained by ICE in 2025. Petitioner, proceeding with counsel, has filed a petition for writ of
19 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that his detention violates the Immigration and
20 Nationality Act. The court issued injunctive relief, ordering petitioner to be afforded a bond
21 hearing. Petitioner was provided that hearing, at which he was denied bond. Petitioner now
22 moves to amend his petition. For the following reasons, I recommend that petitioner’s motion to
23 amend be denied and that the petition be dismissed without prejudice for petitioner’s failure to
24 exhaust his administrative remedies.
25 Background
26 Petitioner entered the United States at an unknown time. ECF No. 3-4 at 11. There is no
27 allegation or evidence that, prior to his present detention, petitioner had any contact with
28 immigration officials. In July 2025, petitioner was detained by ICE in California. Id.
1 Procedural History
2 On January 5, 2026, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and, on the
3 following day, he filed a motion for temporary restraining order. ECF Nos. 1 & 3. On January 8,
4 2026, respondents filed a response to petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order. ECF
5 No. 6. Four days later, the court granted petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order and
6 ordered respondent to “provide petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an
7 immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” ECF No. 8.
8 On January 20, 2026, petitioner was provided a bond hearing, at which the immigration
9 judge denied bond based on the finding that petitioner is a flight risk. See ECF No. 9-1 at 2. On
10 February 5, 2026, petitioner filed a renewed motion for temporary restraining order. ECF No. 9.
11 On April 29, 2026, the court denied this motion and referred the matter to me. ECF No. 15.
12 While petitioner’s renewed motion for temporary restraining order was pending, petitioner
13 filed a motion to amend his petition. ECF No. 14. Respondents have filed an opposition to this
14 motion. ECF No. 17.
15 Legal Standard
16 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates
17 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75
18 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
19 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
20 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a
21 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.
22 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of
23 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have
24 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction
25 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
26 Analysis
27 Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, his motion to
28 amend should be denied because amendment would be futile, and the petition should be
1 dismissed without prejudice.
2 “The exhaustion requirement is prudential, rather than jurisdictional, for habeas claims.”
3 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). To decide whether exhaustion is
4 required, courts consider the Puga factors to determine if:
5 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to
generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation
6 of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to
7 allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the
need for judicial review.
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9 Id. (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)).
10 Where a court finds that the petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative
11 remedies, it “ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the
12 proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies.” Id. (quoting Leonardo v. Crawford, 646
13 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)). However, even if a consideration of the Puga factors favors
14 prudential exhaustion, a court may nonetheless excuse exhaustion if “administrative remedies are
15 inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture,
16 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Id. (quoting
17 Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). I begin by considering the Puga factors
18 in turn.
19 First, it does not appear that “agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to
20 generate a proper record and reach a proper decision.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. On the
21 contrary, courts have found that where, as here, the petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under
22 section 1226, the first Puga factor weighs against prudential exhaustion. See Okoth v. Kaiser,
23 No. 1:25-cv-1936-KES-SAB, 2026 WL 45199, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026); Hernandez Burruel
24 v. Murray, No. 1:25-cv-1569-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3240356, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025).
25 Although neither party has provided documentation of the bond hearing, there is presumably a
26 written order, transcript, and/or audio recording; it therefore appears that consideration by the
27 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is unnecessary to generate a record or for this court to
28 reach a proper decision. For these reasons, the first Puga factor does not weigh in favor of
1 finding exhaustion prudential.
2 Second, “relaxation of the [exhaustion] requirement would encourage the deliberate
3 bypass of the administrative scheme.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. “Granting petitioner’s
4 requested relief would ‘bypass’ the administrative scheme under § 1226(a) and its implementing
5 regulations.” See Okoth, 2026 WL 45199, at *3 (finding that the second Puga factor weighs in
6 favor of prudential exhaustion). Notably, the Court of Appeals has held that section 1226’s
7 procedures facially satisfy due process. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1213 (9th Cir.
8 2022). While the Court of Appeals did not foreclose as-applied challenges, petitioner does not
9 argue that section 1226’s procedures violate his due process rights. I find that “relaxing the
10 exhaustion requirements in this case would encourage others to immediately seek habeas review
11 if they deem the federal courts to be a more sympathetic forum.” See Martinez v. Scott, No. 2:25-
12 cv-1538-TSZ-GJL, 2025 WL 2689844, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2025), report and
13 recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2689066 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 19, 2025).
14 Third, “administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and
15 to preclude the need for judicial review.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. Indeed, the BIA “has
16 the authority to correct the erroneous factual determinations and evidentiary errors alleged” by
17 petitioner. See Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *5 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii)). The
18 BIA’s review of the IJ’s order would “allow the agency to correct its own mistakes” and
19 potentially “preclude the need for judicial review.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988.
20 Accordingly, while the first factor weighs against prudential exhaustion, the second and
21 third factors support the finding that petitioner has failed to exhaust prudentially required
22 administrative remedies.
23 As noted, a court may excuse exhaustion if “administrative remedies are inadequate or not
24 efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will
25 result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Id. Petitioner does not establish any
26 such grounds for excusing the exhaustion requirement.1 Accordingly, because petitioner does not
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1 To the extent that petitioner argues that the exhaustion requirement should be excused
28 based on his allegation that his bond hearing was constitutionally inadequate, I disagree for the
1 demonstrate that the exhaustion requirement should be excused, the petition for writ of habeas
2 corpus should be dismissed without prejudice. See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (holding that a
3 petition may be dismissed without prejudice where the petitioner has failed to exhaust
4 administrative remedies); Okoth, 2026 WL 45199, at *4 (dismissing the petition because the
5 petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies); Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *7 (same).
6 Similarly, petitioner’s motion to amend should be denied because amendment would be futile in
7 light of petitioner’s failure to exhaust. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).
8 Lastly, the Court of Appeals’ decision in Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
9 2011), is persuasive. In that case, after the petitioner filed a habeas petition, the court ordered that
10 petitioner be afforded a Casas-Castrillon hearing.2 Id. at 1159. The petitioner was provided a
11 hearing, at which the IJ denied bond based on the finding that the petitioner “posed a danger to
12 the community.” Id. “Rather than appealing the IJ’s adverse bond determination to the BIA, [the
13 petitioner] filed a motion for review of the IJ's decision in his pending habeas case, arguing that
14 the hearing failed to satisfy due process or conform to the district court’s previous order.” Id.
15 The Court of Appeals held that “[t]his short cut was improper” and that the petitioner “should
16 have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district
17 court to review the IJ’s decision.” Id. at 1160. The court further held that “[o]nce the BIA
18 rendered its decision, [the petitioner] could have properly pursued habeas relief in the district
19 court.” Id. Accordingly, the court remanded the case with instructions for the district court to
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21 reasons stated by the court in denying petitioner’s renewed motion for temporary restraining
order. See ECF No. 15 at 2-3; see also Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007)
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(“The exception to the rule that constitutional claims need not be exhausted before the agency are
23 claims of denial of procedural due process by the IJ, which must be raised before the BIA because
the agency does have the power to adjudicate procedural due process claims.”).
24 2 A Casas-Castrillon hearing was afforded to a noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) and whose “immigration case reaches judicial review” such that their detention is then
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governed under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for a bond hearing. Avilez v. Garland, 69
F.4th 525, 528 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942
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(9th Cir. 2008)). The Court of Appeals has since overturned Casas-Castrillon, holding that
27 section 1226(c) “authorizes detention during the judicial review phase of removal proceedings.”
Id. at 537. While Casas-Castrillon is no longer good law, and the hearing in the present action is
28 distinct, Leonardo is nonetheless instructive.
1 | dismiss the action without prejudice. /d. at 1161.
2 Here, as in Leonardo, the court ordered a bond hearing, petitioner was denied bond at that
3 | hearing, and petitioner has sought judicial review before exhausting administrative remedies.
4 | Given these core similarities, the Court of Appeals’ reasoning from Leonardo is persuasive;
5 || petitioner’s “short cut was improper” and he must exhaust administrative remedies—t.e., wait
6 | until the BIA issues its decision on his appeal—before seeking habeas relief. See id. at 1160.
7 | Accordingly, as in Leonardo, | find that this action should be dismissed without prejudice. See
8 | id. at 1161.
9 Conclusion
10 Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:
11 1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be dismissed without
12 | prejudice.
13 2. Petitioner’s motion to amend, ECF No. 14, be DENIED.
14 3. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
16 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).. Within fourteen days of
17 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the
18 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to
19 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed
20 | within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file
21 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
22 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.
23 | 1991).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ June 24, 2026 QH———
26 JEREMY D. PETERSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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